

**Romanian Journal of International Relations and European
Studies (ROJIRES)**

New Narratives for Europe

Vol. 2, no. 1/2013-2014

Romanian Association of International Relations and European Studies

Scientific Committee

Enrique Banus (Barcelona)
Adrian Basarabă (Timișoara)
Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu (Bucharest)
Mircea Brie (Oradea)
Mariana Cojoc (Constanța)
George Contogeorgis (Athens)
Gabriela Drăgan (Bucharest)
Ioan Horga (Oradea)
Adrian Ivan (Cluj-Napoca)
Ariane Landuyt (Siena)
Francisco Aldecoa Luzzaraga (Madrid)
Andrei Marga (Cluj-Napoca)
Adrian Miroiu (Bucharest)
Gabriela Pascariu (Iași)
Nicolae Păun (Cluj-Napoca)
George Poede (Iași)
Vasile Pușcaș (Cluj-Napoca)
Denis Rolland (Strasbourg)
Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro (Coimbra)
Sophie Vanhoonacker (Maastricht)

Editorial Committee

George Anglițoiu (Bucharest)
Mihail Caradaică (Bucharest)
Simion Costea (Tg. Mureș)
Radu Cucuta (Bucharest)
Natalia Cugleşan (Cluj-Napoca)
Oana-Andreea Ion (Bucharest)
Claudia Iov (Cluj-Napoca)
Claudiu Marian (Cluj-Napoca)
Florin Pastoiu (Craiova)
Andra Popa (Bucharest)
Adrian Claudiu Popoviciu (Oradea)
Alina Stoica (Oradea)
Ionuț Virgil Șerban (Craiova)
Luminița Șoproni (Oradea)
Nicolae Toderăș (Bucharest)
Ioana Vrăbiescu (Bucharest)

Editorial Assistance: Elena ZIERLER

ISSN-L 2284 – 9882
ISSN 2285 – 3529

Contents

Andreea IANCU ♦ New Narratives for Europe: Constructing European Union's Global Role through Human Security	5
Mihaela-Adriana PĂDUREANU ♦ The Role of the Democratic Peace Theory in the Evolution of the European Neighbourhood Policy	17
Ana Maria COSTEA (GHIMIȘ) ♦ The Eastern Partnership: Between Efficiency and Necessity Evaluation of the Bilateral Dimension.....	27
Anastasiia GAVIUK ♦ The Geopolitical Crisis and Instability Factors within the Black Sea Region	37
Edina Lilla Mészáros and Ioan Horga ♦ Solidarity and Equal Burden Sharing in the EU over Irregular Migration: Pervasive Reality or Bedtime Story?	43
Cristina-Maria DOGOT ♦ A Theorist of European Federalism: Alexandre Marc	71
Ylljet ALICKA ♦ L'écrivain-diplomate, tradition ou hasard ? Prolégomènes sur le cas albanais.....	85
Bogdan Constantin MIHĂILESCU ♦ Decisionism, Postmodernism and International Relations.....	95
Natalia CUGLEȘAN ♦ 30 Years of Regionalization in France. What Lessons for Romania?.....	107
Mădălina Laura CUCIURIANU ♦ Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – An Economic Effect of Globalization –	139
Book reviews	149
Alina-Carmen BRIHAN ♦ Imagining and Shaping the EU's Future. Narratives for Europe's 21th Century.	151
Mariana BUDA ♦ The Evaluation of Projects and Programs, a new discipline at the University of Oradea	163
Call for Papers	173

New Narratives for Europe: Constructing European Union's Global Role through Human Security

Andreea IANCU*

Abstract: *In the context of a fatigue European Union, suffering from a “last man” type of syndrome, rethinking the narratives of European Union is a necessary step in (re)assuring its internal coherence and to affirm its international role. Globalization, the changing meaning of security and a high degree of international interdependence determine the rhetoric of human security and of responsibility to protect, which value the individual as the security reference system. The fundamental European bounding principles stand on solidarity and the mutual need for security, with focus on individuals, in the context of peace and democracy. In this context, for a palliative rethinking of European narratives and to define its international role, EU should reaffirm its core principles through a bottom-up approach, based on common values correlated around the paradigm of human security. In order to reestablish trust and credibility (simultaneously within and beyond Europe) European Union should assume its declared responsibility to protect by over-passing the double-standards and devised political interests approach to humanitarian crisis. Moreover, a process of narrative rethinking based on a constructivist social construction of bottom-up pressure, can fill the current gap between rhetoric and practice regarding EU's external reactions and could transform EU in the leading exponent of the human security paradigm, affirming its global role. The proposed article focuses on the role of constructivist methods in determining the resurrection of EU using the human security strategy, through a bottom-up approach.*

Key words: *European Union, Human Security, Narratives, Constructivism, Last man, Bottom-up pressure*

Introduction

The current international dynamics and the incidence of unpredictable violent internal events worldwide create a new necessary pattern of reactions from global actors. The changing global conjuncture transform the reaction of important international, to crisis events, especially those that are a threat for human lives, from being a matter of choice, in a title of moral responsibility, that exclude the opt-out cause. The network of global relations and the multi-lateral interconnectivity explains the “butterfly effect” types of global relations and the necessity of global actors to react to humanitarian crises in order to them to maintain, in realism's terms, their influence and power, their prestige but moreover, considering the structuralism thesis and the democratic peace theory, to avoid the conflict escalation and the contamination of their inner space.

This paper analyzes the possibility to create a new narrative of Europe that would constitute an incentive for European Union (EU) to become internationally involved and to be an important global actor. The main thesis of this article is that considering that the EU has the necessity to rethink its narratives for the new generation, being in a “last man” type of situation and that the proposed solution concentrates on constructivist method, centered on soft values, it can be assumed that human security, which summarizes the

* PhD Candidate in Political Sciences, Faculty of Philosophy and Social Political Sciences, “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iași.

main values of the European citizens can represent a bottom-up incentive for a more active EU in the globalized world in order to export and apply worldwide these values.

In the first section it is analyzed the EU's fatigue as described by President Barroso in his speech calling for new narratives of Europe, identifying that the EU suffers from the Fukuyama's "last man" syndrome. The second section demonstrates that the change of EU is not more possible from a traditional top-down approach, but it needs a bottom-up incentive, based on strong internalized values. The next part of this article presents the synopsis of the Constructivism, as the driving theoretical background for a re-born of Europe through soft values and using the discourse and the socialization process. The forth section draws the lines of human security paradigm and correlates it with the main European's value, action continued in the following section, which explains the mechanisms of new narratives through human security based on a bottom-up approach. The next parts structure the internal and external incentives of EU and Europeans to adopt a human security approach, while the last section makes the apology of the transformative role of human security for EU's global role and image.

The wake-up call: the EU or "the last man" syndrome

The recent economic prolonged crisis, expressed in long term unemployment and economic austerity measures, together with the international tensions generated by the internal conflicts form the Arab Spring determined, at a minimalist, but visible on long term effect, discursive frictions between the European Union's member states regarding the different intentionality of response. These factors, correlated with the routine of mechanisms and an automatically, disclaimed repetition caused in time, the loose of European bounding principles. The European Union was characterized by a type of "fatigue"¹, being on the dangerous path to become a world populated by Fukuyama's "last man" or "men without chests"² as result of the routine and self-sufficiency of liberal democracy, or extrapolated here European ideology. The European Union as a singular actor, formed by a different, remote generation that cannot empathize with the core founding EU's principles because it cannot understand the realities that determined this connection, characterized by an endemic self-sufficiency was in danger to become, as resulted from the European Commission President Barroso's discourse, a "last man" type of entity, "with no desire to be recognized as greater than others"³. This metaphor and the alarm signal driven by the President Barroso are translated by the lack of desire for international affirmation/ of EU in a highly competitive world, therefore EU needs "a fresh impetus in a new rapprochement"⁴.

Rethinking the new narratives of Europe - a bottom-up approach

Considering the previous desolating image, the projection of a tired Union, a "last man" scenario of Europe, together with the concerned and concerning wake-up call of the European Commission's President Barroso, drive the attention towards a necessity to an inverse rethinking of the European Project, from a bottom-up perspective. The idea that conducts this argumentation is strengthened by the type of imagined new narrative

¹ European Commission, "Speech by President Barroso: "A New Narrative for Europe"," SPEECH/13/357 23/04/2013, accessed 07 March, 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-357_en.htm?utm_medium=twitter&utm_source=twitterfeed.

² Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), xxi.

³ Ibid.

⁴ European Commission, "Speech by President Barroso."

rapprochement, “a coming together between the people of Europe and the European Union⁵”, which focuses on the ground dimension of European construction. This last remark is translated in a bottom-up necessary approach, which translates the power and, in loose terms, the responsibility to the individual to rethink, re-imagine and re-compose the European Union existential purpose through a subjective attachment towards its basic, original and re-formed European values. In the face of an obsolete, fatigue Union, which lacks the energy to transform itself or to reaffirm its role, the reconstruction of the discursive framework is a necessity in order to reconfigure the social reality. This reversed pattern gives to the individuals the power to rebuild, through discourse, a European Union that could respond to their needs and necessities. This fact means that the EU would be invested with a high degree of trust, generated by the fact that its citizens would have inner support for the founding values and goals. As a consequence, following a logical pattern and considering the EU a living entity, this new energy input could generate the impetus to be actively internationally involved and to affirm its role in the globalized world, and more important, to export its values, centered on respect for human rights and individual empowering. These two arguments correspond to the proposed line of evolution in *The Barcelona Report*, that argues for a “more active and more capable” European Union⁶.

This paradigm change embedded in the implementation of a new narrative of Europe stands under the signs of repetition, as all the action lines have the leitmotif of “re-” (thinking, consider, construct), as an attempt to resuscitate the European *raison d’être* for the new generation that is unable to empathize with the fundamental, original European values. This speech is the proof that the European Union has reached, together with this state of fatigue, a necessary maturity to find the paths to re-consider itself and its international role, by constructing a the social European reality thorough speech, narrative that connects the individuals through the process of socialization. This roadmap is generated by the current trends both in theoretical field of international relations and in the emerging practice of international organizations, especially UN⁷, in empowering the individual, on one side by transforming them in the security referent, and on the other side, as a consequence, empowering them in construction of new type of social, international order. This change of perspective in reconsidering the source of change and of solid transformation of reality is explained by the Constructivist theory, which advocates transformative role of the individual and of discourse.

Constructivism – building reality through discourse

Constructivism advocated the power of discourse, values and ideas to change the reality, based on the premise that, in fact, the reality is a “ubiquitous subjective state of mind”⁸. The leitmotif of this theory is the subjectivity and the liquid characteristic of reality, as being a social determinant. The main focus of this explanatory theory and the justification of its presence in this argumentative discourse can be found in its premise that nonmaterial factors, such as ideas, norms and values have the power to change the reality of

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe,” The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities [Presented to EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana], Barcelona, 15 September 2004, 8, accessed 07 March, 2014, <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/40209/>.

⁷ UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

⁸ Edward A. Kolodziej, *Security and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 14.

international politics, from the current practice to the cooperation for the interdependence of utilities around the norms⁹. Identity and culture are the instrumental and principled ideas that structure reality, because they are distinctive factors of groups that determine through knowledge, norms and values¹⁰. By the correlation of this argument with Anderson's principle of "imagined community"¹¹, which is based on the idea that members of a community have the inner perception that they are connected through the common soft values that they share, results the premise of the possibility to reconstruct the European Union's international role through a new narrative to which European citizens to adhere.

Ideas and discourses play an important role in European integration in influencing states preferences and the European political process. Constructivism is focusing on the power of language and discourse in transforming the reality: "by speaking, we make the world what it is"¹². The European integration is a function of pro-integration ideas, on how to achieve policy goals, on principled ideas on which EU should be grounded and on common identity¹³. The processes of negotiation at the European level are explained by Constructivism in terms of persuasion and social influence, in which "moral entrepreneurs" and epistemic communities have an important role for managing the bargaining of ideas¹⁴. Following this logic, the process of (re)building the European values through new narratives focuses on epistemic communities and on their the social transformative power, by managing ideas and sharing values. In addition, Risse's opinion regarding the role of discursive practices in establishing and maintaining power relations¹⁵ is strengthening the argumentation of the role of narratives in constructing a coherent, conscious European identity, fact that can be the natural incentive for EU to affirm its role in a globalized world. The socialization phenomenon is the driving core of this reformative proposed method. The socialization of the individuals that participate in the decision-making process, but in the same time of all the individuals that have contact with European values, through the proposed narratives pillars have the role to create shared intersubjective understandings that influence further the process of socialization and integration of authentic European values. In the same time, integration and socialization can be identified at state level both internally and outside of EU's border. State socialization defines the process of internalization of European norms and values, both for member and non-member states¹⁶. The second type of socialization refers to social learning, when elites adopt norms, which constitute of a set of shared intersubjective understandings that influence further the process of socialization. The citizens'

⁹ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is what States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, 2 (Spring 1992): 391-425, 417-424.

¹⁰ Dirk Leuffen et al., *Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

¹¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

¹² Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, "Worlds of Our Making: The Strange Career of Constructivism in International Relations," in *Visions of International Relations: Assessing an Academic Field*, ed. Donald J. Puchala (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 2002), 88, 119-141.

¹³ Leuffen et al., 97.

¹⁴ Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Social Construction and European Integration," in *The Social Construction of Europe*, ed. Thomas Christiansen et al. (London: SAGE Publications, 2001), 57.

¹⁵ Thomas Risse, "Social Constructivism and European Integration," in *European Integration Theory*, Second edition, ed. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 149.

¹⁶ Leuffen et al., 96-7.

socialization is happening in contact with European norms, which can lead to societal mobilization for coerce decision-makers to change state policy¹⁷.

Another dimension that determines the EU's international inactivity is the differentiated integration negative outcomes that affect the construction of a coherent internationally implicated role. The main causes of differentiated integration are identified by constructivism as being imperfect ideational consensus, ideational heterogeneity, and politicization (threats to national identity or fundamental national values or norms). Constructivism finds that the states' incentives to participate in a certain policy are placed in the weakness of exclusive national identities in the country, the compatibility with the norms, values, and policy ideas to the other participating states and the legitimization of the domestic level for European integration¹⁸. This perspective, intersected with the socialization of the individuals demonstrates that, in order to construct a coherent, effective and coordinate European values milieu and a European foreign security policy, it should be founded a common denominator value or policy.

Constructivism presents the role of discourse in creating or transforming realities. Speech acts performed at different levels have consequences for the shape of European politics and joint international actions. This is concentrated in Austin's conception that the discourse has an important role in "doing", and in Foucault's ideas that demonstrate the political force of performative language¹⁹. The intersubjectivity and socialization process, correlated with the role of the discourse in forming transforming reality are the necessary instruments for the resurrection of EU through new narratives and using human security paradigm. In the context of a tired Europe, in a future danger of becoming obsolete and flawed, the human security strategy, which has a constructivist background and is built on the core European values, appears to have the necessary impact, both within and beyond the EU in order to reconstruct its internal and internal role.

Human security paradigm

Human security represents, through the synthesis of the multitude of existing definitions and critiques, the process to assure "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear" in the context of dignity for endangered individuals (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing), regardless their nationality. It aims an enfranchisement of the global citizen, by overcoming the traditional concepts of national state and pushing for a new form of sovereignty proper for the post Westphalian era²⁰.

The pillars that aggregate the human security thinking are derived from the ethical debates concerning the inherent rights of the individual, based on natural law. The origins of these ideas can be traced to ancient Greeks, found in the writings of Kant, Hegel, Marx, Durkheim, and others. All this authors put as the core of their theories the individual, humanity or human communities²¹. Human security paradigm is traced in cosmopolitan theories and it is reloaded in the current cosmopolitan scenarios that try to anticipate the evolution of the international system. The origins of human security thinking are found as well in liberal internationalist thought, because it build the bridge from the domestic and

¹⁷ Checkel, 57.

¹⁸ Leuffen et al., 103.

¹⁹ Thomas Diez, "Speaking Europe: The Politics of Integration Discourse," in *The Social Construction of Europe*, ed. Thomas Christiansen et al. (London: SAGE Publications, 2001), 88.

²⁰ Wolfgang Benedek, "Human Security and Human Rights Interaction," in *Rethinking Human Security*, ed. Moufida Goucha and John Crowley, (UNESCO: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 7.

²¹ Robert Fine, *Cosmopolitanism* (London, New York: Routledge, 2007), ix.

international approach to human rights, transformed in this manner in human security²². Human security is seen by some authors as having the solely role to protect the vital core of human lives and the fulfillment of human being²³, while it has to be found a common pathway between global rights and national interests²⁴. In contrast, Acharya sustains that human security is a “holistic paradigm which offers opportunities for creative synthesis” giving credits for new international actors and global civil society²⁵.

These fundamental proto-ideas that focus on the individual, demonstrate the potential of this principle, on one side, to concentrate the main issues regarding the ethical justification of human rights, and on the other side and derived from the first dimension, the capacity to embed the core European values in a dynamic paradigm that can transcend the EU’s borders.

The main transformation that this strategy promotes represents the changing of the security referent, from state towards the individual or communities as subjects, referents of security²⁶.

The fact that the etymology of the concept is compound by two terms, human, which refers primarily to the need to protect and to intersubjectivity and security, a concept used in IR until this formulae exclusively in relation with state, can generate controversies and misunderstandings regarding the core meaning of this paradigm. This combination of terms express, in fact, that the analyzed theory is the meeting point of the individual with the national level, and beyond that, the global arena. Therefore following the argumentation line of this paper, human security represents the palliative of the EU’s fatigue, giving the European citizens a common belief structured in a paradigm that can create through a bottom-up process the incentives of new lines of global action in the name of common humanity, embedded already but with weak support in the proposed European Common Foreign And Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

New narratives through human security – a bottom-up process

In the call for a new narrative of Europe President Barroso structured three pillars for action: “human, meaning that it is not just about economy; civilization, meaning that it is about culture; and peace, meaning that at the end there is an overall political project²⁷. Due to the fact that security is a socially constructed concept²⁸, human security strategy emergence was a consequence of the ubiquitous feeling of “mutual vulnerability” in the

²² Antonio Franceschet, “Global Legalism and Human Security,” in *A Decade of Human Security. Global Governance and New Multilateralism*, ed. Sandra J. MacLean et al. (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), 32.

²³ Sabina Alkire, “A Vital Core that Must Be Treated with the Same Gravitas as Traditional Security Threats,” in *What Is Human Security? Comments by 21 Authors*, ed. P. Burgess and T. Owen, Special Issue of *Security Dialogue* 35, 3 (2004): 359-360.

²⁴ Lloyd Axworthy, “A New Scientific Field and Policy Lens,” in *What Is Human Security? Comments by 21 Authors*, ed. P. Burgess and T. Owen, Special Issue of *Security Dialogue* 35, 3 (2004): 348-9.

²⁵ Amitav Acharya, “A Holistic Paradigm,” in *What Is Human Security? Comments by 21 Authors*, ed. P. Burgess and T. Owen, Special Issue of *Security Dialogue* 35, 3 (2004).

²⁶ Inger Helene Sira and Jonas Gräns, “The Promotion of Human Security in EU Security Policies,” *INEX POLICY Brief* 7 (March 2009): 4.

²⁷ European Commission, “Speech by President Barroso.”

²⁸ Eduard Newman, “Critical Human Security Studies,” in *Review of International Studies* 36 (2010): 84.

international system²⁹ that calls for human(itarism) and peace, in the context of civilization (translated in the respect for every culture). Furthermore, it is advocated a new “rapprochement impetus” in order “for the new generation that is not so much identified with this narrative of Europe, to continue to tell the story of Europe”³⁰.

This “wake-up call” focuses on the individual subjective level, in order to construct a system of values common for the new generation. The process of socialization based on the contagion of “good beliefs” represents the driving path of the launched call for a new narrative of Europe. Human security strategy has the necessary formulae that can encompass the basic European values. Considering the Constructivist theory, though the discursive method a domino process of soft values of human security internalization and a bottom-up pressure for elaborating corresponding external policies is possible. Human security represents more than just political stability; it appeals more punctual values as respect for human rights, for human life, respect for other cultures, justice and sustainability³¹, ones of the most used leitmotiv values approached by the European citizens³². The vitality of such a phenomenon would be assured by the predisposition of European citizens toward soft values, such as “solidarity, social cohesion and the social market economy”³³. A narrative construction that can encompass the core values of the European citizens can represent the necessary incentive for an effectively working strategy that could impulse the EU’s global role.

This logic, of the bottom-up pressures within EU can be explained by Moravcski’s³⁴ two level game metaphor, the domestic pressures and inter-governmental negotiations, but should be translated beyond this approach, due to the civil society network pressure organized around the new internalized ideas. Considering this theory, a remark should be made, that in order to be valid, the EU has to be considered the domestic level, while the “intergovernmental negotiations” should be projected at global level.

Incentives for the EU to adopt the human security strategy

A decade ago few human security initiatives for EU have been launched, but with no major impact on foreign policies or in its international reactions to crises or conflicts. The European Security Strategy and The Barcelona Report represents the first steps toward a European coherent human security paradigm. *The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities - A Human Security Doctrine for Europe* concentrated seven action-pillars that Europe should assure in order to overcome the insecurity gap within and beyond EU’s borders: the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force³⁵. Moreover, the report highlights the

²⁹ Barbara von Tigerstrom, *Human Security and International Law. Prospects and Problems* (Oxford and Portland: Oregon Hart Publishing, 2007), 19.

³⁰ European Commission, “Speech by President Barroso.”

³¹ Mary Kaldor et al., “Human Security: A New Strategic Narrative for Europe,” *International Affairs* 83, 2 (2007): 279.

³² European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication, “The Values of Europeans,” *Standard Eurobarometer TNS Opinion & Social*, 77 (Spring 2012): 9-11.

³³ European Commission, “Speech by President Barroso.”

³⁴ Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism,” in *European Integration Theory*, ed. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 70.

³⁵ EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities”, Barcelona, 15 September 2004, 2.

importance of the bottom-up approach on communication, consultation, dialogue and partnership with the local population, simultaneously within and beyond Europe. Although these initiatives were not successful, the human security strategy can be found embedded in the European projects of conflict prevention, crisis management and Civil-military coordination (CMCO)³⁶.

The theoretical and argumentative ideas exposed in this paper so far can generate the pattern proposed to resurrect the role of EU in the globalized world. Considering that the EU has the necessity to rethink its narratives for the new generation, being in a “last man” type of situation and that the proposed solution concentrates on constructivist method, centered on soft values, it can be assumed that human security, which summarizes the main values of the European citizens can represent a bottom-up incentive for a more active EU in the globalized world in order to export and apply worldwide these values.

Considering the fact that the entire proposed action for building a solid EU stands under the sign of repetition, the explanation for the reasons of EU to act globally as the response to a bottom-up human security based approach can be found in the re-analyzing of The Barcelona Report. A decade ago the report stated three sets of reasons that represent incentives for EU to adopt this strategy and to act globally according to its principles. The most important reason for EU to adopt human security paradigm (and adapted to the current discussion, for the citizens to advocate for it to be formalized) is morality, in the name of “our common humanity”³⁷. This fact represents one of the most important incentives for Europeans to correlate their actions and interests in constructing a new European value framework that would transcend the EU’s boundaries.

The second stated reason is legal, because the human rights background of human security creates the obligation, under the Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter and The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of international actors, therefore of EU, to respond to situation that endanger people worldwide³⁸.

The third reason enounced in the Barcelona report that creates the incentive to act globally based on the human security doctrine is the global common vulnerability, which is expressed, for EU citizens in the ‘enlightened self-interest’³⁹. Even if the desire to assure the protection of individuals based on the “common humanity” stands as a core principle to drive human security type of actions, the realist reasons of shared insecurity can be considered the most important incentive for European Union to act globally. The European citizens cannot be secure while the others are affected by severe insecurity, due to the possible contagion process and of secondary effects (immigrant flows, terrorist acts, economic instability). The bottom-up pressure for peace and security within Europe generates, as an outcome, the international role played by EU in order to defend these principles for the security of human beings regardless their nationality⁴⁰.

Furthermore, correlated with these reasons, is the fact that the Europeans see the EU as being best represented by peace as value⁴¹, which creates a responsibility of the institutional framework to project this value beyond its borders. In addition, the EU’s response to worldwide crisis represents a symbol of how it is perceived and can assure its

³⁶ Kaldor et al., 274-7.

³⁷ EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, 8.

³⁸ Ibid., 10.

³⁹ Ibid., 10.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 13-4.

⁴¹ European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication, “The Values of Europeans”, 12.

political legitimacy⁴². This reasoning can be applied to the trust that European citizens invest in EU in an eventuality of a crisis, based on the (in)effectivity of the institutional reactions to worldwide crises.

Human security for a coherent EU global role

Following the bottom-up approach impetus for peace, security, respect for human rights embedded in human security strategy, EU can renew the multilateral international order, promoting these principles for the shared aim of peace. Multilateralism represents the approach of creating common rules and the process of reaching solutions to problems through cooperation and empowerment⁴³.

The added value of a human security approach for Europe consists in the coherence that it would assure to actions and institutional concepts, as being an umbrella strategy that would coordinate for a common goal the other component concepts. Kaldor et al. complete the list of advantages that a human security strategy would bring for EU with the aspect of effectiveness, through a process of standardization and visibility, by raising the internal and external awareness about its implication in crises, fact that would increase the impact of EU missions and would create a multilateral approach of global relations⁴⁴.

Being a normative and a civilian power, EU wants to promote peace and maintain stability within and beyond its borders, through the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy)⁴⁵. The bottom-up pressure towards the implementation of human security strategy could offer the EU the opportunity to overcome the present gaps and double standard reactions toward similar situation that asks for a human security type of intervention.

Human security paradigm is operationalized through the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle. The foundations of the responsibility to protect, as a guiding principle for the international community, lie in specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and national law. Responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine emergence was a response to the incompatibility between the principle of sovereignty and freedom from intervening in domestic affairs of states and the obligation to protect human rights which are one of the most important purposes of UN⁴⁶. Responsibility to protect does not encompass only the “responsibility to react,” but also the “responsibility to prevent” and the “responsibility to rebuild”⁴⁷, which create a more comprehensive panel in human security light.

The imperfect implementation of the response under the R2P principle to the conflicts from Libya and Syria represent the gaps in the European coordination and the asymmetry of reactions among the European nations. The most relevant examples, which should be analyzed in a further research, are the Germany’s diplomatic blunder towards

⁴² Kaldor et al., 283.

⁴³ Ibid., 285.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 287.

⁴⁵ Sira and Gräns, 2.

⁴⁶ Julia Hoffmann, Andre Nollkaemper, *Responsibility to Protect: From Principle to Practice* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 14.

⁴⁷ ICISS. *The Responsibility to Protect 2001* (Ottawa: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty; International Development Research Centre, 2001), 7.

the Libyan crisis⁴⁸ and the British parliament rejection for the support of a coalition intervention in Syria after the “red line” was crossed by the usage of chemical weapons.

Conclusions

The proposed model of the construction of the new narratives of Europe through discourse using as background the core European values correlated in the human security strategy that would coagulate through the process of socialization and internationalization this norm in order to create a bottom-up pressure towards states and EU to implement within and beyond borders these shared values could represent the palliative of the imperfect and incongruent EU external, global role.

The model of coordination of main European values through discourse would represent the incentive to create a more effective, coherent, legitimate and democratic EU, which would overcome the present EU fatigue and its “last man” type of syndrome. Correlating the core European values would create not only a more coherent Union, but would represent the emergence of an authentic imagined community within EU borders, and beyond through translation. EU would be invested with a high degree of trust, generated by the fact that its citizens would have inner support for the founding values and goals. As a consequence, following a logical pattern and considering the EU a living entity, this new energy input could generate the impetus to be actively internationally involved and to affirm its role in the globalized world, and more important, to export its values, centered on respect for human rights and individual empowering.

Human security strategy implementation for a re-considered EU in a globalized world is important because it responds to the amalgam of new global, national, local threats, it is complementary to the increasing number of global norms and it can respond to the outcomes of globalization⁴⁹. Human security strategy represents the narrative construction that can encompass the core values of the European citizens and can, through constructivist processes, to represent the necessary incentive for an effectively working strategy that could impulse the EU’s global role. The implementation of human security strategy, correlated with a coherent action of EU member states under the R2P principle, would represent for the EU the capacity to transform the global relations towards multilateralism and could create, through a spill-over process, a transformation of the current international practice in order to transform the individual in the main referent of security.

This paper concentrated on the normative, soft aspect of the possibility to reconsider the EU’s global role through a bottom-up process of human security strategy implementation. The limits of the present research are methodological and the lack of quantitative proofs, as well as the theory process model that can be criticized, due to the volatility of human security paradigm. Nonetheless, this theoretical approach represents an introductory idea in the analysis of the transforming the EU’s image and role within and beyond its border. Further research should focus on more specific dimensions of the proposed analytical pathway.

⁴⁸ Wolfgang Seibel, “R2P and German foreign policy “after Libya”,” in *Norms and Practice of the Responsibility to Protect [working title]*, ed. C. Daase, J. Junk, and W. Seibel (London: Routledge, 2012), 9.

⁴⁹ Inger Helene Sira and Jonas Gräns, “The Promotion of Human Security in EU Security Policies,” 4.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Acharya, Amitav. "A Holistic Paradigm," in *What Is Human Security? Comments by 21 Authors*, edited by P. Burgess and T. Owen, Special Issue of *Security Dialogue* 35, 3 (2004): 355-356.
- Alkire, Sabina. "A Vital Core that Must Be Treated with the Same Gravitas as Traditional Security Threats." In *What Is Human Security? Comments by 21 Authors*, edited by P. Burgess and T. Owen, Special Issue of *Security Dialogue* 35, 3 (2004): 359-360.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1983.
- Axworthy, Lloyd. "A New Scientific Field and Policy Lens." In *What Is Human Security? Comments by 21 Authors*, edited by P. Burgess and T. Owen, Special Issue of *Security Dialogue* 35, 3 (2004): 348-349.
- Benedek, Wolfgang. "Human Security and Human Rights Interaction." In *Rethinking Human Security*, edited by Moufida Goucha and John Crowley, 7-19. UNESCO: Blackwell Publishing, 2008.
- Checkel, Jeffrey T. "Social Construction and European Integration." In *The Social Construction of Europe*, edited by Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jørgensen, and Antje Wiener, 50-66. London: SAGE Publications, 2001.
- Diez, Thomas. "Speaking Europe: The Politics of Integration Discourse." In *The Social Construction of Europe*, edited by Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jørgensen, and Antje Wiener, 85-101. London: SAGE Publications, 2001.
- European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication. "The Values of Europeans." *Standard Eurobarometer TNS Opinion & Social*, 77 (Spring 2012): 9-11.
- European Commission. "Speech by President Barroso: "A New Narrative for Europe"." SPEECH/13/357 23/04/2013. Accessed 7th March, 2014. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-357_en.htm?utm_medium=twitter&utm_source=twitterfeed.
- EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana. "A Human Security Doctrine for Europe The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities." Barcelona, 15 September 2004.
- Fine, Robert. *Cosmopolitanism*. London, New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Franceschet, Antonio. "Global Legalism and Human Security." In *A Decade of Human Security. Global Governance and New Multilateralism*, edited by Sandra J. MacLean, David R. Black, and Timothy M. Shaw, 31-38. Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006.
- Fukuyama, Francis. *The End Of History and the Last Man*. New York: The Free Press, 1992.
- Hoffmann, Julia, and Andre Nollkaemper. "Responsibility to Protect: From Principle to Practice." Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012.
- Horga, Ioan, Ariane Landuyt, *Communicating EU Policies beyond the Borders*, (Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2013).
- "A Human Security Doctrine for Europe", The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities [Presented to EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana], Barcelona, 15 September 2004. Accessed 07 March, 2014. <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/40209/>.
- ICISS. *The Responsibility to Protect 2001*. Ottawa: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty; International Development Research Centre, 2001.

- Kaldor, Mary, Mary Martin, Sabine Selchow. "Human Security: A New Strategic Narrative for Europe." *International Affairs* 83, 2 (2007): 273-288.
- Kolodziej, Edward A. *Security and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Leuffen, Dirk, Berthold Rittberger, and Frank Schimmelfennig. *Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
- Moravcsik, Andrew and Frank Schimmelfennig. "Liberal Intergovernmentalism." In *European Integration Theory*, Second edition, edited by Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, 67-90. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Newman, Eduard. "Critical Human Security Studies." *Review of International Studies* 36 (2010): 77-94.
- Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood. "Worlds of Our Making: The Strange Career of Constructivism in International Relations." In *Visions of International Relations: Assessing an Academic Field*, edited by Donald J. Puchala, 119-141. South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 2002.
- Risse, Thomas. "Social Constructivism and European Integration." In *European Integration Theory*, Second edition, edited by Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, 144-161. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Seibel, Wolfgang. "R2P and German foreign policy "after Libya"." In *Norms and Practice of the Responsibility to Protect [working title]*, edited by C. Daase, J. Junk, and W. Seibel London: Routledge, 2012.
- Sira, Inger Helene, and Jonas Gräns. "The Promotion of Human Security in EU Security Policies." *INEX Policy Brief* 7 (March 2009): 1-7.
- Tigerstrom, Barbara von. *Human Security and International Law. Prospects and Problems*. Oxford and Portland: Oregon Hart Publishing, 2007.
- UNDP. "Human Development Report 1994." New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy Is what States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organizations* 46, 2 (Spring 1992): 391-425.

The Role of the Democratic Peace Theory in the Evolution of the European Neighbourhood Policy¹

*Mihaela-Adriana PĂDUREANU**

Abstract: *The significant effects that the European Union had for its citizens in providing security and prosperity had long been acknowledged. In the last 60 years this construction has managed to offer, for millions of citizens, an incredible amount of improvement in their lives. As a community of democracies, EU aims to interact with its neighbors on the basis of its core values: democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights. And even if its democratic deficit, lack of legitimacy and the attacks from the ring-wing populists are major threats, the EU is called to have a more pronounce role in the international affairs through its foreign policy.*

Key-words: *legitimacy, foreign policy, democratic peace, European Union.*

Introduction

Despite the crisis that the EU has been facing in the last six years, it has been able to maintain security on the old continent and to provide for its now almost half billion citizens the greatest economic prosperity that has ever been known in Europe. Albeit this paper does not investigate the internal processes through which the EU has been built, I will briefly mention the two factors that added to the need of having a united continent or at least half of it. The first one was the external threat posed by the USSR and second, the elite-driving project that aimed at creating a Europe that will surpass the reasons that brought war some many times in the past in this geographical space. And the goal has been accomplished until August 2008, when the Russian Federation and Georgia have fought a brief war. I made these affirmations because the main idea of this paper is that the EU, through its common foreign policy is aiming at ensuring its security by promoting democracy in its neighborhood, guided by the theory of the democratic peace, because a democratic neighborhood should not pose any threats to the EU.

In the first part of this article I will present the theoretical framework used in this analyse and then I will follow two main research questions. The first one explores the relation between the EU and its neighbors – is EU still able to play a significant role for its neighbors and can still have a major influence in their foreign policy decisions? In this case we will use the example of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), with its Eastern and Southern dimensions. Will the Eastern Partnership countries choose to deepen relations with the EU, while they have avoided or they withdraw from a closer relation with the Russian Federation and with the newly established Eurasian Union, or will the Southern countries avoid a new kind of authoritarianism. The second research question is: can the EU increase the level of democratization in these countries?

¹ Funding: This work is based on the research grant Eastern Partnership. Civilian Security Need-Assessment and Development Opportunities/Options (PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-1014), funded by the Romanian Ministry of Education.

* Mihaela-Adriana Pădureanu is young researcher with the Center of East-European and Asian Studies, within the National School of Political Studies and Public Administration. Contact: mihaelapadureanu@gmail.com.

Extending the EU's values through liberal democratic peace

First of all I want to underline that in this paper, the EU's foreign policy is defined as "the set of policies adopted by the Union's Member States to address issues and manage relationships beyond their collective external border"². It should be noted that we are talking about the all 28 member states and not about the individual foreign policies. Although finding an appropriate concept for what we call today the European Union is difficult and therefore can aggravate the analyse of EU's foreign policy, in this paper we choose to define the EU as a community of democracies that is willing to continue and to deepen the relation with its neighbors based on what it considers to be universal values. K. Smith mentions the difficulty of defining the EU as well as the critiques that the institutional mechanisms receive in times of crisis, when it is considered that its response is to slow³. Due to the fact that the member states share the same values, known as the "Copenhagen criteria" we consider that their behavior can be best explained through liberal leans.

The most well know liberal theory that explains the lack of war between states with the same political regime is the theory of democratic peace. The democratic peace theory has its origins in the work of I. Kant and its concept of "pacific union of free republics, or the liberal democratic peace"⁴. Exploring on Kant's work, M. Doyle identifies three features that, when all three of them are combined, allow us to say that denocratic countries do not fight between them. These three aspects are: "Republican representation, an ideological commitment to fundamental human rights, and transnational interdependence"⁵. Doyle is showing how each one of these three conditions have their own contribution for strengthening the peace between democracies. First of all, a republican government allows citizens, seen as free individuals, to request accountability from their representatives; because the governments are legitimate, they can take decisions in the area of foreign policy, while the free trade helps preserve the interconnections that were already created⁶. In conducting a foreign policy analyse based on liberal assumptions all of them should be followed in the form of "individual rights, domestic commercial interest, or a more complicated combination of both, together with republican institutions and international

² Daniel C. Thomas, „Explaining the Negotiation of EU Foreign Policy: Normative Institutionalism and Alternative Approaches,” *International Politics* 46, 4 (2009): 340.

³ Karen E. Smith, "The European Union: A Distinctive Actor in International Relations," *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* IX, 2 (2005): 103-114. This is also mentioned in: Geoffrey Edwards, „The EU's Foreign Policy and the Search for Effect,” *International Relations* 27, 3 (2013): 280. For a detailed discussion on the rationalism and constructivism in EU studies, see: Joseph Jupille et al., "Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union," *Comparative Political Studies* 36, 7 (2003): 7-40. Eva Gross aslo analyses the EU reaction in crisis situation in: Eva Gross, *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy* (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), especially 63-90.

⁴ Michael W. Doyle, „A More Perfect Union? The Liberal Peace and the Challenge of Globalization,” *Review of International Studies* 26 (2000): 82, doi:10.1017/S0260210500000814. Doyle explores the emergence of democratic peace theory also in his two-parts article: Michael W. Doyle, „Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs Part 2,” *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 12, 4 (1983): 323-353.

⁵ Michael W. Doyle, „Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace,” *The American Political Science Review* 99, 3 (2005): 463.

⁶ Ibid., 464.

perceptions”⁷. Taking into account the three dimensions, we will try to identify each of them in EU’s behavior towards its neighbours.

The importance of shared values, norms and practices in EU’s foreign policy, has lead scholars to label EU as a “normative” or “civilian power”⁸ in the last decade, which uses the soft power to attract new followers. But critics have also mentioned that EU’s foreign policy has not been build only on ideational factors, but that the strategic and ideational dynamics actually co-exist in EU’s policies⁹. The critiques are contributing to the debate about what and why the EU chooses to support or to oppose different policies. These questions have exposed the need for clarifying the way in which the EU behaves in international affairs.

A possible response was given by a new direction in the European Union Studies, that began to explore terms such as actorness and effectiveness, based on new developments in the international system. C. Hill in an article from 1993, investigates extensivley the term *actorness*, defined as a quality that some suppose that the (then) European Community had, without describing what this aspect means or what it involves. EC had different approaches for distinct topics, while the area of foreign policy continued to be lead largely by intergovernmentalism¹⁰. The topic of actorness answers the question if we can consider the EU as an actor in the world affairs. As I mentioned earlier, in this paper we consider EU as a unitary actor formed by democratic states. Following Sjöstedt, Hill presents three elements that an actor has: is delimited from others; is autonomous and it has some structural prerequisites that allows it to take action¹¹. The EU has managed to consolidated these features through the Treaties adopted in the late ’90s and early 2000s. The Lisbon Treaty, the latest document adopted by the EU countries and aiming at reforming the Union’s institutions offers a greater role for the foreign policy area, by creating the function of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, who works closely with the European External Action Service. But the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) continues to be dependable on the political will of the member states, and this seems to be the area less likely to come under any kind of *common* decision-making.

The main changes in the international system in the last decade have made the need for a coherent European common foreign policy extremely important. For example, the US rebalancing towards Asia-Pacific or the financial crisis have only added to the need of deepening the study of EU’s role in the world¹² and also the urgency to stress more what actorness means before clarifying what features does the EU have¹³.

⁷ Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and Foreign Policy,” in *Foreign Policy, Theories, Actors, Cases*, ed. Steve Smith et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 59.

⁸ See: Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, 2 (2002): 235-258; Hanns Maull, “Germany and the Use of Force: Still a ‘Civilian Power’?,” *Survival* 42, 2 (2000): 56-80 and Karen E. Smith, “Beyond the Civilian Power Debate,” (London: LSE Research Online, 2005), accessed May 5, 2014, <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/812>.

⁹ Richard Youngs, „Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU's External Identity,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 42, 2 (2004): 419.

¹⁰ Christopher Hill, „The Capability-expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role,” *Journal Of Common Market Studies* 31, 3, (1993): 308-309.

¹¹ Gunnar Sjöstedt, *The External Role of the European Community* (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1977), quoted in Hill, 309.

¹² Arne Niemann and Charlotte Bretherton. „EU External Policy at the Crossroads: The Challenge of Actorness and Effectiveness,” *International Relations* 27, 3 (2013): 262. These problems and their impact on EU are also discussed in: Karen E. Smith „Can the European Union Be a Pole in

In this context, the initiative New Narrative for Europe should be seen as a mean through which the EU is continuing to build its own identity in the neighborhood and in the near abroad, while is also focusing on the internal construction of the EU. The content of the document is stressing the importance of democracy and human values for the internal development of the EU¹⁴ and the citizens' individual responsibility for what the officials label as "Europe". But what actually does Europe mean is not exactly very clear, although the document does mention the importance of philosophy and art for the continent and the attraction it has on its neighbors. The proposed plan for the future argues that cities should become more powerful in EU¹⁵, as another mean through which to decrease the force of the nation-state and to promote cosmopolitanism. This proposal can be classified as another try to obtain public support for a political project that will add legitimacy to the European policies, or more so will try to offer for the new generations of Europeans, those who do not identify a role for the EU in their everyday life, a reason to keep supporting the Union. This European construction is continuing to define itself in relation with what is outside itself, or from our theoretical perspective as a community of democracies that interacts with non-democratic states¹⁶.

Promoting democracy, building peace in ENP

The link between promoting democracy for its neighbours and thus assuring security for itself is reflected in the European Security Strategy¹⁷ and in European Commission's Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours documents. They both represented the theoretical framework on which the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched in 2004¹⁸ and updated in 2011, under the name "A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood. A review of European Neighbourhood Policy"¹⁹. ENP contains bilateral and multilateral relations with the 16 most closest states under the names of: the Eastern Partnership (EAP), the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED) and the Black Sea Synergy²⁰.

a Multipolar World?," *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs* 48, 2 (2013): 114-126, DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2013.788378.

¹³ Niemann and Bretherton, 264.

¹⁴ „New Narrative for Europe,” 1, accessed May 10, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/debate-future-europe/new-narrative/pdf/declaration_en.pdf.

¹⁵ Ibid., 4.

¹⁶ Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, "Le frontiere europeee – espressioni dell'identita", *Transylvanian Review*, vol. XXIII, Supplement No.1, 2014, 202-216.

¹⁷ This topic is explored also in: Yannis A. Stivachtis and Stefanie Georgakis, "Democratization as a Peace Strategy," in "The European Union and Peacebuilding," Special issue of *Review of European Studies* 5, 3 (2013): 95-104. See also: Richard Youngs, "Democratic Institution-building and Conflict Resolution: Emerging EU Approaches," *International Peacekeeping* 11, 3 (2004): 526-543, DOI: 10.1080/1353331042000249082.

¹⁸ I analysed this initiative in: Mihaela Adriana Pădureanu, „The Eastern Partnership: A Tool to Involve Citizens, Build Democracy and Provide Security,” in *Eastern Partnership. The Road so Far*, ed. Mihail E. Ionescu (Bucharest: Military Publishing House, 2013), 23-72.

¹⁹ European Commission. European Union External Action, „A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood. A review of European Neighbourhood Policy,” [Joint Communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission], Brussels, 25 May 2011, COM(2011) 303, accessed May 16, 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf.

²⁰ European Union External Action, „What Is the European Neighbourhood Policy?,” accessed May 15, 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm.

The 2011 updated version of the ENP is stressing the three main goals that were mentioned in the beginning of this article: „A new approach is needed to strengthen the partnership between the EU and the countries and societies of the neighbourhood: to build and consolidate healthy democracies, pursue sustainable economic growth and manage cross-border links”²¹. In order to promote this aims, the EU will increase funds for these regions totaling EUR 6942 millions between 2011-2013, while democracy promotion was extended through the European Endowment for Democracy and the economic development through the Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) instrument. The underfunded or the un-balanced financing of the ENP dimensions is reflected in this numbers: between 2011-2013 Moldova received EUR 273.1 million, and Tunisia EUR 240 million, Egypt received almost double than the sum of Moldova: EUR 449.3 million and Ukraine EUR 470.1 million, therefore the Eastern border of the Union has received more than the Southern states²². This allows us to say the the Eastern policies were favored by the decision-makers, while the states in the South were underfunded.

Further, this official document mentions the threats that the unresolved conflicts in the neighborhood pose for the Union. Examples include: Israeli-Palestinian problem, Middle East, the South Caucasus, the Republic of Moldova and Western Sahara²³.

The events known as the Arab Spring have had their own influence on the EU's foreign policy and worried powerful states in the Union. France and Italy, which are interested in allocating important resources for promoting the EU's values and norms in the countries from the Southern neighborhood were also willing to support quality research studies in the area²⁴. The Arab Spring requested from the European policy makers a clear position, or at least focused attention for evaluating its effects on the EU's security. The countries from Union's Neighbourhood, although in an interdependent relation with it have different values and political systems, which will also question the old approach towards them. More precisely, the support of authoritarian regimes just because they were predictable and stable. In 2012 or even 2013 we could have said that more informed decision for the Eastern border would have been able to avoid similar events in the region, but the latest developments in Ukraine do not allow us to say that this was the case. We can find the same problems in the East as well as in the South: lack of trust in the democratic institutions, or even the possibility of military conflict because of territorial disputes as in the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Also, as is often the case in post-authoritarian or post-totalitarian societies, there is a lack of social cohesion in the near abroad²⁵. In this context the EU's support can offer an alternative to these societies and contribute to stable and democratic states, while its own road in the last decades can be a good example.

²¹ European Commission. European Union External Action, „A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood,” 1.

²² European Commission, „EU Strengthens the European Neighbourhood Policy with Increased Funding for the Period 2011-2013,” accessed May 12, 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-221_en.htm.

²³ European Commission. European Union External Action, „A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood,” 5.

²⁴ See also: Mediterranean Prospects, accessed May 10, 2014, <http://www.medpro-foresight.eu/home>.

²⁵ Anar Valiyev, „The Quest for Political Reform in Azerbaijan: What Role for the Transatlantic Community?,” *IAI Working Papers* 12, 12 (April 2012): 1, accessed May 07, 2014, <http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiw1212.pdf>.

The EU's citizens consider that the values promoted by the Union such as: peace, democracy, the respect for human rights are the most relevant and essential for the way in which EU is viewed in the world²⁶. In this situation it is unlikely that we will see a any military intervention from the EU to maintain order or enforce this values.

In 2011, the Arab Spring did in fact receive a response from the European institutions as a new Communication on the part of European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, under the name of *A Medium Term Programme for a renewed European Neighbourhood Policy*²⁷. The new strategy is proposing a clearer vision for the European Neighbourhood Policy between 2011-2014 and implementation of the article 8, from the Lisbon Treaty that mentions: „The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterized by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation”²⁸. Even more, the updated version stresses the necessity to differentiate between the member states according to the efforts they make in order to develop the relation with the Union.

As for the economic sector, the partner countries should be able to deepen the relations with the EU after implementing its economic standards. In order to obtain these results, the political dialogue should be encouraged between the EU officials and those from the member-states, and that this should go beyond the foreign ministers level in order to facilitate the mutual trust and offer a space for communication that can resolve the misunderstandings.

Trying to create a sense of closeness between societies, the strategy is looking to increase mobility between people, especially that of students, researchers and business men, whose role is seen as essential in strenghtening cooperation²⁹. The European institutions the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and the Social Committee and the Committee of Regions continued to address the problems of the Arab Spring when they all agreed to launch „*A Partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean*”. According to it, the EU is ready to treat each country differently, based on its own progress and to affirm its support for the the democratic forces in those countries, or what has called the principle „more-for-more”. The first move was to offer EUR 30 millions as humanitarian aid³⁰. Libya and the displaced persons in Libya and Egypt were the main receivers of this aid. Further,

²⁶ Rikard Bengtsson, „The EU and the European Security Order. Interfacing security actors” (London: Routledge, 2010).

²⁷ EU Neighbourhood Library, „A Medium Term Programme for a Renewed European Neighbourhood Policy (2011-2014),” 37, accessed May 12, 2014, <http://www.enpi-info.eu/library/content/medium-term-programme-renewed-european-neighbourhood-policy-2011-2014>. See also, Ioan Horga, Grigore Silasi, Istvan Suli-Zakar, Stanislav Sagan, *The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighbourhood Policy*, Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2009.

²⁸ *Treaty of Lisbon*, art. 8, accessed May 18, 2014, <http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-european-union-and-comments/title-1-common-provisions/6-article-8.html>.

²⁹ EU Neighbourhood Library, „A Medium Term Programme,” 37-8.

³⁰ European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, „A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” [Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions], COM(2011) 200 final, Brussels, 8.3.2011, 3, accessed May 19, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/speeches-statements/pdf/20110308_en.pdf.

the paper promotes all the dimension for cooperation that the ENP had already exposed, such as support for civil society, trade, commerce and sectoral cooperation, all used in order to restabilize the area. But, apart from the lack of economic prosperity in the region, the document emphasizes the need for a proper model for these countries, a role that can be played by Turkey³¹. Nonetheless, the political dimension of this model or regional cooperation is not mentioned, only the economic one. In the final part of the document, the EU does mention its own experience and how it managed to overcome the historical rivalries.

Štefan Füle, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy has recognized that there has been an unsatisfactory approach to the tensions between EU's interests and values and that this has been addressed by EU's changed approach that now support change and modernization³². In order to support this new approach, the EU has established three new principles that should lead the relations between the EU and the neighbours: the more for more principle and mutual accountability. This means that the strategy based on the three Ms: money, mobility and markets that offers incentives such as visa liberalisation or greater access to the EU's internal market, will be differentiated for every state, taking into account its own progress³³. Therefore, the EU is continuing to use mechanisms that have proved successful during the enlargement policy such as the conditionality, but this also shows its lack of methods and mechanisms that can be used in dealing with a third part.

The 2013, ENP paper „European Neighbourhood Policy: Working towards a Stronger Partnership” mentions that the ENP can only support, but not replace the democratic process in the member countries³⁴. In this case, the societies and the individual are the main promoters of democracy in these states, although in most cases they can receive financial support from the EU. The document also mentions, the fact that the model proposed by the EU can be seen as less attractive due to the competitive involvement of other actors in the foreign policies of these countries³⁵. These alternatives are represented in the Eastern neighborhood by the Eurasian Union and in the South by the Gulf countries, Arab League and Turkey, but the document points out that only the choice to join the Custom Union, part of the Eurasian Union is mentioned as incompatible with the deepening economic relations with the EU. Of course, this can be explained by the fact that no different economic model is proposed by the Arab countries, which is not the case with the former ex-Soviet states and with the Custom Union.

EU's next budget is proposing EUR 15.4 billion for the neighborhood and affirms its commitment to continue to engage with the neighbours, while also recognizing the many challenges that they face. Noticing that 2013 was „a year of crises in some of its

³¹ Ibid., 11.

³² Štefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, „Arab Spring” (Conference, EU- Nachbarschaft – Der Arabische Frühling ein Jahr danach), Munich, 3 February 2012,

Commission Européenne, SPEECH/12/66, accessed May 06, 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-66_en.htm?locale=fr.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, „European Neighbourhood Policy: Working towards a Stronger Partnership” (Joint Communication to European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions), JOIN(2013) 4 final, Brussels, 20.3.2013, 4, accessed May 19, 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/docs/2013_enp_pack/2013_comm_conjoint_en.pdf.

³⁵ Ibid., 22.

partners, reflecting political instability and difficult socio-economic conditions”³⁶ the ENP remains the major framework for cooperation with these countries and the only important offer that the EU has in its foreign policy.

With this steps, the official position of the Union is aiming at not only stabilizing the neighborhood but also at doing this by promoting democracy. Due to the fact that the neighborhood countries can be considered as weak states, in the South as well as in the East, the way in which the EU is build and managed can be considered a model for the outside actors.

Conclusions

For what have mentioned in this paper, the EU is able to offer a formal answer yearly to the challenges that appear in its neighborhood. What all the papers and the documents have in common is the need to deepen democracy, to increase contacts between people and to improve the economic relations. Also, it is important to notice that the relations between the EU and the 16 member states of the ENP are governed by the EU's values and norms. But if in the Central and Eastern Europe in the mid-90s the EU had no rival, the situation is different today. The latest events in Ukraine, that are still going on at the moment of the writing, show us that not all societies and governments are ready or able to implement the rules proposed by the EU, even if that will be translated in immediate financial help for some groups. Also, in the Southern neighborhood, the recent developments in Egypt, or to mention the continuing civil war in Syria are concrete example that this disordered zones require a clear and rapid answer from the EU. As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, this comes as a contradiction for the EU that does not behave like that and is bounded to its complicated institutional structure.

Therefore, if the European officials are really willing to be an example for the troubled countries and to promote their successful model, then they should be ready to discuss the institutions that respond to this kind of situations and to modernize them, because their response should be quicker and clearer. Besides, if EU wants to be more than a passive or a just a responsive actor then it should be ready to lead and accept its responsibility as the world's biggest humanitarian aid donor.

Funding: This work is based on the research grant Eastern Partnership. Civilian Security Need-Assessment and Development Opportunities/Options (PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-1014), funded by the Romanian Ministry of Education.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bengtsson, Rikard. „The EU and the European Security Order. Interfacing Security Actors.” London: Routledge, 2010.
- Brie, Mircea, Ioan Horga, “Le frontiere europeee – espressioni dell’identita”, *Transylvanian Review*, vol. XXIII, Supplement No.1, 2014, 202-216.
- Doyle, Michael W. „Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs Part 2, *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 12, 4 (1983): 323-353.

³⁶ Commission Européenne, „Neighbourhood at the Crossroads – Taking Stock of a Year of Challenges” (Press Release), Brussels, 27 March 2014, accessed May 20, 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-315_en.htm.

- Doyle, Michael W. „A More Perfect Union? The Liberal Peace and the Challenge of Globalization.” *Review of International Studies* 26, (2000): 81-94. doi:10.1017/S0260210500000814.
- Doyle, Michael W. „Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace.” *The American Political Science Review* 99, 3 (2005): 463-466.
- Doyle, Michael W. “Liberalism and Foreign Policy.” In *Foreign Policy, Theories, Actors, Cases*, edited by Steven Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne, 54-77. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Edwards, Geoffrey. „The EU's Foreign Policy and the Search for Effect.” *International Relations* 27, 3 (2013): 276-291.
- Gross, Eva. *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy*. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- Hill, Christopher. „The Capability-expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role.” *Journal Of Common Market Studies* 31, 3 (1993): 305-329.
- Horga, Ioan, Silasi, Grigore, Suli-Zakar, Istvan, Sagan Stanislav, *The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighbourhood Policy*, Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2009.
- Jupille, Joseph, James A. Caporaso, Jeffrey T. Checkel. “Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union.” *Comparative Political Studies*, 36, 7, (2003): 7-40.
- Manners, Ian. “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?.” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40, 2, (2002): 235-258.
- Maull Hanns. “Germany and the Use of Force: Still a ‘Civilian Power’?.” *Survival* 42, 2 (2000): 56-80.
- Niemann, Arne; Bretherton, Charlotte. „EU External Policy at the Crossroads: The Challenge of Actorness and Effectiveness.” *International Relations* 27, 3 (2013): 261-275.
- Pădureanu, Mihaela Adriana. „The Eastern Partnership: A Tool to Involve Citizens, Build Democracy and Provide Security.” In *Eastern Partnership. The Road so Far*, ed. Mihail E. Ionescu, 23-72. Bucharest: Military Publishing House, 2013.
- Smith, Karen E. “The European Union: A Distinctive Actor in International Relations.” *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* IX, 2, (2005): 103-114.
- Smith, Karen E. “Beyond the Civilian Power Debate.” [online]. London: LSE Research Online, 2005. Accessed May 05, 2014. <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/812>.
- Smith, Karen E. „Can the European Union Be a Pole in a Multipolar World?.” *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs* 48, 2 (2013): 114-126, DOI:10.1080/03932729.2013.788378.
- Stivachtis, Yannis A., and Stefanie Georgakis. “Democratization as a Peace Strategy.” In “The European Union and Peacebuilding,” Special issue of *Review of European Studies* 5, 3 (2013): 95-104.
- Thomas, Daniel C. „Explaining the Negotiation of EU Foreign Policy: Normative Institutionalism and Alternative Approaches.” *International Politics* 46, 4 (2009): 339-357.
- Valiyev, Anar. „The Quest for Political Reform in Azerbaijan: What Role for the Transatlantic Community?,” *IAI Working Papers* 12, 12 (April 2012): 1-9. Accessed May 07, 2014. <http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiw1212.pdf>.
- Youngs, Richard. „Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU's External Identity.” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 42, 2 (2004): 415-435.

Youngs, Richard. "Democratic Institution-building and Conflict Resolution: Emerging EU Approaches." *International Peacekeeping* 11, 3 (2004): 526-543. DOI: 10.1080/1353331042000249082.

Documents:

- Commission Européenne. „Neighbourhood at the Crossroads – Taking Stock of a Year of Challenges.” Press Release, Brussels, 27 March 2014. Accessed May 20, 2014. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-315_en.htm.
- EU Neighbourhood Library. „A Medium Term Programme for a Renewed European Neighbourhood Policy (2011-2014).” Accessed May 12, 2014. <http://www.enpi-info.eu/library/content/medium-term-programme-renewed-european-neighbourhood-policy-2011-2014>.
- European Commission. European Union External Action. „A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood. A review of European Neighbourhood Policy.” Joint Communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission, Brussels, 25 May 2011, COM(2011) 303. Accessed May 16, 2014. http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf.
- European Commission. „EU Strengthens the European Neighbourhood Policy with Increased Funding for the Period 2011-2013.” Accessed May 12, 2014. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-221_en.htm.
- European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. „European Neighbourhood Policy: Working towards a Stronger Partnership.” Joint Communication to European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, JOIN(2013) 4 final, Brussels, 20.3.2013. Accessed May 19, 2014. http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/docs/2013_enp_pack/2013_comm_conjoint_en.pdf.
- European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. „A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean.” Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, COM(2011) 200 final, Brussels, 8.3.2011. Accessed May 19, 2014. http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/speeches-statements/pdf/20110308_en.pdf.
- European Union External Action. „What Is the European Neighbourhood Policy?.” Accessed May 15, 2014. http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm.
- Füle, Štefan, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy. „Arab Spring.” Conference, EU- Nachbarschaft – Der Arabische Frühling ein Jahr danach, Munich, 3 February 2012. Commission Européenne, SPEECH/12/66. Accessed May 06, 2014. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-66_en.htm?locale=fr.
- Mediterranean Prospects. Accessed May 10, 2014. <http://www.medpro-foresight.eu/home>.
- „New Narrative for Europe.” Accessed May 10, 2014. http://ec.europa.eu/debate-future-europe/new-narrative/pdf/declaration_en.pdf.
- Treaty of Lisbon*. Accessed May 18, 2014. <http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-european-union-and-comments/title-1-common-provisions/6-article-8.html>.

The Eastern Partnership: Between Efficiency and Necessity

Evaluation of the Bilateral Dimension

Ana Maria COSTEA (GHIMIȘ)*

Abstract: *The Eastern Partnership's member states have become essential factors for the European continent's security especially after 2007. Following this logic, after the Union for Barcelona, the Georgian war and the countless gas crises, Poland proposed a program that will encompass only Eastern European states. Although it is a dedicated program, the experts still tend to debate around the effectiveness of the Eastern Partnership since the region it encompasses presents itself with large differences among its members. The present article aims to analyze this aspect using the evaluation driven, change model that was proposed by Chen.*

Key words: *EU, Eastern Partnership, Russia, change model, security*

Introduction

According to the European Union's Security Strategy from 2003, "A Secure Europe in a Better World", "the European Union is inevitably a global player. [...] The increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world"¹. The quality of being a global player is stipulated in the very first page of the strategy, therefore this would be the starting point for the EU, the de facto accomplishment upon which the entire strategy is being developed. The inevitability character is explained more in terms of geographical interests of the organization's member states, and not necessarily according to the level of power projection of the entire organization. For example, we can notice the preferences of France in the Mediterranean area, or in the Middle East as part of its foreign policy strategy (France a regional player that can take the leadership of a coalition, as in the case of the Contact group in Libya). We can also notice the preferences of states like Italy that are very sensitive regarding the migration policy of the EU and the southern frontier's security, since for years it had to deal with a huge number of refugees from Africa, fact that affects its economic and social development due to the high level of unemployment rate. At the Eastern frontier of the country, Poland and Romania are clearly advocating for EU's engagement in the area.

In terms of power, it is clear that the EU is a soft power that still has the attractiveness character that can make third parties to change according to EU values, principles and standards². In a broader picture in which we take into consideration other international powers, in which the US does not play the role of the universal soldier

* Phd. Student, Babeș-Bolyai University, Faculty of History and Philosophy, International Relations and Security Studies Doctoral School

¹ European Council, "A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy," Brussels, 12 December 2003, 1, accessed May 23, 2014, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

² Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, "Le frontiere europene – espressioni dell'identità", *Transylvanian Review*, vol. XXIII, Supplement No.1, 2014, 202-216.

anymore, China is not willingly to take the leadership, the Asian states become more influential and Russia more active, the EU has the potential to act globally and to influence world affairs.

The present article aims to develop an evaluation of the Eastern Partnership programme in order to be able to test the efficiency of the program in what regards the European security taking into account both the domestic and external dynamics within the region, the interests, the needs and the perceptions of direct and indirect involved actors.

In terms of methodology, I will focus on the applicability of the principles proposed in the program evaluation theory by Tsyh Huey Chen. For a clearer perspective I will use one of two evaluation models proposed by the author: the action model (involving prescriptive premises) and the change model (involving descriptive premises) in order to get a picture as most reliable and comprehensive overview of the results, but also on the process that was started by launching the Eastern Partnership. It also will analyze both primary and secondary sources, so as to take into account as many possible variables that may have an effect on signing an Association Agreement. From a temporal point of view, the current analysis will stop to 2014, when the Vilnius Summit was due to take place. I will analyze bilateral perspective, focusing on the possibility of signing an Association Agreement at 2013 Eastern Partnership Summit.

European Neighbourhood Policy and the need for a more focused approach

*"The European Union achievements are many, but maybe among the most important one is the fact that it managed to bring peace among historic former enemies"*³. Being a regional player that wants to become a globally involved organization, therefore, to apply the aforementioned strategy to outside, the EU needs to firstly create a secure, stable and predictable regional environment⁴. Since the last three rounds of enlargement, the 2004 and 2007 named also the big bang enlargement (twelve states became Member States of the EU- Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvian, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania), 2013 Croatia, the Eastern frontier of the entire organization has changed, creating a new security architecture that presented itself with new opportunities and threats likewise. States like Moldova or Ukraine have become immediate neighbours of the EU⁵. After 2007 the EU's decision making process was naturally harder to be achieved as 27 states had different interests that were needed to

³ Ioan Horga, "Deepening/ Weedening EU Building versus Debordering/Rebordering of EU Frontiers," in *Communicating the EU Policies Beyond the Borders: Proposals for Constructive Neighbour Relations and the New EU External Communication Strategy*, ed. Ioan Horga and Ariane Landuyt (Oradea: Oradea University Press 2013), 27-37, 27.

⁴ Fabienne Maron et al., *Media and The Good Governance Facing the Challenge of the EU Enlargement* (Bruxelles, IISA, 2005); Dogot, Cristina-Maria, Ioan Horga "Enlargement Process, Classic Geopolitics, and EU Internal Priorities, in, in *Eurotimes*, 13, *Permeability and the Impermeability of Socio- Economic Frontiers within European Union*, eds., Violene Deltai, Cristina Maria Dogor, Gabor Kozma, Jaroslaw Kundera, (Oradea/Bruxelles: Oradea University Press/Bruylant, 2009): 161-183

⁵ Adrian Pop et al., "România și Republica Moldova – între Politica Europeană de Vecinătate și perspectiva extinderii Uniunii Europene" [Romania and Republic of Moldova – between European Neighbourhood Policy and the perspective of European Union enlargement], *Institutul European din România – Studii de impact III*, accessed March 11, 2013, 6, http://www.ier.ro/documente/studiideimpactPaisIII_ro/Pais3_studiu_5_ro.pdf; Ioan Horga, Grigore Silași, István Süli-Zakar, Stanisław Sagan, *The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and Eurooepan Neighbourhood Policy* (Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2009).

follow. Regionally, the entire organization was changing from within and also from the outside. The four European freedoms of movement of: goods, capital, persons and services created a relative vulnerability in terms of external threats especially in the Schengen Area that presented with the situation in which it was very difficult for the goods and even the persons to be tracked once they had passed the border as no ID is required. Poland or Romania's eastern frontier became in 2004 and 2007 parts of the EU's eastern frontier, thus creating a common issue among all member states, since all benefited from a secure border.

In 2003 the European Commission came up with the Communication named „Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” where the aim was to create “a circle of friends at the external borders of the Union, characterized by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation⁶”. Furthermore, in 2004 the European Neighbourhood Policy was launched with which the EU engaged:

- *“To work with the partners to reduce poverty and create an area of shared prosperity and values based on deeper economic integration, intensified political and cultural relations, enhanced cross-border cooperation and shared responsibility for conflict prevention between the EU and its neighbours;*
- *To anchor the EU's offer of concrete benefits and preferential relations within a differentiated framework which responds to progress made by the partner countries in political and economic reform⁷.”*

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) includes three distinct regions: the Mediterranean region (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia), the Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) and Eastern Europe (the Republic of Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine⁸). Initially, Russia had been included in the program, but Moscow rejected the proposal, preferring to develop a bilateral partnership with the EU through the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which provides cooperation between the two international players on four common spaces: economy, freedom, security and justice, external security and research and education⁹.

This program could be perceived as an alternative to enlargement policy. Although some countries from the above mentioned group are unwilling or unable to accede to the EU from a geographical point of view, for the Eastern countries, the ENP was a first step towards the EU. However, the main objective of this policy was to

⁶ Pop et al., 7.

⁷ “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours,” COM (2003)104 final, 9, accessed March 20, 2013, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0104:FIN:EN:PDF>.

⁸ For this area of EU's neighbourhood policies, see Cristina-Maria Dogot, „European Union, Russia, and ENP/EaP Countries,” in *The EU as a Model of Soft Power in the Eastern Neighbourhood*, EURINT Conference Proceedings, 15-17 May 2013, ed. Ramona Frunză et al. (Iași: Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” Iași, 2013), 385-389.

⁹ Karen Smith, “The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy,” *International Affairs* 81, 4 (2005): 759.

maintain a general approach in order to solve the large problems of the regions¹⁰ and the accession prospects remained uncertain.

In terms of national preferences, the ENP is a reflection of the French preference in the Mediterranean region, fact that could be financially noticed as this area is benefiting from two thirds of the European funds that are allocated to this program¹¹. Regarding the Eastern part of the Neighbourhood policy, the old member states' preferences were in keeping the status-quo regarding the EU's agenda, until August 2008 when the Georgian War erupted and highlighted the political disfunctionalities within the EU.

After the Georgian war, Poland with the support of Sweden launched the Eastern Partnership (EaP) program, which is a more focused version of the ENP as it comprises only 6 countries (Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan). Although the program has not been received with much enthusiasm and support from old EU member states (the new states tried to gain bargaining power whereas the old member states tried to keep their regional status), the Georgian war increased significantly the relative bargaining power of Poland, fact that made this project to be implemented¹². On the other hand, although the official discourse of the ENP's objectives or Eastern Partnership's ones is political association, the creation of a free trade area and economic integration with the EU, they have proven to be necessary tools used for the underlying the objective of security which was in total accordance with the preferences of Eastern frontier EU member states, but the fact that these programs do not offer clear perspectives is a weak point in the external communication system of the EU as a whole.

The Eastern Partnership seen through the change model

In order to test the above mentioned hypothesis, I will use the concepts and the variables that are proposed by Huey-Tsyn Chen in his program theory. In order to be able to develop such an evaluation, Chen proposes two models: the change model and the action model. If the first refers to the aim of the program (objectives, results), the second highlights the way in which the program has been implemented (processes)¹³.

Using the change model, the evaluators take into consideration the following variables: the aim and the objectives of the program (why there was a need for such a program, its objectives and the results that are foreseen to be accomplished through the program implementation)¹⁴.

If we analyse the Eastern Partnership, the objective that was declared during the Prague Summit from 2009 is "*to create the necessary conditions for political association and economic integration between the European Union and the interested partner states*"¹⁵. One very important aspect that is stipulated in this declaration is the focus on the interested states, thus the program is designed to answer the needs of all six states

¹⁰ Pop et al., 10-12.

¹¹ Jan Draus, "Polish-Ukrainian Relations after Independence." *NowaUkraina*, 2011, 68, accessed April 30, 2013, http://nowaukraina.org/nu_11_2011/06_Draus.pdf.

¹² Kerry Longhurst and Susanne Nies, "Recasting Relations with the Neighbours – Prospects for the Eastern Partnership," *IFRI*, February 2009, 5, accessed March 11, 2013, http://www.ifri.org/files/Europe_visions/Europe_Visions_4.pdf.

¹³ Huey-Tsyn Chen, "Practical Program Evaluation: Assessing and Improving Planning, Implementation, and Effectiveness," London: Sage Publication, 2005), 20.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Council of the European Union, "Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit," Prague, 7 May 2009, accessed September 11, 2013, 6, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/eastern_partnership/documents/prague_summit_declaration_en.pdf.

(Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgian, the Republic of Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine), but not all of them seem to be interested in achieving this level of cooperation with the EU. Moreover, there is no condition that they will be taken as a whole since the program is designed to have different expectations.

At regional level, although the program was designed to run simultaneously with the strategic partnership with Russia, indirectly, it tried to decrease Moscow's influence in the area, showing an alternative; a soft power based one, which the ex-soviet states could follow.

Regarding the next variable causes that determined the emergence of the program¹⁶, the non-EU Eastern Europe was considered to be a "problematic area" due to illegal activities like drug trafficking, organized crime, illegal migration etc¹⁷. The eastern frontier became even more important in establishing the security of the entire organization, thus a common issue. Due to the fact that isolation is not an effective and efficient strategy for a player like the EU, the Member States needed to find suitable solutions that would protect and increase the soft power of the Union and at the same time will create a stable and predictable area where the Russian Federation was and still is a crucial player.

Also in terms of determinants, over time, the ENP's strategy of "*one size fits all*" proved to be ineffective due to different political and cultural systems from the three regional areas¹⁸. Thus its success is questionable, given the Syrian current dynamics and the program's objective of creating a peaceful neighbouring area. Additionally, after 2008, thus after the Georgian war, Poland succeeded in attracting Europe's attention towards Eastern Europe, especially towards Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Least, but not last, one factor that determined the emergence of the EaP is the Ukrainian gas crises that put the EU member states in a very difficult position economically speaking from the position of the consumer that did not receive the contracted energy amounts.

Another variable mentioned by Chen is the analysis of the intervention or of the treatment. He refers here to the identification of actions or activities that are aiming to change the determinant¹⁹, thus in our case the status-quo ante-EaP.

The program encompasses two dimensions: the bilateral one and the multilateral one. The first foresees other contractual relations as the Association Agreement (AA), which includes the Deep and Comprehensive Deep Trade Agreement (DCFTA) and the visa liberalization²⁰. The AA will be signed with every partner state when all the necessary conditions are to be fulfilled, therefore we cannot speak anymore about one size fits all as in the case of the ENP. The EU puts to its partners' disposal the Comprehensive Institutional Building Programme meant to increase the public administration's competences and efficiency in all EaP member states²¹. This program had a budget of 175

¹⁶ Chen, 21-22.

¹⁷ Artur Gruszczak, „The Securitization of the Eastern Borders of the European Union. Walls or Bridges?” (paper to the UACES 40th Annual Conference Exchanging Ideas on Europe: Europe at a Crossroads, Bruges, 6-8 September 2010), accessed June 1, 2012, <http://www.uaces.org/pdf/papers/1001/gruszczak.pdf>.

¹⁸ Ibid., 13-15.

¹⁹ Chen, 23.

²⁰ European Commission External Relations Directorate, General Directorate European Neighbourhood Policy, “Vademecum on Financing in the Frame of the Eastern Partnership,” 3-4, accessed September 11, 2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/eap_vademecum_14122009_en.pdf.

²¹ Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Eastern Partnership,” COM(2008) 823 final, 4, accessed September 11, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/eastern_partnership/documents/eastern_partnership_communication_from_the_commission_to_the_european_parliament_and_the_council_en.pdf.

million euro and encompasses activities like: twinning, trainings, expert exchanges, internships, mobility grant, etc²².

In 2013, ante-Vilnius the closest state to sign an AA was Ukraine, but given the external pressures from Russia, the domestic fragmentation especially at the level of population, the high level of corruption, Iulia Timoshenko's case, this event had little chances to be accomplished. Ukraine was closely followed by Moldova that had more chances to initial an AA rather than to sign it. The motives could have been procedural: Kiev started the negotiations with two years earlier than Chisinau did and it finalized then in December 2011 and initialized the AA in March 2012. The negotiations between the EU and Moldova were finalized in June 2013. Regarding Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, they did not fulfil the requirements ante Vilnius or they did not want to sign an AA, as is the case of Armenia, which already declared that it wants to be part of the Custom Union with Russia²³. Georgia registered a positive trend closing 23 chapters from a total of 26 regarding the economical policies, while Azerbaijan succeeded in closing 14 of them²⁴. Belarus is already part of Custom Union²⁵ and it did not participate to the bilateral meeting that were taking place within the program²⁶.

Another sector that is targeted through the bilateral dimension is the economical integration in order to develop the free trade agreements²⁷. One essential condition in this sense is that the partner states to accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Georgia became member in 2000, Moldova in 2001, thus after the EaP was released, Ukraine in 2008 and Armenia in 2003. Belarus and Azerbaijan were not members of this organization²⁸, fact that can reveal two aspects: one, they cannot be part of this international structure due to procedural objective reasons or they do not want to. This last possible reason can affect the efficiency of EaP also since it is not correlated with the desires and need of the partner states or that it does not offer enough incentives in order to determine its partner states to make the necessary adjustments in order to be members of WTO.

The last major chapter of the program is called mobility and security. This one encompasses the necessary requirements in order to lift the visa²⁹. In this case, ante Vilnius the Republic of Moldova was the sole state that was close enough to fulfil of the requirements for visa lifting in the case of travels that do not exceed 90 days.

Regarding the last two subchapters of the bilateral dimension, they refer to energy security and support for social and economic development. The last refers to the problems that the partner states face in order to eliminate regional disparities or the social ones that

²² European Commission, "Vademecum," 4.

²³ "EU Loses Armenia to Russia's Customs Union," *Euractiv*, 4-5 September 2013, accessed September 11, 2013, <http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/eu-loses-armenia-russia-customs-news-530224>.

²⁴ European Commission, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, „Joint Staff Working Document. Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2012 Regional Report: Eastern Partnership,” Brussels, 27.3.2014, SWD(2014) 99 final, 11, accessed March 11, 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/2014/regional/eastern_partnership_report.pdf.

²⁵ Olga Shumylo-Tapiola, "The Eurasian Customs Union: Friend or Foe of the EU?," 3 octombrie 2012, accessed September 11, 2013, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/10/03/eurasian-customs-union-friend-or-foe-of-eu/dyir>.

²⁶ European Commission, "Joint Staff Working Document," 11.

²⁷ Commission of the European Communities, "Communication from the Commission," 4.

²⁸ World Trade Organization, "Members and Observers," accessed September 11, 2013, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.

²⁹ Commission of the European Communities, "Communication from the Commission," 6.

emerged from religious, cultural, historic, ethnic differences. In order to tackle these issues, the EU offers funds for cross-border cooperation, transnational programs, and pilot regional programs. The states can also sign a Memorandum through which the EU ensures its assistance in what concerns its experts and networks at the local and national administration level³⁰. Regarding the energy security, this is a very important dimension for both the EU and its partner states, all having in common external factor, the exporter. Regardless of this aspect, we cannot find another common point for all states involved: on one side, we can identify the importers: large part of the EU member states, Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, etc; on the other, Azerbaijan is an exporting state; additionally, Ukraine and Belarus are transit countries fact that provides them a better position at the negotiating table regarding their energy security³¹.

The relationship between Azerbaijan and the EU is crucial in terms of energy. The EU is producing only 43% of its necessary, the rest being imported from Russia (53%), Norway (32%) and Algeria (15%). A study made in January 2009 by a group of European experts showed that the quantities of Russian gas that were transported to European consumer countries are about 300 billion cubic meters (34% of EU imports of gas), with 80% the use of Ukraine as a country transit. Of this amount: Germany uses- 96 million cubic meters, Italy - 60.5 million, France - 27.4 million, Hungary - 38 million, United Kingdom - 23.8 million, Poland - 21 million, Czech Republic - 18 million, Austria - 11mil, Romania - 15 million, Greece - 7.4 million cubic meters, Bulgaria - 9.7 million, Serbia - 10 million, Macedonia - 0.3 million, Croatia - 3 million, Belgium - 8.8 million, Sweden - 1.1 million , Finland - 13.4 million, Slovenia - 1.9 million, Slovakia - 19 million, Moldova - 3.8 million etc³². Given the unpredictability of Russia and the increased level of dependency on its energy, the EU needed to diversify its sources of supply. In this sense Nabucco project was created, having Azerbaijan as an energy supplier³³. But given the European differences regarding this project and South Stream, the Georgian war, the lack of investors and Azerbaijan traditional balancing policy, in 2013 the European Commission renounced to the project³⁴. From this point of view, the EaP program is a failure, since its components choose other external alternatives, although the EU created several incentives. Maybe these were not enough, or maybe they were not what the partner countries were expecting, because, at a closer look, the EU is offering closer cooperation with its structures, but in the end no membership perspectives arose although some EaP states performed the necessary reforms having in mind this desiderate. Moreover, the program seems not to take into consideration the context, meaning Russia and its traditional policy regarding the Eastern post-soviet non-EU member states, fact that would be seen after the Vilnius Summit through the Ukrainian crisis.

³⁰³⁰ Ibid., 8.

³¹ Energy Community, "Members," accessed September 11, 2013, http://www.energy-community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/MEMBERS.

³² "European Dependence on Russian Gas," 14 January 2009, accessed February 17, 2010, http://rt.com/Top_News/2009-01-14/European_dependence_on_Russian_gas.html.

³³ „Nabucco și AGRI fără gaz” [Nabucco and AGRI without gas], *Focus energetic* [Focus energy], 23 January 2012, accessed June 15, 2014, <http://www.focus-energetic.ro/nabucco-si-agri-fara-gaz-6529.html>.

³⁴ Clara Weiss, "European Union's Nabucco Pipeline Project Aborted," 13 July 2014, accessed September 11, 2014, <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/07/13/nabu-j13.html>.

Conclusions

In consequence, this middle way offered by the program worked counterproductive for both the EU and its external partners. If we correlate the perceived needs of the partners with the activities and the purpose of the program we will see that often they do not converge, being rather a middle way in which the EU was trying to implement an incremental method in order to develop an economic and political relationship with six Eastern European states without giving clear perspectives. On one hand we can identify: states that wanted to become EU member states like Moldova, Georgia and to a certain extent Ukraine, states that did not want to develop a closer approach towards the EU like Belarus and Armenia, states that wanted to balance both the EU and Russia like Azerbaijan, state that presented domestic vulnerabilities like frozen conflicts: Moldova-Transnistria, Georgia-South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Armenia and Azerbaijan-Nagorno Karabach; states that present themselves with a large number of Russian speaking minorities, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia; states that have foreign military presence on their territories, Moldova, etc. If we correlate the purpose of the program with the EU's general need to create a safe and predictable neighbourhood, we will see that not even in this case the program is successful, taking into consideration that this initiative generated an antagonistic response from Russia, fact that would automatically destabilize the area. Therefore, a bottom up approach in terms of foreign affairs can work in a regressive way if the bargaining process does not generate a common position that is also coherent and passes the time test.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Brie, Mircea, Ioan Horga, "Le frontiere europeee – espressioni dell'identita", *Transylvanian Review*, vol. XXIII, Supplement No.1, 2014, 202-216.
- Chen, Huey-Tsyn. "Practical Program Evaluation: Assessing and Improving Planning, Implementation, and Effectiveness." London: Sage Publication, 2005.
- Commission of the European Communities, "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Eastern Partnership." COM(2008) 823 final. Accessed September 11, 2013. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/eastern_partnership/documents/eastern_partnership_communication_from_the_commission_to_the_european_parliament_and_the_council_en.pdf.
- "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours". COM(2003)104 final. Accessed March 20, 2013. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0104:FIN:EN:PDF>.
- Council of the European Union. „Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit.” Prague, 7 May 2009. Accessed September 11, 2013. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/eastern_partnership/documents/prague_summit_declaration_en.pdf.
- Dogot, Cristina-Maria, Ioan Horga "Enlargement Process, Classic Geopolitics, and EU Internal Priorities, in, in *Eurolimes, 13, Permeability and the Impermeability of Socio- Economic Frontiers within European Union*, eds., Violene Deltai, Cristina Maria Dogor, Gabor Kozma, Jaroslaw Kundera, (Oradea/Bruxelles: Oradea University Press/Braylant, 2009): 161-183

- Dogot, Cristina-Maria. „European Union, Russia, and ENP/EaP Countries.” In *The EU as a Model of Soft Power in the Eastern Neighbourhood*, edited by Ramona Frunză, Gabriela Carmen Pascariu, Teodor Moga, 385-398. EURINT Conference Proceedings, 15-17 May 2013. Iași: Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” Iași, 2013.
- Draus, Jan. “Polish-Ukrainian Relations after Independence.” *NowaUkraina*, 2011. Accessed 11 September 2013. http://nowaukraina.org/nu_11_2011/06_Draus.pdf.
- Energy Community. „Members.” Accessed September 11, 2013. http://www.energy-community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/MEMBERS.
- European Commission External Relations Directorate, General Directorate European Neighbourhood Policy. “Vademecum on Financing in the Frame of the Eastern Partnership.” Accessed September 11, 2013. http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/eap_vademecum_14122009_en.pdf.
- European Commission, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. „Joint Staff Working Document. Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2012 Regional Report: Eastern Partnership.” Brussels, 27.3.2014, SWD(2014) 99 final. Accessed March 11, 2014. http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/2014/regional/eastern_partnership_report.pdf.
- European Council. “A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy.” Brussels, 12 December 2003. Accessed March 23, 2014. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.
- “European Dependence on Russian Gas.” 14 January 2009. accessed February 17, 2010. http://rt.com/Top_News/2009-01-14/European_dependence_on_Russian_gas.html.
- „EU Loses Armenia to Russia’s Customs Union.” *Euractiv*, 4-5 September 2013. Accessed September 11, 2013. <http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/eu-loses-armenia-russia-customs-news-530224>.
- Gruszczak, Artur. „The Securitization of the Eastern Borders of the European Union. Walls or Bridges?” Paper to the UACES 40th Annual Conference Exchanging Ideas on Europe: Europe at a Crossroads, Bruges, 6-8 September 2010. Accessed September 11, 2013. <http://www.uaces.org/pdf/papers/1001/gruszczak.pdf>.
- Horga, Ioan “Deepening/Weedening EU Building versus Debordering/Rebordering of EU Frontiers.” In *Communicating the EU Policies Beyond the Borders: Proposals for Constructive Neighbour Relations and the New EU External Communication Strategy*, edited by Ioan Horga and Ariane Landuyt, 27-37. Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2013.
- Horga, Ioan, Ariane Landuyt, *Communicating the EU Policies Beyond the Borders: Proposals for Constructive Neighbour Relations and the New EU External Communication Strategy*, Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2013
- Horga, Ioan, Grigore Silași, István Süli-Zakar, Stanisław Sagan. *The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighbourhood Policy*. Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2009.
- Longhurst, Kerry, and Susanne Nies. “Recasting Relations with the Neighbours -Prospects for the Eastern Partnership.” *IFRI*, February 2009. Accessed 11 March 2014. http://www.ifri.org/files/Europe_visions/Europe_Visions_4.pdf.
- Maron, Fabienne, Renaud de La Brosse, and Ioan Horga. *Media and The Good Governance Facing the Challenge of the EU Enlargement*. Bruxelles: IISA, 2005.
- „Nabucco și AGRI fără gaz” [Nabucco and AGRI without gas]. *Focus energetic* [Focus energy]. 23 January 2012. Accessed June 15, 2014. <http://www.focus-energetic.ro/nabucco-si-agri-fara-gaz-6529.html>.

- Pop, Adrian, Gabriela Pascariu, George Anglițoiu, and Alexandru Purcăruș. “România și Republica Moldova – între Politica Europeană de Vecinătate și perspectiva extinderii Uniunii Europene” [Romania and Republic of Moldova – between European Neighbourhood Policy and the perspective of European Union enlargement]. *Institutul European din România – Studii de impact III*, Accessed March 11, 2013. http://www.ier.ro/documente/studiideimpactPaisIII_ro/Pais3_studiu_5_ro.pdf.
- Shumylo-Tapiola, Olga. “The Eurasian Customs Union: Friend or Foe of the EU?.” 3 October 2012. Accessed September 11, 2013. <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/10/03/eurasian-customs-union-friend-or-foe-of-eu/dyir>.
- Smith, Karen. “The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy.” *International Affairs* 81, 4 (2005).
- Weiss, Clara. „European Union’s Nabucco Pipeline Project Aborted.” 13 July 2014. Accessed September 11, 2014. <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/07/13/nabu-j13.html>
- World Trade Organization. „Members and Observers.” Accessed September 11, 2013. http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.

The Geopolitical Crisis and Instability Factors within the Black Sea Region

Anastasiia GAVIUK*

Abstract: *The issue of the Black Sea region is a vexing topic amongst the scientific community, as it can be qualified as a region of cooperation, but also as a confrontation area for the external and internal forces. Therefore, the list of instability factors in the region has been expanded due to the geopolitical fracture between the Euro Atlantic powers and Russian Federation. This turns the Black Sea region into "a threat to the foundations of the international peace system which was, paradoxically, created here in Yalta in 1945". As a result, the stability and security in the region have become an immediate concern to the EU. Among the main factors of instability in the Black Sea region we can draw our attention to the issue of the economic projects to diversify gas and energy supplies to Europe; the region's militarization and the issue of unresolved conflicts and territorial claims; the problem of regional organizations' low efficacy.*

Key words: *the Black Sea region, conflict of interests, geopolitical fracture, Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the Crimea.*

Introduction

Historically, the Black Sea region has always been a spot where economic, political, and strategic interests of the world's leading players are mixed up. It is impossible to avoid conflict of interests in the area where we have so many intertwined influences. Nowadays, it is common knowledge that the Black Sea region is rich in natural resources and has a great energy transport and export routes' system. However, it also has rough challenges that, in its turn, contribute to the contested nature of the region. Therefore, the issue of the Black Sea region is a vexing topic amongst the scientific community, as it can be qualified both as a region of cooperation, and as a confrontation area for the external and internal forces.

Starting with Romania and Bulgaria's accession to NATO in 2004 and to the EU in January 2007, the Black Sea region came into the focus of international attention. As a result, the stability and security in the region have become an immediate concern to the EU itself.

Therefore, the list of instability factors in the region has been expanded due to the geopolitical fracture between the European Union and the Customs Union, as well as between security forces – NATO and CSTO. Thus, new geopolitical challenges have emerged as a result of the Euro Atlantic powers and Russian Federation's confrontation. On one hand the EU, NATO, and the USA promote their interests in the former Soviet Union area and dynamically cooperate with Turkey, and on the other hand Russia considers the region to be its separate zone of dominance.

In 2008 the critical role of the region received its recognition again due to the armed conflict in Georgia, when Russia demonstrated its rough response to the increased presence of Western powers and Russia's political rivals in the Black Sea basin. Its sharp-elbowed behavior continued and, consequently, resulted into the annexation of the Crimea

* Yuri Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University. E-mail: rotkovskaya.nast@mail.ru.

in 2014¹. Such a flow of events makes it possible to assume that there is a new level of cold confrontation, and economic and geopolitical rivalry. This turns the Black Sea region into “a threat to the foundations of the international peace system which was, paradoxically, created here in Yalta in 1945”².

Thus, among the main factors of instability in the Black Sea region we can focus on the following.

Economic projects to diversify gas and energy supplies to Europe

All of the countries in the region have different dynamics and are heterogeneous in terms of size, economic development, security concerns and foreign policy priorities. But, there is only one common denominator for both fostering cooperation and catalyzing conflict in the Black Sea basin, and this is energy³. After the Persian Gulf region, it is the second-largest source of oil and natural gas along with its rich proven reserves of minerals and metals⁴. The oil fields of Baku (Azerbaijan) had global importance from the last decades of the nineteenth century until the middle of the twentieth century. Owing to the wealth and geopolitical value of the South Caucasus, it was a highly sought-after goal during World War I and World War II⁵.

However, today energy has become more of a controversial issue rather than a uniting one. Whether they like it or not, all countries in the region are involved in energy politics. And the controversy over the transport of Caspian oil and gas, involving all the major actors across the region, will continue into the future due to competing interests.

For example, the EU alongside with the US works out the project “Southern energy transportation corridor” – the gas supply from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan through Turkey⁶. Romania in its turn tries to make its dependence on Russian gas not so critical producing its own natural gas. But still, it is not capable yet to diversify its gas imports, which comes mainly from Russia⁷. At the same time, Kremlin officials have

¹ Michael Weiss, “Russia Stages a Coup in Crimea,” *The Daily Beast*, 03.01.2014, accessed November 20, 2014, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/03/01/so-russia-invaded-crimea.html>.

² Iryna Kutsiuk, “Чорноморський регіон – лінія нового геополітичного розламу” [The Black Sea region as a new geopolitical fracture line], *UA Foreign Affairs*, 31.03.2014, accessed November 18, 2014, <http://uaforeignaffairs.com/ua/ekspertna-dumka/view/article/chornomorskii-region-linija-novogo-geopolitichno-go-r/>.

³ Dr Sohbet Karbuz, “Losing the Energy Battle: How and Why the US and EU Need to Engage the Black Sea Region,” *Journal of Energy Security*, 26 July 2010, accessed November 18, 2014, http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=255:losing-the-battle-why-and-how-the-united-states-and-europe-need-to-engage-the-black-sea-region&catid=108:energysecuritycontent&Itemid=365.

⁴ Erhan Büyükkakıncı, “Security Issues and Patterns of Cooperation in the Black Sea Region” (at the 3rd BSARG (the Black Sea Research Group) Meeting, “GUUAM-Myth or Reality in the Aspect of the Black Sea Regional Security,” 20 June 2001, Simferopol).

⁵ Revaz Gachechiladze, “Geopolitics in the South Caucasus: Local and External Players,” *Gepolitics* 7, 1 (Summer 2002): 113.

⁶ Gareth M. Winrow, “The Southern Gas Corridor and Turkey’s Role as an Energy Transit State and Energy Hub,” *Insight Turkey* 15, 1 (2013), accessed November 20, 2014, http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight-turkey-vol_15_no_1_2013_winrow.pdf.

⁷ “Кризa в Україні: яку стратегію обере Румунія?” [Crisis in Ukraine: which strategy will Romania choose], *Geostrategy*, 27 May 2014, accessed October 28, 2014, <http://geostrategy.ua/node/803>.

actively developed economic projects to diversify gas supplies to Europe bypassing Ukrainian territory – the “South Stream” under the Black Sea⁸.

As we can see, the Black Sea region is a nexus of multiple oil and gas pipelines and pipeline projects. According to John M. Roberts⁹, the principal geographical elements are as follows. In the Southeast, **Georgia** is already playing a major role in energy transit as a host country for *Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline* and its natural gas twin, *South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP)*.

Turkey, naturally, also plays a major role in the currently erratic delivery of Iraqi crude to market via Ceyhan while its gas pipeline system may yet carry gas from Iraq, Iran and a wide range of other current or potential gas producers to European markets. **Bulgaria and Romania** are both involved in existing gas transit south from Russia to Turkey as well as in proposals for gas supplies heading in the opposite direction from Turkey to the great European gas distribution centre of Baumgarten in Austria. Furthermore, they are looking for a new ‘Bosporus bypass’ pipelines that would enable Russian and Caspian oil reach European markets without transiting the congested Turkish straits.

Ukraine occupies a unique position since it already possesses a pipeline - the Odessa-Brody line, which could be used either as a Bosporus bypass or as a means for enabling Russia to expand its own exports, but at a cost of increased oil traffic through the Bosporus. However, its most important function relates to gas since some 90 per cent of Russian gas exports to Europe currently transit Ukraine en route to market.

Finally, there is **Russia** itself. Contrary to the Black Sea littoral states, Russia is both a supplier and transit state. Its triangular relationship with Ukraine and Turkmenistan remains of crucial importance to European energy security, as it was demonstrated during the gas cut-off imbroglio in early 2006. The principal political and economic elements concern the question of how to resolve the Turkish straits issue with regard to oil, and, for gas, whether or how to use prospective new supply routes through the Caucasus, Turkey and the Balkans to reduce European reliance on Russian gas supplies or prompt Russia into adopting a less monopolistic approach to its role as a transit country¹⁰.

In order to reduce its reliance on gas supplies from Russia, the EU is pushing for the construction of three new pipelines in the region, which would ultimately bring natural gas from the Caspian Basin and from as far away as Iraq to Europe.

The three pipelines are *Nabucco*, running from the eastern border of Turkey to Austria; *White Stream*, running from Georgia under the Black Sea to Romania; and the *Interconnector between Turkey and Greece and Italy (ITGI)*¹¹. However, the list of the Black Sea pipeline options and projects to bring gas and oil to Western markets extends further.

The issue of unresolved conflicts and territorial claims

Another instability factor is militarization and complete destabilization of situation in the Black Sea region. It should be noted, that separatist movements in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have a serious impact on Moldova and Georgia.

⁸ “Gazprom,” accessed October 30, 2014, <http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/pipelines/south-stream/>.

⁹ John M. Roberts, “The Black Sea and European Energy Security,” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 6, 2 (2006): 207-223.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 207-209.

¹¹ Antoine Blua, “EU Agrees Deal on Energy Links with 'Southern Corridor',” *Radio Free Europe*, 08 May 2009, accessed November 16, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_Meeting_Focuses_On_Energy_Links_With_Southern_Corridor/1624233.html.

They inhibit their Euro-Atlantic aspirations and threaten their territorial integrity. Regrettably, present-day news discloses the same challenge to be faced by Ukraine concerning the Crimea and its Eastern regions. The brutal annexation of the Crimea due to which Russia expanded its military and political presence in the Black Sea region may cause a serious redistribution of power balance in this area. It also demonstrates a lack of reliable guarantees against aggression and external interference. Moreover, such kind of events can reach and influence far more countries of the Eastern Europe and Europe as a whole.

However, the internal stability and Ukraine's role in the international relations will depend primarily on internal reforms and changes, including the opportunities provided by the Association Agreement with the EU, the decentralization of power and resolution of socio-cultural contradictions¹².

The current state of international relations reflects the crisis of the European security system, at least in the sense in which this complex of relationship was considered to be normal, traditional and more or less acceptable for its participators in the last two decades. As for Ukraine's place in this process, the question is about the difficulty of membership in regional collective security systems or bilateral defense alliances with the corresponding set of specified liabilities. The current state of Ukraine reflects the acceptability or unacceptability of massive destabilizing influence of one participant of the conventional system of European security on another. Especially, if such an impact is accompanied by task-oriented propaganda, the annexation of the territory, sabotage, the supply of military equipment, heavy weapons and ammunition.

In its broad sense the external dimension of the Ukrainian crisis opens a question about the observance of generally recognized "rules of the game", also about how the contractual and legal standards and principles of multilateral cooperation are taken into account, and the participants' willingness to seek mutually agreed approaches in situations that reveal the fundamental divergence of leading actors' interests¹³.

The problem of low efficiency of regional organizations

All above mentioned should also be appended with the problem of low efficiency of regional organizations (BSEC and others) and the inability of the regional countries to improve political dimension of their cooperation. Despite large number of different regional structures, in reality, none of them can take responsibility to prevent regional conflicts and become a guarantor of the Black Sea region's security. Thus, nowadays, the naval operational group BLACKSEAFOR which celebrated its 10th anniversary in 2011 doesn't seem to be the uniting force able to solve urgent issues of security.

Over the past decade, a prospective naval project that used to face regional security challenges, gradually lost its political capacity and ceased to develop. According to experts, BLACKSEAFOR has turned into a "club" and not a naval "block", where the

¹² Sergiy Tolstov, "Проблеми та пріоритети України в умовах кризи європейської безпеки// Зовнішні справи" [The problems and priorities of Ukraine in the condition of the European security crisis], *UA Foreign Affairs*, 07.08.2014, accessed November 16, 2014, <http://uaforeignaffairs.com/en/expert-opinion/view/article/problemi-ta-prioriteti-ukrajini-v-umovakh-krizi-jevropei/>.

¹³ Ibid.

military of member states can directly solve narrowly applied problems of military and military-technical cooperation¹⁴.

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) being the largest regional organization, also cannot accept the security function, as since its establishment in 1992 it has positioned itself as the structure responsible for implementing economic projects. Such kind of position is motivated by the fact that regional countries' interests in the foreign policy often do not match. The BSEC's attempt to discuss regional security issues, such as the resolution of "frozen" conflicts will badly affect regional economic cooperation.

Meanwhile, the lack of regional mechanisms that guarantee the stability and security of the Black Sea region leads to the fact that other international players (first of all such as the US and the EU) are beginning to determine these issues. Therefore, afore-done research enables us to understand that effective regional cooperation should be based not only on the economic but also on the political and military ground.

Conclusion

To sum it up, we can state that the current crisis in the Black Sea region is the result of both previous and latter problems. The Black Sea region is increasingly becoming a critical strategic crossroads in the 21st century geopolitics. If the EU is serious about the diversification of its energy supplies and improving its longterm energy security, the region must become a priority for the EU, because its oil and especially gas options will heavily depend on it.

The current state of international relations reflects the crisis of the European security system and it also demonstrates a lack of reliable guarantees against aggression and external interference. Therefore, effective regional cooperation should be based not only on the economic but also on the political and military ground. Prospects for the Black Sea region in the 21st century will be shaped by the interaction between major external actors, the ambitions of states and people in the region, and the region's role as a crossroads of civilizations.

Thus, establishing reliable mechanisms of ensuring security in the spirit of mutually beneficial and non-discriminatory international cooperation and frank dialogue among all actors in the Black Sea and Caspian region is of paramount importance.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Blua, Antoine. "EU Agrees Deal on Energy Links with 'Southern Corridor'." *Radio Free Europe*, 08 May 2009. Accessed November 16, 2014. http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_Meeting_Focuses_On_Energy_Links_With_Southern_Corridor/1624233.html.
- Büyükkakıncı, Erhan. "Security Issues and Patterns of Cooperation in the Black Sea Region." At the 3rd BSARG (the Black Sea Research Group) Meeting, "GUUAM-Myth or Reality in the Aspect of the Black Sea Regional Security," 20 June 2001, Simferepol.
- "Чорноморський регіон: Зона особливих інтересів Росії" [The Black Sea region: Russia's special zone of interest]. *Військова панорама* [Viys'kova panorama], 8

¹⁴ "Чорноморський регіон: Зона особливих інтересів Росії" [The Black Sea region: Russia's special zone of interest], *Військова панорама* [Viys'kova panorama], 8 February 2013, accessed 18.11.2014, <http://wartime.org.ua/5189-chornomorskiy-regon-zona-osoblivih-nteresv-rosyi.html>.

- February 2013. Accessed 18.11.2014. <http://wartime.org.ua/5189-chornomorskiy-region-zona-osoblivih-nteresv-rosvi.html>.
- “Криза в Україні: яку стратегію обере Румунія?” [Crisis in Ukraine: which strategy will Romania choose]. *Geostrategy*, 27 May 2014. Accessed October 28, 2014. <http://geostrategy.ua/node/803>.
- Gachechiladze, Revaz. “Geopolitics in the South Caucasus: Local and External Players.” *Gepolitics* 7, 1 (Summer 2002): 113-138.
- “Gazprom.” Accessed October 30, 2014. <http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/pipelines/south-stream/>.
- Horga, Ioan, Grigore Silași, István Süli-Zakar, Stanisław Sagan. *The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighbourhood Policy*. Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2009.
- Karbuz, Sohbet. Dr. “Losing the Energy Battle: How and Why the US and EU Need to Engage the Black Sea Region.” *Journal of Energy Security*, 26 July 2010. Accessed November 18, 2014. http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=255:losing-the-battle-why-and-how-the-united-states-and-europe-need-to-engage-the-black-sea-region&catid=108:energysecuritycontent&Itemid=365.
- Kutsiuk, Iryna. “Чорноморський регіон – лінія нового геополітичного розламу” [The Black Sea region as a new geopolitical fracture line]. *UA Foreign Affairs*, 31.03.2014. Accessed November 18, 2014. <http://uaforeignaffairs.com/ua/ekspertna-dumka/view/article/chornomorskii-region-linija-novogo-geopolitichnogo-r/>.
- Roberts, John M. “The Black Sea and European Energy Security.” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 6, 2 (2006): 207-223.
- Tolstov, Sergiy. “Проблеми та пріоритети України в умовах кризи європейської безпеки // Зовнішні справи” [The problems and priorities of Ukraine in the condition of the European security crisis]. *UA Foreign Affairs*, 07.08.2014. Accessed November 16, 2014. <http://uaforeignaffairs.com/en/expert-opinion/view/article/problemi-ta-prioriteti-ukrajini-v-umovakh-krizi-jevropei/>.
- Weiss, Michael. “Russia Stages a Coup in Crimea.” *The Daily Beast*, 03.01.2014. Accessed November 20, 2014. <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/03/01/so-russia-invaded-crimea.html>.
- Winrow, Gareth M. “The Southern Gas Corridor and Turkey’s Role as an Energy Transit State and Energy Hub.” *Insight Turkey* 15, 1 (2013): 145-163. Accessed November 20, 2014. http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight-turkey-vol_15_no_1_2013_winrow.pdf.

Solidarity and Equal Burden Sharing in the EU over Irregular Migration: Pervasive Reality or Bedtime Story?

Edina Lilla MÉSZÁROS and Ioan HORGA***

“Showing solidarity is a political act and by no means a form of moral selflessness...”¹

Abstract: *Since the establishment of the European Community, the existence or lack of solidarity among member states has been debated by the European policy-makers. Recently, the Lisbon Treaty saw the enshrinement of a solidarity clause, explicitly demanding upon EU member states to provide assistance to each other in time of emergencies, disasters, terrorist attacks or crises. In the spirit of this clause, our research wishes to demystify if there is solidarity in the EU over irregular immigration, and if there exists an equal distribution of burden and willingness to accept the burden among EU countries. As our main hypothesis, we consider that the EU is heading towards more security and no solidarity concerning irregular migration. In order to prove our assumptions, firstly, we analyze the solidarity within the borders of the Union, unfolding the behaviour of the European institutions and some EU countries while their fellow member states (e.g. Malta and Italy) deal with extraordinary waves of irregular immigrants, depicting the Schengen zone, as an area of mutual distrust. Secondly, we question the existing solidarity beyond the borders of the EU towards refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants, emphasizing on the existence of double standards when dealing with immigrants, showing a European Union whose solidarity is selective. We wonder whether the EU member states will manage to rise above their fragmented nation-state attitude, and whether they will be able to consolidate a powerful supranational European Union based on mutual trust and solidarity, successfully continuing to tell the story of Europe.*

Keywords: *welfare state system, Lampedusa, asylum policy, Dublin regulation, Schengen*

The principle of solidarity and the EU as a normative power

Before unfolding whether there is solidarity in the European Union over irregular immigration, it is essential to describe the meaning of the term *solidarity*. Making a short historical glance we find out that the French Revolution is considered as the birth moment of the modern notion of solidarity. Initially the concept of “solidarity” was linked to that of *fraternité*, which assured subsistence for the poor citizens in case of need, the assistance given to these being declared a fundamental right in France in 1790. But the idea of solidarity carried a deeper meaning, a shared responsibility for a common objective, a common good, not only serving the interests of an individual. Thus solidarity acquired a

* Phd. Student, Babeş-Bolyai University, Faculty of History and Philosophy, International Relations and Security Studies Doctoral School

** Phd. Professor at the University of Oradea, Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Science and Communication Sciences.

¹ Jürgen Habermas, “Democracy, Solidarity and the European Crisis,” (Lecture Delivered by Professor Jürgen Habermas on 26th of April 2013 in Leuven), accessed February 28, 2014, <http://www.kuleuven.be/communicatie/evenementen/evenementen/jurgen-habermas/en/democracy-solidarity-and-the-european-crisis>.

political connotation, which was meant to secure the welfare and autonomy of every citizen, as a member of society.²

The Merriam Webster dictionary defines it as “a feeling of unity between people who have the same interests, goals”³, while in international public law one of the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly entitled *Promotion of a democratic and equitable international order* identifies it as a “fundamental value, by virtue of which global challenges must be managed in a way that distributes costs and burdens fairly, in accordance with basic principles of equity and social justice, and ensures that those who suffer or benefit the least receive help from those who benefit the most”⁴, both definitions implying a form of selflessness among actors.

Émil Durkheim, a French sociologist from the 19th century tried to find out what type of solidarity existed in relatively simple societies and what prevailed in the modern world, identifying two types of solidarity, a *mechanical* and an *organic* one. In Durkheim’s viewpoint *mechanical solidarity* is characteristic to traditional societies, which are small and homogenous, where human beings are engaged in similar activities, while modern societies, where members have different values and undertake distinct enterprises, are held together by an *organic solidarity*. In case of traditional societies, based on shared identity, solidarity is emotional, while in a more interdependent modern society, where members rely on each other, solidarity is rather functional than emotional. Thereby, in modern societies solidarity is not an expression of selflessness but a deliberate act of self-interest.⁵ Applying Durkheim’s models of solidarity perhaps the *organic* one could be the best implemented in the realities of the European Union.

Inspired by Durkheim’s work the authors of a publication of *Notre Europe*, a Paris based think tank, proposed two types of logics driving inter-state solidarity within the European Union, namely: logic based on *direct reciprocity* (according to this rationale an EU member state helps the others so that they would return the favour in the future in case of need) and a logic based on *enlightened self-interest* (one member state supports the others because it knows that acting in the interest of other EU members or in the interests of the EU as a whole ultimately serves its own self-interest).⁶ A good example of the first type of logic, *direct reciprocity* in the EU constitutes the *solidarity clause*, enshrined in Article 222⁷ of the Lisbon treaty, demanding upon EU member states to mutually help each other in time of emergencies, disasters, terrorist attacks or crises; and the European

² Philip Dann, “Solidarity and the Law of Development Cooperation,” in *Solidarity: A Structural Principle of International Law*, ed. Rüdiger Wolfrum and Chie Kojima (Heidelberg: Springer, 2010), 56-57.

³ Merriam Webster Dictionary, “Definition of the Term Solidarity,” accessed February 28, 2014, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/solidarity>.

⁴ Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Responsibility to Protect: Reflecting Solidarity,” in *Solidarity: A Structural Principle of International Law*, ed. Rüdiger Wolfrum and Chie Kojima (Heidelberg: Springer, 2010), 94.

⁵ Émil Durkheim, *The Division of Labour in Society* (Houndmills: The Macmillan Press, 1984), XIV.

⁶ Sofia Fernandes and Eulalia Rubio, “Solidarity within the Eurozone: How Much, What for, for How Long?,” *Notre Europe*, Policy Paper 5 (2012): 4-5, accessed March 2, 2014, <http://www.eng.notre-europe.eu/011-3089-Solidarity-within-the-Eurozone-how-much-what-for-how-long.html>.

⁷ “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,” Article 222, *Official Journal of the European Union*, 2010/C 83/01, 150, accessed March 3, 2014, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:SOM:en:HTML>.

Solidarity Fund⁸, developed in order to help members states affected by natural disasters. Under the aegis of the classical mutual insurance scheme EU member states engage themselves to reciprocally assist each other in face of risks, to which all of them are exposed. Here the focus is not on the altruist act of providing aid, but on the interest based on direct reciprocity, as the perils occur randomly, today's provider of help can be tomorrow's beneficiary.⁹

The EU's Cohesion Policy could be named an example for the second logic, *enlightened self-interest* driving interstate solidarity within the European Community, where solidarity is a result of the general perception that supporting the recipient countries would ultimately bring benefits to the donor countries. Under this rationale the wealthier countries help the poorer ones in exchange of the engagement of the latter to the conditions set by them, which on long term signify more benefits for the richer than for the poorer countries. Outside the intra-EU rationale we could argue that EU's Neighbourhood Policy¹⁰ or Common Migration Policy is also driven by *enlightened self-interest*. The Community in exchange of financial assistance demands from the neighbourhood countries the adherence to certain values and principles and to comply with some requirements.

Perhaps, the distinguished reader might wonder what connection is between the principle of solidarity and the normative nature of the EU, as it was heralded in the title of the first subchapter of our empirical research. This enigma will be disclosed in the following lines.

Midst the debates concerning the civilian or military nature of the European Union during its historical development, appeared Ian Manners, devotee of social constructivism introducing the concept of *Normative Power Europe*.¹¹ In his view, the EU can be described as a normative power, characterized by common values, which has the ability to create its own rules and norms within the borders of rational judgment. According to the thesis of normative power, the EU is an entity that primarily manifests itself by well-established norms, departing from the classical norms and values such as freedom, democracy, rule of law, and human rights to basic goals such as social development and lack of discrimination, culminating in the Copenhagen Criteria and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Manners concluded that the Union's international identity is embodied by these rules and objectives. This normative character is embedded in the 2nd Article of the Treaty of Maastricht, affirming that "the Union is founded on the values of

⁸ European Commission, Regional Policy, "EU Solidarity Fund," accessed March 2, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/solidarity/index_en.cfm.

⁹ Fernandes, 5.

¹⁰ Ioan Horga, Grigore Silași, István Süli-Zakar, Stanisław Sagan. *The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighbourhood Policy*. Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2009; Cristina-Maria Dogot, Ioan Horga "Enlargement Process, Classic Geopolitics, and EU Internal Priorities, in, in *Eurotimes, 13, Permeability and the Impermeability of Socio- Economic Frontiers within European Union*, eds., Violene Deltai, Cristina Maria Dogor, Gabor Kozma, Jaroslaw Kundera, (Oradea/Bruxelles: Oradea University Press/Bruylant, 2009): 161-183; Cristina-Maria Dogot, „European Union, Russia, and ENP/EaP Countries.” In *The EU as a Model of Soft Power in the Eastern Neighbourhood*, edited by Ramona Frunză, Gabriela Carmen Pascariu, Teodor Moga, 385-398. EURINT Conference Proceedings, 15-17 May 2013. Iași: Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” Iași, 2013; Ioan Horga, Ariane Landuyt, *Communicating the EU Policies Beyond the Borders: Proposals for Constructive Neighbour Relations and the New EU External Communication Strategy*, Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2013.

¹¹ Richard G. Whitman, "Norms, Power and Europe: A New Agenda for Study of the EU and of International Relations," in *Normative Power Europe. Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, ed. Richard G. Whitman (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 1.

respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”¹² The same common values are echoed in José Manuel Durão Barroso’s, President of the European Commission speech held at the official ceremony to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome explaining that “our unity is based on deep ties: common roots and common values. It is those values that make us a Community and a Union, not just a market. The triumph of the last 50 years has been the triumph of those values in Europe, of freedom and solidarity, delivered through a Community of law. Our challenge for the next 50 years is to propose, but not to impose, those values beyond Europe’s borders. This is the unfinished European adventure.”¹³

We acknowledge that when developing the concept of the *Normative Power Europe*, Manners mostly referred to the actorness of the EU in international politics, the normative power theory invoking the Union’s desire and ability to set standards for others, by spreading its norms and values rather than using military might for persuasive purposes. If the relations between the Union and third parties are supposed to be based on core values and principles like solidarity, one could expect the intra-European (between the EU member states) relations to be governed by the exact same principles, implying different forms of acts of altruism.

So departing from the normative nature of the EU, characterized by the adherence to common values and principles of its members states, we contend that the consciousness of being mutually dependent on each other for the preservation of common goals and for the sustenance of the welfare state system is what has guided the inter-state solidarity links during the development of the European integration project, not a genuine desire help the fellow state.¹⁴ The entire history of the European integration lies under the auspices of self-interest, and one of the main objectives of our research is to reveal whether there exists solidarity between member states, in the field of asylum and immigration, and if there exists, is it based on acts of genuine altruism or it’s driven by the self-centeredness of member states?...

What is solidarity within the framework of the European Union?

Implementing this notion in the milieu of the European Communities it is revealed to us that since its foundation “solidarity” has been one of the guiding principles of the European integration project. Although this concept was incorporated in the preamble of the Treaty establishing the European Steel and Coal Community more than six decades ago, recognizing “that Europe can be built only through real practical achievements which will first of all create real solidarity, and through the establishment of common bases for economic development”¹⁵, at the beginning it was driven by the veiled desire of nations states to achieve their self-interests, rather than by the unifying dreams of the European

¹² Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 2, 19.

¹³ “A Stronger Europe for a Successful Globalization,” (speech by Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, President of the European Commission at the Official Ceremony to Celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Signing of the Treaties of Rome, 25.03.2007), accessed March 2, 2014, http://www.eu2007.de/en/News/Speeches_Interviews/March/0325Barroso.html.

¹⁴ Fernandes, 4.

¹⁵ “Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community,” Paris, 18 April 1951, 3, accessed March 1, 2014, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:11951K:EN:PDF>.

federalists. The principle of solidarity made possible for the founding member states to pursue their own agenda and objectives under the protective arms of a supranational entity.¹⁶

In the preamble of the Treaty establishing the European Union is written the contracting parties' desire to deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions,¹⁷ while the 3rd Article charges the Union to organise the relations between the member states and between their citizens in a manner showing solidarity and consistency.¹⁸ This principle is reiterated in the Preamble and Article 1 of the Amsterdam Treaty supplemented with a mandatory task of member states to "support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity".¹⁹

The most recent treaty, which represents the legal backbone of the Union, the Treaty of Lisbon also stands under the principle of *solidarity*, just in comparison with the previous EC/EU frameworks treaties it makes a clear distinction between different types of solidarities. It even enshrined a special *solidarity clause* for the first time in the history of the EU, emphasizing on the importance of mutual assistance given by member states to each other in time of natural or man made disasters or terrorist attacks, thus engaging even EU member states²⁰ which previously embraced a status of permanent neutrality, to offer help in the situations mentioned above.

As it was stressed before the Lisbon Treaty enumerates a variety of types of solidarity between member states, like financial solidarity, energy solidarity or asylum and border management solidarity, solidarity with third countries, and with people with disabilities. However, we will not bother with providing a thorough analysis of the different types of solidarities, our attention explicitly focusing on the lack or existence of solidarity manifested in the field of irregular immigration, refugees and asylum, this being a deliberate limitation within which we've confined our inquiry.

The principle of solidarity in migration policy

In the field of asylum, migration and border controls, the articles of the Lisbon Treaty highlight the reliance on the principle of solidarity and responsibility-sharing. However, it must be noticed that the principle of solidarity in the area of asylum, immigration and border control has appeared in other EU documents preceding Lisbon, such as the Dublin Convention (1990), Tampere European Council Conclusions (1999), Hague Programme (2004), European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (2008), Stockholm

¹⁶ Andreas Raspotnik et al., "The Issue of Solidarity in the European Union," (Discussion Paper prepared for the TEPSA Pre-Presidency Conference 14-15 June 2012, Cypriot EU Presidency 2012: Institutional consolidation and responding to new challenges Plenary Session, *Which kind of solidarity? An analysis of the sharpened debate on the EU in the member states*, 12 June 2012), 1, accessed February 28, 2014, <http://www.tepsa.eu/download/TEPSA%20Discussion%20Paper%20The%20issue%20of%20solidarity%20in%20the%20European%20Union.pdf>.

¹⁷ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 17.

¹⁸ Hanspeter Neuhold, "Common Security. The Litmus Test of International Solidarity," in *Solidarity: A Structural Principle of International Law*, ed. Rüdiger Wolfrum and Chie Kojima (Heidelberg: Springer, 2010), 212.

¹⁹ "Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on the European Union, The Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Related Acts," *Official Journal* C 340, 10 November 1997, Article 11, accessed March 3, 2014, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/html/11997D.html#0001010001>.

²⁰ Like Austria.

Programme (2010), EU's Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (2011), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on enhanced intra-EU solidarity in the field of asylum: An EU Agenda for better responsibility-sharing more mutual trust (2011) i.e.²¹

The Dublin Convention signed in 1990 by the EC member states laid down the rules concerning the assignment of responsibility for examining an asylum application, clearly stipulating that an asylum seeker can make only one application in the territory of the EC. Applying simultaneously in more than one country was considered an abuse of the asylum system.²² The 7th article of the convention is very explicit underlining that the state in charge for examining an application should be either the one in which the refugee first entered, or the state which had issued a visa.²³ If this was a country other than that in which the asylum seeker had lodged his/her application the applicant could be removed to that country. Although signed in 1990, it only came into force in 1997 after it has been ratified by EU member states.²⁴

In 2003 the Dublin Convention was revised by the Dublin Regulation reiterating the *principle of the first place of entrance*, meaning that the asylum seeker can lodge his/her application in the first country in which he/she arrived.²⁵

The principle of solidarity appears two times in the **Tampere European Council Conclusions** from 1999, emphasizing on the EU's normative nature, stressing that "the aim is an open and secure European Union, fully committed to the obligations of the Geneva Refugee Convention and other relevant human rights instruments, and able to respond to humanitarian needs on the basis of solidarity. A common approach must also be developed to ensure the integration into our societies of those third country nationals who are lawfully resident in the Union."²⁶ Furthermore Article 16 underlines the setup of efforts to reach agreement on the temporary protection for displaced person following the principle of solidarity between member countries.²⁷ The 1999 Tampere European Council Conclusions can boast with significant achievements in the field of asylum and migration, establishing a common EU asylum and migration policy, including partnership with countries of origin, a Common European Asylum System (CEAS), fair treatment of third- country nationals, and management of migration flows.²⁸

²¹ Iris Goldner Lang, "Is There Solidarity on Asylum and Migration in the EU," in *Croatian Yearbook of Law and Policy* 9, 9 (Prosinac 2013): 8, accessed March 5, 2014, http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=168957.

²² Teresa Hayter, *Open Border: The Case Against Immigration Controls* (London and Ann Arbor: Pluto press, 2004) Second Edition, 84-85

²³ "Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in of the Member States of the European Communities," in: *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 97/C 254/01, 19 August 1997, 4, accessed April 12, 2014, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:41997A0819%2801%29&from=EN>

²⁴ Hayter, 85.

²⁵ Vicki Squire, *The Exclusionary Politics of Asylum* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 80.

²⁶ "Presidency Conclusions Tampere European Council," 15 and 16 October 1999, Article 4, accessed March 4, 2014, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-r1.en9.htm.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Article 16.

²⁸ Alessandro D'Alfonso, "EU Funds for Asylum, Migration and Borders," *European Parliamentary Research Service Briefing* 11/02/2014, 3, accessed March 4, 2014,

The Hague Programme from 2004 was the first document in which the idea of financial solidarity in the field of asylum, migration and borders was introduced, underlining that this field “should be based on solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility including its financial implications and closer practical cooperation between Member States: technical assistance, training, and exchange of information, monitoring of the adequate and timely implementation and application of instruments as well as further harmonisation of legislation.”²⁹ The document also reiterates the principle of fair sharing of responsibilities between MS and welcomes the establishment of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, nicknamed Frontex.

A *Europe of responsibility, solidarity and partnership in migration and asylum matters* was foreseen by the **Stockholm Programme** from 2010, targeting the development of a forward-looking and comprehensive EU migration policy, based on solidarity and responsibility, with the objective of establishing a common asylum system till 2012.³⁰ The Stockholm Programme stresses the EU member countries to show effective solidarity towards their fellow member states facing particular migratory pressures.³¹ Besides the principle of *solidarity* and *responsibility sharing* the ethos of *mutual trust* is put forward, pointing out the existence of significant differences between national provisions and their application in the field of asylum, border and immigration. The establishment of a Common European Asylum system would contribute to a higher degree of harmonization of laws, and “common rules, as well as a better and more coherent application of them, should prevent or reduce secondary movements within the Union, and increase mutual trust between Member States.”³²

The migratory waves trained under the Arab Spring in 2011 had shown the incoherencies of the previous cooperation agreements on migration and border control with third countries, contributing to the elaboration of a new core document on the 18th of November 2011, entitled **The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility** (GAMM) regulating the relations between the EU and TCNs³³. The document emphasizes on the need to further tackle the phenomenon of irregular immigration also calling upon the improvement of the efficiency of the EU’s external borders on the basis of common *responsibility*, solidarity and greater practical cooperation.³⁴ **Promoting international protection and enhancing the external dimension of asylum policy** appears as the third

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2014/130663/LDM_BRI%282014%29130663_REV1_EN.pdf.

²⁹ “The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security, Justice in the European Union,” art. 1.2 Asylum Migration and Border Policy, *Official Journal of the European Union*, 2005/C 53/01, 3, accessed March 4, 2014, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2005:053:0001:0014:EN:PDF>.

³⁰ European Council, “Notices from European Union Institutions, Bodies, Offices and Agencies. The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens,” *Official Journal of the European Union*, 2010/C 115/01, 5, accessed March 5, 2014, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:115:0001:0038:EN:PDF>.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 32.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Third country nationals.

³⁴ European Commission, Communication, “The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility,” COM(2011) 743 final, Brussels, 18.11.2011, 5, accessed March 4, 2014, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0743:FIN:EN:PDF>.

pillar of the GAMM, pointing out the necessity of showing solidarity with refugees and displaced persons, thus reiterating the EU's normative nature.³⁵

In its **Communication COM(2011) 835** the Commission proposes the reinforcement of *intra-EU solidarity* on asylum around four axes: practical cooperation and technical assistance, financial solidarity, allocation of responsibilities, and improving tools for governance of the asylum system.³⁶ As echoed in the Stockholm Programme the principle of mutual trust among members also occupies a pivotal position in this document.

Solidarity in the field of asylum and migration policy is also expressed in various articles of the Lisbon Treaty. Even though the insurance of a common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control based on solidarity between the MS appears for the first time in the TFEU³⁷ in Article 67(2)³⁸, Article 80 is the most explicit formulation of the principle of solidarity, making a clear-cut reference to fair-sharing of responsibility, in the same time covering all policies on border checks, immigration and asylum.

Beside solidarity and fair-responsibility sharing both the EU and the member countries are bound by the doctrine of *sincere cooperation*, a principle developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union. The principle of *sincere cooperation* is enclosed in Article 4 (3)³⁹ of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) referring to the relations between the European Union (EU) and Member States and in Article 13(2)⁴⁰ to those between the EU institutions. Consequently, we may conclude that the principle of *sincere cooperation* is applicable to all policy areas, thus the member states and the EU are obliged to give assistance to each other in the field of asylum and immigration.

However all of us know that if something is enshrined in a document it doesn't mean that it's implemented in practice by the related parties. For this reason we have committed ourselves to try to elucidate this ambivalent dilemma in the upcoming lines.

Solidarity instruments provided by the EU in the field of immigration, asylum and border control

As a consequence of their geographic position, historical or cultural ties with certain countries⁴¹, or level of economic development, some EU member states are more

³⁵ Ibid., 17.

³⁶ European Commission, "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Enhanced Intra-EU Solidarity in the Field of Asylum: An EU Agenda for Better Responsibility-Sharing more Mutual Trust," COM (2011) 835 final, Brussels, 2.12.2011, 2, accessed March 4, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/201112/1_EN_ACT_part1_v6.pdf.

³⁷ Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or Lisbon Treaty.

³⁸ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 67(2), 75.

³⁹ "Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties." Ibid., 20.

⁴⁰ "Each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them. The institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation." Ibid., 24.

⁴¹ Here we refer especially to former colonizer countries like France, UK, Spain, which have close historical, cultural, linguistic ties with their former colonies. According to the **unified migration systems theory** what really determines the migration systems are the similar migratory patterns and continuous interplay of historical, economic, cultural and political relations between sending and receiving countries. Based on this approach migration occurs mainly between those regions that are already linked culturally, economically, historically or politically to each other. See:

predisposed to migratory waves than others. This creates an *asymmetry* regarding the monitoring of the EU's common external borders, as Yves Bertoncini, Secretary-General of Notre Europe ascertained in one of his declarations.⁴² To tackle this asymmetry, which is particularly detectable in terms of asylum seeking, and somehow to compensate those EU countries which are more exposed to major migratory flows than others, several solidarity mechanisms were developed by the EU's supranational institutions.

These solidarity mechanisms can be grouped in three categories: the first one grants financial assistance, the second one offers technical and operational assistance under the leadership of the EU's Border Agency, Frontex, while the last one permits the so called "sharing" of refugees, under the Temporary Protection Directive from 2001⁴³, which allows the hosting of refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring states if, the countries' hosting capacities in which they've lodged their asylum applications are saturated.

Financial solidarity instruments

For the 2007-2013 budgetary period the EU put on the disposal of member states four financial instruments in the field of asylum, immigration and border control under the umbrella of the Solidarity and the Management of Migration Flows (SOLID)⁴⁴ programme, which allocated 4 billion euro to migration issues. This counted for 0.4% of the EU's Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for that period, and was mostly implemented through "shared management", this meaning that every participating country performed actions in the context of national programmes.⁴⁵

As it is summarised in **Figure 1**, under the 2007-2013 funding period the EU introduced four funds, namely ERF (European Refugee Fund), EIF (European Integration Fund), RF (Return Fund) and finally the EBF (External Borders Fund), while in the communication of Commission entitled **Building an open and secure Europe: the home affairs budget for 2014-2020** from 2011 it has been decided to increase the home affairs budget to 10.9 billion (from 6.9 billion in 2007-2013) for the period 2014-2020 and also the financial framework undergone some modifications. In order to simplify the financial solidarity scheme only two funds were foreseen for the MFF 2014-2020, instead of the previously existing four, establishing the Asylum and Migration Fund (AMF) and the Internal Security Fund (ISF).

Belachev, Gebrewold, "Migration Theories and African Migration to Europe," in *Africa and Fortress Europe: Threats and Opportunities*, ed. Belachev Gebrewold (Aldershot: Ashgate Publication, 2007), 96.


⁴² Yves Bertoncini, "Migrants, 'Schengen Area and European Solidarity,'" *Tribune - Notre Europe's Viewpoint*, (June 2011): 1, accessed March 5, 2014, http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/notre_europe_s_viewpoint_june_2011_schengen_03.pdf?pdf=ok.

⁴³ Yves Pascouau, "Schengen and Solidarity: The Fragile Balance between Mutual Trust and Mistrust," *European Policy Paper* (4 July 2013): 5, accessed March 6, 2014, http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?pub_id=2784.

⁴⁴ "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Establishing a Framework Programme on Solidarity and the Management of Migration Flows for the Period 2007-2013" {SEC(2005) 435} /* COM/2005/0123 final /, accessed March 5, 2014, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52005DC0123:EN:HTML>.

⁴⁵ European Commission, "European Solidarity in Action. EU Funding for Home Affairs," without year, 2, accessed March 5, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/pdf/eu_funding_for_home_affairs_en.pdf.

Figure 1. *EU financial solidarity instruments in the field of migration, asylum, and border control under the 2007-2013 MFF, respectively 2014-2020 funding period*⁴⁶



European Refugee Fund (ERF)

According to statistics around 250.000 third country nationals apply for asylum in the EU every year, and as it has been ascertained before there's an unequal distribution of asylum claims among the EU countries, some being exposed to disproportionally large influxes of migrants in need of protection, seriously testing their reception capacities. In the previous budgetary period the **European Refugee Fund**, the longest existing fund of all, first launched in 2000 covered of wide range of procedures from asylum to reception infrastructure, integration of refugees, resettlement and emergency measures. From the 4 billion Euros allocated under SOLID, ERF enjoyed 700 million.⁴⁷ The ERF was designed to help and ease the efforts of the MS in receiving refugees, guaranteeing access to fair and efficient asylum procedures, assuring equal treatment for every person in need for protection, no matter in which EU country they have submitted their asylum application.⁴⁸ In 2010 the relocation of 255 citizens under international protection from Malta to other EU countries was possible thanks to this ERF, which financed this pilot project, thus easing pressure on the Maltese asylum system. In the same year the ERF supported Greece with an additional amount of 9.8 million Euros for emergency needs also deploying expert teams to support the reform initiated in the country's asylum system.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Source: Own elaboration based on the data from European Commission, European Solidarity in Action. EU Funding for Home Affairs and Alessandro D'Alfonso, "EU Funds for Asylum, Migration and Borders," *European Parliamentary Research Service Briefing* 11/02/2014, 4-7, accessed March 4, 2014, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2014/130663/LDM_BRI%282014%29130663_REV1_EN.pdf.

⁴⁷ D'Alfonso, 5.

⁴⁸ European Commission, "European Solidarity in Action. EU Funding for Home Affairs," 3.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

European Integration Fund (EIF)

The ageing of the EU's population is an omnipresent phenomenon, on long run seriously challenging the communities' economic competitiveness, for this reason the Union must fill the labour shortages. With other words Europe needs foreign, and especially unskilled, labour forces to maintain its economic leader position in the world. Every year around 2.2 million permits are issued to third-country nationals to reside or stay for employment, family or study reasons. The main role of the European Integration Fund is to financially assist the member states initiatives which target the facilitation of the integration of foreign citizens into the European societies. For this purpose 825 million Euros were allocated during 2007-2013.⁵⁰

Successful projects co-financed by EIF can be found in Greece (project which aimed the facilitation of communication between immigrants and hospital staff); Spain (project which targeted the rising of awareness and prevention of female genital mutilation); Latvia (language programmes for migrant children).⁵¹

Return Fund (RF)

In the EU's viewpoint in order to address the phenomenon of irregular migration a sustainable and credible policy approach is needed, based on an effective return policy. It is widely echoed that the Community's return policy is in line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, giving preference to voluntary return. However, continuously following the news concerning immigration issues, one might notice that in real life not the voluntary return procedure is implemented in the majority of the cases by the member states, the migrants, asylum seekers being returned by force, showing a clear gap between theory and practice. In the upcoming subchapter we endeavour to reveal the genuine face of the return procedures, through the prism of two case studies. Looking at its budget the RF disposed of 676 million Euros for 2007-2013, supporting return and reintegration programmes and specific assistance for vulnerable returnees. Our country was also a beneficiary of this fund promoting voluntary return and reintegration.⁵²

External Borders Fund (EBF)

Undoubtedly, the biggest slice of the 4 billion Euros pie had the External Borders Fund under the 2007-2013 MFF with 1.8 billion Euros.⁵³ The rationale behind the establishment of the EBF was the promotion of fair sharing of the implications of an economic origin of external border control between the Schengen countries. The financing of certain actions of Frontex, the European Agency responsible for the good management of the EU's external borders were also eligible under this fund, together with actions for building a common EU visa policy. The palette of the financed projects is large ranging from the acquisition of helicopters to strengthen border surveillance in Cyprus and equipment to identify forged documents in Malta, to training for Border Guard aviation staff in Poland.

In order to simplify the financial solidarity scheme for the 2014-2020 budgetary period, it has been decided that only two funds will support the EU's home affairs policies, namely the **Asylum and Migration Fund (AMF)** with a budget of 3.86 billion

⁵⁰ Ibid., 4.

⁵¹ D'Alfonso, 6.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ European Commission, "European Solidarity in Action. EU Funding for Home Affairs," 6.

Euros (replacing the former ERF, EIF and RF), and the **Internal Security Fund (ISF)** counting on 4.64 billion Euros.⁵⁴

The Asylum and Migration Fund will cover all areas concerning migration, from asylum, regular migration, to integration and return of irregularly staying third country nationals. The principles of *solidarity* and *responsibility sharing* are reiterated under the guiding lines of this fund, which also includes a **Resettlement Programme**. As enclosed in the Commission's Communication the aim of the Resettlement Programme is twofold: "to provide durable solutions to an increased number of refugees by supporting their transfer from outside EU territory and their establishment in an EU Member State; and to maximize the strategic impact of resettlement through a better targeting of those persons who are in greatest need of resettlement on the basis of common EU resettlement priorities."⁵⁵

On the other hand 3.5 billion Euros of the **Internal Security Funds'** budget will be allotted to an instrument for external borders and visa. This seeks to assist the member states in their efforts to secure the Union's external borders and to implement the provisions of the Schengen acquis, while endorsing consular cooperation on visas.⁵⁶

The allocation of these financial instruments follows one simple rule, namely that each member state gets a fixed amount of these funds combined with a share which is proportional to its degree of exposure to migratory influxes, which can be perceived as a solid expression of EU solidarity.

Technical and operational instruments

As the distinguished reader could notice there is a huge variety of instruments put on the disposal of the member countries by the Union. The big question is whether the member states can manage wisely these instruments which were given to them in order to tackle immigration, asylum and border control issues. On the other hand, one can ask himself/herself whether these instruments are not only parts of a well-directed propaganda machine led by the top EU policymakers, which under the aegis of the principle of *solidarity* are trying to cloak a migration policy, which, in reality is rather exclusive than solidary and inclusive.

Solidarity towards member states facing heavy migratory waves can also be expressed through missions, operations coordinated by Frontex, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders. On the request of Schengen countries facing extraordinary migratory movements Joint Operations can be set up, which are planned and developed on the basis of the Annual Risk Analysis Report of Frontex, which inspects the possible future risk of irregular migration and cross-border crime along the EU's external border.

The role of these joint operations is to implement coordinated operational activities for the controlling of irregular migration flows and cross-border criminality.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ European Commission, "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Building an Open and Secure Europe: The Home Affairs Budget for 2014-2020," COM (2011) 749 final, Brussels, 15.11.2011, 4, accessed March 6, 2014, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0749:FIN:EN:PDF>.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 5.

⁵⁶ D'Alfonso, 7.

⁵⁷ Frontex, European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, "FRAN Quarterly 3," July-September

The most recent example of Joint Operation is JO Hermes, started on the 15th of February 2011 in Italy and it was extended till April 2014. The main tasks of this Joint Operations consisted in monitoring and interception at borders, screening of arrived migrants, risk analysis, assistance in return, and involvement of Europol if the situation required.⁵⁸ Hermes was launched to assist Italy faced with an increased number of immigrants from North Africa, as a consequence of the upheavals initiated by the Arab Spring. Though various EU countries provided assistance from Austria, Malta, Sweden, Belgium, France, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Spain, to Portugal, Romania and Switzerland, also involving roughly 50 experts from the member states, at that time its efficiency was questioned by the Italian authorities and public opinion.⁵⁹

Frontex can also deploy RABITs (Rapid Border Intervention Teams) at the request of any Member State dealing with urgent and exceptional situations resulting from a mass influx of irregular immigrants. RABIT teams are made up by a rapid intervention reserve gathering national border guards, which can be deployed in a maximum of 5 days following the request of the member states in need of assistance⁶⁰. The very first intervention of the RABIT teams occurred in November 2010, when Greece requested assistance from Frontex to handle the heavy migration flows coming from its common border with Turkey.

Solidarity in “sharing people”

As the third solidarity mechanism could be identified the physical relocation of beneficiaries of international protection. **Intra-EU relocation** means the transferring of beneficiaries or applicants for international protection from one member state to another, with the receiving member state assuming responsibility for examining the application or for integration measures. This procedure must always take place with the solid consent of the persons concerned, and the countries benefiting of intra-EU relocations should engage themselves to address potential weaknesses of their own asylum system. However, intra-EU relocations should not result in mere responsibility shifting.⁶¹

The EU Relocation Malta (EUREMA) initiated in 2010 is one the most successful projects of this kind, involving 10 EU Member States who have committed, to varying degrees, to relocate beneficiaries of international protection from the small island country

2013, 18, accessed March 7, 2014, http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Fran_Q3_2013.pdf.

⁵⁸ Frontex Press Release, “HERMES 2011 Running,” 21 February 2011, accessed March 7, 2014, <http://www.frontex.europa.eu/>.

⁵⁹ Edina Lilla Mészáros, “The Dilemma of Securitization of the EU’s Southern Borders: Shall We Let Them in or Shall We Keep Them Out, or the European Way of Dealing with the North African Immigrants,” *Eurolimes* 15, *A Security Dimension as Trigger and Result of Frontiers Modification*, ed. Giuliana Laschi et al. (Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2013), 43-44.

⁶⁰ “Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 11 July 2007 Establishing a Mechanism for the Creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as Regards that Mechanism and Regulating the Tasks and Powers of Guest Officers,” 6, *Official Journal of the European Union* L199/30, 31.07.2007, accessed March 7, 2014, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:199:0030:0039:EN:PDF>.

⁶¹ European Council on Refugees and Exiles, “Enhancing Intra-EU Solidarity Tools to Improve Quality and Fundamental Rights Protection in the Common European Asylum System,” January 2013, 7, accessed March 8, 2014, <http://www.ecre.org/component/content/article/56-ecre-actions/315-enhancing-intra-eu-solidarity-tools.html>.

of Malta. Nonetheless, one must take also into consideration the fact that despite its overall positive impact, intra-EU relocation procedures are highly limited in their scope and are based on the voluntary decisions of member states to accept persons under international protection from another country, not to mention that it's mostly directed towards refugees and not asylum seekers. The study of the EU Commission on Relocation has also underlined that the vast majority of member states choose to use other types of solidarity and burden-sharing tools, like financial assistance or policy harmonization.⁶²

Genuine or false solidarity and responsibility sharing in the EU over irregular immigration

1.1. Irregular immigrants and asylum seekers in the EU and Italy in numbers, a quantitative analysis

The European Union's relative political stability and economic prosperity are the most important attraction forces for immigrants in search of a better life. Besides pull factors of an economic origin, there are also other forces contributing to the emergence of the phenomenon of migration, such as political, social, environmental, cultural, or even humanitarian factors.⁶³ As revealed by the Migration and Home Affairs Directorate General of the European Commission, the number of foreign citizens irregularly staying in the EU reached 429.000 in 2013, this representing a slight decrease of 1% compared to the previous year, and about 30% compared to 2008.⁶⁴ We find it very surprising that the statistics on illegal stays in the EU appearing in the Annual Risk Analysis of Frontex (345.000)⁶⁵ do not coincide with those published on the European Commission's official site, thus exposing a clear lack of consensus amongst the different EU agencies on having a common approach on this matter.

The Annual Risk Analysis from 2014 shows that the number of illegal border crossings at the Union's external borders increased between 2012 and 2013 from 72.500 to 107.000. Thus this represented a 48% annual increase, it was still lower than the total number of detections of illegal border-crossing reported during the Arab Spring, reaching 141.000 in 2011. In 2013, amongst the third country nationals involved in illegal border crossing we find the Syrians, Libyans and Egyptians; these citizens subsequently applied also for asylum. However, according to the Frontex statistics, the Syrians, Eritreans and Afghans were the top 3 nationalities concerning fraudulent border crossing, the Syrians on their own representing a quarter of detections (25.500), clearly as a consequence of the civil war and volatile situation in their country of origin. The biggest number of asylum applications, 50.096 came also from Syrian refugees. In comparison with 2012, the number of asylum applications issued by Syrian citizens has doubled.⁶⁶

⁶² Lang, 11-12.

⁶³ European Commission, "Eurostat. Migration and Migrant Population Statistics," accessed March 31, 2014. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics#Further_Eurostat_information.


⁶⁴ European Commission Migration and Home Affairs Directorate General, "Irregular Immigration," accessed March 16, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/immigration/irregular-immigration/index_en.htm.

⁶⁵ Frontex, European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, "Annual Risk Analysis 2014," May 2014, 8, accessed May 6, 2014, http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2014.pdf.

⁶⁶ Annual Risk Analysis 2014, 7.

On the Central Mediterranean Route (involving Italy and Malta) there were 40.304 illegal border crossings in 2013, 75% of which were reported between July and October. According to the statistics, the top nationality involved in fraudulent border crossing at this route were the Eritreans (9.926), followed by Somalis with 4497 detections.⁶⁷ The Frontex analysts have concluded that there has been a change in the modus operandi of the immigrants, who instead of fishing boats used more rubber boats while trying to reach the EU shores, putting in peril their lives, because although rubber dinghies represent the cheapest sailing option, they tend to be overcrowded, thus increasing the risk of capsizing and sinking.⁶⁸

Figure 2. Detections of illegal border-crossing in 2013 with percentage change on 2012 by route and top nationality detected



Source: Frontex Annual Risk Analysis 2014, 33.

In the number asylum application we can notice a clear fluctuation from 425.000 in 2001 to 200.000 in 2006, reaching 335.895 in 2012.⁶⁹ Asylum applications are unevenly

⁶⁷ Ibid., 34.

⁶⁸ Ibid..

⁶⁹ European Commission Migration and Home Affairs Directorate General, “Common European Asylum System,” accessed, March 16, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm.

distributed in the EU; there are countries, which are more targeted like others, for example in 2010 from the 1.4 million refugees recognized in the EU, Germany accepted the asylum application of 594.269, the UK that of 238.150 people, France took 200.687, Sweden 82.629, while Italy accepted the asylum claims of 56.397 third country nationals.⁷⁰ During the Arab Spring in 2011 the number of asylum applications in the EU member states increased by 15% compared to the previous year reaching a total of 277.370. In this period the most applications were submitted in the southern EU Member States and, in particular, in Italy and Malta by migrants coming from the Central Mediterranean route.⁷¹ The Frontex Fran Quarterly gathering data for the third quarter of 2013⁷² reported 97.207 applications for asylum, 32.473 refusals of entry, the number of effective returns accounting for 40.420.⁷³

Analysing the situation in Italy, at a closer introspection we realize that according to the *Caritas e Migrantes* immigration report, in 2013 there were 59.885.227 people residing in Italy out of which 4.387.721 (7.4%) were foreign citizens.⁷⁴ In the first four months of 2014 there were registered 25.650 irregular arrivals in Sicily and 660 in Puglia and Calabria, while this number was only 40.000 for the entire year of 2013.⁷⁵ In 2013 in Italy a total number of 26.620 asylum applications were recorded, the most applications coming from Nigerian citizens (3519); the Eritreans with 2109 claims also situated amongst the top nationalities applying for asylum.⁷⁶ For 2012 it was estimated that approximately 326.000 were residing irregularly on the territory of Italy representing 0.5% of the population of the country; 58.060 foreign citizens have obtained asylum in 2012, this means that there were 0.96 refugees per 1000 inhabitants. The editorial staff of *Alla-Fonte* has corroborated the data provided by the United Nations, European Union and of the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat) and has concluded that while in 2008 the number of foreign citizens irregularly residing in Italy was estimated between 279.000-461.000, in 2013 according to a maximized esteem it has reached 1.383.756. In 2013, in Malta were reported 13.084 illegal stays; the number of irregular immigrants accounting for 3% of the population of the country.⁷⁷ During 2011, 1862 third country nationals requested asylum in the small country from the Mediterranean, turning Malta into the country with the biggest number of refugees and asylum claims per inhabitants, 17 refugees/ 1000 inhabitants.

⁷⁰ D'Alfonso, 2.

⁷¹ Enhancing Intra-EU Solidarity, 13.

⁷² July-September 2013.

⁷³ Frontex Fran Quarterly, 10.

⁷⁴ Caritas e Migrantes, "XXIII Rapporto Immigrazione 2013: Tra crisi e diritti umani, [23rd Immigration Report 2013: Between Crisis and Human Rights]," 2013, 12, accessed March 19, 2014, http://www.chiesacattolica.it/ccci_new_v3/allegati/53507/SINTESI%20XXIII%20Rapporto%20Immigrazione.pdf.

⁷⁵ Luca Romano, "Immigrati clandestine in Italia: +823% in un anno [Illegal Immigrants in Italy: +823% in one year]," *il Gorinale.it*, 14 May 2014, accessed May 23, 2014, <http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/interni/immigrati-clandestini-italia-823-anno-1018993.html>.

⁷⁶ Ministero Dell'Interno Home Page, "Dati asilo 2013/2014 [Asylum data 2013/2014]," accessed May 23, 2014, www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/dati_asilo_2013_-_2014.pdf.

⁷⁷ Redazione di Alla-Fonte.it, "Immigrazione regolare, clandestine e rifugiati: le cifre dell'Europa a 27 [Regular, Irregular Immigration and Refugees: the Figures in Europe of 27]," in: Alla-Fonte.it, 8 October 2013, accessed March 31, 2014, <http://www.alla-fonte.it/joomla/italia/immigrazione-regolare-clandestina-e-rifugiati-le-cifre-delleuropa-a-27.html>.

If someone takes a closer look at these statistics will realize that there are serious mismatches, and there's no consensus between the various EU agencies and national authorities. One thing is sure that not even the European institutions can give a clear answer to the question targeting the true number of irregular immigrants residing in the EU, estimating it between 1.9 and 3.8 million citizens.⁷⁸

1.2. "All for one and one for all, united we stand divided we fall"⁷⁹

Case study: EU solidarity over irregular immigration in Italy and Malta

Italy and Malta are two of the EU's member states, which in the recent years have faced increased levels of migratory influxes coming North Africa and the Middle East. Of course, there are also other EU countries targeted by this phenomenon, like Spain or Greece, but in the light of the recent events from August and October 2013, involving sank ships full with refugees from Africa, we have decided to concentrate our attention exclusively on analysing whether there existed solidarity from the EU's supranational institutions and fellow member states towards Italy and Malta.

Departing our investigation from the Arab Spring and its consequences in terms of human mobility we find out that between January and May 2011 around 31.000 Tunisian immigrants reached the shores of Italy. The peak moment occurred in March 2011, when on the small Italian island from the Mediterranean, Lampedusa arrived 14.400 Tunisian citizens.⁸⁰ In the same time Malta was mostly targeted by Libyan citizens fled after the civil war from their country.

As a feedback Italy declared a situation of humanitarian emergency and demanded immediate assistance and solidarity from the EU and fellow member states. Although, this phenomenon was considered both by the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as an ordinary case of illegal immigration, which had to be handled by normal border-control measures, the Commission put on the disposal of Italy solidarity and burden sharing instruments. This included financial assistance under the European Refugee and External Border Fund to cover the costs related to medical care, humanitarian assistance, evacuation and repatriation of third country nationals. And last but not the least a Joint Operation codenamed Hermes was set up by Frontex to assist Italy in its efforts. Italy was not satisfied with the help provided by the Union, continuously demanding more support and solidarity through the various channels of the media. Furthermore in April of 2011, the Italian government issued temporary residence permits on humanitarian ground to Tunisian immigrants, leading up in a conflict with France, which questioned the legality of these documents and reintroduced border control in the area of free movement in order to prevent the Tunisian immigrants to reach its territory. The EU had turned into a scene a


⁷⁸ European Commission, "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council Establishing an Entry/Exit system (EES) to Register Entry and Exit Data of Third Country Nationals Crossing the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union," COM(2013) 95 final, 2013/0057 (COD), 28.02. 2013, 3, accessed April 1, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/doc_centre/borders/docs/1_en_act_part1_v12.pdf.

⁷⁹ Alexandre Dumas, *The Three Musketeers*.

⁸⁰ Edina Lilla Mészáros, "The Pillars of Schengen Crumbling at the First Light Blow of Wind?! The Franco-Italian Fray Over Schengen," in *European Union in Crisis*, ed. Edina Lilla Mészáros and Mirela Mărcuț (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 90-91.

mudslinging and responsibility shifting, seriously testing the Schengen area and the principle of free movement of citizens.⁸¹

Figure 2. Detections of illegal border crossings in 2011 (especially Tunisian citizens)



Source: Own elaboration prepared based on Frontex Issue 1 and Issue 3, 2011⁸²

The fellow member states (Germany, Austria, and Belgium) implemented the lines of the well-known quotation, “help yourself and God will help you” the vast majority of them considering this migratory influx as an internal affair of the Italy, consequently it was supposed to be dealt exclusively by it. They considered that the number of immigrants was not as big as Italy to force this problem on other countries.

Before becoming a member of the EU, Malta didn’t have to face such a huge migration pressure as it does today. Joseph Muscat, the Maltese PM⁸³ has asserted that the burden which Malta has to bare concerning the reception of North African immigrants is way out of its league. The 17.743 African immigrants received in the past ten years by Malta are equivalent to 2.5 million received by the UK.⁸⁴

In August 2013 a leaking dinghy with 102 passengers was rescued 80 kms off the Libyan shores by a Liberian oil tanker called Salamis. The Maltese government defied the international laws and the clear request of the European Commission when refusing to take the refugees, which were finally received by the Italian authorities. While Cecilia Malmström the EU Home Affairs Commissioner stressed that it was Malta’s “humanitarian duty” to receive the immigrants, the Maltese PM didn’t seem to agree with the appeal, stating that his country’s “position during this crisis was always strong, consistent and legitimate” also sending a strong message to its political homologues from

⁸¹ Ibid., 97-99.


⁸² Ibid., 91.

⁸³ Prime Minister.

⁸⁴ Colin Freeman, Nick Squires, “EU Immigration: ‘Malta Is the Smallest State, and We Are Carrying a Burden that Is Much Bigger than any Other Country,’” in: *The Telegraph*, 21st July 2013, accessed March 19, 2014, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/malta/10192458/EU-immigration-Malta-is-the-smallest-state-and-we-are-carrying-a-burden-that-is-much-bigger-than-any-other-country.html>.

the MS⁸⁵ and EU decision-makers, according to which Malta “[...] is not a pushover”.⁸⁶ The same month a similar event took place when the rubber dinghy of immigrants originating from Libya capsized and sank close to the shores of Malta. The Maltese army began an overnight rescue operation which lasted for 13 hours, saving 112 passengers.⁸⁷ In October 2013 another boat fell over with 200 people on board, demanding the lives of 33 immigrants, fortunately the Italian coastguard has managed to save the others.⁸⁸

Picture 1. Malta’s population in relation with the number of asylum seekers



Source: Jessica Abrahams, “Malta’s Migrant Headache,” *Presseurop*, accessed March 11, 2014, <http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/4041581-malta-s-migrant-headache>.

Regarding the level of assistance given by the EU’s supranational institutions and fellow member states, Malta’s PM expressed his disappointment, underlining that he has received nothing but “empty talk”, wondering how many have to die “[...] before something gets done”, emphasizing that the Mediterranean is turning into a *cemetery of immigrants*.⁸⁹

One of the biggest humanitarian catastrophes occurred close to the shores of Lampedusa on the 3rd of October 2013, when a boat carrying 500 Eritrean nationals sank,

⁸⁵ Member States.

⁸⁶ EUBusiness, “Boat Migrants Refused by Malta Land in Italy,” 8 August 2013, accessed 31 March, 2014, <http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/italy-refugee-malta.q60>.

⁸⁷ Jessica Abrahams, “Malta Needs EU Help to Cope with Its Immigration Crisis,” *The Guardian*, 4 August 2013, accessed March 10, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/04/malta-needs-eu-help-immigration-crisis>.

⁸⁸ Juan Cole, “Club Dead: EU Immigration Laws Turning Mediterranean into Graveyard-Malta PM,” in: *Informed Comment*, 13 October 2013, accessed April 12, 2014, <http://www.juancole.com/2013/10/immigration-mediterranean-graveyard.html>.

⁸⁹ Debating Europe, “Is There Solidarity in Europe over Illegal Immigration,” 19 November 2013, accessed 5 March, 2014, <http://www.debatingeurope.eu/2013/11/19/is-there-solidarity-in-europe-over-illegal-immigration/#.VMKPeSyjuIS>.

ending the life of more than 350 of them. The Italian authorities, including Enrico Letta PM, the Minister of Interior Angelino Alfano, together with the president of the European Commission, Mr. Barroso, and Mrs. Malmström visited the island of Lampedusa in order to reassure the inhabitants of their support and swift crisis management. Besides promising an *intervention package* for Lampedusa, for heavy migratory pressures Letta publicly apologised “for the shortcomings that the government and institutions have shown in this matter”, announcing a state funeral on the 3rd of October.⁹⁰ The EU Commission promised additional 30 million Euros to Italy in order to deal with the problem of refugees, and Alfano highlighted the importance of the European Task Force in the joint management of migration.

Picture 2. The Mediterranean depicted as a “cemetery” of immigrants



Source: “Chappatte on the Latest Disaster at Lampedusa,” accessed March 10, 2014, <http://migrantsatsea.wordpress.com/2013/10/06/chappatte-on-the-latest-disaster-at-lampedusa-2/>.

The message sent by the fellow European Member States was clear, not honoring Italy’s desperate cry for help, or they couldn’t or they simply didn’t want to show solidarity to Italy. Germany’s Minister of Interior stated that his country is already taking a lot of immigrants, it cannot take other burdens. Germany hosts 945 refugees per 1 million inhabitants, while Italy only 260 per million, of course we don’t have to forget that the population of Germany is bigger with 20 million than that of Italy.

⁹⁰ Ministero Dell’Interno, “Più fondi dall’Unione europea per l’emergenza Lampedusa [More Funds from the European Union for the Emergency in Lampedusa],” 9 October 2013, accessed April 01, 2014, http://www1.interno.gov.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/notizie/immigrazione/2013_10_09_conferenza_stampa_Lampedusa_Letta_Barroso.html.

This humanitarian catastrophe put a pressure on the EU decision-makers, culminating in some minor reforms introduced to the Dublin Convention; however we cannot speak about great changes that would have revolutionized the European refugee and asylum policy. The new Dublin III Regulation constrains a member state from moving a person to another EU country, if there's risk that the person will be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. Among the innovations of Dublin III we can also find the introduction of an early warning mechanism, which facilitates the detection of problems and the receiving of assistance from the EU Commission or the European Asylum Support Office.⁹¹ On the other hand this Regulation is still based on the *first entry principle*, and it's not possible to apply for asylum in more than one EU country at the same time. As a positive result we might name the initiation of an extensive rescue and search operation in the Central Mediterranean under the nicknamed *Mare Nostrum*, led by Italy.⁹²

Picture 3. Europe showing solidarity to irregular immigrants from the shores of Lampedusa



Source: “Tragedy in Lampedusa,” (Cartoons), accessed March 10, 2014, http://www.toonpool.com/cartoons/Tragedy%20in%20Lampedusa_210277.

⁹¹ “Dublin III Regulation,” (Official Site of Cecilia Wikström MEP ALDE), accessed April 1, 2014, <http://ceciliawikstrom.eu/en/politik/migration-och-asyl/dublinforordningen/#>.

⁹² Amnesty International, “EU Leaders Must Urgently Act to Stop the Increasing Death Toll in the Mediterranean Sea,” 13 May 2014, Amnesty International Public Statement, accessed 23 May 2014, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR01/008/2014/en/7d27bac5-67ff-4495-9a14-26b510c32600/eur010082014en.html>.

Conclusions

As the distinguished reader could notice this article tackles a very controversial and actual topic, that of immigration and asylum, which lately has caused great stir amongst the EU member states and decision-makers. We have tried to approach this matter from a different angle that of solidarity, wondering whether there is an equal distribution of burdens between the members states, and if the supranational institutions of the European Community provide proportional assistance to the countries hit by increased migratory waves.

Unfortunately, as the presented case studies have demonstrated there is no true solidarity among member states in terms of immigration and asylum policy. Even if countries like Germany, due to their economic might and low unemployment rate could take more migrants and refugees, they are not willing to take extra burdens on their shoulders. Ute Schaeffer, the Deutsche Welle's editor in chief speaks about the *moral bankruptcy* of the European refugee and asylum system, claiming that the EU policy in this matter is cowardish, immoral and short-sighted.⁹³

In our opinion even if the EU's decision-making triangle⁹⁴ has introduced some minor changes in the Dublin Regulation, the fundamental problem of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers are still not being tackled. We also wonder how the mighty plan of having a genuine Common European Asylum System will be successfully implemented in the EU, if there's no consensus amongst the member states or solidarity, and recently many EU countries put a ceiling on the number of immigrants authorised for admission?

In our view the new Dublin Regulation is nothing but an old idea wrapped in a new cloak, designed to deceive and lure the third country nationals with the fairy tale about an enticing Europe.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- "A Stronger Europe for a Successful Globalization." Speech by Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, President of the European Commission at the Official Ceremony to Celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Signing of the Treaties of Rome, 25.03.2007. Accessed March 2, 2014. http://www.eu2007.de/en/News/Speeches_Interviews/March/0325Barroso.html.
- Abrahams, Jessica. "Malta Needs EU Help to Cope with Its Immigration Crisis." *The Guardian*, 4 August 2013. Accessed March 10, 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/04/malta-needs-eu-help-immigration-crisis>.
- Abrahams, Jessica. "Malta's Migrant Headache." *Presseurop*. Accessed March 11, 2014. <http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/4041581-malta-s-migrant-headache>.
- Amnesty International. "EU Leaders Must Urgently Act to Stop the Increasing Death Toll in the Mediterranean Sea." Amnesty International Public Statement, 13 May 2014. Accessed May 23, 2014. <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR01/008/2014/en/7d27bac5-67ff-4495-9a14-26b510c32600/eur010082014en.html>.

⁹³ Ute Schaeffer, "Opinion: EU Refugee Policy Is Morally Bankrupt," *Deutsche Welle*, 9 October 2013, accessed April 1, 2014, <http://www.dw.de/opinion-eu-refugee-policy-is-morally-bankrupt/a-17146506>.

⁹⁴ EU Commission, EU Parliament and EU Council of Ministers.

- D'Alfonso, Alessandro. "EU Funds for Asylum, Migration and Borders." *European Parliamentary Research Service Briefing* 11/02/2014. Accessed March 4, 2014. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2014/130663/LDM_BRI%282014%29130663_REV1_EN.pdf.
- Bertoncini, Yves. "Migrants, 'Schengen Area and European Solidarity.'" *Tribune - Notre Europe's Viewpoint*, (June 2011): 1-2. Accessed March 5, 2014. http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/notre_europe_s_viewpoint_june_2011_schengen_03.pdf?pdf=ok.
- Boisson de Chazournes, Laurence. "Responsibility to Protect: Reflecting Solidarity." In *Solidarity: A Structural Principle of International Law*, edited by Rüdiger Wolfrum and Chie Kojima, 93-111. Heidelberg: Springer, 2010.
- Caritas e Migrantes. "XXIII Rapporto Immigrazione 2013: Tra crisi e diritti umani, [23rd Immigration Report 2013: Between Crisis and Human Rights]." 2013, 12. Accessed March 19, 2014. http://www.chiesacattolica.it/cc_i_new_v3/allegati/53507/SINTESI%20XXIII%20Rapporto%20Immigrazione.pdf.
- "Chappatte on the Latest Disaster at Lampedusa." Accessed March 10, 2014. <http://migrantsatsea.wordpress.com/2013/10/06/chappatte-on-the-latest-disaster-at-lampedusa-2/>.
- Cole, Juan. "Club Dead: EU Immigration Laws Turning Mediterranean into Graveyard-Malta PM." *Informed Comment*, 13 October 2013. Accessed April 12, 2014. <http://www.juancole.com/2013/10/immigration-mediterranean-graveyard.html>.
- "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Establishing a Framework Programme on Solidarity and the Management of Migration Flows for the Period 2007-2013." {SEC(2005) 435} /* COM/2005/0123 final. Accessed March 5, 2014. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52005DC0123:EN:HTML>.
- "Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union." *Official Journal of the European Union*, 2010/C 83/01. Accessed March 3, 2014. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:SOM:en:HTML>.
- "Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in of the Member States of the European Communities." *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 97/C 254/01, 19 August 1997, 4. Accessed April 12, 2014. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:41997A0819%2801%29&from=EN>.
- Dann, Philip. "Solidarity and the Law of Development Cooperation." In *Solidarity: A Structural Principle of International Law*, edited by Rüdiger Wolfrum and Chie Kojima, 55-79. Heidelberg: Springer, 2010.
- Debating Europe. "Is There Solidarity in Europe Over Illegal Immigration." 19 November 2013. Accessed March 5, 2014. <http://www.debatingeurope.eu/2013/11/19/is-there-solidarity-in-europe-immigration/#.UydxIM6n1uM>.
- Dogot, Cristina-Maria, Ioan Horga "Enlargement Process, Classic Geopolitics, and EU Internal Priorities, in, in *Eurolimes, 13, Permeability and the Impermeability of Socio- Economic Frontiers within European Union*, eds., Violene Deltai, Cristina Maria Dogor, Gabor Kozma, Jaroslaw Kundera, (Oradea/Bruxelles: Oradea University Press/Bruylant, 2009): 161-183.
- Dogot, Cristina-Maria „European Union, Russia, and ENP/EaP Countries." In *The EU as a Model of Soft Power in the Eastern Neighbourhood*, edited by Ramona Frunză, Gabriela Carmen Pascariu, Teodor Moga, 385-398. EURINT Conference

- Proceedings, 15-17 May 2013. Iași: Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” Iași, 2013.
- “Dublin III Regulation.” Official Site of Cecilia Wikström MEP ALDE. Accessed April 1, 2014. <http://ceciliawikstrom.eu/en/politik/migration-och-asyl/dublinforordningen/#>.
- Durkheim, Émil. *The Division of Labour in Society*. Houndmills: The Macmillan Press, 1984.
- EUbusiness. “Boat Migrants Refused by Malta Land in Italy.” 8 August 2013. Accessed 31 March, 2014. <http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/italy-refugee-malta.q60>.
- European Commission. “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Building an Open and Secure Europe: The Home Affairs Budget for 2014-2020.” COM (2011) 749 final, Brussels, 15.11.2011. Accessed March 6, 2014. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0749:FIN:EN:PDF>.
- European Commission. “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Enhanced Intra-EU Solidarity in the Field of Asylum: An EU Agenda for Better Responsibility-Sharing more Mutual Trust.” COM (2011) 835 final, Brussels, 2.12.2011. Accessed March 4, 2014. http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/201112/1_EN_ACT_part1_v6.pdf.
- European Commission, Communication. “The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility.” COM(2011) 743 final. Brussels, 18.11.2011. Accessed March 4, 2014. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0743:FIN:EN:PDF>.
- European Commission. “European Solidarity in Action. EU Funding for Home Affairs.” Without Year. Accessed March 5, 2014. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/pdf/eu_funding_for_home_affairs_en.pdf.
- European Commission. “Eurostat. Migration and Migrant Population Statistics.” Accessed March 31, 2014. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics#Further_Eurostat_information.
- European Commission Migration and Home Affairs Directorate General. “Common European Asylum System.” Accessed March 16, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm.
- European Commission Migration and Home Affairs Directorate General. “Irregular Immigration.” Accessed March 16, 2014. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/immigration/irregular-immigration/index_en.htm.
- European Commission. “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council Establishing an Entry/Exit system (EES) to Register Entry and Exit Data of Third Country Nationals Crossing the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.” COM(2013) 95 final, 2013/0057 (COD), 28.02. 2013, 3. Accessed April 1, 2014. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/doc_centre/borders/docs/1_en_act_part1_v12.pdf.
- European Commission. Regional Policy. “EU Solidarity Fund.” Accessed March 2, 2014. http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/solidarity/index_en.cfm.
- European Council on Refugees and Exiles. “Enhancing Intra-EU Solidarity Tools to Improve Quality and Fundamental Rights Protection in the Common European Asylum System.” January 2013. Accessed March 8, 2014.

- <http://www.ecre.org/component/content/article/56-ecre-actions/315-enhancing-intra-eu-solidarity-tools.html>.
- Fernandes Sofia and Eulalia Rubio. "Solidarity within the Eurozone: How Much, What for, for How Long?." *Notre Europe, Policy Paper* no. 5 (2012): 1-74. Accessed March 2, 2014. <http://www.eng.notre-europe.eu/011-3089-Solidarity-within-the-Eurozone-how-much-what-for-for-how-long.html>.
- Freeman, Colin, and Nick Squires. "EU Immigration : 'Malta Is the Smallest State, and We Are Carrying a Burden that Is Much Bigger than any Other Country.'" *The Telegraph*, 21st July 2013. Accessed March 19, 2014. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/malta/10192458/EU-immigration-Malta-is-the-smallest-state-and-we-are-carrying-a-burden-that-is-much-bigger-than-any-other-country.html>.
- Frontex, European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. "Annual Risk Analysis 2014." May 2014, 8. Accessed May 6, 2014. http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2014.pdf.
- Frontex, European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. "FRAN Quarterly 3." July-September 2013. Accessed March 7, 2014. http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q3_2013.pdf.
- Frontex Press Release. "HERMES 2011 Running." 21 February 2011. Accessed March 7, 2014. <http://www.frontex.europa.eu/>.
- Gebrewold, Belachev. "Migration Theories and African Migration to Europe." In *Africa and Fortress Europe: Threats and Opportunities*, edited by Belachev Gebrewold, 85-107. Aldershot: Ashgate Publication, 2007.
- Goldner Lang, Irina. "Is There Solidarity on Asylum and Migration in the EU." *Croatian Yearbook of Law and Policy* 9, 9 (Prosinac 2013): 1-14. Accessed March 5, 2014. http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=168957.
- Habermas, Jürgen, "Democracy. Solidarity and the European Crisis." Lecture Delivered by Professor Jürgen Habermas on 26th of April 2013 in Leuven. Accessed February 28, 2014. <http://www.kuleuven.be/communicatie/evenementen/evenementen/jurgen-habermas/en/democracy-solidarity-and->.
- "Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security, Justice in the European Union." *Official Journal of the European Union*, 2005/C 53/01. Accessed March 4, 2014. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2005:053:0001:0014:EN:PDF>.
- Hayter, Teresa. *Open Border: The Case Against Immigration Controls*. London and Ann Arbor: Pluto press, 2004. Second Edition.
- Horga, Ioan, Grigore Silași, István Süli-Zakar, Stanisław Sagan. *The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighbourhood Policy*. Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2009.
- Horga, Ioan, Ariane Landuyt, *Communicating the EU Policies Beyond the Borders: Proposals for Constructive Neighbour Relations and the New EU External Communication Strategy*, Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2013.
- Merriam Webster Dictionary. "Definition of the Term Solidarity." Accessed February 28, 2014. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/solidarity>.
- Mészáros, Edina Lilla. "The Dilemma of Securitization of the EU's Southern Borders: Shall We Let Them in or Shall We Keep Them Out, or the European Way of

- Dealing with the North African Immigrants.” In *Eurotimes* 15, *A Security Dimension as Trigger and Result of Frontiers Modification*, edited by Giuliana Laschi, Alexis Vahlas, and Dorin I. Dolghi, 39-59. Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2013.
- Mészáros, Edina Lilla. “The Pillars of Schengen Crumbling at the First Light Blow of Wind?! The Franco-Italian Fray Over Schengen.” In *European Union in Crisis*, edited by Edina Lilla Mészáros and Mirela Mărcuț, 82-108. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013.
- Ministero Dell’Interno Home Page. “Dati asilo 2013/2014 [Asylum data 2013/2014].” Accessed May 23, 2014. www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/dati_asilo_2013_-_2014.pdf.
- Ministero Dell’Interno. “Più fondi dall’Unione europea per l'emergenza Lampedusa [More Funds from the European Union for the Emergency in Lampedusa].” 9 October 2013. Accessed 1st April 2014. http://www1.interno.gov.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/notizie/immigrazione/2013_10_09_conferenza_stampa_Lampedusa_Letta_Barroso.html.
- Neuhold. Hanspeter. “Common Security. The Litmus Test of International Solidarity.” In *Solidarity: A Structural Principle of International Law*, edited by Rüdiger Wolfrum and Chie Kojima, 193-225. Heidelberg: Springer, 2010.
- Notices from European Union Institutions, Bodies, Offices and Agencies, European Council. “The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens.” *Official Journal of the European Union*, 2010/C 115/01. Accessed March 5, 2014. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:115:0001:0038:EN:PDF>.
- Romano, Luca. “Immigrati clandestine in Italia: +823% in un anno [Illegal Immigrants in Italy: +823% in one year].” *il Giornale.it*, 14 May 2014. Accessed May 23, 2014. <http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/interni/immigrati-clandestini-italia-823-anno-1018993.html>.
- Redazione di Alla-Fonte.it. “Imigrazione regolare, clandestine e rifugiati: le cifre dell’Europa a 27 [Regular, Irregular Immigration and Refugees: the Figures in Europe of 27].” *Alla-Fonte.it*, 8 October 2013. Accessed March 31, 2014. <http://www.alla-fonte.it/joomla/italia/immigrazione-regolare-clandestina-e-rifugiati-le-cifre-delleuropa-a-27.html>.
- “Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 11 July 2007 establishing a Mechanism for the Creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as Regards that Mechanism and Regulating the Tasks and Powers of Guest Officers.” *Official Journal of the European Union*. Accessed March 7, 2014. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:199:0030:0039:EN:PDF>.
- Pascouau, Yves. “Schengen and Solidarity: The Fragile Balance between Mutual Trust and Mistrust.” *European Policy Paper* (4 July 2013): 1-20. Accessed March 6, 2014. http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?pub_id=2784.
- “Presidency Conclusions Tampere European Council.” 15 and 16 October 1999. Accessed March 4, 2014. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-r1.en9.htm.
- Raspočnik, Andreas, Marine Jacob, and Laura Ventura. “The Issue of Solidarity in the European Union.” Discussion Paper prepared for the TEPSA Pre-Presidency Conference 14-15 June 2012, Cypriot EU Presidency 2012: Institutional

- consolidation and responding to new challenges Plenary Session, *Which kind of solidarity? An analysis of the sharpened debate on the EU in the member states*, 12 June 2012. Accessed February 28, 2014. <http://www.tepsa.eu/download/TEPSA%20Discussion%20Paper%20The%20issue%20of%20solidarity%20in%20the%20European%20Union.pdf>.
- Schaeffer, Ute. "Opinion: EU Refugee Policy Is Morally Bankrupt." *Deutsche Welle*, 9 October 2013. Accessed April 1, 2014. <http://www.dw.de/opinion-eu-refugee-policy-is-morally-bankrupt/a-17146506>.
- Squire, Vicki. *The Exclusionary Politics of Asylum*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- "Tragedy in Lampedusa." Cartoons. Accessed March 10, 2014. http://www.toonpool.com/cartoons/Tragedy%20in%20Lampedusa_210277.
- "Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community." Paris, 18 April 1951. Accessed March 1, 2014. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:11951K:EN:PDF>.
- "Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on the European Union, The Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Related Acts." *Official Journal C* 340, 10 November 1997. Accessed March 3, 2014. <http://eur->
- Whitman, Richard G. "Norms, Power and Europe: A New Agenda for Study of the EU and of International Relations." In *Normative Power Europe. Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, edited by Richard G. Whitman, 1-25. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

A Theorist of European Federalism: Alexandre Marc

Cristina-Maria DOGOT*

Abstract: *The federalist idea, so often invoked in the current economic crisis, is not a new one, but it is very old, even ancient, many theorists considering it as a result of the particularity of European civilisation, namely of its diversity. Developed as a solution to the problem of dispersed political and territorial entities, and with the aim to solve their more difficult objectives concerning their identity, federalism will be reconsidered during the interwar period and after the Second World War, when several groups of intellectuals related its principles to the idea of European unity. The conceptual approaches of many federalists intersected and complemented each other, representing, in the end, a source of inspiration for the workers of the European Union as we know these days. The present paper aims to highlight and analyse some thoughts of the impassioned European federalist who was Alexandre Marc, and how they could be considered for the actual period.*

Key words: Alexandre Marc, European federalism, personalism, Europeanism

Introduction

During the interwar period the European federalist idea knew a large variety of approaches, several groups of intellectuals from almost all the Western states considering it as the most appropriate solution for a more peaceful European continent (or even for a more peaceable world). The movements focused on the matter of European unity proliferated in the interwar period and by the activities they organised and different journals, newspapers articles, flyers etc. contributed to the popularisation of the idea of European unity and to the issue of first European common organisations.¹ One consequence of the existence of these movements was that they have been a source of inspiration for generations that will follow the Second World War and will provide the leaders of opinion who will contribute, from different perspectives, to the launch of the process of European integration. Hence, at the end of the WWII some of these intellectuals continued their efforts for a united Europe, people like Altiero Spinelli, Hendrik Brugmans, Mario Albertini, Luigi Einaudi, Alexandre Marc or Denis de Rougemont becoming some of the key actors of the process of European integration, either at the level of the newly established common European institutions (like Spinelli and Brugmans), as theorists of federalism (Albertini) or specialists in various fields (Einaudi), or as proponents of some new organisations whose main objective was to support the European integration process at its grass-roots (establishing European education or cultural institutions and working for their permanent development). To the last category belong Hendrik Brugmans, Denis de Rougemont and especially Alexandre Marc, who contributed to the establishment or to the well functioning of some very

* PhD, University of Oradea. E-mail: cdogot@uoradea.ro.

¹ Alain Greilsammer, *Les mouvements fédéralistes en France de 1945 à 1974* (Nice : Presse d'Europe, 1975) ; Jean Pierre Gouzy, "The Saga of the European Federalists during and after the Second World War," *The Federalist* 1 (2004); Catherine Previti, "Alexandre Marc: du personnalisme communautaire à l'Europe fédérée. Un nouveau fonds aux archives historiques," accessed March 26, 2014, <http://www.eui.eu/Documents/Research/HistoricalArchivesofEU/PublicationsAbouttheFonds/AM.pdf>.

important educational and cultural institutions, such as: *College of Europe* in Bruges, the *Centre Européen de la Culture* in Geneva *Centre européen de documentation* of Saarbruecken, the *Centre international de formation européenne* in Nice, and respectively the *Collège universitaire d'études fédéralistes* in Aosta.² Giving to the fact that almost all these federalists met each other³ and collaborated in many of their projects, they acted generationally and so could be considered as a pressure group of their time. However, in this article we shall consider only the thought of one of them, Alexandre Marc, disciple of Husserl and Heidegger and follower of philosophy of W. Stern, K. Jaspers, Ch. Péguy and Przyvara⁴, an author who is little known, but whose ideas concerning the integral federalism represented the basis of various organisational attempts and theoretical approaches dedicated to the launch of the project of European unity.

European effervescence of a generation

Born in Odessa, in 1904, Aleksander Markovitch Lipiansky left Russia in 1918, when his parents emigrated to France in order to escape from the new political regime. Hence, his education in philosophy, law and political science developed in France and in Germany, where, in the same time, he met the majority of his later companions in ideas and action (Arnaud Dandieu, Robert Aron, D. de Rougemont, A. Spinelli, H. Brugmans, Emmanuel Mounier, Bernard Voyenne, etc.). With some of them he founded the ecumenical group *Ordre Nouveau* en 1930⁵, and the homonymous journal in 1933 (until 1938).⁶ By 1919 Marc was already the initiator of the meetings of almost fifty believers of various denominations or agnostics, philosophers belonging to different generations, in the cradle of personalism that was Club du Moulin Vert. Among those attending the Club were Nicolai Berdyaev, Roland de Pury, Max Dominicé, Jacques Maritain, René Dupuis,

² Gouzy, "The Saga of..." 12-21; Jean-Michel Guieu, "Le militantisme européen, une approche générationnelle (des années 1920 aux début des années 1950)," *Histoire@politique. Politique, culture, société* 1, 10 (2010), accessed March 21, 2014, http://www.cairn.info/zen.php?ID_ARTICLE=HP_010_0009; Bertrand Vaysière, "Alexandre Marc. Personalism at the Service of Europe," *The Federalist* 2 (2002): 137; Mathiew D'Auria, "Junius and the 'President Professor': Luigi Einaudi's European Federalism," in *Europe in Crisis: Intellectuals and the European Idea, 1917-1957*, ed. Mark Hewitson and Matthew D'Auria (Oxford, New York: Berghahn Books, 2012).

³ There are well known the numerous federalist congresses organised immediately after the end of WWII.

⁴ Alexandre Marc, *Dialectique du déchaînement. Fondements philosophiques du fédéralisme* (Paris: Éditions La Colombe, 1961).

⁵ Bringing together believers of different faiths, the ecumenical spirit is more developed than inside *Esprit*: Catholics (A. Marc, J. Jardin, Daniel-Rops), surrealists and heroists (A. Dandieu, R. Aron, the last, Jewish, considered himself as Nietzschean), Protestants (D. de Rougemont, C. Chevalley). Denis de Rougemont, "Alexandre Marc et l'invention du personnalisme," in *Le fédéralisme et Alexandre Marc* (Lausanne: Centre de recherches européennes, 1974), 61.

⁶ Jean-Pierre Gouzy, "Marc Alexandre (1904-2000)," *L'Europe en formation* 291 (Hiver 1993-1994); Bruno Ackermann, *Denis de Rougemont. Une biographie intellectuelle*, vol. I, *De la révolte à l'engagement. L'intellectuel responsable* (Geneve: Ed. Labor et Fides, 1996), 188; Greilsammer, 118;. In the '30s A. Marc collaborated, beside many French, Spanish, Italian, Swiss, Belgian, or English federalists, with several French journals (the most knew being *Esprit*), where he wrote about the matters of proletariat, revolutionary consciousness, spiritual revolution and Christianity, or the attitude of French young people toward the German problem. Gouzy, "Marc Alexandre (1904-2000)"; "Bibliographie d'Alexandre Marc," accessed April 03, 2014, http://www.cife.eu/fr/2/bibliographie_50-1.

and Jean Jardin.⁷ The members of the movement were declared adversaries of communism, about whose supporters they believed that were some collectivist consciousness⁸, unfavourable to the *person*, Berdyaev declaring himself ultrapersonalist, follower of the primordality of the person over society and State, fanatic of *individual-personal reality*, of the *unrepeatable-unique* and not of *the general and collective*.⁹

By its editorial policy *Ordre Nouveau* rejected the reformism, the *nebulous pacifism*, the *atomist individualism*, *the Moloch state*¹⁰, pretorianism, nationalism and internationalism, but propagated the spiritual primacy and placed the politics in the service of the spiritual and economic fields.¹¹ Concerning the economic field, the group around *Ordre Nouveau* predicted several transformations for the economic and social fields (some ideas were embraced by A. Marc): a new type of plannification, the vital minimum¹² (guaranteed social minimum), the civil service, the credit reform and so a new Europe, able to cope with the global crisis. Called also “universal allowance” or “citizenship income”, the “vital minimum” was intended both to satisfy the “basic needs”¹³ of individuals and, according to A. Marc, to act as “the wheel of stability and economic driver” and to provide “the proper working of economy”¹⁴ when technology, automation, robotics (that cannot consume what there are producing!) will largely replace the work of individuals¹⁵.

In the journal *Ordre Nouveau*, A. Marc¹⁶ (and some other intellectuals) endorsed and developed the thesis of personalist philosophy, that emerged in Germany in the early

⁷ Nikolai Berdiaev, *Cunoaşterea de sine. Exercițiu de autobiografie filozofică* [Self-knowledge: an essay in autobiography] (București: Ed. Humanitas, 1998), 188-189; Vaysière, “Alexandre Marc,” 124-125.

⁸ Em. Mounier makes the conceptual difference between „collectivist” and „community” spirit. Emmanuel Mounier, *Le personnalisme, Le personnalisme* (Paris: Presse Universitaire de France, 1995), 38-41.

⁹ Ibid., 276; Denis de Rougemont, “Alexandre Marc et l’invention du personnalisme,” 52-54, 62.

¹⁰ The syntagm seems to belong to Charles Péguy (from the Hebrew *Môlek*, namely for that people are sacrificed (Alexandre Marc, “Quel fédéralisme pour quelle Europe ? Mais le fédéralisme personnaliste,” *L’Europe en formation* 294-295 (automne-hiver 1994): 43-44.), and is very used in the writings of personalist federalists. Greilsammer considers that this approach demonstrates that one of the theoretical sources of integral federalism could be the work of Tocqueville. Greilsammer, 188-190.

¹¹ As a way to protest with regard to the excessive role of the states in the lives of European citizens, personalists have consistently refused to use the capital to denominate them. Alexandre Marc, “L’état sans majuscule,” *L’Ordre Nouveau. Revue mensuelle*, 2^e année, 14, 15 (octobre 1934), in *L’Ordre Nouveau*, Réédition par les soins de la Fondation Émile Chanoux, Vol. II, Revues de n^o. 14 au n^o 26 (Aoste, Edizioni Le Château, 1997).

¹² Alexandre Marc, *L’Europe dans le monde* (Paris: Éd. Payot, 1965), 49.

¹³ Léon Tézenas considers that pointing out the need to satisfy the vital needs means to recognise “the fundamental physiological equality of individuals”. Léon Tézenas, “Essai de révision des valeurs,” *L’Ordre Nouveau. Revue mensuelle*, 2^e année, 11 (15 mai 1934): 41sq., in vol. I of *L’Ordre Nouveau*, Réédition par les soins de la Fondation Émile Chanoux, Revues de n^o. 1 au n^o 13 (Aoste: Edizioni Le Château, 1997).

¹⁴ Alexandre Marc, “Fin de l’esclavage,” *L’Europe en formation* 279 (automne 1990): 33, 35-37, 40. Note that the author in another work sets *guaranteed social minimum* related items, namely *individualized social credit* and *social bonus*, all the three ensuring the social optimum. Marc, *L’Europe dans le monde*, 43.

¹⁵ Marc, “Fin de l’esclavage,” 40.

¹⁶ Gouzy considers that A. Marc introduced in France the concepts of this philosophy. Gouzy, “Marc Alexandre (1904-2000).”

of 20s, from the personalist psychology of William Stern and the philosophy of Max Scheller.¹⁷ According to Marc, personalism plays the role of catalyst between a general situation, that of **crisis**¹⁸, and its solution, the **federalism**, which is considered close to the integral humanism, personalism, and also existentialism¹⁹.

In 1933 he published his first book, with René Dupuis, entitled *Jeune Europe*, and he also elaborated a letter with Daniel-Rops, addressed to Hitler, in which they denounced some ideas fostered by the newly installed leader.²⁰ Between 1937-'39 A. Marc (and some former members of *Ordre Nouveau*) was member of the *Mouvement des Fédérateurs*, in 1940 he began the military service and enrolled in the French Resistance movement, and then he joined the mouvement *La Fédération*. Everywhere he tried to spread the federalist ideas and to convince on the necessity of European unity.²¹

At the end of WWII, following the discourse of Winston Churchill at Zürich the federalist movement intensified and organised better its activities, and enhanced the cooperation between its members. Hence, giving to the initiative of the *Comité français pour la Fédération européenne*²², A. Marc and other federalists or supporters of this philosophy (among them A. Spinelli and Albert Camus) met in Paris (March 1945) and in Luxembourg (September 1946). This post-WWII effervescence of the federalist movement and actions called for a better coordination, materialised through the establishment of the *Union européenne des fédéralistes (UEF)*, in December 1946. Hendrik Brugmans was appointed as the first president of UEF, and until 1947 A. Marc was the secretary, a position he left for that of Director of the institutional political, social and economical Department of *UEF*, held until 1953. Beside his activities in *UEF*, A. Marc also collaborated with the *Mouvement universelle pour une confédération mondiale*, and in 1947 he participated and was involved (with D. de Rougemont and A. Spinelli²³) in organising the first congress of *UEF*, in Montreux. His direct participation in organising

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ According to integral federalist crisis means “the fracture of a continuum ... increase in hazards, so uncertainties. It is manifested by changing complementarities in antagonisms, the rapid development of deviations in trends, the acceleration of destructuring / disintegrating processes... the breaking of regulations, and so the flood of uncontrolled process tending towards self-magnification or to clash violently in other antagonistic and uncontrolled processes. Now we are not only in a society where a cultural crisis arose... where a new economic crisis spreads... We are in a situation where the crisis appears to us, not as an accident in our societies, but as their mode of being.” E. Morin, *Pour sortir du XX^e siècle*, Paris, Fernand Nathan, coll. «Dossiers 90 », 1981, 330, quoted in Alexandre Marc, “Crises et CRISE,” *L'Europe en formation* 245 (septembre-octobre 1981): 42-43.

¹⁹ Marc, *Dialectique du déchaînement...*, 21.

²⁰ Gouzy, “Marc Alexandre. 1904-2000.” See too Bernard Voyerne, *Histoire de l'idée fédéraliste*, vol. III, *Les lignes proudhoniennes* (Paris: Presses d'Europe, 1981), 185-187, 189-190.

²¹ Greilsammer, 118; Voyerne, *Histoire*, 202-203.

²² Established in June 1944, in Lyon. Greilsammer, 201, 208.

²³ A. Marc and A. Spinelli meet first time during the Congress, but they confronted their federal ideas in some other occasions (like Congress of Rome, in December 1948, when A. Marc imposed, with only one vote difference, his project concerning the adoption of a *European Federal Constitution*; in elaborating the *Manifest of European federalists*, in 1957, a document that A. Marc didn't accepted) and collaborated in some others: in preparing and developing the *Congrès du peuple européen* (1955-1961), considered one of the most revolutionary federalist actions, and of another Congress of *UEF* in Montreux, in 1964. Gouzy, “Marc Alexandre (1904-2000)”; Vaysière, 129, 136; Raimondo Cagiano de Azevedo and Edmondo Paolini, “Alexandre Marc et Altiero Spinelli,” *L'Europe en formation* 321 (été 2001): 48-53.

this event offered the perfect occasion to support the principles of integral federalism.²⁴ Following this congress were elaborated two documents, the *General Policy Motion* and the *Economic Policy Motion*, where the idea of federalism was presented as *the dynamic principle of all human activities, a synthesis solution based on organic solidarity and freedom of the members of society*. Hence, in the first motion the federal Europe meant, for the integral federalists, not its *geometrical ordering*, but *to face, to unite and coordinate the concrete and heterogeneous realities that are the nations, the economic regimes, and political traditions of Europe*²⁵. The second motion sustained the inefficiency of economic centralisation, projected the need of free movement of goods, capitals and individuals, but with the progressive passage, in different fields, to the federalist structures²⁶.

A. Marc used all his official positions in *UEF* to contribute to conferences, to organising different events (the Europe's Congress from Hague, in May 1948 included), and to elaborating some projects concerning, as for example, the establishment of a Supreme Court of Human Rights, the elaboration of a World and a European Constitution, and of a federation of European universities²⁷. In doing so, A. Marc promoted, implicitly, the values and principles of integral federalism as synthesis of personalist thought and of anarchist socialism as solution to the global crisis²⁸. The two failures registered by the European Community at its beginnings, that of the European Defence Community and European Political Community, the following agreements of Paris (October 1954) and even the Treaty of Rome, all have been considered by the supporters of integral federalism (self-called *maximalists*) only as a "shameful compromise,"²⁹ while the solution of a "genuine political federation"³⁰ was more necessary than ever. This situation at the level of the European community motivated federalists (Michel Mouskhély, Guy Héraud, and A. Marc) to elaborate, in 1963, the *Charte fédéraliste*, adopted at Montreux, in 1964, by *Mouvement fédéraliste européenne* and *Action européenne fédéraliste*, considered the first theoretic and doctrinary document of the supporters of European federalism.³¹

A philosophy of federalism

Alexandre Marc's approach on federalism could be considered rather radical, but it is explicable in the context of his time. The concept of ***personalist revolution*** was one of the most used by the members of *Ordre Nouveau*, and A. Marc was no exception. Giving to his studies in Germany, A. Marc was familiar with the concept of personalism,

²⁴ Greilsammer, 208-210.

²⁵ Marc, *L'Europe dans le monde*, 181-182.

²⁶ Alexandre Marc, *A hauteur d'homme. La révolution Fédéraliste* (Paris: Ed. Je Sers, 1948), 193-205. The second congress of *UEF*, held in Rome in November 1948, has not the same echo amongst federalist groups. Following to the Congress of Hague (May 1948), where the cleavage between the supporters of European federalism was first time but acuteness felt, the Congress of Rome had to develop its works in this unfavourable atmosphere. Voyenne, 220-221; Greilsammer, 45.

²⁷ Greilsammer, passim; Gouzy, "Marc Alexandre (1904-2000)."

²⁸ Voyenne, *Histoire*, 203, 241.

²⁹ Greilsammer, 87-88.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 90.

³¹ Voyenne, *Histoire*, 147, 155, 250; Greilsammer, 102-104, 111; Jean-Pierre Gouzy, "L'apport d'Alexandre Marc à la pensée et l'action fédéralistes," in *Le fédéralisme et Alexandre Marc* (Lausanne: Centre de recherches européennes, 1974), 22-25.

but he is the one who charged it with a political significance³² by applying it to the federalist structures, considered as the only one able to make efficient personalism in the public space without leading either to the anarchy or the exacerbation of central power³³.

Thus, according to Marc, the main mission of federalism was to overthrow the *established disorder*, although/because it has already become a habit.³⁴ This *established disorder* represented, for A. Marc, the existing national political structures, limited in terms of vision, but with important decision-making powers. These must be replaced with a *higher power in terms of space*, more effective, within which the national economic and political institutions develop **together** their activities. This *spatial gigantism* should be considered the main characteristic of even the definition of European federalism, *the federalism of the vital space* or *the desire for political power*, but Marc preferred to call it *a new social order*³⁵. This new social order was necessary in order to change both the *substance* and the *form* of society, to produce the **total revolution**, the only able to answer not only to a European problem, but to a global one³⁶ (a holistic response to a total problem)³⁷. Only such a revolution, consisting in a transformation of the highest human values, and needing a “superhuman” effort, would have deserved the name of federalism, but it could be achieved only by *personalism*³⁸. According to Marc only the “revolutionary federalism”³⁹ should change dramatically the European society. However, a sociological quantification of this change cannot be easy to realise, because the expected revolution consisted in “a new attitude toward the world; a transfigured lifestyle and thought; a harmonious recovery of all human energies”⁴⁰, “a *change in attitude*, a *change of perspective* and a *change of plan*”⁴¹, “the necessary transfiguration... of the human City”⁴² possible to realise only by the federalist doctrine⁴³, both at European and international level⁴⁴, because federalism was able, according to Marc, to give the people the capacity “to rediscover and reclaim a new human balance”⁴⁵, and so a new order.

Although the concept of revolution is usually associated with at least a transitory specific or general disorder, for personalist federalists the personalist revolution the concept of order was an intrinsic one. Consequently, “When the order is not in order, it

³² Christian Roy, “La question du travail dans la pensée d’Arnaud Dandieu,” *L’Europe en formation* 309 (été 1998): 115.

³³ Pierre Duclos, “Le fédéralisme institué,” in *Le fédéralisme contemporain. Critères, institutions, perspectives*, ed. Henri Brugmans and Pierre Duclos (Leyde: A.W. Sythoff, 1963), 167-169.

³⁴ Greilsammer, 5. Our emphasise.

³⁵ Ibid., 6.

³⁶ Ibid., 8. Our emphasise.

³⁷ Ibid., 19.

³⁸ It is an approach that the author does not want to be confused with individualism. Ibid., 106. See too: Marc, *A hauteur d’homme...*, 73-78.

³⁹ Marc, “Pour en finir avec l’État,” *L’Europe en formation* 284 (printemps 1992): 40.

⁴⁰ Alexandre Marc, *Fondements du Fédéralisme. Destin de l’homme à venir* (Paris, Montréal: Eds. d’Harmattan, 1997), 23. All these could only be possible through *Education* and *Action*, the key concepts of federalist revolution. Marc, *L’Europe dans le monde*, 115.

⁴¹ Marc, *Dialectique du déchaînement...*, 115.

⁴² Marc, *A hauteur d’homme*, 32.

⁴³ “... no revolutionary action without doctrine.” Alexandre Marc, “De la malfeasance des intellocrates,” *L’Europe en formation* 263 (printemps 1986): 36. By doctrine must be understood “a mean of discernment, of ordering, of liberation.” Marc, *L’Europe dans le monde*, 88.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 17.

⁴⁵ Marc, *Dialectique du déchaînement...*, 24.

must be in the revolution, and the only revolution that we are considering is the revolution of order”⁴⁶. Taking into account the already historical communist experience, this type of rethorics actually could be easily (and superficially) considered as an unusual or even extremist one. On the contrary, it was directed only toward the idea of a large popular bear in the process of European unity (a necessity dramatically felt by the EU until today, or especially today, in time of crisis) and wanted to emphasise one of the most important qualities of the new generation, that of openness to the others, to multi- and interculturality, to diversity, some “radical”, “revolutionary”⁴⁷ qualities for the time. However, in the given historical context it is completely understandable, especially if we consider that members of these think-thanks declared themselves against of any ideology of their time, communism and fascism included. According to them, it is just the idea of **order** that gives the **total** character of personalist revolution, and the total character of the personalist revolution provides its anti-totalitarian, anti-system and liberating nature.⁴⁸ In the same time, the personalist revolution had an intrinsic Christian nature: in order to be free, man could and should be Christian in faith and revolutionnary in action⁴⁹ (the process of becoming a person meant also to assume the common good of the community⁵⁰).⁵¹

For A. Marc the difficulty that most people did not know was to decipher the meaning of the term federalism, as most of the time dictionaries could not provide a proper definition either. For A. Marc federalism is a *mystique* (although Marc himself considers inaccurate the used word), bound to his contemporaries’ revival, a proficient philosophy, able to restore man to humanity, a *social and legal* doctrine, which restores the individuals to the community without annihilating them, an *economy* that removes the individuals from the tyranny of money, but without subjecting them to the tyranny of the state, a *social and political* regime that creates in the same time both traditional and revolutionary institutions, a *method of action*⁵² involving the lowest risks, because *it considers freedom*⁵³ *the principle of any type of organisation*⁵⁴. A. Marc reports action to time, and considers that “to act” means to live in the present time (a time with a higher

⁴⁶ Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu, *La Révolution nécessaire* (Paris: Grasset, 1933), XVI, quoted in Henri Brugmans, *Panorama de la pensée fédéraliste* (Paris: Ed. de la Colombe, 1956), 114, footnote 2.

⁴⁷ Vaysière, 127.

⁴⁸ Marc, *L’Europe dans le monde*, 191.

⁴⁹ Bernard Vuyenne, “Alexandre Marc: *homme debout*,” in *Le fédéralisme et Alexandre Marc* (Lausanne: Centre de recherches européennes, 1974), 31-33.

⁵⁰ Daniel-Rops, “Destin personnel et bien commun,” *L’Ordre Nouveau. Revue mensuelle*, 2^e année, 11 (15 mai 1934), in *L’Ordre Nouveau*, Réédition par les soins de la Fondation Émile Chanoux, Vol. I, Revues de n°. 1 au n° 13 (Aoste: Edizioni Le Château, 1997), 20.

⁵¹ In the actual context, when Islamism is intensely in increasingly politicised (in Islamic regions, in Europe, and worldwide), this reference to Christianity and Marc’s idea of global federalism could be largely discussed, because it is easy to consider that his *global federation* is one limited to the Christian societies. However, if we consider the roots of Europeanism (Greek rationalism, Judeo-Christian spirituality and the Roman law), this approach fits in the patterns of the time.

⁵² A. Marc quotes Proudhon, who says: “The essential condition of life is *action*. ... The action is not pure propaganda, but is *idea*.” Marc, *Fondements du Fédéralisme*, 42-43. According to A. Marc neither the spirit nor mind, nor will there cannot exist without *action*. Ibid., 52. Action means *participation* that Proudhon considers the idea force, the key idea, and the idea symbol of federalism. Ibid., 54.

⁵³ Understood, on the human level, as well as *the ability to escape to the inner causes, to return to the self*. Ibid. 49.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 19. Our emphasise.

dimension than the past), but not as a new way of being for things, but *as a specific way of being for persons*⁵⁵, who *exist and are represented only by action*⁵⁶, but an action that starts from and ends, with the man, the *person*⁵⁷. According to A. Marc, any political doctrine that would try to manage the whole range of problems of humanity would be doomed to failure from the start. So, federalism must prove that it is the *newest synthetic principle*, with universal significance and value, which allows the reshaping of the world without to mechanising or to brutalising it.⁵⁸ However, Marc doesn't consider the personalist federalism as a universal formula, although, in his opinion, its essence is given, as in a divine inspiration, by three elements that the author considers like a **trinity: Life, Action, and Thought**. According to Marc, federalism is a common denominator of all human aspirations, a new organic unit, which has the ability to build a *complete* but anti-totalitarian doctrine⁵⁹, because the spirit is totalising, referring to the human being as a whole in its essence, but not totalitarian⁶⁰. The dialectic of personalist federalism is one of the ordered, methodical, and creative harshness⁶¹. This type of federalism is, according to Marc, a realist, critical but constructive one, an approach above itself⁶².

From a diachronic perspective, A. Marc distinguishes three large periods in history of *global federalism*:

1. The period of territorial federalism, called political too, which starts once with the upsurge of the Greek fortress, until the moment considered by Ch. Péguy that of *numea* „ historical transcription” of political federalism, that is up to the American Revolution at the end of XVIII century.

2. The period of progressive overcoming, by economic and social sectors, of “political” space for the application of fundamental principles of federalism, period that lies between that of Proudhon and the emergence of Yugoslavia (which is at the same time guilty and the victim of a genuine ambiguity, which led to its tragic failure).

3. The period of conquest of a new dimension: epistemological, methodological, dialectical, onthological (upgrading to the rank of philosophy of federalist doctrine). This period begins in France at the late of '20s, with the experiences and researches of the group *Ordre Nouveau*.⁶³

Regarding the contemporary federalism, A. Marc makes out four other periods, namely:

- the sources (1914-1945) ;
- birth and outline of the movement (1945-1954) ;
- para-governmental or conformist stage (1948-1954) ;
- the oppositional step (since 1954) ;

⁵⁵ By *person* Marc understands the really living man, the fully man, one who acts, *homo agens*, but contemplation is not excluded from the action. Ibid., 60-62. Our emphasise.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 61. Our emphasise.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 65-66. According to Marc, “the passage of the man as individual to man as person is such a ontic jump which can not be compared with any other experience.” Alexandre Marc, “Denis de Rougemont, un homme à-venir. Prolégomènes à toute synthèse future,” *Cadmos* 33 (printemps 1986): 41.

⁵⁸ Marc, *Fondements du Fédéralisme*, 20.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 22-24. Our emphasise, recognising herself as proponent of the integral federalism of P.-J. Proudhon.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 44.

⁶¹ Ibid., 25. Our emphasise.

⁶² Ibid., 87.

⁶³ Ibid., 86-87.

-the stage of the struggle for the *Charte fédéraliste* (starting with the Congress of Lyon, in 1962).⁶⁴

According to Marc, it is the possibility of this dual approach to federalism, diachronic and synchronic, which gives the prospective and also the practical nature of federalism.⁶⁵

However, the author considers too the synchronic, the sociological perspective of federalism, about which A. Marc believes that it cannot start from an *a priori* system, but only from reality. Hence, the federal general pattern of A. Marc is as follows:

- at a basic level, *phenomenological*: autonomy;
- at a *problematical* level: conflictual cooperation;
- at a *teoretical* level: suitability;
- a level-size *exceeding*: participation.⁶⁶

Like so, the osmosis of the diachronic and synchronic approaches denotes the *prospective* character of federalism, in a *constructive* significance: starting from the past and present, and in some extent by the future, the federalism is building *that is to come*. This specificity of federalism makes obvious its practical side, which will be in response to the crisis of civilisation provoked by development of technique, and materialised in massification, proletarianization and nationalisation.⁶⁷ In this way, the final objectives of federalism become the influence over technique and fight against alienation, while the intermediary aims, with a socio-economic and socio-political nature, are: to improve the price mechanisms; to introduce a new concept of profitability; the liberation of enterprises and the development of some objective regulations on remuneration of capital, but without to transform the federal system in a interventionist or dirigist one. A. Marc has not sustained an economy out of any planning, because *every economic action is a planning one*,⁶⁸ but he considered some specific problems: who must realise planning, why, by what methods, and in the benefit of whom. In this respect, A. Marc called this type of economy as an “oriented” one and has established some guidelines for the federalist planning, namely:

- by the act of planning nothing is imposed to consumer, but, on the contrary, it will take into account its needs and desires;
- the act of planning will have to be concerned with the lowest institutions, i.e. with those *directly involved* (the principle of *adequacy*);
- the act of planning will be given with a very precise control instrument, that of *bizonal organisation* (principle of *autonomy*);
- the act of planning has to use only objective methods;
- the act of planning will take into account concepts of production and productivity;
- the act of planning will be put in the service of people, out of any excessive bureaucracy;

The instrument by which it was possible this control was considered the *bizonal organisation*⁶⁹, where two economical zones, one subject to a mandatory planning (basic

⁶⁴ Marc, *L'Europe dans le monde*, 194.

⁶⁵ Marc, *Fondements du fédéralisme...*, 88.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 88.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 88-89.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 90-91.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 132-133. Our emphasise.

needs economy) and one subject to indicative planning (economy of desires)⁷⁰ will balance and control each other outside of any administrative, political, economic or financial interference, pressure, intervention and manipulation⁷¹. So, in the federalist planning (*oriented economy*) everyone must always know who is planning and why, according to what methods and for whose benefit, without losing neither the right of property nor the possibility to associate in trade unions, the symbol of man's rebellion.⁷²

The model of federal Europe

After this broad overview of the federal model, A. Marc focuses on its implementation in Europe. According to him, the necessity of a federal system in Europe should not be established due to the existence of Soviet Russia, although this was an important reason for European unity⁷³. According to Marc, European federalism had to be perceived as different by the concept of Europeanism, meant as Hamiltonian supranationalism⁷⁴. Neither Europe nor federalism are the reason of unity⁷⁵, but only the objective to realise an European union with different levels and fields, consisting in: i./ a better international role for Europe; ii./ another type of relation with America; iii./ an attraction and a hope for the Eastern Europeans; iv./ better coordination of the aid dedicated to developing countries and of relations with these states; v./ an improvement of production and of the quality of cultural and material life of Europeans, and so of their democratic life, as basis for the restoration of the dignity of the human person and of effervescence of a new humanism, comparable to scientific and technical progress of the time.⁷⁶ Once accomplished, the "European Federation", had to assume some given tasks, such as defence, diplomacy, foreign trade, currency, economic and social policies, as well as the drawing up a European constitution, founded on respect for human rights and communities, necessary to be guaranteed by a Supreme Court of Justice, with the possibility be interpellated by anyone. This Court should also decide "the powers of the federal authorities, and to devote individual and collective freedoms and national, ethnic, and cultural autonomies". On the other side, the European federal institutions should have direct resources and power of independent decision, acting at executive and popular, legislative, and legal levels⁷⁷.

Another important idea of A. Marc was that the federal Europe should not be *no island, no fortress*⁷⁸ (the actual migration to European Union has made these terms become very common appellatives describing the EU's obstructive policies). Europe has always been an entity with a strong voice beyond its borders, and the only way to reach this objective was federalism. A. Marc claimed himself as a supporter of the Europe of

⁷⁰ Marc, "Fin de l'esclavage," 41.

⁷¹ Marc, *Fondements du fédéralisme...*, 137-138.

⁷² Alexandre Marc, "Prospective socio-économique du fédéralisme. Quelques repères," *L'Europe en formation* 255 (janvier-mars 1984): 52. See too Marc, *L'Europe dans le monde*, 68.

⁷³ Marc, *L'Europe dans le monde*, 141-166.

⁷⁴ Alexandre Marc, "Le fédéralisme, pour quoi faire?," *L'Europe en formation* 286 (automne 1992). B. Voyerne believes that the federal vision of Hamiltonians was limited only to that of "the composite state or multinational polity". Voyerne, *Histoire*, 235.

⁷⁵ Alexandre Marc, "Bref rappel du programme de l'Union européenne des fédéralistes," *L'Europe en formation* 282 (automne 1991): 28.

⁷⁶ Alexandre Marc, "De la pensée à l'action. Le fédéralisme," *L'Europe en formation* 265 (automne 1986): 34-35.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 33-34.

⁷⁸ Marc, *Fondements du fédéralisme...*, 127.

regions⁷⁹, of homelands, and of nations in the same time. In his opinion the future Europe will be or polyphonic and polychrome at the same time, or it will not exist at all. Because the objective of personalists was to create a Europe that is *at height of man as free and responsible person*, the new European society has to be founded on the convergence, even coincidence, of the following four inseparable attributes: *autonomy, responsibility, competence, and capacity to overcome*.⁸⁰

Europe has not been, and should never be considered *an end in itself*⁸¹, said A. Marc, but he was convinced that the creation of a united Europe was necessary for several reasons: because Europeans should feel responsible towards the European continent just as they felt towards their country, region, community or family; because other parts of the world (Africa, Asia, South America, post-communist Russia) have not yet reached capacity to create such a federal body; because he sees no other better way to preserve European diversity.⁸²

Europe had to be built, without unduly haste and with patience, accepting that all European countries that will adopt the future European Constitution and will respect the human rights to enjoy the indefeasible right to join the Federation⁸³.

Conclusions

Although he didn't play such an important role as his friend, the famous federalist Denis de Rougemont or as many illustrious supporters of federalism, A. Marc contributed in his merely practical way (journalism articles, brochures, conferences, organised meetings, speeches⁸⁴) to the dissemination of the idea of federalism. Even death found him, at 96 years old, working on a new book on integral federalism.⁸⁵

Such as Luigi Einaudi stated in one of his articles that many of federalist projects were found to be chimeric⁸⁶, and he was absolutely right. It is enough to take a look on the proposals submitted, discussed and sometimes voted during the numerous congress or ordinary meetings of federalist groups after the end of the WWII and to understand in what extent the proposals of different federalist groups or leaders of opinion didn't conclude in any way. EU is far from the federalist project of A. Marc and from any federalist project of the post-war period, but this doesn't minimise the efforts of these shadow men who were

⁷⁹ An idea shared at least by Denis de Rougemont, who developed it in several articles that projected many actual regional policies and practices developed or encouraged by European Union, as for example the network of regions that are the Euroregions. Denis de Rougemont, "Europe divisée ou Europe fédérée?," (1972), in vol. II of *Œuvres complètes, III, Écrits sur l'Europe, 1962-1986* (Paris: Éditions de la Différence, 1994). But it was specific for integral federalists to consider too family and communes as elements of the European (and global) federation, for the latest only with the condition that they come off from the situation of isolation and dispersion in which the centralised state deferred them and to get involved in the legal, legislative and governance process. Michel Glady, "À la hauteur de l'homme. Des frontières au fédéralisme," *L'Ordre Nouveau. Revue mensuelle*, 2^e année, 15 (novembre 1934): 9-11, 14, 18-20, in *L'Ordre Nouveau*, Réédition par les soins de la Fondation Émile Chanoux, Vol. II, Revues de n°. 14 au n° 26 (Aoste: Edizioni Le Château, 1997).

⁸⁰ Alexandre Marc, "Quel fédéralisme pour quelle Europe?," 28.

⁸¹ Marc, *Fondements du fédéralisme*..., 128.

⁸² Ibid., 155-156.

⁸³ Ibid., 159-160.

⁸⁴ Vaysière, "Alexandre Marc," 129-131.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 123.

⁸⁶ D'Auria, 290.

members of these federalist groups. As Bernard Vaysière concluded, “Marc’s project was extremely mechanistic: his conception of federalism finds no basis in history and it is possible to note too many contradictions in this philosophy that mixes order with freedom, plurality of membership and corporativism, etc. The project of Alexandre Marc, which bore the hallmark of its author’s philosophical approach, too often favoured idea over action, the long term over the short term, and this made it difficult for it to attract a broad consensus, above all among politicians and at the level of public opinion.”⁸⁷

However, this was the end of the majority of the projects that intellectuals ventured to propose to politicians, but this should not be an obstacle for intellectuals to express their opinions on the real or potential organisation of different societies and political systems. When studying the federal movements of the ’40-’50, it is obvious that almost only the militants who joined some political groups succeeded to impose, in some extent, their ideas on European unity. It was not the case for A. Marc (and so many others), who avoided taking part in any political group and, furthermore, until 1946 acted as a stateless citizen, threatened with expulsion⁸⁸. Because united Europe was realised by them, it is difficult to consider the federalists who accepted the compromise of politics as benefiting from the opportunities offered by the process started once with Schuman Declaration. On the other hand it is not so easy to accuse the idealism of federalists who didn’t identify themselves with none of the political approaches, not even with the one launched by Robert Schuman, because their ideas and actions inspired generations of young Europeans who came to work in the EU institutions, to teach about the projects of European unity or EU history. Alexandre Marc and the other federalists, whatever their approaches on this so complex method of social, economical and political organisation, have accomplished their mission by bringing into light and explaining federalism from so many perspectives that any politician or political system could do. And, perhaps, some of their ideas will be used one day.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- D’Auria, Mathiew. “Junius and the ‘President Professor’: Luigi Einaudi’s European Federalism.” In *Europe in Crisis: Intellectuals and the European Idea, 1917-1957*, edited by Mark Hewitson and Matthew D’Auria, 257-305. Oxford, New York: Berghahn Books, 2012.
- Berdiaev, Nikolai. *Cunoaşterea de sine. Exercițiu de autobiografie filosofică filozofică* [Self-knowledge: an essay in autobiography]. București: Ed. Humanitas, 1998.
- “Bibliographie d’Alexandre Marc.” Accessed April 03, 2014. http://www.cife.eu/fr/2/bibliographie_50-1.
- Brugmans, Henri. *Panorama de la pensée fédéraliste*. Paris: Ed. de la Colombe, 1956.
- Bruno Ackermann, *Introduction. Biographie intellectuelle et journal non intime*, în: Idem, *Denis de Rougemont. Une biographie intellectuelle*, vol. I (în continuare *D. de Rougemont I*), *De la révolte à l’engagement. L’intellectuel responsable*, Geneve, Ed. Labor et Fides, 1996
- Cagiano de Azevedo, Raimondo, and Paolini, Edmondo. “Alexandre Marc et Altiero Spinelli.” *L’Europe en formation* 321 (été 2001): 45-54.

⁸⁷ Vaysière, “Alexandre Marc,” 138.

⁸⁸ Vaysière, “Alexandre Marc,” 124, 136-137.

- Daniel-Rops. "Destin personnel et bien commun." *L'Ordre Nouveau. Revue mensuelle*, 2^e année, 11 (15 mai 1934). In *L'Ordre Nouveau*, Réédition par les soins de la Fondation Émile Chanoux, Vol. I, Revues de n°. 1 au n° 13, 17-22. Aoste: Edizioni Le Château, 1997, pp. 17-22.
- Duclos, Pierre. "Le fédéralisme institué." In *Le fédéralisme contemporain. Critères, institutions, perspectives*, edited by Henri Brugmans and Pierre Duclos, 71-189. Leyde: A.W. Sythoff, 1963.
- Gladys, Michel. "À la hauteur de l'homme. Des frontières au fédéralisme." *L'Ordre Nouveau. Revue mensuelle*, 2^e année, n°. 15 (novembre 1934): 8-22, in *L'Ordre Nouveau*, Réédition par les soins de la Fondation Émile Chanoux, Vol. II, Revues de n°. 14 au n° 26. Aoste: Edizioni Le Château, 1997.
- Gouzy, Jean-Pierre. "Marc Alexandre (1904-2000)." *L'Europe en formation* 291 (Hiver 1993-1994): 7-14.
- Gouzy, Jean Pierre. "The Saga of the European Federalists During and After the Second World War." *The Federalist* 1 (2004): 12-46.
- Gouzy, Jean Pierre. "L'apport d'Alexandre Marc à la pensée et l'action fédéralistes." In *Le fédéralisme et Alexandre Marc*, 1-29. Lausanne: Centre de recherches européennes, 1974.
- Greilsammer, Alain, *Les mouvements fédéralistes en France de 1945 à 1974*, Nice, Presses d'Europe, 1975.
- Guieu, Jean-Michel. "Le militantisme européen, une approche générationnelle (des années 1920 au début des années 1950)." *Histoire@politique. Politique, culture, société* 1, 10 (2010). Accessed March 21, 2014. http://www.cairn.info/zen.php?ID_ARTICLE=HP_010_0009.
- Marc, Alexandre. "Bref rappel du programme de l'Union européenne des fédéralistes." *L'Europe en formation* 282 (automne 1991): 25-33.
- Marc, Alexandre. "Crises et CRISE." *L'Europe en formation* 245 (septembre-octobre 1981): 39-52.
- Marc, Alexandre. "Denis de Rougemont, un homme à-venir. Prolégomènes à toute synthèse future." *Cadmos* 33 (printemps 1986): 25-46.
- Marc, Alexandre. *Dialectique du déchaînement. Fondements philosophiques du fédéralisme*. Paris: Éditions La Colombe, 1961.
- Marc, Alexandre. "L'état sans majuscule." *L'Ordre Nouveau. Revue mensuelle*, 2^e année, 14, 15 (octobre 1934). In *L'Ordre Nouveau*, Réédition par les soins de la Fondation Émile Chanoux, Vol. II, Revues de n°. 14 au n° 26, 29-32. Aoste: Edizioni Le Château, 1997.
- Marc, Alexandre. *L'Europe dans le monde*. Paris: Éd. Payot, 1965.
- Marc, Alexandre. "Le fédéralisme, pour quoi faire?." *L'Europe en formation* 286 (automne 1992): 23-28.
- Marc, Alexandre. "Pour en finir avec l'État." *L'Europe en formation* 284 (printemps 1992): 27-45.
- Marc, Alexandre, *Fondements du Fédéralisme. Destin de l'homme à venir*. Paris, Montréal: Eds. d'Harmattan, 1997.
- Marc, Alexandre. *A hauteur d'homme. La révolution Fédéraliste*. Paris: Ed. Je Sers, 1948.
- Marc, Alexandre. "De la malfaisance des intellocrates." *L'Europe en formation* 263 (printemps 1986): 21-39.
- Marc, Alexandre. "De la pensée à l'action. Le fédéralisme." *L'Europe en formation* 265 (automne 1986): 13-35.

- Marc, Alexandre. "Quel fédéralisme pour quelle Europe ? Mais le fédéralisme personnaliste." *L'Europe en formation* 294-295 (automne-hiver 1994): 25-58.
- Marc, Alexandre. "Prospective socio-économique du fédéralisme. Quelques repères." *L'Europe en formation* 255 (janvier-mars 1984): 49-58.
- Mounier, Emmanuel. *Le personnalisme*. Paris: Presse Universitaire de France, 1995.
- Previti, Catherine. "Alexandre Marc: Du personnalisme communautaire à l'Europe fédérée. Un nouveau fonds aux archives historiques." Accessed March 26, 2014. <http://www.eui.eu/Documents/Research/HistoricalArchivesofEU/PublicationsAbouttheFonds/AM.pdf>.
- Rougemont, Denis de. "Alexandre Marc et l'invention du personnalisme." In *Le fédéralisme et Alexandre Marc*, 51-69. Lausanne, Centre de recherches européennes, 1974.
- Rougemont, Denis de. "Europe divisée ou Europe fédérée?." 1972. In vol. II of *Œuvres complètes, III, Écrits sur l'Europe, 1962-1986*, 375-398. Paris: Éditions de la Différence, 1994.
- Roy, Christian. "La question du travail dans la pensée d'Arnaud Dandieu." *L'Europe en formation* 309 (été 1998): 111-140.
- Tézenas, Léon. "Essai de révision des valeurs." *L'Ordre Nouveau. Revue mensuelle*, 2^e année, n° 11, 15 mai 1934. In vol. I of *L'Ordre Nouveau*, Réédition par les soins de la Fondation Émile Chanoux, Revues de n°. 1 au n° 13, 33-67. Aoste: Edizioni Le Château, 1997.
- Vaysière, Bertrand. "Alexandre Marc. Personalism at the Service of Europe." *The Federalist* 2 (2002): 123-142.
- Voyenne, Bernard. "Alexandre Marc: *homme debout*." In *Le fédéralisme et Alexandre Marc*, 30-36. Lausanne: Centre de recherches européennes, 1974.
- Voyenne, Bernard. *Histoire de l'idée fédéraliste*, vol. III, *Les lignes proudhoniennes*. Paris: Presses d'Europe, 1981.

L'écrivain-diplomate, tradition ou hasard ? Prolégomènes sur le cas albanais

Ylljet ALICKA¹

Abstract: *The idea to start a view of the Albanian governmental organization on what is considered diplomatic—birth/creation, came not only because in the international diplomacy practice a similar case is adapted as a rule/law institutionalized, but also in the fact that in Albania there were no real studies in this matter. Taking into consideration the short history of the government. What would be the characteristics of a country where the governmental discipline has dominated for a long and harsh time that at the same time pushed the conception into rough methodological rules? On a wider plan, this research attempts to understand how the interference of the political culture takes place with the convocation of the beginning under the different political regimes in Albania: during the monarchy, (the priority of the national matter) the communism (the uniform, oppressive and totalitarian thinking), today, parliamentary republic, (the partitions of cultural diplomacy from the propaganda, etc.) Even though it is not consolidated as an institutional tradition, it results more as a matter of lobbying and political needs, that evolved and has been consolidated as a regeneration of the diplomatic corpus, as a structural matter of diplomacy or even as a practice of political culture. In other words, is more of a rule than an exception.*

Key words: Albania, Ambassador, structural diplomacy, writer, traveler.

Introduction

L'idée de mener une recherche pour, éventuellement, amorcer une réflexion sur les écrivains-diplomates albanais répond à une double stimulation. Comme il s'agit d'une pratique courante, quasi-institutionnalisée dans certains pays, interroger la situation albanaise à cet égard présente incontestablement un intérêt. En second lieu, ce cas des écrivains-diplomates albanais n'a encore jamais été objet d'étude et mérite donc qu'on s'y arrête, ne serait-ce que pour constater convergences et divergences avec la tendance générale. Ajoutons que la question n'est pas beaucoup mieux étudiée dans le reste du monde. Il existe bien des ouvrages récents publiés sur les écrivains-diplomates italiens², suisses³ ou encore européens et latino-américains⁴. Mais l'approche est à chaque fois relativement large et donc moins intéressante. En effet, des livres publiés par toutes sortes de professionnels, y compris diplomates, sont légion et ne signifient pas cette double nature, hybride, à la fois de création artistique et d'agent négociateur officiel d'un Etat. S'agissant de l'Albanie, la question est d'autant plus insolite que la discipline étatique a été longtemps particulièrement forte et la liberté de création parallèlement réduite.

¹ Ecrivain, Ambassadeur d'Albanie en France 2007-2011 et Directeur de l'action internationale au Ministère de la Culture 1992-1994.

² Stefano Baldi and Pasquale Baldocci, *Through the Diplomatic Looking Glass. Books Published by Italian Diplomats since 1946* (Genève: DiploFondation, 2007), 169.

³ Jacques Rial, *Le Bicorné et la Plume. Les publications de diplomates suisses de 1848 à nos jours* (Genève: DiploFondation, 2008).

⁴ *Ecrivains et diplomates. L'invention d'une tradition XIXe-XXIe siècle*, ed. Laurence Badel et al. (Paris : Armand Colin 2012). Pour notre part, nous remercions pour sa relecture attentive le connaisseur des lettres et praticien des relations diplomatiques Alexis Vahlas.

De fait, l'Albanie s'est longtemps distinguée sur la scène internationale et on peut s'interroger sur le point de savoir s'il existe là encore une spécificité du pays des aigles. Autrement dit, il convient d'évaluer comment s'est jouée dans un pays jeune et longtemps isolé l'interférence entre la culture politique et la vocation créatrice. Et ce quel que soit le régime politique: pendant la monarchie alors que prime la question nationale, durant la période communiste sous le joug d'une pensée monolithique et totalitaire et, finalement, dans la république parlementaire actuelle qui a séparé de la propagande la diplomatie et la politique culturelle.

Pour tenter d'apporter quelques éléments de réponse à une question aussi redoutable, il convient de l'aborder de manière pluridisciplinaire en considérant d'un même mouvement les dimensions historique, sociologique, culturel, et même généalogique. Mais pour des raisons évidentes de facilité pédagogique, nous diviserons cette enquête en quatre parties: l'origine du phénomène (I), les vicissitudes croisées des deux fonctions (II), la possibilité de "cross-fertilization" (III) et, enfin, un bilan du côté albanais (IV).

Origine d'un phénomène protéiforme

Il existe des ouvrages récents publiés sur les écrivains diplomates français⁵ et italiens⁶. Mais une approche trop large est moins intéressante car les livres publiés par toutes sortes de professionnels – dont les diplomates – sont légion et ne signifient pas nécessairement cette double nature, hybride, à la fois de création artistique et d'agent négociateur officiel d'un Etat. Nous nous intéressons ici uniquement aux diplomates reconnus en temps qu'écrivains. Dans cette optique et si l'on se réfère aux exemples historiques connus dans l'ensemble du monde – car il s'agit d'un sujet aussi bien rétrospectif que prospectif – une évidence s'impose: il n'y a point d'écrivain-diplomate type. Dans l'ensemble, ce sont au contraire des singularités fortes, venues des sommets de la littérature mondiale. On pense pour la France à François-René de Chateaubriand⁷, Henri Beyle dit Stendhal⁸, Paul Claudel⁹, Jean Giraudoux¹⁰, Alexis Léger dit Saint-John Perse¹¹,

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Baldi and Baldocci, 169.

⁷ François-René de Chateaubriand (1768-1848). Sa gloire littéraire ne l'empêche pas d'être successivement grand voyageur, ambassadeur - il représente la France à Berlin, Londres, Rome et dans des conférences internationales – et ministre des affaires étrangères.

⁸ Henri Beyle dit Stendhal (1783-1842) n'a cependant jamais fait mystère de sa préférence pour la littérature. L'écrivain accepte d'être Consul de France auprès des Etats pontificaux par nécessité et faute d'avoir été nommé préfet.

⁹ Paul Claudel (1868-1955) a certainement eu la carrière diplomatique la plus riche avec des postes à New-York, Boston, Shanghai, Prague, Francfort, Hambourg, avant d'être ambassadeur de France au Brésil, au Danemark, au Japon, aux Etats-Unis puis en Belgique. Son œuvre littéraire est tout aussi prolifique et lui permet d'être élu à l'Académie française en 1946.

¹⁰ Jean Giraudoux (1882-1944) est un diplomate de carrière, premier au concours des chancelleries en 1910 après un échec l'année précédente, mais est davantage connu pour ses œuvres littéraires.

¹¹ Alexis Léger (1887-1975) est un diplomate de carrière qui choisit précisément le pseudonyme de Saint-John Perse pour séparer sa carrière de poète. Sa progression de carrière est remarquable puisque le jeune secrétaire de la légation française en Chine finira Secrétaire général du ministère des affaires étrangères. La dimension littéraire n'est pas en reste grâce à une imposante œuvre poétique qui lui vaut d'obtenir le prix Nobel de littérature en 1960.

Paul Morand¹² ou encore Romain Gary¹³. La tradition ne perpétue à l'époque contemporaine avec des écrivains-diplomates tels que Jean-François Deniau¹⁴, Jean-Pierre Angremy¹⁵ ou Daniel Rondeau¹⁶.

Si l'on élargit la recherche au continent européen dans son ensemble, on trouve la même diversité de situation. L'Italien Curzio Malaparte¹⁷, le Grec Georges Seféris¹⁸, le Yougoslave Ivo Andric¹⁹, le germano-tchèque Franz Carl Weiskopf²⁰, le Polonais Czeslaw Milosz²¹ ou encore les Roumains Duiliu Zamfirescu²² et Alexandre Paleologu²³ entremêlent les deux parcours de manière parfois très déséquilibrée.

¹² Paul Morand (1888-1976) a été ambassadeur à Bucarest et à Berne en parallèle de sa carrière d'écrivain qui le mènera jusqu'à l'Académie française où il élu en 1968.

¹³ Romain Gary, mais également Emile Ajar, Shatan Bogat ou Fosco Sinibaldi (1914-1980) est une personnalité originale. Sa carrière diplomatique commence avec la fin de la seconde guerre mondiale et lui vaut des affectations en Bulgarie, au Royaume-Uni et surtout aux Etats-Unis où il finit Consul général de France à Los Angeles. Sur le plan littéraire, il demeurera comme le seul écrivain à avoir reçu deux fois le prix Goncourt, en 1956 et 1975, d'abord sous le nom de Gary puis en utilisant le pseudonyme Emile Ajar pour tourner le principe de l'unicité de la récompense.

¹⁴ Jean-François Deniau (1928-2007) a une carrière diplomatique et politique de très haut niveau associant d'éminentes responsabilités européennes, notamment comme commissaire et député européen, et nationales comme député du Cher, ministre mais également ambassadeur de France en Mauritanie et en Espagne. Il est aussi l'auteur d'une vingtaine de romans et devient "immortel" en étant élu à l'Académie française en 1992.

¹⁵ Jean-Pierre Angremy (1937-2010), souvent plus connu sous le nom littéraire de Pierre-Jean Rémy, a occupé des fonctions diplomatiques à Hong-Kong, Beijing, Londres et Florence, avant d'être le représentant adjoint de la France à l'UNESCO. Il a publié quelque soixante-dix romans et a été élu à l'Académie française en 1988.

¹⁶ Daniel Rondeau (né en 1948) est essentiellement un écrivain mais qui concrétise sa passion de l'international en devenant ambassadeur de France à Malte puis représentant de la France à l'UNESCO.

¹⁷ Curzio Malaparte (1898-1957) restera moins connu comme diplomate – malgré une expérience dans l'Europe de l'après-guerre et particulièrement en Pologne – que comme écrivain.

¹⁸ George Seféris, (1900-1971) suit les traces de son père qui mêlait déjà poésie et droit international pour mener en parallèle une œuvre littéraire et une carrière diplomatique, qui commence et se termine au Royaume-Uni, comme ambassadeur la seconde fois, en passant par l'Albanie, l'Egypte, l'Afrique du sud ou la Turquie. Sa création romanesque est consacrée en 1963 par le prix Nobel de littérature.

¹⁹ Ivo Andric (1892-1975) assure des fonctions diplomatiques importantes pendant l'entre-deux guerres qui le mènent à Rome, Bucarest, Trieste, Paris, Marseille ou encore Madrid, avant d'être nommé ambassadeur à Berlin. Il écrit ensuite ses principales œuvres, dont *La chronique de Travnik* qui porte en partie sur les ambassades du temps de l'empire ottoman. Il obtient le prix Nobel de Littérature en 1961.

²⁰ Franz Carl Weiskopf (1900-1955) débute une carrière littéraire mais rejoint le corps diplomatique tchécoslovaque après la seconde guerre mondiale. Il sera en poste aux Etats-Unis, en Suède et en Chine comme ambassadeur.

²¹ Czeslaw Milosz (1911-2004) aura une carrière diplomatique brève d'agent diplomatique de la République populaire de Pologne, de 1945 à 1950, date à laquelle il décide de demander l'asile politique en France. Il développera ensuite une œuvre riche, en France puis aux Etats-Unis, qui lui vaudra le prix Nobel de littérature en 1980.

²² Duiliu Zamfirescu (1858-1922) a déroulé une brillante carrière diplomatique le manant jusqu'aux fonctions de ministre des affaires étrangères après avoir été en poste en Italie, en Grèce et en Belgique. Sa carrière littéraire est tout aussi réussie avec en apogée son entrée à l'Académie roumaine en 1909.

Au-delà de notre vieux continent, les exemples variés abondent tout autant. Que l'on pense au Guatémaltèque Miguel Angel Asturias²⁴, au Chilien Pablo Neruda²⁵, au Mexicain Octavio Paz²⁶, ou encore l'Iranien Fereydoun Hoveyda²⁷. Au surplus, dans la plupart de ces cas, les fonctions diplomatiques arrivent après la renommée littéraire et n'empêchent pas cette dernière de grandir encore, certains parvenant à conquérir le Graal du Nobel. C'est ainsi le cas de Pablo Neruda, Czeslaw Milosz ou Octavio Paz.

Si les regards – tant celui de l'écrivain que celui du diplomate- se tournent du côté de l'Albanie, les exemples sont nombreux et les logiques similaires. L'histoire albanaise est ponctuée d'écrivains-diplomates, et ce dès la naissance de l'Etat. Surtout, ces figures n'ont pas été moins importantes pour la culture nationale. Que l'on songe au précurseur de l'écrivain-diplomate albanaise, Faik Konica²⁸, mais également à ces modèles du passé Mitat Frasheri²⁹, Eqerem Bej Vlora³⁰, Jusuf Vrioni³¹, Misto Treska³² et Javer Malo³³. Quant à

²³ Alexandre Paleologu (1919-2005) a la particularité de commencer sa carrière diplomatique de 1946 à 1948, au sortir de la seconde guerre mondiale, est de la reprendre à la fin du régime communiste lorsqu'il est nommé ambassadeur à Paris en 1990. Il est cependant très vite "démissionné" après s'être proclamé "ambassadeur des golans" en référence aux manifestants violents menaçant Bucarest. Issu d'une grande famille byzantine, il a publié une dizaine d'ouvrages.

²⁴ Miguel Angel Asturias (1899-1974) occupe des fonctions diplomatiques alors qu'il a déjà un passé de journaliste, romancier et parlementaire. Sa carrière diplomatique le mène à Buenos Aires et Paris, puis, comme ambassadeur, à Mexico, Buenos Aires et San Salvador. Mais son opposition au pouvoir dictatorial le pousse à l'exil. Il se voit décerner le prix Nobel de littérature en 1967.

²⁵ Pablo Neruda (1904-1973) sera consul dans différents pays d'Amérique latine mais également à Batavia, Rangoon, Calcutta et, surtout, en Espagne où il se lie avec Federico Garcia Lorca. Son implication dans la guerre civile espagnole déterminera à la fois sa carrière politique et son œuvre d'écrivain. Cette dernière sera couronnée par le prix Nobel de littérature en 1971.

²⁶ Octavio Paz (1914-1978) est déjà écrivain lorsqu'il est nommé ambassadeur en Inde en 1962. Il démissionnera six ans plus tard en signe de protestation contre la répression des manifestations estudiantines à Tlatelolco. Son œuvre littéraire est considérable et lui vaut d'obtenir le prix Nobel de littérature en 1990.

²⁷ Jusqu'à la révolution islamique de 1979, Fereydoun Hoveyda (1924-2006) poursuit une brillante carrière diplomatique sur des postes multilatéraux, auprès de l'UNESCO puis comme ambassadeur auprès de l'ONU après avoir été vice-ministre des affaires étrangères. Sa carrière littéraire est postérieure à 1979 et constitue une sorte de seconde vie professionnelle pendant son exil aux Etats-Unis.

²⁸ Faik Konica (1875-1942) sera notamment l'ambassadeur d'Albanie aux Etats-Unis de 1926 à 1939. Il contribue alors au rayonnement culturel de son pays en publiant le périodique *Albania*, en plus d'une correspondance abondante avec plusieurs personnalités dont Apollinaire.

²⁹ Parfois sous le nom de plume de Lumo Skendo, Mithat Frasheri, (1880-1949) associe une carrière politique avec une activité de libraire et d'écrivain. Il fait partie de la délégation albanaise auprès de la conférence de paix à Paris de 1920 à 1922.

³⁰ Eqerem bej Vlora (1885-1964) est également connu à la fois comme diplomate et comme écrivain. Ont été écrits en albanais et notamment traduits en allemand: *Aus Berat und vom Tomor; Tagebuchblätter von Ekrem Vei Vlora* (1911) et *Lebenserinnerungen* (1973).

³¹ D'abord connu et reconnu comme traducteur en français d'Ismail Kadaré, Jusuf Vrioni (1916-2001) a eu le bonheur d'une fin de vie prolifique, tant comme ambassadeur de l'Albanie auprès de l'UNESCO, de 1998 à 2001 que comme auteur des *Mondes effacés*.

³² Misto Treska (1914 - 1993) a lui traduit en albanais Diderot, Hugo, Maupassant et Stendhal, en plus de fonctions diplomatiques et d'une carrière d'écrivain.

³³ Ambassadeur d'Albanie en France de 1967 à 1975, Javer Malo (1912-1997) a été également écrivain avec notamment le très beau *Paris*.

l'époque actuelle, elle a été servie par Teodor Laço³⁴, Besnik Mustafaj³⁵, Luan Rama³⁶, Agim Isaku³⁷, entre autres. Le nobélisable Ismaël Kadaré fait alors presque figure d'exception en préférant consacrer sa vie à une œuvre littéraire – certes inégalée – sans incursion en-dehors du monde des lettres.

Reste que la continuité entre eux tous n'exclut pas certaines évolutions importantes. Celles-ci sont liées à plusieurs facteurs tels que le contexte idéologique, l'entrelacement de l'histoire littéraire albanaise avec celle des relations internationales, ainsi que les priorités changeantes du pays: question nationale, rayonnement politique, développement économique, rayonnement culturel, réputation internationale, etc.

S'y ajoute le fait que les périodes de transformation profonde des structures du système gouvernementale et des relations internationales, y compris la politique de ressources humaines au sein du ministère des affaires étrangères, se sont accompagnées de changements sensibles, et parfois rapides, des pratiques et de politique du corps diplomatique. Les transitions idéologiques et le besoin subséquent de renouvellement du personnel diplomatique créent parfois des appels d'air qui propulsent des non-professionnels dans des fonctions de représentation et d'action au service d'un Etat en quête de re-légitimation. Or, les écrivains peuvent faire mer veille dans ce rôle.

D'une manière générale, et comme partout mais à des époques et en des lieux différents, cette tendance est aussi déterminée par les priorités spécifiques de l'Albanie, à savoir si son image s'appuie sur la culture ou sur la politique, puisqu'il est admis que la diplomatie n'est pas seulement la défense des intérêts stratégiques ou commerciaux, mais surtout un vecteur de représentation de soi, d'une image, et plus généralement d'un système de valeurs.

Vicissitudes croisées des fonctions diplomatique et littéraire

De toute évidence, il n'existe pas de statut officiel du diplomate-écrivain dans les traités internationaux, pas plus en temps de paix qu'en temps de guerre et quel que soit son rang dans les classements de "best-sellers".

Toutefois, on peut a priori douter de sa prédisposition à de telles fonctions. En effet, il est admis qu'un diplomate de carrière est capable de mener des négociations internationales dans le respect des procédures et du cérémonial. Qu'il sait garder les secrets d'Etat et, d'une manière générale, agir de manière discrète, pour régler efficacement des questions sensibles concernant la politique de son Etat ou la situation de certains de ses ressortissants. C'est là toute la différence avec l'écrivain qui, lui, s'efforce le plus souvent de plaire à un large public et de défendre la liberté et la justice, sans craindre de contester l'ordre social établi.

³⁴ Né en 1934, Teodor Laço, a cumulé des responsabilités politiques, notamment comme ministre de la culture de 1994 à 1997 et diplomatiques - comme ambassadeur de l'Albanie en Russie - avec une production de romans dont *Era e tokës* (*L'odeur de la terre*).

³⁵ Né en 1957, Besnik Mustafaj a été ambassadeur d'Albanie en France de 1992 à 1997 puis ministre des affaires étrangères de 2005 à 2007. Mais il est également un écrivain reconnu et traduit en français chez Actes Sud: *L'Albanie entre crimes et mirages*, *Un été sans retour*, *Les cigales de la canicule*, *Petite saga carcérale*, *Le Tambour de papier* (prix Méditerranée étranger 1997), *Doruntine fille-sœur*, et *Le vide* (Albin Michel).

³⁶ Luan Rama, Écrivain, journaliste et diplomate albanais, Né en 1952, ambassadeur d'Albanie en France. Auteur de nombreux essais, recueils de poèmes, romans. *Le long chemin sous le tunnel de Platon*, *Couvrez-moi avec un bout de ciel* (poèmes) et *Santa Quaranta*.

³⁷ Agim Isaku, né 1955, écrivain, ambassadeur d'Albanie en Slovaquie, Auteur de « Kështjella dimërore » (*Le château hivernal*), « Shkopi » (*Le baton*).

Les exigences contradictoires de ces deux logiques, plus souvent concurrentes que convergentes, ne deviennent compatibles qu'à partir du moment où l'éthique de l'écrivain se démarque d'un culte absolu de la justice et de l'originalité tandis que celle du diplomate dépasse les simples exigences du professionnalisme. Surtout, l'expérience montre qu'en Albanie comme ailleurs, l'écrivain-diplomate ne conquiert sa légitimité de diplomate qu'à partir du moment où il assimile les pratiques diplomatiques. Il ne s'agit donc pas de superposer les identités, mais de les articuler en masquant certains aspects de chacune d'elles.

Quel que soit le terme, *diplomate-écrivain* ou *écrivain-diplomate*, la confrontation de ces deux professions, ou vocations, a fait l'objet de larges débats. Mais ce n'était pas nécessairement de manière positive. Souvent, le jeu politique consiste à accuser un parti ou une coalition politique au pouvoir pour avoir introduit dans la sphère diplomatique ses partisans sous couvert d'ouverture à des personnalités du monde de la culture. Cela semble rarement justifié en Albanie. Indépendamment des différences, on peut dire qu'à quelques exceptions près, l'expérience albanaise a montré que le diplomate et l'écrivain ont coexisté en connaissant et respectant leurs fonctions respectives. La raison en est peut-être le sentiment d'un devoir commun: témoigner, même si les formes de témoignage sont naturellement particulières à chaque fonction. De toute évidence, l'écrivain-diplomate est un *témoin engagé*, tandis que le diplomate de carrière est un *témoin détaché*.

En revanche, il faut souligner le fait que, dès ses débuts, la pratique consistant à inclure des personnalités culturelles dans la diplomatie albanaise a connu des oppositions, et ce tant de la part des institutions administratives que du milieu des écrivains lui-même. Cela complique alors l'intégration de la pièce rapportée artistique dans les rouages institutionnels. Un diplomate de carrière sait bien où est sa place hiérarchique et jusqu'où va sa liberté critique, tandis que l'écrivain-diplomate oscille entre une indépendance d'esprit congénitale et la soumission à la machine administrative qui l'a nommé.

Nous ne savons pas si des personnalités telles que Faik Konica ou Eqerem Bej Vlora ont su trouver leur place et garder une marge de liberté critique. Mais, en-dehors de l'Albanie, on connaît bien des exemples d'écrivains réputés ayant « souffert » pendant leur carrière diplomatique, soit qu'il ait été difficile d'endosser tous les aspects d'une ligne diplomatique officielle, soit qu'il ait été décevant de devoir subir les conséquences d'un positionnement critique. Toutes choses égales par ailleurs, l'Italien Malaparte fut démis de ses fonctions en quelques heures dès lors qu'il osa s'opposer à Mussolini tandis que l'ambassadeur de France au Sénégal et lauréat du prestigieux prix Goncourt, Jean-Christophe Rufin, s'éloigna parfois de la ligne officielle pour exprimer un point de vue divergent sur la situation internationale. Chez certains, l'épisode diplomatique se transforme d'ailleurs en parenthèse maudite, réceptacle de bien des désillusions.

A l'inverse, la liberté naturelle de pensée et d'expression d'un écrivain peut s'avérer irresponsable et catastrophique dans une relation diplomatique. Il existe bien des cas de diplomates-créateurs qui ont profité et abusé de leur prétendue indépendance d'esprit ou de leur réputation pour développer, dans un rapport ambivalent avec la carrière, ce *complexe du caméléon*. Ainsi, le diplomate et prix Nobel Ivo Andrić n'hésite lors d'un entretien avec le comte Ciano, en charge de l'Albanie, à lui proposer ni plus ni moins de diviser l'Albanie entre l'Italie et la Yougoslavie puis de déporter les Albanais musulmans en Turquie³⁸.

Mais les deux logiques ne sont pas toujours contradictoires. Il est admis que le fonctionnaire idéal dans la sphère diplomatique est celui qui est capable d'incarner en

³⁸ Bogdan Krizman, "Elaborat dra Ive Andrica o Albaniji iz 1939 godine" [L'analyse du Dr Andrić sur l'Albanie de 1939], *Casopis za suvremenu povjest* 2 (Zagreb, 1977): 77-89.

même temps le pouvoir politique et le pouvoir administratif; celui qui, en d'autres termes, se distingue par un sens exceptionnel de l'intérêt public fondé sur une égale capacité à respecter les règles et à les assouplir au nom de l'intérêt général ou à long terme. L'écrivain peut alors avoir moins de difficulté à sortir de la discipline à courte vue. N'est-il pas alors en mesure d'apporter un enrichissement ?

Cross-fertilization ?

Concrètement et positivement, on peut considérer trois catégories de diplomate-créateur selon le degré d'intrication de leurs deux natures et observables à partir de trois cercles concentriques qui resserrent graduellement la corrélation: à l'extérieur, les diplomates qui écrivent et publient *par ailleurs* des œuvres littéraires; dans un cercle intermédiaire, ceux qui sont inspirés dans leur activité créatrice par les pays où ils exercent leurs talents diplomatiques; enfin, dans le cœur de cible où la concentration de la double nature est la plus forte, ceux qui écrivent directement sur l'action diplomatique et en font donc l'objet d'une création artistique.

L'Albanie est incontestablement présente et se distingue dans ces trois hypothèses. Ainsi, le livre de Besnik Mustafaj (*Doruntine-fille sœur*), relève du premier cercle, Pëllumb Kulla avec *Rrëfenjë nga Amerika* (*Des histoires d'Amérique*), du deuxième cercle, tandis que Luan Rama (*Le long chemin sous le tunnel de Platon*) mêle très étroitement les deux univers littéraire et diplomatique. Il est en revanche difficile d'affiner l'analyse et de compléter la catégorisation. En effet, les questions qui naissent de l'application de cette division au cas albanais sont nombreuses. L'Albanie possède-t-elle une tradition bien établie de cet alliage écrivain-diplomate ? Peut-on en conséquence bâtir une généalogie des cas albanais ? Le cas échéant, à quelle époque a-t-elle été la plus remarquable ? D'une manière plus générale, quelles sont les logiques et les circonstances qui ont dominé dans la nomination d'ambassadeurs venus du milieu culturel: la promotion interne de plumitifs du ministère, le recrutement opportuniste, la symbolique extérieure ou l'incarnation d'un symbole politique ? Les propositions sont-elles venues de la Présidence, du Conseil des ministres ou du Ministère des affaires étrangères ? Comment le corps diplomatique de carrière a-t-il réagi à ces nominations: acceptation d'une greffe provisoire, rejet d'un corps étranger, ou plaisir d'un mariage illégitime ? La nomination d'un écrivain comme ambassadeur est souvent source de tensions internes. « Le ministère des affaires étrangères hait la gloire à l'extérieur des bureaux », écrivait Stendhal.

Si l'on resserre la question sur la part des motifs tantôt politiques et tantôt culturels de la nomination, quel a été le rapport entre les uns et les autres aux différentes époques ?

Du côté de l'écrivain, la question primordiale est de savoir si l'intégration dans la diplomatie se fait en tant que membre d'une élite culturelle ou pour un mode de vie confortable; par goût de la connaissance du monde, par attrait de l'exotisme, ou parce qu'acteur privilégié de l'histoire globale ? Autrement dit, s'agit-il d'un besoin littéraire, d'inspiration ou de décalage, d'un besoin de rayonnement plus large ou, plus prosaïquement, d'un besoin d'argent ?

Il faut enfin distinguer le cas des diplomates qui se piquent d'être des écrivains comme ils parviennent à se convaincre d'avoir toutes sortes d'autres talents du fait de représenter un pays dans sa globalité à l'étranger³⁹. « Tous les ambassadeurs qui

³⁹ Qu'il soit permis de renvoyer ici à l'ouvrage très critique publié par l'auteur sur les turpitudes de ces diplomates égotistes pour qui le poste de responsabilité à l'étranger est le prétexte à faire montre de prétentions extra-diplomates, au mieux ridicules et parfois coûteuses pour le développement du pays d'accueil: « *Un conte d'internationaux* », Toena, 1997, Tirana.

deviennent écrivains ne réussissent pas à publier, et tous les diplomates qui publient ne sont pas des écrivains/ambassadeurs », écrit Rummelhardt⁴⁰. Saluons tout de même parmi les envoyés diplomatiques ceux qui, sans prétendre au titre d'écrivains, ont publié des mémoires, carnets de voyage ou études historiques dans le domaine de la diplomatie.

Quel bilan albanais ?

Afin d'esquisser un bilan du cas albanais et en tenant compte de la brièveté de l'histoire de l'Etat albanais, on peut dire que l'Albanie n'est pas en reste par rapport aux pratiques européennes et extra-européennes. Bien que cela soit moins consolidé comme tradition institutionnelle que dans certains Etats comme la France, la diplomatie albanaise a connu de nombreuses réussites. Avec, le plus souvent, une combinaison heureuse de l'art de la création et de l'écriture avec le monde des négociations diplomatiques, aussi bien au niveau multilatéral qu'au niveau bilatéral.

D'un point de vue historique, la coexistence entre les deux « métiers » a été continuelle depuis la création de l'Etat albanais, et a parfois permis d'établir une relation harmonieuse entre la langue et la réalité. Au-delà des questions de circonstances, de nécessités politiques ou de liens personnels, elle a évolué et s'est consolidée de manière à souvent régénérer le corps diplomatique, au point d'apparaître aux yeux de certains comme passant du statut d'exception à celui de règle tant pour la diplomatie structurelle que pour la politique culturelle albanaise.

En revanche, il ne semble pas que l'incorporation d'écrivains dans la diplomatie albanaise ait eu pour but de compenser un quelconque manque de compétences, et cela n'a pas non plus entraîné de transformation du corps diplomatique traditionnel. On peut même penser le contraire et arguer que la dimension culturelle a renforcé l'ego du corps diplomatique et a valorisé encore davantage la dimension symbolique de l'action politique. C'est donc la diplomatie culturelle qui s'en trouve renforcée.

D'un point de vue plus sociologique, le phénomène observé – avec ses régularités et ses nuances – nous permet d'attester de pratiques variées, avec cependant une sorte d'âge d'or des écrivains-diplomates dans les années 90, avec une vague de nominations de talents littéraires et de personnalités culturelles tels que Visar Zhiti, Rudolf Marku, Virxhil Muçi, Ilirian Zhupa, etc. Au surplus, la nomination s'effectue dans la plupart de ces cas sur une base strictement individuelle et non à partir d'une stratégie délibérée. Ce faisant et de la même manière qu'ailleurs dans le monde, le phénomène albanais s'appuie sur des cas particuliers qui, selon les circonstances, ont été invités ou se sont proposés. Si l'on considère d'ailleurs chacune de ces nominations, les termes et conditions de recrutement ont été variables de l'une à l'autre. Tout comme sont fort diverses les raisons qui ont poussé un homme de l'art à s'engager, pour l'Albanie, dans l'exercice de fonctions diplomatiques.

Reste qu'on peut établir aujourd'hui, à partir d'une recherche documentaire empirique, que plus de la moitié des diplomates albanais ont publié un livre, et qu'il s'agit dans un cas sur dix d'une œuvre littéraire ou romanesque. Qui plus est, les ministres successifs des affaires étrangères albanais ne se sont pas montrés hostiles face à ce phénomène, ce qui confirme sa pérennisation, allant jusqu'à tolérer des expressions fortement anticonformistes, à l'image d'un Faik Konica optant pour un mode de vie très particulier, l'éloignant de ses collègues diplomates, tant du fait du style de vie que de l'indépendance de sa personnalité.

⁴⁰ Jacques Rummelhardt, « L'humilité est une qualité première du diplomate », *La Croix*, 28/2/11.

Enfin, s'agissant du mode opératoire de ces écrivains-diplomates par nature atypiques, on semble s'éloigner de l'antinomie traditionnelle action-crédation. Les ambassadeurs créateurs albanais perçoivent de plus en plus la diplomatie comme un terrain d'action que comme un poste d'observation. Précisément, à l'époque actuelle de la diplomatie publique et de l'ère numérique, le recrutement d'ambassadeurs peut répondre à une logique de soutien des entreprises ou du développement de la présence culturelle. A cet effet, l'écrivain-diplomate peut jouer un rôle à nul autre pareil et résolument tourné vers une diplomatie culturelle d'action. Il est donc permis de considérer que la relance de la diplomatie albanaise dans le domaine culturel implique que la littérature et la diplomatie consolident les termes d'une nouvelle relation leur permettant de contribuer ensemble et activement à ce monde en recomposition.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

- Ecrivains et diplomates. L'invention d'une tradition XIXe-XXIe siècle*, edited by Laurence Badel, Gilles Ferragu, Stanislas Jeannesson et Renaud Meltz. Paris : Armand Colin 2012.
- Baldi, Stefano, and Pasquale Baldocci. *Through the Diplomatic Looking Glass. Books Published by Italian Diplomats since 1946*. Genève: DiploFondation, 2007.
- Bogdan Krizman, "Elaborat dra Ive Andrica o Albaniji iz 1939 godine" [L'analyse du Dr Andriç sur l'Albanie de 1939], *Casopis za suvremenu povjest* 2 (Zagreb, 1977): 77-89.
- Rial, Jacques. *Le Bicorné et la Plume. Les publications de diplomates suisses de 1848 à nos jours*. Genève: DiploFondation, 2008.
- Rummelhardt, Jacques. « L'humilité est une qualité première du diplomate ». *La Croix*, 28/2/11.

Decisionism, Postmodernism and International Relations

*Bogdan Constantin MIHĂILESCU**

Abstract: *In the field of international relations, as well as in the entire social and political universe, the decision making process is a fundamental matter. There are multiple patterns and theorizations of the way the decisions are - or should be – taken. But, beyond the abstract formalizing and modelling, there is a certain kind of decision-making apology, which shaped a consistent theory, called decisionism, which gets a part of its arguments from the world of the international relations and of the political leaders. Decisionism insists on the existence of a space of the sovereign decision, which cannot be definitively and radically restricted to a regulated frame; it also emphasizes the permanent tension between the settled rules, the complexity of the reality and the will of the decision makers. In the context of late modernity, of the deconstructions of the postmodernist type, of the weak thought, lacked of certainties and of strong benches, the realism, the pragmatism and the contextualism – as instruments of evaluation and decision taking – can be easily manipulated within a self-referential decisionism. Consequently, between the legalistic idealism of the objectivistic modernity and the pragmatism of the subjectivistic postmodernism it must be found a middle way, which should be able to permit the creation of an equilibrium between the will of that who decides and the objective frame of the rules, on the one hand, and the uncertainties, the suspicions or the relativities specific to an ambiguous and melted contemporaneity, on the other hand. Thereby, the decisionism may lead either to arbitrary authoritarianism, or to lack of coherence and to absolutizing of the contingencies.*

Keywords: *decisionism, weak thought, legalism, international politics, postmodernism, pragmatism, realism.*

Introduction

Decisionism is a theory which appears in the frame of the political philosophy, especially through the works of Carl Schmitt. It cannot be clearly indicated a central text which could be considered the theoretical basis of decisionistic doctrine elaborated by Schmitt; in spite of that, in a great part of his work, the author developed a special view, regarding the importance of will decisions within the legal and the political system.¹ In some interwar works – as *Political Romanticism*, *Dictatorship*, *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*, *Political Theology*, *Constitutional Theory* – Schmitt builds a theory according to which passivity is a part of the modern culture, came by the way of Romanticism (cultural tendency which cultivates the absolute freedom of the individual's emotion). This passivity impedes the political action and decision², and for this reason it must be surpassed, when certain exceptional circumstances arise, which are asking exceptional measures, legitimating dictatorship and sovereign decisional will³. The liberal

* Lecturer at the “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University, Iași, Department of Political Sciences, International Relations and European Studies. E-mail: bogdanmihailescu2002@yahoo.com.

¹ Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward, “Introduction to: Carl Schmitt. Dictatorship: From the Beginning of the Modern Concept of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class-Struggle,” in Carl Schmitt, *Dictatorship: From the Beginning of the Modern Concept of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class-Struggle* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), xxi.

² Carl Schmitt, *Political Romanticism* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2011).

³ Carl Schmitt, *Dictatorship* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).

parliamentary system is considered by Schmitt either unable, in too many situations, to take the quick decisions necessary for the moment, or only a mask for falsify and for misapply the sovereignty⁴, so that the sovereign authority must be re-affirmed, being the source of the law, the only one which can decide how the rules can be applied in the particular cases, and that can even determine namely which are those exceptional cases that justify the suspension of the rules.⁵ When the community expresses itself, in the form of its political unity, it has the sovereign power to impose and to change the constitutional rules, there being no obstacles for this decision.⁶

Thereby, in a summary manner, Schmitt's view on the importance of decision underlines the fact that every legal order system grounds, ultimately, on the sovereign decision, and not on some fundamental legal norms.⁷

The decisionistic perspective proposed by Schmitt shows – on its two landings – that on the legal level, there is a space of the autonomy of the magistrates, who, by their decisions, may become the source of norms, mainly where the laws couldn't cover certain particular cases, and also demonstrates that, on the other side, the decision of sovereign authority, and not the basic constitutional norms, represents the ultimate political level.⁸ In most of the cases, from the standings of the liberal and democratic proceduralism, where the contractualist and dialogical-constructivist side is emphasized, Schmitt's view is rejected, his decisionist theory being considered dangerous, much too close to authoritarianism; thereby, decisionism is counterposed by democratic deliberativism.⁹

Schmitt's decisionism is also understood as the expression of an ultra-authoritarian solution of the author towards the social and the political crises that the interwar Germany will go through, so that not only the legal-philosophical arguments have counted in the elaboration of the respective theory, but mainly the historical and the political realities.¹⁰ In this context, decisionism is taking shape as a theory which upholds that the sovereignty is the capability to decide the exceptional state, where the ordinary norms are suspended, and “the sovereign decision is a self-referential and unmediated act of authority – singular, absolute, and final”¹¹, being thereby established “the primacy of politics over the rule of law”.¹² At the same time, decisionism is also seen as the expression of a realism which conceives the sovereignty in terms of power, the law as an artificial convention based on coercion, and the human nature rather hostile to regulation, an inadequate vision, because it neglects the fact that the sovereignty may be the fullest authority to create laws,

⁴ Carl Schmitt, *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy* (Mass: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1988).

⁵ Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

⁶ Carl Schmitt, *Constitutional Theory* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).

⁷ Lars Vinx, “Carl Schmitt,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, accessed May 14, 2014, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/schmitt>.

⁸ Hoelzl and Ward, xxii-xxiii.

⁹ Bonnie Honig, “Between Decision and Deliberation: Political Paradox in Democratic Theory,” *The American Political Science Review* 101, 1 (2007).

¹⁰ Benno G. Teschke, “Fatal Attraction: A Critique of Carl Schmitt's International Political and Legal Theory,” *International Theory* 3, 2 (2011): 187.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 192.

¹² *Ibid.*

authority which, on its turn, must be regulated by laws, or by the fact that normativity, and not arbitrariness represents a natural way of the human nature.¹³

Although the horror of the totalitarian regimes of the past century has created legitimate idiosyncrasies with regard to every belief which was used for obtaining, for keeping or for the abusive use of power within the respective political regimes, and, consequently, with regard to Schmitt's theory, for all that, his view on decisionism underlines some important aspects, difficult to deny, as the existence of a space of the sovereign decision, which cannot be definitively and radically barred into a regulated framework, or of a permanent tension between the settled rules, the complexity of the reality and the will of the deciders. These phenomena can be best observed in the field of international relations, where the decision making process is a fundamental matter, the role of the leaders being a major one, and the efforts of introducing the restrictive regulations are constantly facing with contestations.

There are multiple patterns and theorizations¹⁴ of the way the decisions are - or should be - taken. But, beyond the abstract formalising and modelling, there is a certain kind of decision-making apology, named by Judith Shklar¹⁵ *decisionism*, which gets a part of its arguments from the world of the international relations and of the political leaders.

Starting from the observation of an intense preoccupation, came from those interested by the understanding of the social and of the political issues, towards the question of the decision and of the deciders, Shklar proposes an approach of the decision by researching the level and the ideological area connected to the concept of decision.¹⁶ There are, considers Shklar, at least three types of political theories which come closer of what it could be the nature of decisionism. These are the romanticism, along with the existentialist thought, the legal realism and the realism from the theory of international relations, theories which have in common the contestation of the legalism, of the contractualist political foundationalism, or of the efficacy of the regulation.¹⁷

According to the decisionist interpretation, "whether one says one is following a rule or not, one is still making a personal decision ... Thus these so-called rules are not at all binding, and a rule that is not binding is, clearly, not a rule".¹⁸ Consequently, the rules are nothing but fences meant to hide the lack of courage, or the fear of assuming the risks, fences which - for those who take right decisions - are useless.¹⁹ Alexander Herzen and Albert Camus - authors who cultivate an individualism unadapted to the rationalistic-positivistic regulations - are, for Shklar²⁰, edifying examples for this kind of decisionism, examples came from the line of romanticism and existentialism. Herzen, without being an

¹³ Terry Nardin, "Theorising the International Rule of Law," *Review of International Studies* 34, 3 (2008): 396.

¹⁴ David E. Bell et al., *Decision Making: Descriptive, Normative and Prescriptive Interactions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Richard R. Lau, "Models of Decision-Making," in *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, ed. David O. Sears et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Esența deciziei* [Essence of decision] (Iași: Polirom, 2010); Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr., *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

¹⁵ Judith N. Shklar, "Decisionism," in *Rational Decision*, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New Jersey: Aldine Transaction, 2007).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 5-7.

irrationalist or a hedonist, is an egocentric promoter of absolute experiences, of liberty, emotion and passion, of complete consumption of the moment, being a protester, a challenger of the limitations established by conventional norms, by dogmas and rules, and a skeptic when it comes to the possibility of introducing some schemas of principles, which could guide the life, the future, the behavior, the values and the attitudes.²¹ Camus, by his theory of the absurd, leads the decisional problematic into a dimension of the acceptance of irrationality²², and he builds – as Shklar shows – a view according to which "only the lone decider has the right to judge. Decisions replace rules".²³

The legal realism, within which reappear some prospects exposed by Schmitt, understands the problematic of decision in terms of decisional authority of the magistrates, who, in many situations, cannot remain on the level of simple executants or interpreters of the law, because the last either is too general, too far from the particular cases, or, in some circumstances, it doesn't even exist. Thus, remarks Shklar, at least in the frame of the North-American juridical thought, it can be observed a gap between the academic legal realism and the legalistic ideology embraced by the public, or by some belonging to the justice system, ideology according to which the magistrates can only be the instruments of the law, and not at all the creators of it.²⁴

The legalistic thought was considered to be only a naive attempt of domesticating the social life, by appealing to hypothetical fundamental rules, which could somehow preexist the real situations and problems. It was also seen as a way of escaping from reality, a reality which permanently demands strong decisions, adjusted to the context. Starting from the deconstruction of the legalistic view, this type of realism comes to valorize the decision capacity of the leaders, who, by their judgments, manage to imprint the changes that a society need, when it confronts to difficulties, so that decisionism becomes a belief in the power of the mature deciders to cure and to resolve.²⁵

But the best known understanding, and which best apprehends the decisionist view, is the realism from the theory of international relations, where the decisional phenomenon is considered an aspect of the power, which is omnipresent, and which dominates the public space.²⁶ The power, shows Morgenthau, is the first goal of the politics, and when the fulfillment of certain aims is intended, through the agency of international politics, the struggle for power is inherent.²⁷ Hereby, in the absence of this struggle for power, any other international activity is completely outside of the international politics²⁸, by *power* being understood "the man's control over the minds and actions of other people"²⁹, and by *politics* "the mutual control relations between the owners of public authority and between they and people in general".³⁰ The power, for the advocates of realism, depends on somebody's capacity to influence and to impose his own will, being the foremost understanding element of the decision taking process from the

²¹ Isaiah Berlin, "Herzen și Amintirile sale" [Herzen and his *Memoirs*], in *Adevăratul studiu al omenirii* [The Proper Study of Mankind], ed. Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer (București: Meridiane, 2001).

²² Abraham Sagi, *Albert Camus and the Philosophy of the Absurd* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002), 67-86.

²³ Shklar, 7.

²⁴ Ibid., 7-8.

²⁵ Ibid., 9-10.

²⁶ Ibid., 11.

²⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politica între națiuni* [Politics among nations] (Iași: Polirom, 2007), 67.

²⁸ Ibid., 67-68.

²⁹ Ibid., 68.

³⁰ Ibid.

area of international politics, above other reasons, as those belonging to the moral, cultural or ideological order.³¹ Realism, shows Shklar, is denouncing the hypocrisy of idealism and normativism when it comes to the manner of approaching the foreign relations, the last ones depending exclusively on the field of pragmatism and of power relations, the useful decisions being strictly taken only in the light of this kind of logic.³² From this reason, realism seems to be that which sustains the most proper way of thinking for those who decide in the issues of international politics, and which includes: pragmatism, rationality, the knowledge of the countable reality, the knowledge of their own capacities, and the power to eliminate both false desiderata, and perverting illusions. Realism and its correlated decisionism have a great power of reducing the complexity of the international space and of transposing it into a schematic form, centered on the interaction between the rational actors, orientated by their own interests.³³ At the same time, these two approaches succeed to de-ideologize the foreign policy, because here the political beliefs of the decider are not important anymore; essential now is the reality which is imprinting the correct solution to the mature decider, that who also has the power to act in consequence.³⁴

Decisionism is an apology of the decision taken **when, how and by whom** is necessary, without laying stress on confining ideologies or rules. Thus, remarks Shklar, decisionism is an ideology without a proper doctrine, is a way of relating to the action, which wants to be beyond the regimentation within the ordinary ideologies and conventions. Nevertheless, in spite of the critiques inherent to these approaches, it has its positive aspects, as the wish to impose order, the capacity to face the difficult situations and to overcome passivity, ideological facileness or to avoid to get stuck in the projects unadapted to the context - that's why, for the followers of thought currents as those presented earlier, decisionism remains the most adequate theory for the political space.³⁵

Decisionism, correlated to pragmatism, contributes to the edification of the realist perspective. Besides, the pragmatic philosophy is well accepted within the studies from the international relations theory's field.³⁶ Pragmatism, as Charles Peirce presents it, lays stress on the identification of the effects, with practical relevancy, which the objects of our concepts may have.³⁷ William James considers that this principle, exposed by Peirce, may be described in a wider manner, in the sense of understanding the concepts and theories by their consequences, in our practical experience³⁸; thereby, those who have beliefs which

³¹ Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, *Relații internaționale* [International relations] (Iași: Polirom, 2008), 97-99.

³² Shklar, 12.

³³ Ibid., 13.

³⁴ Ibid., 15.

³⁵ Ibid., 16-17.

³⁶ Shane J. Ralston, "Pragmatism in International Relations Theory and Research," *Eidos* 14 (2011).

³⁷ Charles S. Peirce, "Probleme centrale ale pragmaticismului" [Issues of pragmatism], in *Filosofia americană* [American philosophy], ed. Andrei Marga (București: All Educational, 2000), 125.

³⁸ William James, "Concepte filosofice și rezultate practice" [Philosophical conceptions and practical results], in *Filosofia americană* [American philosophy], ed. Andrei Marga (București: All Educational, 2000), 154.

are not consistent with the future realities are in danger.³⁹ More succinctly, John Dewey presents pragmatism as a doctrine of valorizing the consequences.⁴⁰

In the international politics, realism wishes to indicate the only way considered relevant, that of following the national interests and of power calculations, decisionism insists on the will of the mature leader, and pragmatism focuses on the theme of the right weighing of the consequences, trying to offer the necessary frame of benchmarks. Therefore, for avoiding the deviation to arbitrariness, decisionism assumes the pragmatic background. This wish to eliminate the unpredictability and the arbitrariness also correlates realism with pragmatism, even if pragmatism cannot help all the time realism to face the critiques brought to it.⁴¹ Realism, which can be best understood as a form of practical rationality, as a way of managing the contingency and of searching for the prudence, functions on the strength of a double rejection – beneficent for its explanatory capability – both of the nostalgic conservatism, which is unable to imprint strong and wide decisions, and of the revolutionary idealism, broke out of the contextuality and of the reality, bearer of disastrous obnubilations.⁴²

But both the decisionism and the realist-pragmatic approach from the international relations field need inner moderation – imprinted by the rationality of calculations and by the temperance given by the confidence in what the experience has validated along the time – and external limitation – imposed by the international organizational framework and by the polemic with the idealist normativity. Besides, these two prospects also need a clear conceptual framework, and certain undeniable cultural benchmarks and valorical backgrounds. In the absence of some of these barriers, decisionism can convert itself, as the history of the past century showed us, into a cult of the unlimited decision, no matter how it could be, authoritarian or dictatorial.

In the context of late modernity, of the postmodernist-type deconstructions, of the weak thought, lacked of certainties and of strong benchmarks, pragmatism and contextualism, seen as instruments of evaluation and of decisions taking, can be easily manipulated within a self-referential decisionism, which can therefore justify all that a major decider of the international politics wants at a given moment.

Postmodernism is characterized by a type of reflection which exhibits its power, especially in the dimension of the critique and of the rejection, being lacked of the area of the strong principles. It is described here what Vattimo and Rovatti called the *weak thought*, where "rationality must ... de-potentiate itself, concede ground, not be afraid to withdraw towards that presumed zone of shadow, not remain paralyzed because of losing the Cartesian brightly, unique and stable criterion".⁴³ The weak thought of postmodernism abandons the trust in reason's hegemony, rejects the conviction that the world worth to be seen only by its lens, purified of any intrusion from other spheres. Being a renouncement, it is therefore a loss, but in the same time it wishes to be also a bearer of wins, as the

³⁹ William James, "Concepția pragmatismului asupra adevărului" [Pragmatism's conception of truth], in *Filosofia americană* [American philosophy], ed. Andrei Marga (București: All Educational, 2000), 174.

⁴⁰ John Dewey, "Dezvoltarea pragmatismului american" [The development of american pragmatism], in *Filosofia americană* [American philosophy], ed. Andrei Marga (București: All Educational, 2000), 274.

⁴¹ Stefano Guzzini, "The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 10, 4 (2004).

⁴² Ibid., 553-555.

⁴³ Gianni Vattimo and Pier A. Rovatti, *Gândirea slabă* [Weak thought] (Constanța: Pontica, 1998), 8.

liberation from the constraints of the rationalist rigorism, or as the openings of some new possibilities of exploring and understanding the world. These new possibilities include a decent and opened approach to the history, without continuing the rejection of the traditions, as the Enlightenment did; the weak thought is also taking into account some excluded territories, unsuspected or unpredicted by the schematism of the strong reason or by the scientific paradigm.⁴⁴ Thus, compared to the prevailing pattern within the modernity, the weak thought is a different way of relating to the past, present and future. "In the direction of the past: weak thought can re-approach to the past by the help of that theoretical filter which could be named piety. An endless amount of messages, that which the tradition sends towards us, may be listened once again by an ear which is prepared".⁴⁵ Towards the present, by renouncing to the strong reason, the eyesight and the thinking are not limited anymore, in front of these appearing a multitude of new aspects⁴⁶, and "in the direction of the future... why don't we advance the hypothesis that a more restrained behavior of the strong reason could produce a meeting on another territory than the normative and disciplined one, on which there are usually stipulated all our agreements?"⁴⁷

This weak thought is accompanied by an abandonment of the foundationalist and universalistic strategies of knowledge and affirmation, so that even the possibility of a world regulated by norms and institutions, with bases drawn out of the ideological, valorical or philosophical certainties doesn't seem credible anymore. Modernity, in spite of starting and placing the critical reason on the way of finding the objective reality and the universal principal certainties, now supports the attacks came from the same critical reason, which turns against its own world, for deconstructing it and for exposing its limits, concomitantly downgrading its own status⁴⁸, while postmodernism – with its non-foundationalist, non-universalistic and non-rationalistic discourse – inscribes itself within the same process. Being no longer preoccupied by the existentialist, ontological and metaphysical level of the social and political space, or by the identification of the argumentative foundations, with role of unique and universal basis of legitimation for the political institutions and practices, the weak thought of postmodernism situates itself in the hermeneutical, dialogical, aesthetical and pragmatical horizon.⁴⁹ Thus, postmodernism proposes a knowledge which "refines our sensibility to the difference and strengthens our capacity to support the immeasurability"⁵⁰, being a way to understand a world which accepts the fact that „there are problems in the social and human life without acceptable solutions, twisted trajectories impossible to rectify ... doubts that cannot be drove away through laws, moral agonies impossible to comfort, let alone curing by any prescription

⁴⁴ Ibid., 8-9.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 8.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 9.

⁴⁸ Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectica Luminilor* [Dialect of Enlightenment] (Iași: Polirom, 2012); Jürgen Habermas, "Împletirea dintre iluminism și mit: Horkheimer și Adorno," [The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Horkheimer and Adorno], in *Discursul filosofic al modernității* [The philosophical discourse of modernity], ed. Jürgen Habermas (București: All Educational, 2000).

⁴⁹ Richard Rorty, "Prioritatea democrației în raport cu filosofia" [The priority of democracy to philosophy], in *Obiectivitate, Relativism și Adevăr* [Objectivity, relativism and truth], ed. Richard Rorty (București: Univers, 2000).

⁵⁰ Jean-François Lyotard, *Condiția postmodernă* [The postmodern condition], (București: Babel, 1993), 16-17.

dictated by reason”.⁵¹ The postmodern wisdom, as Bauman calls it, is rather a philosophy of renunciation, which doesn't insist anymore on the necessity or on the possibility of finding the great foundations and certainties which are supposedly to be bearer of objective justice and universal legitimacy, or of emancipation and unavoidable progress. Therefore, “the postmodern spirit reconciled to the idea that the misery of the human condition will persist”.⁵²

On the background of deconstructive postmodernism and of postmodernity, where the social, political, juridical and economical frameworks and projects of modernity were abandoned, decisionism knows a revival. In a horizon of benchmarks deconstruction, of the acceptance of the relativity and of the fallibility of knowledge, when the normativity and the binding regulations suffer a relaxation, in the absence of the certainty of foundations, the approach of the decision enters a realm of doubtfulness. Here both the guidance and the control and limitation mechanisms are not coming anymore on a metaphysical-deontic line, or on a rationalist-contractualist one, but rather they appear as a result of the cultivation of sensibility, empathy and solidarity⁵³, or by appealing to the individual moral consciousness and responsibility.⁵⁴ But the understanding of the decisional issue from the public space in these terms is rather a normative approach, which is considered insufficient by the postmodern spirit. Hence, the dimension of desiderata, of empathy or of responsibility is accompanied by the pragmatical one. Pragmatism offers both the way of realistic understanding of the interests, or of the calculations behind the political decisions, and the appreciation of these in terms of utility, satisfaction or brought benefits. However, the question of taking the decision on a field of uncertainty, indetermination and undecidability remains opened and difficult. But there are attempts, as those of Derrida⁵⁵, to describe, from a perspective of postmodernist kind, how these problems could be surpassed.⁵⁶

The idea of justice, in Derrida's interpretation, is beyond the calculations of the reason and beyond the finite laws, is a space of undecidability, of endless interconnections and of multiple responsibilities, having a dimension of infinity, which the laws and the decisions limits and frame through the agency of the different calculations that are made.⁵⁷ These calculations are obligatory, forcing the decisions to enter a way of the relative predictability – decisions unavoidably perceive the influence of the aporia and of the undecidability – otherwise, in its infinity, justice can reveal itself through unbearable and destructive consequences.⁵⁸ “That justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unrepresentable exceeds the determinable cannot and should not serve as an alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles ... Left to itself ... idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse

⁵¹ Zygmunt Bauman, *Etica postmodernă [Postmodern Ethics]* (Timișoara: Amarcord, 2000), 266.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Richard Rorty, “Drepturi umane, raționalitate și sentimentalism” [Human rights, rationality and sentimentality], in *Adevăr și progres [Truth and progress]*, ed. Richard Rorty (București: Univers, 2003).

⁵⁴ Bauman, 270-271.

⁵⁵ Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority,” in *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, ed. David G. Carlson et al. (New York: Routledge, 1992).

⁵⁶ David Campbell, “The Deterritorialization of Responsibility: Levinas, Derrida, and Ethics after the End of Philosophy,” in *Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics*, ed. David Campbell and Michael J. Shapiro (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 44-49.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 46.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 46-48.

calculation”.⁵⁹ Therefore, decisions are the expression of a balance of the undecidability, are the fruit of some reasonings, intuitions, interpretations of the rules and of the fallible and relative norms, the undecidability remaining present “at least as a ghost – but an essential ghost- in every decision, in every event of decision”.⁶⁰ Decision is necessary, shows Derrida, but it has never the comfort given by the connection to perennial certainties and foundations – this lack of self-referential foundations also calls into question the authority and the legitimacy basis of the regulated force and violence, leading the last ones to arbitrariness - hence, all the time decision is rather a result of assuming the fallibility, the uncertainty, the indetermination, than of the indubitable interferences and of the omnipotent reason.⁶¹ Thereby, Derrida tries to emphasize the limits of the modern juridical systems⁶² and, in the same time, as, in general, postmodernism doesn't intend to abandon the entire discourse and project of the modernity, but only to liberate them from illusions, he wishes to keep the practices which proved their utility and necessity, without placing them in the horizon of the legalistic enforcements. This deconstructive approach can prove its utility, because the awareness of the contingent and the relative character of the law, of the decisions and also of their bases, can better protect them from arbitrariness⁶³, and can simultaneously create, keep or develop a space of liberty, which the citizens of late modernity may use in their own benefit.⁶⁴

With regard to the decisional issue, the deconstruction of the strong concepts, specific to modernity and to legalism, leads rather to decisionism. In spite of the tries made, this deconstruction may hardly be considered as a help or as an ally in the fight against the arbitrariness, the manipulation, the domination will, or the deformable particular interest. This is the reason why, in different particular decisional spaces, as that of the international relations, the illusion of the doubtless criteria and of the inviolable and the universal accepted limits cannot be credited anymore; nevertheless, decisionism cannot be invoked as the only reality. Postmodernism, at the level of the international relations theory and of the international law criticize the idealistic and the legalistic positions, considering them inconsistent, without precision and arbitrary, and at the level of the practice of the international politics it understands the international desiderata or rules as instruments of domination used in the political struggle.⁶⁵ The critique of postmodernism moves the outlook on the international relations towards a realism lacked of any modern epistemological desiderata⁶⁶; shows that the depoliticization of the international law is impossible and, moreover, this politicization must be accepted and used to the best of it, so that the subjectivity and the attempt of fulfilling the particular objectives become natural, and even a necessity⁶⁷; underlines the historicity and the factual dependency of the international law and relations.⁶⁸

⁵⁹ Derrida, 28.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 24.

⁶¹ Derrida.

⁶² William Sokoloff, “Between Justice and Legality: Derrida on Decision,” *Political Research Quarterly* 58, 2 (2005): 342.

⁶³ Ibid., 344.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 350-351.

⁶⁵ Andreas L. Paulus, “International Law after Postmodernism: Towards Renewal or Decline of International Law?,” *Leiden Journal of International Law* 14, 4 (2001): 731-732.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 734-735.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 735-737, 739-743.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 737-739.

But all these, on the one hand, let the international space into an absolute indetermination, so that here everyone seems to can act at any time, anyhow, on everybody, depending on the interests, on the calculations, on the capacities or on the momentary fancies, and, on the other hand, place the decision will of the sovereign central authority outside of any exterior fundamental limits. This is the reason why, at least at the discursive and the expectative level, the classical postwar approach, which insists on the need of finding and establishing - in virtue of some universal visions of justice and legitimacy – some general rules of international law, which the sovereign states can recognize and respect without restraint, equally accepting the international arbiters that judge the correct application of norms, seems to remain the reference standard which saves us from falling into a new medievalism.⁶⁹ However, the critiques came from realism, the deconstruction, made by the postmodern reflection, to the universalistic foundations and benchmarks of modernity, and, above all, the historical contexts and the international events, non-frameable in the logic of idealism and legalism, make that the last ones cannot be considered sufficient and functional. Therefore, there is an interval – between the regulating normativity of international relations, the subordination of the international actors to the universal norms and to the international control institutions and the realist and the postmodernist approach of the subjective interests and of the power calculations, of the distrust in the fancies of modern cosmopolitanism and of the deconstructive critique of the ideologies and of the strong concepts – within which the international politics of the late modernity is moving. The abandonment of any of the two horizons may create insurmountable difficulties of perception, or may lead to unbearable behaviors and decisions. That's why it is needed a placing in the interior of this interval – appeared between the desideratum and the context, between objectivity and subjectivity, between the absolute of the fundament and the relativity of the interests, of the cultural and the historical datum – and a search of a middle way.⁷⁰

Consequently, between the legalistic idealism of the objectivistic modernity, and the pragmatism of the subjectivistic postmodernism or of the realistic decisionism, it must be found a third way, which should be able to permit the creation of an equilibrium between the will of that who decides and the objective frame of the rules, on the one hand, and the uncertainties, the suspicions, the limits or the conditionalities specific to an ambiguous and melted contemporaneity, on the other hand. Otherwise, idealism means a misapprehension, or a despise of the reality, and decisionism may lead either to arbitrary authoritarianism, or to lack of coherence and to absolutizing of the contingencies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. *Esența deciziei* [Essence of decision]. Iași: Polirom, 2010.
- Bauman, Zygmunt. *Etica postmodernă* [Postmodern Ethics]. Timișoara: Amarcord, 2000.
- Bell, David E., Howard Raiffa, and Amos Tversky. *Decision Making: Descriptive, Normative and Prescriptive Interactions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 748-749.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 755.

- Berlin, Isaiah. "Herzen și *Amințirile sale*" [Herzen and his *Memoirs*]. In *Adevăratul studiu al omenirii* [The Proper Study of Mankind], edited by Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer, 483-505. București: Meridiane, 2001.
- Campbell, David. "The Deterritorialization of Responsibility: Levinas, Derrida, and Ethics after the End of Philosophy." In *Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics*, edited by David Campbell și Michael J. Shapiro, 29-56. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
- Derrida, Jacques. "Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority." In *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, edited by David G. Carlson, Drucilla Cornell, and Michel Rosenfeld, 3-67. New York: Routledge, 1992.
- Dewey, John. "Dezvoltarea pragmatismului american" [The development of American pragmatism]. In *Filosofia americană* [American philosophy], edited by Andrei Marga, 265-283. București: All Educational, 2000.
- Goldstein, Joshua S., and Jon C. Pevehouse. *Relații internaționale* [International relations]. Iași: Polirom, 2008.
- Guzzini, Stefano. "The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations." *European Journal of International Relations* 10/4 (2004): 533-570.
- Habermas, Jürgen. "Împletirea dintre iluminism și mit: Horkheimer și Adorno" [The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Horkheimer and Adorno]. In *Discursul filosofic al modernității* [The philosophical discourse of modernity], edited by Jürgen Habermas, 114-135. București: All Educational, 2000.
- Hoelzl, Michael, and Graham Ward. "Introduction to: Carl Schmitt. Dictatorship: From the Beginning of the Modern Concept of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class-Struggle." In Carl Schmitt, *Dictatorship: From the Beginning of the Modern Concept of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class-Struggle*, x-xxix. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013.
- Honig, Bonnie. "Between Decision and Deliberation: Political Paradox in Democratic Theory." *The American Political Science Review* 101, 1 (2007): 1-17.
- Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. *Dialectica Luminilor* [Dialect of Enlightenment]. Iași: Polirom, 2012.
- James, William. "Concepte filosofice și rezultate practice" [Philosophical conceptions and practical results]. In *Filosofia americană* [American philosophy], edited by Andrei Marga, 153-169. București: All Educational, 2000.
- James, William. "Conceptia pragmatismului asupra adevărului" [Pragmatism's conception of truth]. In *Filosofia americană* [American philosophy], edited by Andrei Marga, 170-189. București: All Educational, 2000.
- Lau, Richard R. "Models of Decision-Making." In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, edited by David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, 19-59. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Lyotard, Jean-François. *Condiția postmodernă* [The postmodern condition]. București: Babel, 1993.
- Mintz, Alex, and Karl DeRouen Jr. *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politica între națiuni* [Politics among nations]. Iași: Polirom, 2007.
- Nardin, Terry. "Theorising the International Rule of Law." *Review of International Studies* 34, 3 (2008): 385-401.

- Paulus, Andreas L. "International Law After Postmodernism: Towards Renewal or Decline of International Law?." *Leiden Journal of International Law* 14, 4 (2001): 727-755.
- Peirce, Charles S. "Probleme centrale ale pragmaticismului" [Issues of pragmaticism]. In *Filosofia americană* [American philosophy], edited by Andrei Marga, 125-146. București: All Educational, 2000.
- Ralston, Shane J. "Pragmatism in International Relations Theory and Research." *Eidos* 14 (2011): 72-105.
- Rorty, Richard. "Drepturi umane, raționalitate și sentimentalism" [Human rights, rationality and sentimentality]. În *Adevăr și progres* [Truth and progress], Richard Rorty, 91-113. București: Univers, 2003.
- Rorty, Richard. "Prioritatea democrației în raport cu filosofia" [The priority of democracy to philosophy]. In *Obiectivitate, Relativism și Adevăr* [Objectivity, relativism and truth], edited by Richard Rorty, 311-343. București: Univers, 2000.
- Sagi, Abraham. *Albert Camus and the Philosophy of the Absurd*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002.
- Schmitt, Carl. *Constitutional Theory*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008.
- Schmitt, Carl. *Dictatorship: From the Beginning of the Modern Concept of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class-struggle*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013.
- Schmitt, Carl. *Political Romanticism*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2011.
- Schmitt, Carl. *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
- Schmitt, Carl. *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*. Mass: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1988.
- Shklar, Judith N. "Decisionism." In *Rational decision*, edited by Carl J. Friedrich, 3-17. New Jersey: Aldine Transaction, 2007.
- Sokoloff, William. "Between Justice and Legality: Derrida on Decision." *Political Research Quarterly* 58, 2 (2005): 341-352.
- Teschke, Benno G. "Fatal Attraction: A Critique of Carl Schmitt's International Political and Legal Theory." *International Theory* 3, 2 (2011): 179-227.
- Vattimo, Gianni, and Pier A. Rovatti. *Gândirea slabă* [Weak thought]. Constanța: Pontica, 1998.
- Vinx, Lars. "Carl Schmitt." In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed May 14, 2014. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/schmitt>.

30 Years of Regionalization in France. What Lessons for Romania?

Natalia CUGLEȘAN*

Abstract: *The concept of governance conveys not only the idea of representative democracy, but also that of participatory democracy and promotes the pluralism of actors in the decision-making. Decentralization is a process that allows an increase in the visibility of subnational actors in order to identify and solve the problems of local/regional communities. This paper describes the main stages of the modernization of local and regional public administration in France through transfer of important competencies to the regional level, newly created following the decentralization reform, and to the local level represented by the departments and the municipalities. The competencies of the regions as new territorial collectivities established on the grounds of the Defferre Law and their cooperation with the state is the focal point of this study. Romania as a unitary state can replicate the reforms that proved efficient in the process of regional decentralization in France. The lessons for Romania concern the transfer of competencies to the regional governing councils, and their relations with the state and with existing administrative units for the purpose of meeting Romania's objectives focusing on economic development and the mitigation of regional disparities.*

Keywords: *local autonomy, regional decentralization, governance, inter-communal cooperation institutions, development regions, constitutional revision.*

1. Introduction

Decentralization, considered as a fundamental strategy for the transfer of responsibilities from the central state administration to the subnational administrative levels, has raised the interest of researchers and practitioners who aim for a fundamental change of the institutional framework which prepares and adopts political, economic and social decisions¹. Among the multiple interpretations of the decentralization process, a synthetic and relevant definition of decentralization given by D.A. Rondinelli stands out: “the transfer of responsibility for planning, management and resource raising and allocation from the central government and its agencies to: (a) field units of central government ministries or agencies, (b) subordinate units or levels of government, (c) semiautonomous public authorities or corporations, (d) areawide, regional or functional authorities, or (e) nongovernmental private or voluntary organizations”².

* Lecturer at the University “Babes-Bolyai” Cluj-Napoca.

¹ Ehtisham Ahmad and Giorgio Brosio, *Does Decentralization Enhance Poverty Reduction and Service Delivery?*, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009); William Bartlett et al., eds, *Decentralization and Local Development in South East Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); John Loughlin et al., eds, *The Oxford Handbook of Local and Regional Democracy in Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Francesco Palermo, ed., *Regional Dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe: New Approaches to Decentralization* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013).

² Denis A. Rondinelli, “Government Decentralization in Comparative Perspective: Theory and Practice in Developing Countries,” *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 47, 2 (1981): 137; Dennis A. Rondinelli et al., *Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent*

Hence, the concept of *decentralization* is defined as the transfer of public functions from the higher levels to the lowest levels of governance in order to get closer to the citizens³.

Decentralization is *administrative* if the transfer of responsibilities is made to an inferior level, *fiscal* if the transfer concerns financial resources and revenues, and *political* if it involves the transfer of decision-making.

Decentralization can be considered a response of the central public administration to the changes affecting the economy and the society following the European integration or under the democratic pressure exerted by the political parties and by civil society associations. The object of the administrative reforms carried out in Europe over the past three decades was to increase the accountability of civil servants to the citizens in response to demands urging for the implementation of direct or participatory democracy. The agenda of democratic accountability proposes to accomplish accessible, responsible and transparent administration which guarantees the direct participation and representation of citizens in the administrative affairs.

In some EU member states, decentralization was accomplished with different results, some reforms leading to the transformation of the unitary state into a federal state, as in the case of Belgium⁴. In other states the reform resulted in increased regional autonomy, Spain and Italy serving as relevant examples⁵. France was the only place where

Experience, World Bank staff working papers Number 581, Management and development series no. 8 (Washington, D.C., U.S.A.: World Bank, 1983), 13.

³ John P. Loughlin and Eliseo Aja, *Subnational Democracy in the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities* / by John Loughlin with the Collaboration of Eliseo Aja ... [et al.] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 7–21; P. C. Humphreys and O. O'Donnell, "Leadership in a Decentralized Public Service: Some Lessons from Ireland," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 73, no. 1 (2007): 66, doi:10.1177/0020852307075690 Ansell, Cristopher and Gingrich, Jane, "Trends in Decentralization," in *Democracy transformed? Expanding political opportunities in advanced industrial democracies*, ed. Bruce E. Cain, Russell J. Dalton and Susan E. Scarrow, Comparative politics (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 140–63, 140..Marcou, Gérard, *La Régionalisation En Europe – Période 99-2000* (Luxembourg: Parlement Européen, September 2002), 17–32.

⁴ Robert Deschamps, *Le fédéralisme belge a-t-il de l'avenir?* (Namur, 2006), 55–71, <http://www.fundp.ac.be/pdf/publications/63586.pdf>; Wilfried Swenden, "Conclusion: The Future of Belgian Federalism – Between Reform and Swansong? 2007–11: A Critical Juncture in the Transformation of the Belgian State?," *Regional & Federal Studies* 23, no. 3 (2013): 370–376; Ellen et al Wayenberg, "Belgium: A Tale of Regional Divergence?," in *The Oxford Handbook of Local and Regional Democracy in Europe*, ed. John Loughlin, Frank Hendriks, and Anders Lidström (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 71–95.

⁵ Loughlin and Aja, *Subnational Democracy in the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities* / by John Loughlin with the Collaboration of Eliseo Aja ... [et Al.], 232–235; Enrico Borghetto and Fabio Franchino, "The Role of Subnational Authorities in the Implementation of EU Directives," *Journal of European Public Policy* 17, no. 6 (n.d.): 765–767; Benito Giordano and Elisa Roller, "A Comparison of City Region Dynamics in the UK, Spain and Italy: More Similarities than Differences?," *Regional Studies* 37, no. 9 (2003): 914–918; Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, and Arjan H. Schakel, *The Rise of Regional Authority: A Comparative Study of 42 Democracies* / Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, and Arjan H. Schakel (London: Routledge, 2010), 15–28; Alfred P. Montero, "The Limits of Decentralisation: Legislative Careers and Territorial Representation in Spain," *West European Politics* 30, no. 3 (2007): 580–686, doi:10.1080/01402380701276428; Simona and Brunazzo, Marco Piattoni, "Italy: The Subnational Dimension to Strengthening Democracy since the 1998," in *The Oxford Handbook*

the decentralization reforms advanced the most despite the fact that the state preserved its unitary character⁶. However, the common goal of decentralization in most of the EU-15 member states was the need to increase the administrative capacity of the regional and local authorities.

Facing the prospect of EU membership, especially for the purpose of implementing the EU regional policy, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have embarked on decentralization/regionalization reforms, although their impact was inferior to the one achieved by the reforms carried out in France⁷. The regionalization promoted in the Czech Republic and in Poland aimed at responding to demands regarding the absorption of EU Structural Funds because a condition was the existence of regions with a population between 0.8 and 3 million inhabitants⁸. Romania was no exception, but the

of Local and Regional Democracy in Europe, ed. John Loughlin, Frank Hendriks, and Anders Lidström (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 335–342.

⁶ Alistair Cole, “France: Between Centralization and Fragmentation,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Local and Regional Democracy in Europe*, ed. John Loughlin, Frank Hendriks, and Anders Lidström (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 307–30; Alistair Cole, *Governing and Governance in France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0834/2008014965-b.html>; Philip H. Gordon and Sophie Meunier, *The French Challenge: Adapting to Globalization* / Philip H. Gordon and Sophie Meunier (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2001); Gérard Marcou and Helmut Wollmann, “Réforme de La Décentralisation, Réforme de l’État, Régions et Villes En Europe,” in *Annuaire 2004 Des Collectivités Locales* (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2004); Richard Balme, “French Regionalization and European Integration: Territorial Adaptation and Change in a Unitary State,” in *The European Union and the Regions*, ed. J. Barry Jones and Michael Keating (Oxford, UK; New York: Clarendon Press, 1995), 167–90.

⁷ C. O’Dwyer, “Reforming Regional Governance in East Central Europe: Europeanization or Domestic Politics as Usual?,” *East European Politics and Societies* 20, no. 2 (2006): 219–53, doi:10.1177/0888325404271286; *Decentralization and Local Development in South East Europe*, Studies in Economic Transition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse, and Claire Gordon, “Conditionality and Compliance in the EU’s Eastward Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-National Government,” *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 42, no. 3 (2004): 523–51, doi:10.1111/j.0021-9886.2004.00517.x.

⁸ Agnieszka Mync, “Process of democratization and decentralization in Poland,” in *Federalism and decentralization: Perspectives for the transformation process in Eastern and Central Europe*, ed. Jürgen Rose and Johannes C. Traut (Münster, Ger., New York: Lit Verlag; Palgrave, 2002), 235–58; Philip Hemmings, *Improving Public-Spending Efficiency in Czech Regions and Municipalities*, vol. no. 499, OECD Economics Department Working Papers (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2006); Michal Illner, “The Czech Republic: Local Government in the Years after the Reform,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Local and Regional Democracy in Europe*, ed. John Loughlin, Frank Hendriks, and Anders Lidström (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 505–27; Pawel Swianiewicz, “Poland: *ibid.* Europeanization of Subnational Government,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Local and Regional Democracy in Europe*, ed. John Loughlin, Frank Hendriks, and Anders Lidström (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 480–504; Krzysztof Szczerski, “Securing Growth and Cohesion in Europeanized Conditions. The Role of Regional Development Bodies in Poland,” in *Regional Dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe. New Approaches to Decentralization*, ed. Francesco Palermo (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 175–200; J. A. Yoder, “Leading the Way to Regionalization in Post-Communist Europe: An Examination of the Process and Outcomes of Regional Reform in Poland,” *East European Politics & Societies* 21, no. 3 (2007): 424–46, doi:10.1177/0888325407303786; Michael Baun

regionalization method chosen on the grounds of Law No 151/1998 was decentralization through expansion of the competencies of local authorities and the setting up of 8 development regions⁹.

In the following sections, I will elaborate on the highlights of regional decentralization in France after the passing of the Defferre Law, and introduce a few considerations regarding Romania's decentralization plans for the purposes of improving governance and dynamizing the absorption of EU funds for the 2014-2020 financial period. In this context, a natural question arises: can the French regionalization experience be a relevant lesson for the Romanian central authorities? The issue of reducing bureaucracy and optimizing regional/local governance depends directly on the transfer of competencies to the subnational level, on fiscal decentralization and in particular on the relations established between the central and the regional levels in terms of responsibilities.

If the 30 years of regional decentralization experience in France is carefully examined and certain reforms which increase public administration bureaucracy are avoided, Romania could learn from the French model both institutionally and in terms of the costs incurred in this process.

2. Objectives and achievements of the regional decentralization in France

According to Loughlin, the topic of regionalization was addressed since the 1980s under two aspects in close connection with regional development. The first aspect referred to regionalization as eliminating economic disparities in the first years of regional policy enactment when it is essential that the states support the development of the less advanced

and Dan Marek, "Regional Policy and Decentralization in the Czech Republic," *Regional & Federal Studies* 16, no. 4 (2006), doi:10.1080/13597560600989011; .

⁹ Dobre Ana Maria, "Romania: From Historical Regions to Local Decentralization via the Unitary State," in *The Oxford Handbook of Local and Regional Democracy in Europe*, ed. John Loughlin, Frank Hendriks, and Anders Lidström (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 685–714; Adrian Ivan and Natalia Cuglesan, "Multi-Level Governance and Decentralization in the Unitary States of the European Union. Case Study: France and Romania," *NOVOS. Estudos Juridicos* 14, no. 1 (2009): 47–59; László Attila Klárík, "ROLUL REGIUNILOR ÎN CONSTRUCȚIA EUROPEANĂ. STUDIU DE CAZ ASUPRA REGIONALISMULUI ÎN ROMANIA," *Revista Transilvană de Științe Administrative* 3, no. 12 (2004): 76–82; Horga Ioan, "The Multilevel Gouvernance (MLG) and the Respect of the Subsidiarity Principle" in I. Horga & I. Suli-Zakar (eds), *Cross-Border Partnership. Whit special regards to the Hunagrian-Romanian-Ukrainian Tripartite Border*, Debrecen and Oradea University Press, 2010 pp. 169-175; Istvan Suli-Zakar, Ioan Horga, *Regional Development in the Romanian - Hungarian Cross-Border Space. From National to European Perspective*, University of Debrecen Publishing House, 2006, 420p; Ioan Horga, Iordan Gh. Barbulescu, Adrian Ivan, Mycolia Palincsak, Istvan Suli-Zakar, *Regional and Cohesion Policy – Insights Into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design*, Debrecen University Press & Oradea University Press, 2011, 308p; Cristina Matiuta, "Decentralization and Regional Policy in Eastern Europe: Considerations on Romania and Bulgaria," in *Decentralization and Local Development in South East Europe*, ed. William Bartlett, Sanja Maleković, and Vassilis Monastiriotis, Studies in Economic Transition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 135–50; Marius Suciu, "Decentralization and Regional Development in Romania. An Unfinished Reform in Search of a 'European' Model," in *Regional Dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe. New Approaches to Decentralization*, ed. Francesco Palermo (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 105–46.

regions in order to bring them to a level closest to the most developed ones¹⁰. In this context, the European countries added a territorial dimension to their planning and social policies. The second aspect concerned the *top-to-bottom* approach of the regional development policy. This approach aiming at alternative development in the homogenous centralized states was considered to be a reaction to regionalism and to ethnic nationalism. Hence, the regional development policy became one of the fundamental policies of the European Union.

2.1. Act I: the 1982-2002 reforms

The issue of regionalization in France was actually considered in the last years of President De Gaulle's term in office because until then the French presidency had shown no concern for the problems of the regional and local administration. The underlying reason is easily understandable knowing that De Gaulle was a fierce advocate of the powerful central state. Hence, the French people were somehow surprised when in a speech delivered in March 1968 in Lyon, he urged for regionalization: "*L'effort multiséculaire de centralisation qui fut longtemps nécessaire à la France pour réaliser et maintenir son unité [...] ne s'impose plus désormais*"¹¹ admitting that the clock of regionalization had ticked. According to the Gaullist plan, the regions would be governed by a regional council made up of deputies from the region as representatives of the territorial collectivities and of regional councilmen defending the economic and social interests of the region.

2.1.1. The history of regionalization in France

Although in France the tradition of an administrative organization on two levels was strong and the practice of multiple mandates was allowing many parliamentarians to occupy important positions at department level, the idea of regionalization became increasingly attractive. In particular, the economic development planning urged for a new approach in which the region was the central piece of every territorial development program.

Therefore, in 1954 were established the first economic development committees and in the following year regional activity programs were set up. In 1956 the country's territory was structured into 23 regions which were reduced to 21 in 1960. Although at that time there was no talking about organizing the region as administrative unit, several regional plans of economic and social development, including territorial development, were drafted. The regional action divisions set up in 1960 were institutionalized in 1964 by the appointment of a prefect of the region assisted by a regional economic development commission consisting of deputies and officials charged with economic and professional matters¹².

The April 1969 referendum, which submitted to public polls the idea of regionalization and the reform of the Senate, proposing its dissolution and transformation into a body of technical experts, was invalidated¹³. Consequently, President De Gaulle

¹⁰ John Loughlin, "'Europe of the Regions' and the Federalization of Europe," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 26, no. 4 (1996): 144.

¹¹ John Loughlin, *Subnational Government: The French Experience* / John Loughlin, French Politics, Society and Culture Series (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 59, <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0620/2006052967-b.html>.

¹² Vivien A. Schmidt, *Democratizing France: The Political and Administrative History of Decentralization* / Vivien A. Schmidt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 71–76.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 79–88; Boyer, Jean-Claude et al, *La France Les 26 régions*, Collection U. Géographie (Paris: A. Colin, 2005), 6–7

resigned. The referendum failure was triggered by the fact that most of the senators who represented the interests of the departments and municipalities feared that regionalization would reduce their influence at the local level. Hence, they voted against the referendum.

The failed referendum was not really a failure of regionalization as it was a failure of De Gaulle's authority. This assumption is probably true if we think that it was Georges Pompidou, De Gaulle's successor, who completed the reform which institutionalized the region on the grounds of Law No 619/July 5 1972. The new construction enjoyed legal personality and was declared territorial public institution governed by an assembly established following indirect elections (according to Article 5, the members of the regional council were deputies and senators from the region and the elected representatives of the territorial collectivities).

The concept of territorial collectivity describes a French administrative structure distinct from the central state administration, which represents the interests of the population living on that territory. A territorial collectivity is defined based on three criteria:

- a) Legal personality by virtue of the capacity to hold rights and obligations; in respect to this, the collectivity has an independent organization and a private patrimony serving its objectives;
- b) The competencies exercised are laid down in the Constitution; in a unitary state, the territorial collectivity enjoys only the competencies conferred by the parliament;
- c) Power of decision after deliberation in a council of representatives elected by direct vote.

2.1.2. Competencies conferred to the Regional Councils

The decisive step to regional decentralization was the passing of Law No 213 of March 2, 1982 (known in the literature as the Defferre Law) which conferred competencies to the new territorial collectivity – the region – and reconsidered the competencies exercised by the communes and the departments. By 2003 other laws were promoted (Table 1) with respect to the exercise of competencies by the three territorial collectivities, including the relations between the state and the territorial collectivities.

As a result, the regional councils established based on direct and universal vote exercised competencies transferred from the central level in the following sectors:

- Economic development (coordination role): a) establishment of the regime of direct aids and their distribution; b) enforcement and distribution of indirect aids (loan bonds, exoneration of professional fees);
- Territorial development and planning: 1) participation to the elaboration of the national planning and sustainable development policy; 2) drafting of the regional plan for sustainable development and territorial planning; 3) signing of the State-Region plan contracts, mainly for the purposes of sustainable development and territorial planning; 4) drafting of the regional transportation plan; 5) organization of the non-urban road transport services for persons and of the regional railroad transportation;
- Education and professional training: a) construction, maintenance, supply and financing of high schools, special education and maritime professional training institutions; b) extensive contribution to the financing of universities; c) elaboration of the regional plan for the development of professional training; d) adoption of the craftsmanship and lifelong professional training programs;
- Culture: 1) organization and financing of the regional museums; 2) preservation and exploitation of the regional archives.

Table 1 The most important laws concerning decentralization passed in 1982-2002

Legislative act	Object of the law (title of the act)	Amended/completed by law:
L.213/1982	Rights and liberties of the departments and regions	Amended by Law No 809/2004 regarding local liberties and responsibilities
L.595/1982	Th organization and functioning of the Regional Chamber of Accounts	Amended successively by Law No 663/1983, Law No 13/1988, Law No 18/1989, Law No 10/1990, Law No 2/1993 and Law No 1040/1994.
L.623/1982	Additions to Law No 213/1982 and the administrative control of the activities of territorial collectivities	Completed by Law No 142 /1996
L.8/1983	The split of competencies between communes, departments and regions	Completed by Law No 663/1983
L.16/1986	The organization of the regions and amendments to the provisions regarding the general councils	Amended and enforced by Law No 347/2012
L.13/1988	The improvement of decentralization	Amended successively by Law No 142/1996, Law No 546/1998, Law No 209/2007 and Law No 347/2012.
L.122/1993	The transparency of public procedures	Amended successively by L.530/1994, L. 101/1995, L.142/1996, L.609/1996, L.616/2001, L.73/2002, L.148/2007 and L.776/2008. Last amendment: L.387/2012
L.135/1998	The functioning of the regional councils	Completed by L.36/1999
L.36/1999	The election of regional councilmen and of the Corsica Assembly councilmen	

The competencies of the departments and communes remained unaffected by the establishment of the new territorial collectivity. The region received transferred competencies from the central level, without displacement of civil servants from the centre to the regions in line with the competencies transferred, thus leading to an increase in the administrative costs. The cooperation between the state and the territorial collectivities was boosted by the establishment of an Institute of the Territorial Collectivities and Local Public Services (Article 53) in the form of a public interest group enjoying financial autonomy and consisting of representatives of the state and of the local collectivities, along with other people from the public and private sector recognized for their ethical reputation. Involving the state and representatives of the legislative body in the administration of the institute was compatible with the restricted normative role of the regional authorities, a characteristic of the unitary state. However, this had the advantage of allowing the territorial collectivities to contribute to the elaboration of future decisions concerning the relations between the state and the collectivities. A common regime was

set up for the three collectivities regulating the legal control of their authority acts, the budgetary and accounts control¹⁴

2.2 Act II: the 2003-2004 reform package

After the June 2002 elections, the topic of decentralization regained the forefront of the public debate. The law on the revision of the Constitution which sparked Act II of decentralization was based on a project of the Senate which received support from the government and, in particular, from then President Chirac¹⁵. The state approved experimentation at local and regional level, which was an innovation, and conferred normative powers to the collectivities in order to derogate, for experimental purposes and for a limited period of time, from the laws regulating the exercise of the competencies stipulated in the constitutional law. Some authors interpreted it as a premise for the transformation of the French state into a subsidiary state¹⁶. However, it must be pointed out the positive impact on the population, as revealed by an opinion poll carried out by *Observatoire interregional*¹⁷.

2.2.1. The new competencies conferred to the regions by the 2003 and 2004 laws

The most important aspect of Act II of decentralization was amending the Constitution by declaring the region as territorial collectivity, along with the communes and the departments. Before this constitutional revision, the region was legitimized solely on the grounds of Law No 213/1982. Consequently, in a decentralized unitary state such as France, the state has to abandon its general territorial tasks and focus on the regulatory activity, on law enforcement, on the protection of the under-privileged and of vulnerable spaces¹⁸. The region was now going to exercise important competencies in the sphere of professional training, including adult professional training, area in which the separation of competencies between the state and the region was foreseen to be completed by 2008, without any staff transfers from the central level¹⁹.

The main legislative acts regulating the organization and functioning of the territorial collectivities and, in particular, the constitutional sanctioning of the region, were passed in 2003 and 2004. By 2008 – the deadline for the enforcement of the 2003-2004 law package – several other legislative acts referring to the functional optimization of the territorial authorities were also passed (Table 2). Based on the 2003-2007 enactment, the regional councils exercised competencies in the following fields:

¹⁴ Gérard Marcou, “Experiența Franceză În Regionalizare: Descentralizarea Regională În Statul Unitar,” *Alterra V*, no. 9 (1999): 18.

¹⁵ Patrick Le Lidec, “Pourquoi Une Nouvelle Étape de La Décentralisation? Modernisation Politique et Competition Politique,” in *Annuaire 2004 Des Collectivités Locales* (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2004), 16–17.

¹⁶ Géraldine Chavrier, “IV. L’Expérimentation Locale: Vers Un État Subsidaire□?,” *Annuaire Des Collectivités Locales*, 2004, 49, doi:10.3406/coloc.2004.1526.

¹⁷ Dominique Reynié, “L’Apport Des Assises Des Libertés Locales,” in *Annuaire 2004 Des Collectivités Locales* (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2004), 30.

¹⁸ Jean-Claude Némery, “Réforme de La Décentralization et Transferts de Compétences,” in *Annuaire 2004 Des Collectivités Locales* (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2004), 69.

¹⁹ Jean-Claude Thoenig, “Institutional Theories and Public Institutions.,” *Public Administration* 83, no. 3 (n.d.): 671–674; Jean-Claude Douence, “IX. Les Transferts de Compétences En Matière de Formation Professionnelle,” *Annuaire Des Collectivités Locales*, 2004, 121–124, doi:10.3406/coloc.2004.1531.

○ *Economic development*: a) elaboration of the regional economic development plan for experimental purposes and for a 5-year period; b) reconfiguration of the aids provided to companies (in the sense of economic and real estate assistance); c) setting up the regime of economic aids for companies, including the adoption of decisions regarding their lease;

○ *Territorial development and planning*: a) elaboration of the regional plan for infrastructure and transportation; b) introducing candidates for the development, maintenance and administration of civil airports; c) exercising ownership, development and administration rights on demand (deadline for submission: January 1, 2006) for all non-autonomous ports relevant for the state and located on its territory;

○ *Education and professional training*: a) exercising ownership of the immovable patrimony of high schools, special education institutions and maritime professional high schools; b) staff recruitment and human resources management (technicians, workers and services) in high schools; c) establishing and implementing the regional policy for apprentices and professional training for the youth and adults; d) adoption of the apprenticeship program and lifelong professional training in the framework of the regional plan for the development of professional training.

○ *Culture*: a) responsibility for the general inventory of the cultural patrimony; b) the possibility of underwriting, for experimental purposes, the crediting for the maintenance and restoration of the patrimony which does not belong to the state nor to public institutions; c) obtaining ownership of monuments which belong to the state or to the centre for national monuments; d) organization and financing of artistic professional training;

○ *Health*: a) performing vaccinations, fighting tuberculosis, leprosy, AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases; b) on demand participation for experimental purposes and for a 4-year period to the financing of sanitary equipments.

The region's involvement in the education sector envisaged participation in the restoration of documentation institutions belonging to one or several universities and the introduction of communication networks in particular by means of new technologies and restoration of the student hostels²⁰.

Table 2. The main legislative acts concerning decentralization passed in 2003-2007

Legislative act	Title of the law	Observations
L.276/2003	Decentralized organization of the Republic	Law with constitutional character which declared the region as territorial collectivity in the revised Constitution.
L.704/2003	The possibility of experimentation by the territorial collectivities	The authorities of the territorial collectivities were granted the right to overlook the legislative provisions which regulated their competencies and apply experimentation for a period of three years.
L.705/2003	Organization of the local referendum	
L.758/2004	Enforcement of Article 72/2 of the Constitution	Organic law stipulating the financial autonomy of territorial collectivities, and the enforcement of the

²⁰ Choukri Ben Ayed, "Entre Universalisme et Développement Local. L'émergence D'une Nouvelle École En France?," *Revue Internationale D'éducation de Sèvres* 46 (2007): 26–27; André Legrand, "L'Éducation et La Décentralization," in *Annuaire 2004 Des Collectivités Locales* (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2004), 136.

Legislative act	Title of the law	Observations
	concerning the financial autonomy of territorial collectivities.	principle of equalization (<i>péréquation</i>) among collectivities by providing the poorer collectivities with larger contributions from the richer ones.
L.809/2004	Law stipulating local liberties and responsibilities	Law No 809/2004 amended in particular Law No L.213/1982, including subsequent amendments.
L.157/2005	Development of rural territories	Law stipulating the conditions in which the state was going to provide assistance to the rural collectivities for trade and professional activities, including by using the equalization method (<i>la méthode de la péréquation</i>)
L. 1667/2006	Transferring the management of maritime ports to the territorial collectivities	Expanding the competencies of regional and departmental authorities.
L.1822/2007	Finance Law with effect from 2008	Collection of taxes by the state and the territorial collectivities

Also, the region was conferred prerogatives with respect to the training of the auxiliary medical staff by setting up institutes and schools, including exercising competencies related to the functioning and equipment of these entities, pending decision of the regional council president and approval by the prefect²¹.

2.2.2 Cooperation of regional authorities with the state in matters of economic development

Due to the competencies conferred to the regions by laws regulating the transfer of competencies the visibility of the regions in the decision-making process increased. The state-region contracts represented the most important form of cooperation between the two levels. On the one hand, it allowed the regions to finance their development programs and, on the other hand, it preserved the major role of the state in setting development guidelines. Between 2000 and 2006, for instance, the value of the state-region contracts was 33.6 billion Euros, with roughly equal contributions from the state and the regions. Almost three times higher than the value of the first generation contracts, the amount engaged in 2000-2006 triggered an increase in the contribution of the region up to 20-25% of their investment budget²². By means of the contracts concluded with the state, the regions, unlike the other territorial collectivities, contributed to the development of the railway and road infrastructures, thus consolidating their coordination role in territorial planning and development as a privileged partner of the state. At the same time, the regions absorbed EU funds for the achievement of objectives 1, 2 and 3 (Figure 1).


For 2007-2013, the state-region plan contracts, as they are called today, representing the 5th generation contracts, have had three major objectives: a) competitiveness and territorial attractiveness; b) promoting sustainable development; c) social and territorial cohesion. The infrastructure is present in all the contracts concluded between the state and

²¹ Didier Truchet, "Santé: La Centralization Ineluctable?," in *Annuaire 2004 Des Collectivités Locales* (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2004), 141; Richard B. Saltman, Vaida Bankauskaite, and Karsten Vrangbæk, *Decentralization in Health Care: Strategies and Outcomes*, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies Series (Maidenhead, Berkshire, England; New York: McGraw Hill, 2007), 24–29.

²² D'Estaing, Luis Giscard et Le Nay, Jacques, *Rapport D'information No.1836 Sur La Réforme Des Contrats de Plan Etat-Régions* (présenté devant l'Assemblée Nationale, October 2004), 7.

the territorial collectivities because its modernization and development bring profit to all the stakeholders. By changing the duration of the plan contracts from 5 to 7 years for 2007-2013, the legislator linked the execution of the contracts to the calendar of the Structural Funds. France received 16.3 billion Euros for the 2000-2006 period in order to promote the economic and social cohesion policy. For the 2007-2013 financial exercise, the total amount of the Structural Funds available was 12 billion Euros and the funds have been managed by the state through the regional prefects.

Figure 1. The Structural Funds spent by the French regions in the 2000-6 period.



(Source: <http://www.travail.gouv.fr>)

For 2007-2013, the state-region plan contracts, as they are called today, representing the 5th generation contracts, have had three major objectives: a) competitiveness and territorial attractiveness; b) promoting sustainable development; c) social and territorial cohesion. The infrastructure is present in all the contracts concluded between the state and the territorial collectivities because its modernization and development bring profit to all the stakeholders. By changing the duration of the plan contracts from 5 to 7 years for 2007-2013, the legislator linked the execution of the contracts to the calendar of the Structural Funds. France received 16.3 billion Euros for the 2000-2006 period in order to promote the economic and social cohesion policy. For the 2007-2013 financial exercise, the total amount of the Structural Funds available was 12 billion Euros and the funds have been managed by the state through the regional prefects.

It was estimated that experimentation, according to Law No 704/August 1, 2003, combined with Law No 809/August 13, 2004, would allow the region, or any other local collectivity for that matter, if it demands, to be the only authority in charge with the management and payment in the period stipulated in the law. Alsace was the first region to pursue pilot experimentation in line with the new legal provisions²³

²³ Nathalie Rubio, “Les Collectivités Territoriales et Application Du Droit Communautaire,” *Regard Sur L’actualité, La Documentation Française*, no. 331 (May 2007): 21.

The French border regions are also engaged in trans-border cooperation with the German Länder, and with regions from Belgium, Spain and Italy. It is worth mentioning the cooperation programs developed by Strasbourg and Ortenau regions for the execution of the complex development project reuniting 25 projects in the field of research, communications, and environment etc., financed through INTERREG III A. Another example is the European development pole backed up by the European Union and gathering regions from France, Belgium and Luxembourg with a view to elaborate a development program for 25 communes, of which 4 Belgian, 18 French and 3 from Luxembourg²⁴.

The territorial collectivity representatives proposed to maintain the 5-year duration of the plan contracts because it corresponds to the length of the mandate of regional councils, thus preventing any inconveniences caused by the post-election change in the political orientation of the regional and general councils. According to the regional councils, it is more appropriate to negotiate the plan contracts themselves instead of continuing the execution of a contract negotiated by the previous government of the region. The arguments in favor of a 6-year duration proposed by other representatives were based on the fact that each plan has three stages: strategic elaboration, negotiation – taking place at the beginning of the mandate, which can last up to one year and sets the concrete objectives for the entire mandate – and, finally, the execution of the contract, together with revision of some objectives, if necessary. For these reasons, the 6-year duration was deemed more appropriate.

Analysing the competencies exerted by the regions on the grounds of the 1982-2008 decentralization reforms has allowed us to outline the relations between the regional governance actors in each of these sectors. Article 59(2) of Law No 213/1982 stipulated that problems of regional interest were solved by the Regional Council by means of debates and rulings. The competencies of the Regional Council include the economic, social, sanitary, cultural and scientific development, and territorial planning. In all these sectors, the Regional Council cannot overlook the options of the departments and communes pertaining to the development programs. Article 4221.1 of the General Code of the territorial collectivities stipulates that all the actions undertaken by the Regional Council respect the integrity, autonomy, and competencies exercised by the departments and the communes.

The task of economic development was assigned mostly to the Regional Council. The leading role exercised refers mainly to setting up companies, providing assistance to the companies which experience hardships, bailing the loans contracted by companies. Territorial planning is another important domain in which the regional council leads the drafting of development plans.

At present, the role of the region has become more prominent: in line with Law No 809/2004, the region coordinates the economic development activities carried out on its territory by the territorial collectivities and their communities, except for when the state steps in. Hence, the regional plan for experimental economic development sets the regional strategic guidelines in the economic sector.

The Regional Council has full powers in the field of secondary education (building, maintenance and restoration of high schools), but partners with the state in the financing of academic research. The Regional Council is competent to elaborate the regional program for professional training and apprenticeship.

²⁴ Jean-Paul Carrière, “Les Coopérations Entre Collectivités: Facteur D’intégration À l’Union Européenne?,” *Regard Sur L’actualité*, no. 331 (n.d.): 46–50.

Concerning professional training, the prerogatives of the region expand from establishing to implementing the regional policy for the professional training of apprentices, of the young and adults in search of jobs and professional reconversion. The region also provides assistance to candidates who demand endorsement of their professional experience and skills.

2.3 Financial autonomy of the new territorial collectivity

Law No 213/1982 introduced important amendments regarding the financial autonomy of the local collectivities. However, the law was further amended in order to balance the competencies conferred to the communes, the inter-communal cooperation communities, the departments and the regions with the financial resources available to them depending on the obligations incumbent on each of these collectivities. Based on the principle of independent administration, laid down in the Constitution and reinforced by the provisions of Law No 213/1982, “the fiscal revenues and other resources of the territorial collectivities represent, for each category of collectivities, a certain share of the resources that they are supposed to manage” (Article 72 of the Constitution).

2.3.1 Revenues and spending of the regions

The financial revenues collected by the regions, departments, communes and inter-communal cooperation communities consisted of taxes, lump taxes, royalties etc. Unlike the other territorial collectivities, the region had fewer resources available, such as: professional taxes, land taxes on real-estate properties and on vacant land (except for farmland), royalties for setting up offices (particularly in Île de France region), taxes on motor vehicle registration, taxes on the release of driving licenses, and taxes on oil by-products etc. Consequently, their spending was lower than the spending of the departments and communes. In 2006, it was even lower than the spending of the Groups with their Own Tax (GOT) (in French: *Groupements à fiscalité propre*), as resulting from Figure 2.


The regional council leads the adoption and execution of the regional budget. Until January 1, 2006, the date of the entry into force of the Organic Law referring to the Finance Law (LOLF) these competencies concerned the split of the budgetary spending into sections (investment spending and current spending), and of the budgetary revenues also into sections. The investment spending approved by the council included: investment spending for the functioning of the Regional Council, reimbursement of the debts, the amounts committed in several cooperation frameworks and the spending on studies and prognosis or feasibility reports.

The investment collections comprised, first of all, the amounts received as subsidies, the participations of other public and private actors, and assistance funds supplied by the state. The investment collections were cumulated with levies on the current spending section and installments of the loans granted by the Council. The Regional Council could supplement the investment funds either by contracting loans or by receiving gifts and inheritances. The Council also decided the volume of the current spending which included the necessary sums for the functioning of the Regional Council, the amounts needed for covering the spending incurred by service operation, and the interests due for the contracted loans.

Following the increased competencies of the regions and of the departments after the enactment of the laws from Act II of decentralization, the share of the cumulated spending of regions and departments in the total spending of the territorial collectivities augmented from 39% in 1997, to 43% in 2006. Of course, not all the regions had the possibilities to engage in

economic development spending and to perform the other responsibilities conferred by the decentralization laws, as resulting from the following section.

Figure 2. Evolution of the spending of territorial collectivities in the 1997-2006 period [in billion Euros]; GOT: Groups with their Own Tax.



(Source: <http://www.collectivites-locales.gouv.fr/files/files/memento.pdf>)


2.3.2 Regional disparities and the national policy on the equalization of revenues

The region, introduced as the third territorial collectivity after the communes and the departments, established on the grounds of Article 72 of the Constitution, consisted of 2-8 departments, except for the Overseas Territories (Guiana, Martinique, Guadeloupe and Réunion) each comprising one department. With respect to the area, the population and the resources, the 21 regions of continental France are quite heterogeneous. It is worth mentioning, though, the standard of living expressed in the average GDP/capita of each region of a state or at European level. In every state, be it unitary, federal or regional (such as Spain and Italy) there are very developed regions and regions much under the national average. Figure 3 presents the evolution of the GDP/capita in France, at national level, by comparison with the levels reached by its most developed region (Île de France) and its less developed region (Languedoc-Roussillon). As this situation is found in other EU countries as well, it is common that their central governments, by applying the principle of territorial and social cohesion, perform the equalization of the revenues of regions²⁵.

²⁵ Philip Blair, "Financial Equalisation between Local and Regional Authorities in European Countries," *Local Government Studies* 18, no. 4 (1992): 7–27, doi:10.1080/03003939208433648; Robin Boadway, "The Theory and Practice of Equalization," Queen's Economics Department working paper, 50, no. 1 (2004): 211–54; Charley Darbousset, "Recherches Sur La Notion de Péréquation En Droit Public" (Université de la Rochelle, n.d.), accessed December 31, 2010; Brian Dollery and Lorenzo Robotti, *The Theory and Practice of Local Government Reform*, Studies in Fiscal Federalism and State-Local Finance (Cheltenham; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2008); Jörg Broschek, "Federalism and Political Change: Canada and Germany in

Knowing that France and Romania are unitary states (unlike Germany, a federal state), it is justified to make a comparison between the results of the financial equalization policies put in place in the two countries in order to mitigate (or at least to prevent from growing) interregional disparities. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the GDP/capita of the most developed region in France by comparison with the increase in the GDP/capita at national level and at the level of the least developed region. We notice a permanent increase in the differences between the GDP of Île de France and the GDP of the other regions (expressed here only in the GDP at national level), particularly after year 2000. The government enforced the principle of equalization of resources among collectivities in order to reduce economic discrepancies. However, the measure was enforced only in the remaining 20 regions.

Figure 3. Comparative evolution of the GDP per capita, [Euros] of the most developed and of the less developed region in France in the 2000-2007 period.



(Source: INSEE PIB par Regions, 1990-2009)

Equalization is already recognized in the French financial culture as a useful and productive measure at the level of the complex local-national financial system. In this context, equalizing the resources available to the regions can be considered as an instrument of governance optimization which is one of the basic principles of good governance at national level. By redistributing the wealth of certain regions in order to stimulate the growth of other regions, the government intrigued researchers especially in view of the principle of regional autonomy.

Indeed, the government deemed rightful to take into consideration the needs and possibilities of some regions and the capacity of others to stimulate interregional solidarity, with a view to promote the territorial planning and development policy. A fairly

recent report on the consequences of the equalization policy²⁶ reviewed and discussed in the French Senate emphasizes the progress achieved and some aspects which need rectification.

Obviously, the impact of the financial equalization method on the fiscal autonomy of the territorial collectivities is unquestionable²⁷, but the following questions stands: “Can the constitutionalization of the distribution of resources be interpreted as an infringement of the financial autonomy?” Many arguments can be brought in support of this opinion, given that resources equalization among regions incurs two contradictory outcomes:

1. It preserves a quasi-constant difference between regions and stimulates social cohesion. The measures taken by the state to assist the poorer regions comprise an increase over the 50% average in the state’s participation in the financing of the State-Region plan contracts and the allocation of other sums in order to balance the budgets.
2. The equalization policy (*péréquation entre collectivités locales*) does not lead to an increased sense of responsibility of the recipient regions; moreover, it entails a state of dependency on the central government. This contravenes the principle of financial autonomy and self-governance

In the State-Region plan contracts the state usually participates with 50% of the resources needed to achieve the objectives. However, in the case of the contracts with the more developed regions, the state’s share is under 50%, while for the contracts with disadvantaged regions, the state contributes with more than 50% of the resources needed. This might explain why in the contracts concerning Île de France region, the state participates with only 40% of the contract value. Yet, the state’s contribution was 63% of the total value of the contract concluded with the Limousin region²⁸ and only 35% in the contract with Alsace (*Projet du plan État-Région*, 2007-2013).

For this purpose, three equalization mechanisms (*trois mécanismes de péréquation entre collectivités locales*) were used in order to reduce interregional (inter-communal and communal) disparities: a) the horizontal equalization mechanism providing assistance to the local authorities through transfer of funds from the most developed to the poor communities; b) the vertical equalization mechanism used by the state to provide subsidies to the disadvantaged communities; c) the equalization mechanism so-called “on the spot” (*les dispositifs de péréquation plus ponctuels*). The 2012 Finance Law (Loi n°2011-1977 du 28 décembre 2011) stipulated the creation of a national fund for fiscal inter-communal and communal equalization revenues (*Fond national de péréquation des recettes fiscales intercommunales et communales: FPIC*) worth 150 million Euros for 2012, and estimated on the increase for the following years reaching 1 billion Euros in 2016.

In spite of all these equalization measures, the dispersion remained higher than in Germany, for instance, but did not score a growing trend over time as it did in Romania (Figure 4). The dispersion values shown in Figure 4 have been determined based on the formula proposed at the EU level. Dispersion D started to be used quite recently in the EU in order to express regional inequalities in terms of the GDP/capita. The dispersion index is useful because it accentuates better the differences between regions at national and

²⁶ Institut Thomas More, *Quelles Perspectives Pour La Péréquation En France Après La Suppression de La Taxe Professionnelle?*, Rapport présenté à la Commission des Finances du Sénat, (March 22, 2010).

²⁷ Darbousset, “Recherches Sur La Notion de Péréquation En Droit Public,” 376–379.

²⁸ Stéphanie Jamet, “Faire Face Aux Défis de La Décentralisation En France,” 2007, 23, doi:10.1787/125763645442.

European level. Every year, Eurostat publishes data referring to the GDP/capita of the EU regions and the dispersion value. Dispersion D is calculated using the formula:

$$D = 100 \frac{1}{Y} \sum_{i=1}^n |y_i - Y| \frac{p_i}{P}$$


(1)

where

y_i is the GDP/capita of region 1, 2, 3.....n; Y is the average value of the GDP/capita at national level; p_i is the population of the region 1, 2, 3...n; P is the population of the country; n is the number of the regions.

Figure 4 shows that Germany managed to keep a more stable balance between the prosperity levels of its regions over the first decade of the 21st century, unlike France and Romania. However, this involved interventions of the central governments by means of different mechanisms. For instance, both in Germany and in France the equalization procedures concerning the local collectivities were laid down in the fundamental law of the two countries²⁹.

Figure 4. Comparative evolution of the dispersion of regional disparities in France, Germany and Romania in the 2000-2007 period.



(Source: European Regional Yearbook, 2009, 2011, <http://Eurostat.ec.europa.eu>)

²⁹ Michel Bouvier, “Repenser la solidarité financière entre collectivités locales: les nouveaux enjeux de la péréquation en France,” *Revue Française d'Administration Publique*, 121-122 (2007): 75–78; Laurent Guihéry and Jan Werner, “Les Finances Publiques En Allemagne Quelles Réformes?,” *Revue de l'OFCE* 3, no. 94 (2005): 400–405; Laurent Guihéry, “Fédéralisme fiscal en Allemagne. Quelle réforme de la péréquation financière allemande?” *Economie publique. Etudes et recherches*, 2, no. 8 (2001): 66–69.

2.4 Act III of decentralization in France

The process of decentralization in France has been assessed on a regular basis on Senate's proposal by special committees, which analyze aspects concerning the functional responsibilities, the access to resources, and the political responsibility of each administrative level. The functional responsibilities of the territorial collectivities refer to the domains in which each level is involved and if there are shared competencies. The regional level is involved mainly in the management of education, health, transport infrastructure, economic development and culture. At the local level the typical responsibilities concern a relatively large array of sectors, from basic service supply (salubrity of the streets and public places, solid waste management) to local development planning and social services. The debates around these reports often led to the promotion of new decentralization reforms, the most common examples being the 2000-2002 reports which prepared the introduction of the reform package of 2003-2004, and the reforms from Act III of decentralization which I will be presenting further on.

2.4.1 Recommendations of the Attali report

One of the most relevant reports drafted after the implementation of the reform package of 2003-2004 is the Attali report. It was drafted on President Sarkozy's initiative by a commission presided by Jacques Attali, former first president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1991-1993) and former adviser of former French President François Mitterrand. When the report was submitted to the Senate (Attali, 2008), its content sparked keen debate in the press and at regional level.

The report focused on the means available to optimize local governance, and in particular, regional and national governance. In summary, the optimization of the entire public administration in France follows two main guidelines: cutting the spending of all territorial levels through restructuring and marking the boundaries of the competencies exercised by each level, and reducing the shared competencies as much as possible. Thus, the efficiency of the collectivities is improved by cutting back public deficits which are much higher in France than in other EU member states.

The report pointed out that in 2007, the total spending of the public authorities exceeded 1 000 billion Euros, 35 % of which was the spending of the central public authorities and 20 % the spending of the territorial collectivities, the remaining share being allocated to the social sector³⁰. Considering a national GDP of approximately 1 800 billion Euros, the above-mentioned expenses placed France among the most dynamic countries in terms of spending increase: from 20.7 % in 1980 and 35.2 % in 1990, to 65.9 % of the GDP in 2007.

Translating optimization into practice was going to involve two distinct stages: evaluation and regulation based on the conclusions of the report. The strategy of governance optimization was based on the respect of the spending plan included in the multi-annual budget instead of an annual planning and on analyzing the competencies exercised by the different public services of the central and territorial administration, as follows:

- A thorough evaluation of the education, health, administration etc. services provided at the central level. The results of the evaluation were going to be made public and the beneficiaries of the services were invited to take part in the process;

³⁰ Attali, Jacques(Sous la présidence de), *Rapport de La Commission Pour La Libération de La Croissance Française*, March 2009, 179, www.liberationdelacroissance.fr.

- Evaluation of the direct and indirect representatives of the public services (professors, doctors, civil servants) by their superiors and by the beneficiaries of the services through one or several evaluation institutions.

Special attention was given to the regulations already present in the sphere of decentralization: the very large amount of regulations was bound to create difficulties for those who are supposed to respect them and for the parliament who is in charge of controlling law enforcement. The report also mentioned the fact that between 1998 and 2007 the number of regulations tripled and almost half were put into force only partially³¹. For the purpose of optimization of the administration, the authors of the report pleaded for increased attention to the existing regulations and to future norms per category (laws, directives, regulations, and circulars), as follows:

- Assessment of the usefulness of norms elaborated before the 1970s and of their impact on companies and citizens;
- Simplification and a more careful substantiation of future norms by ex ante and ex post evaluation of every bill and regulation, as well as EU regulations. The Secretary General of the government and the competent minister are in charge with the control of the evaluation before its submission for approval in the parliament;
- Improved coordination between the European and national norms by transposition of all EU directives, without exception;
- Setting up a *Good Governance Committee* to analyze the legislative framework and draft trimestrial reports including proposals for the simplification of laws in this field and the removal of the outdated provisions.

The reorganization of the central and territorial administration was proposed in order to reduce costs. As concerns the government it was deemed necessary to reduce the number of ministers due to the risk of conflicts triggered by the overlapping competencies which reflected negatively on the economic and social development. Besides, there were many shared competencies between two or several ministers which had to be reduced to the minimum and the law must specify the minister nominated as project leader. Reducing costs also involved downsizing the advisers in the ministers. Nevertheless, governance optimization required an increase in the number of autonomous and independent agencies for service regulation and supply.

In the territory, the simplification of administration organization aimed, in the first place, at eliminating the dysfunctions occurred in the process of decentralization: the transfer of competencies from the deconcentrated services to the local public authorities was not followed by the suppression of the deconcentrated services, which thus remained unchanged. For example, the decrease in the number of deconcentrated services for the entire 1982-2006 period was only 15%, in spite of downsizing posts by 50 000³².

The alternative of governance restructuring was the constitutional recognition of the cluster-type inter-communal cooperation communities (*Établissements Publics de Coopération Intercommunale, EPCI*) which would take over new competencies presently exercised by the departments. Inter-communality was an important measure intended to prevent local fragmentation caused by the existence of small communes lacking the resources needed for economic development. Unlike the large and powerful communes

³¹ Ibid., 182.

³² Ibid., 192.

from other EU states, such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden or Finland, the French communes of less than 2 000 inhabitants are clearly at risk.

The consolidation of the EPCI was completed after 2002 due to the increase in the global quotations provided by the state and to material incentives offered to the communes in order to set up cooperation communities. The increase in the spending of the cooperation communities was triggered mainly by the augmentation of the current spending and only insignificantly by the growth of the scale economy. The competencies exercised by the EPCI allowed the central authorities to foresee an essential change in the near future: the gradual taking over by these communities of the departments' prerogatives and the consolidation of the role of regions. However, this was meant to threaten the existence of the departments which was a completely opposite solution from the years 1982 and 2003-2004, when the departments received more significant transfers of competencies and financial resources than the regions, the communes and the cooperation communities.

The report estimated that it would take nearly 10 years to assess the prospects of the EPCI taking over the competencies of the departments. The abolition of the departments after 200 years would depend on the extent to which the transfer of competencies is demanded by the cooperation communities, this being a prerequisite for the restructuring of the governance levels.

Under these circumstances, a new constitutional reform was envisaged which would declare the inter-communal cooperation communities, so far public institutions, as territorial collectivities like the regions and the communes. Further consolidation of the role of regions was also triggered not only by their competencies in the fields of economic development and professional training, but also by the election of the members of the Senate and of the French delegation to the EU Committee of the Regions. The election of senators was deemed to follow the pattern already used in the selection of the French delegation to the Committee of the Regions when 12 elected members out of 24 were representatives of the regions and the remaining 12 seats were assigned to the departments and communes. This meant that half of the senators elected would be representatives of the regions, which is much more than at present.

2.4.2 The new regulations of 2010-2012

The Attali report set the premises for new reforms of the local public administration. Hence, in September 2008 former President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that the reform was bound to envisage the reduction of the decentralized levels and the abolition of the business tax. In the context of the financial crisis, which was starting to show, the simplification of the territorial organization had become an indispensable mission.

Following the Attali report debated in the Senate at the beginning of 2008, the reform began with the setting up of the *Commission for the reform of local public administration* presided by Edouard Balladur who submitted a report to the president of the republic on March 5, 2009³³. Moreover, the reform was backed up in subsequent reports³⁴. A first step was the passing of Law No 1673/2009 regarding the financial

³³ Balladur, Edouard(sous la direction de), *Il Est Temps de Décider, Rapport Au Président de La République*, 2009, <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/094000097/0000.pdf>.

³⁴ Daudigny, Yves, *Rapport d'Information. Fait Au Nom de La Délégation Aux Collectivités Territoriales et À La Décentralisation (1) Sur L'ingénierie Publique*, (Enregistré à la Présidence du Sénat, June 15, 2010); Institut Thomas More, *Quelles Perspectives Pour La Péréquation En France Après La Suppression de La Taxe Professionnelle?*; Laignel, André (sous la présidence

situation in 2010. It stipulated the abolition of the business tax and its substitution by territorial economic contributions (Article 2 of Law No 1673/2009 of December 29, 2009). The territorial economic contribution comprised a land subscription fixed by the municipalities or, if necessary, by the EPCI based on the value of the properties, and a value-added tax for the companies whose turnover exceeds 500 000 Euros. In total, the economic territorial contribution would not exceed 3 % of the property value.

The first law on the reform of local public administration which materialized the ideas of President Sarkozy based on the information provided in the above-mentioned reports and having in mind the international economic-financial situation was Law No 1563/2010 of December 16. The promotion of this law envisaged the simplification of the institutional architecture, the downsizing of civil servants and the clarification of the responsibilities of territorial collectivities (regions, departments, communes and inter-communal cooperation communities), without however envisaging the abolition of the departments, as the Attali report had recommended. Among the most important provisions of Law No 1563/2010 was the position of territorial council member who replaced the general council member and that of regional council member effective from the 2014 elections. Law No 1563/2010 was consolidated by subsequent legislative acts referring to the process of decentralization (Table 3).

Territorial council members would be elected for a six-year term by majority uninominal vote in two polls (Article 1). The territorial council member would participate both in the departmental council and in the regional council, thus entailing a decrease in public administration spending. With regard to this particular provision, Jean-Pierre Bel, the president of the Socialist group in the Senate and Francois Hollande, the Socialist party's candidate to the presidency of the republic at that time, expressed their opposition, the latter making a case of his electoral campaign to annul the provisions referring to the territorial council members if elected president of the country³⁵.

Law No 1563/2010 also declared the metropolis as public institution of cooperation based on agreement between several communes and cities "in order to create a space of solidarity for the purpose of economic, ecological, educational, cultural and social development aiming at enhancing competitiveness and cohesion" (Article 12). At the same time, the law envisaged the possibility of creating metropolitan poles (*pôles métropolitaines*) as new forms of public institutions of cooperation "set up based on agreement between the public institutions of cooperation with independent fiscality" (Article 20) in order to promote economic development, innovation, research, territorial planning, higher education and culture. It was clear since the presidential campaign that the proportions and impact of these transformations would depend on whether the new government of France decides to enforce Law No 1563 or to replace it with other provisions according to the vision of the newly elected president³⁶.

de), *Les Finances Des Collectivités Locales En 2010. État Des Lieux, Rapport de l'Observatoire Des Finances Locales*, 2010, <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/104000378/0000.pdf>.

³⁵ Bel, Jean-Pierre, "Soyons Clairs: La Réforme Territoriale Sera Abrogée," *Le Monde*, March 3, 2012; François Hollande, "Le Changement C'est Maintenant. Mes 60 Engagements Pour La France," n.d., http://download.parti-socialiste.fr/projet_presidentiel_2012_francois_hollande.pdf; Aurelia Peru-Bălan, "Campania Prezidențială Din Franța – 2012. Între Valorile Gaulliste Și Tradiția Stângii Franceze," *Sfera Politicii* Vol. 20, no. 4(170) (2012): 36–49.

³⁶ Gérard Marcou, "Changements et Permanences Dans Le Système Français D'administration Territoriale," *Revue Française D'administration Publique*, no. 141 (n.d.): 8–9.

Table 3. Legislative acts regulating decentralization in the vision of President Sarkozy, 2009-2012

Legislative act	Title of the legislative act	Amended by:	Observations
L.1563/2010	Local administration reform	L.871/2011	Establishing the number of territorial councilmen for departments and regions
		L.281/2012	Amending Article 6 of Law No 1563/2010
		L.1561/2012	Common representation in the municipal and urban communities
L.1673/2009	Finance Law for 2010	L.1657/2010	Finance Law effective in 2011
		L.1977/2011	Finance Law effective in 2012

2.4.3 Act III of decentralization proposed by President in office François Hollande

In his inaugural speech, President Hollande expressed willingness to support the transfer of competencies to the local level, promising to launch Act III of decentralization. Among the objectives of his program, Hollande envisaged the local tax reform, the extension of the competencies of local authorities, including in the employment sector and with regard to the transposition of EU policies, in particular the common agricultural policy.

The rethinking of the decentralization process introduced by former President Sarkozy was one of the first ideas announced in 2012 by the new French government. The promotion of Law No 403/2013 proposed to eliminate the designation of territorial Council members and changed the name of the General Council into Departmental Council and of the general Council members into departmental Council members. If Law No 1563/2010 regulating the election of territorial councilmen as of 2014 had been enforced, the number of civil servants (acting as general and regional councilmen) would have dropped from 6 000 to 3 000. Currently, there is no law which proposes to suppress any decentralized level (I remind that the Attali report foresaw the replacement in ten years' time of the departments with the inter-communal cooperation communities) and, less likely, to reduce the number of the civil servants acting in the management of the territorial collectivities.

In the vision of President Hollande the regions will exercise competencies in the sectors of employment, professional training, assistance to SMEs and the management of Structural Funds. The present government hopes that in time the French regions will enjoy the same autonomy as the German Länder or the autonomous regions in Spain. In turn, the departments will continue to enjoy competencies in the sector of health and others, as they do at present. In the context of new reforms underway, the objectives for 2013 are to reduce inequalities, to support democratization, to set competencies for each administrative level and to improve performance³⁷. By April 2013, the following three bills on decentralization had been drafted:

- The modernization of territorial public action and the assertion of cities (objectives: clarification of the responsibilities of central and local authorities, the role of the cities and the transfer from the central to the local level);
- The mobilization of the regions with a view to foster economic increase, employment and territorial equality (establishing the conditions for economic growth, improving employment management, focusing on the future of the youth and improving the territorial engineering services);

³⁷ Cotten, Michel, "L'acte III de La Décentralisation Est Bien Mal Parti," *Tribune*, accessed July 9, 2013, <http://www.slate.fr/tribune/68029/decentralisation-acte-III-projet-loi>.

- The development of regional solidarity and local democracy (strengthening interregional solidarity, environment protection, guaranteeing energy supply, the transparency of activities at local level, consolidation of community integration).

The pace of the reforms from Act III of decentralization will allow the setting up of coherent relations between the central and the local authorities, and urge the authorities to assume more responsibilities in their fields of interest. The focus on inter-communal development depends on the election of inter-communal councilmen, and for this reason the latter will enjoy more legitimacy which, from this standpoint, resembles the level of legitimacy conferred to the communal representatives.

3. What kind of regionalization in Romania?

The adoption of the territorial-administrative organization falls exclusively within the area of competence of the Romanian state, although it was often claimed that the EU made such demands. Since the time of the accession negotiations, the EU only demanded the setting up of regional structures for the implementation of the regional policy. Knowing that the development regions were created before the EU began the accession negotiations with Romania, it is legitimate to ask: “can statistical regions be considered the result of a process with the most convenient *cost/benefit* ratio?”

3.1 Critical reflection on the development regions

The composition and the role of the development regions in the decision-making process in Romania, regulated on the grounds of Law No 151/1998, amended and completed by Law No 315/2004 are often criticized³⁸. What development regions symbolize for the common citizen is as obvious as can be: they have no meaning. Although the opinions expressed on various occasions by experts in economic geography, administrative sciences and constitutional law, or academics have not been entirely congruent, they all criticized the current situation.

3.1.1 Regional structures lacking visibility and real competencies

In the states of Central and Eastern Europe decentralization and regionalization were approached separately, taking into account various factors, such as the geographic area, the size of the population, the traditions, the experience, the willingness and the orientation of the governing political parties, etc. Hence, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have chosen the path of regionalization, the governing bodies of the regions being elected by direct vote. In the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Romania, Hungary, the Baltic states), the regional level does not exist in reality, only as statistical regions (level NUTS2) under the coordination of the Ministry of Development³⁹.

³⁸ Jordan, Ion, *România, Încotro? Regionalizare, Cum? Când? Structuri Administrativ-Teritoriale În România* (Ed. CD Press, 2003); Klárik, “ROLUL REGIUNILOR ÎN CONSTRUCȚIA EUROPEANĂ. STUDIU DE CAZ ASUPRA REGIONALISMULUI DIN ROMANIA”; Anca and Moraru, Adrian Ghinea, “Considerente Privind Procesul de Descentralizare În România. Reforma Administrativ-Teritorială,” n.d., <http://www.ipp.ro/>; Alina Profiroiu and Marius Profiroiu, “Autonomia Financiară a Colectivităților Locale Din România – Premisă a Succesului Descentralizării,” *Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences*, no. 19 (2007): 77–85.

³⁹ Natalia Cugleşan, “Multilevel Governance in the EU: What Model for Romania,” *Eurojournal.org*, 2006, 1–14; Ivan and Dobre Ana Maria, “Romania: From Historical Regions to Local Decentralization via the Unitary State,” 694–702; Ekaterina Domorenok, “EU Regional Policy and the Process of Institution – Building in Central and Eastern European Countries,” in

In Romania, the regional structures involved in advancing the regional policy are the Council for Regional Development (CDR) and the Agency for Regional Development (ADR). The Council for Regional Development is composed of the presidents of the member County Councils, plus one representative for each municipal, city and communal councils from each county. Thus, CDR can comprise between 16 and 28 members, depending on whether the regions consist of 4 counties (Region 5 West) or 7 counties (Region South-Muntenia). As for the Bucharest-Ilfov region, the members of the CDR are the President of Ilfov County Council, the general mayor of the Bucharest municipality and one representative for each district of the capital, representatives of the local councils from Ilfov County and, at par, representatives from the districts of the capital.

Article 7(8) stipulates the participation as guests, without voting right, of other people such as “county prefects, representatives of municipal, city and communal councils, of institutions and organizations holding responsibilities in the field of regional development, civil society representatives and relevant socio-economic partners”. Apparently, this provision is democratic because it involves the plurality of actors in the decision-making process. However, there is no precise institutional framework concerning the composition of this group, except for the prefects.

The presence of the prefects, of the civil society and of socio-economic partners is fully justified because they represent the interests of the state, of the businesses and of the civil society. On the contrary, it is not clear on what grounds are invited as guests the other representatives of the local councils. The CDR already counts representatives of the local councils from each county, therefore what is the role of guests from the same category? The projects submitted for debate in front of these guests are elaborated by the Agency for Regional Development which, according to Article 8(9), has the necessary institutional and administrative capacity, meaning that the guests can only express an opinion about the projects on the agenda. However, the law does not specify whether they are aware in advance of the content of the projects in order to make an informed opinion.

As for the civil society representatives invited, the law does not stipulate the selection criteria. While the participants from the socio-economic sector can be considered experts or elected representatives, the civil society representatives invited cannot be described as administration professionals, but rather included in the category “arbitrary selection” or “diffuse participation”.

The fact that the legislator has allowed the CDR to decide on the participation of these categories of guests is an argument in favor of those who claim that the Romanian development regions lack visibility in the eyes of the public opinion, namely that the citizens don’t get involved in the problems of the community⁴⁰. Moreover, the fact that the approval of projects in the CDR is a preliminary stage (the resolution is sent to the National Council for Regional Development which needs to draw up the list of projects pending financing) is casting more doubt on the participation of the invitees to the debates of the CDR.

Regional Dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe. New Approaches to Decentralization, ed. Francesco Palermo (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 36–48; Yoder, “Leading the Way to Regionalization in Post-Communist Europe: An Examination of the Process and Outcomes of Regional Reform in Poland,” 426–433. Cuglesan, “Multi-Level Governance and Decentralization in the Unitary States of the European Union. Case Study: France and Romania.”

⁴⁰ Ghinea, “Considerente Privind Procesul de Descentralizare În România. Reforma Administrativ-Teritorială,” 11.

3.1.2 Regional disparities steadily rising

The choice of the government for this regionalization method was probably motivated by the fact that regionalization and decentralization may increase the economic disparities between regions due to the different geographic and economic endemic conditions. The state is holding on to the prerogative of distributing resources in order to reduce the differences between the average revenues of the developed regions and the average revenues of the poorest regions. I will analyse the efficiency of the governmental policy aimed at reducing or at least maintaining the initial differences between regions based on the GDP/capita economic index, established per region since year 2000.

The most disadvantaged region in 2000-2008 was North-East Region 1 which groups 6 counties and the largest population, but has a GDP/capita under 30 % of the EU average (UE=100%). The next region in ascending order of the relative GDP/capita is South-West Region, whose GDP/capita was 30 % of the EU average in 2007 and 36.2 % of the EU-27 average in 2008. In Romania, despite the constant concern of the government, the inequalities between the development regions have increased steadily, as revealed by the evolution of the dispersion (see Figure 4). It is worth mentioning that the financial equalization of the administrative-territorial units has been taken into consideration both in the framework of the law on local public finances and in the context of the regional development policy by the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Administration through government resolutions which put into effect the national strategy regarding the balanced development of the Romanian counties.

Based on the principles of balance and solidarity (Law No 273/2006, Article 13 and Article 15) underlying the activity of the Romanian public authorities, the budgetary spending must be entirely covered from the budget revenues. The territorial administrative units which encounter difficulties are assisted through allocation of sums from the budgetary reserve fund.

Another deficiency of the development regions is the absorption of Structural Funds. Too few of the projects submitted after Romania's accession to the EU proved eligible, thus leading to a very low absorption rate⁴¹.

3.2 How can Romania capitalize on the French decentralization experience?

In the 15 years since the establishment of the development regions in Romania different versions of regionalization were advanced with the aim of contributing to the economic development of all the regions, but in particular of bringing the citizen closer to decision-making. Moving forward to setting up regions governed by councils elected by direct vote and enjoying financial autonomy has become increasingly popular lately. Considering the French experience of more than 30 years, Romania can learn about the successful reforms, but also about the challenges and obstacles which stay in the way of general prosperity. Further on, I will elaborate on the main aspects which need to be considered by the state authorities when discussing the competencies of the regions, the financial resources available to them and the state-region cooperation or the cooperation between the regions and the local public authorities (counties, municipalities and communes).

⁴¹ Cugleşan, Natalia, "Governance and Public Policies in Romania after the Accession to the EU" (presented at the 12th Biennial EUSA Conference, Boston, 2011); Guvernul Romaniei, *Raportul Strategic Național 2012 Privind Implementarea Fondurilor Structurale Și de Coeziune*, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/how/policy/doc/strategic_report/2012/ro_strat_report_2012.pdf.

3.2.1 Election by direct vote of the regional councils

Regional decentralization in Romania can capitalize on the French experience of 30 years. No matter if the number of the regions stays the same as it is today or if it changes to 10 or 12, it is important that these regions be governed by regional councils elected by direct, universal and secret vote in order to guarantee the necessary democratic legitimacy. Declaring the region as administrative unit, along with the existing ones, is an indispensable step. For a better representation in the parliament of the interests of the local communities, the Senate has to change into the Chamber of territorial collectivities, after the model of France, Germany and Austria.

The election by direct vote of a regional council headed by a president elected directly or indirectly from among the regional councilmen for the entire mandate of the council is the more necessary as the rotation principle has proved to be inefficient and was even contested by some of the local political leaders. It has been concluded that rotation encourages the active participation of county presidents only in the first year of their term in office. I find it useful to explore the possibility of electing councilmen who represent both the county and the region as a solution for maintaining bureaucracy at a sensible level and for rendering cooperation more efficient between the two levels (region and county), not to mention the economic aspects. Law No 1563/2010 promoted in the mandate of former French President Nicolas Sarkozy responded to a national challenge, that of reducing the budgetary spending of the public administration.

3.2.2 The competencies transferred to the regional level

The transfer of competencies to the regional level is extremely important for the economic, social, cultural and scientific development of the regions. Bringing decision-making closer to the citizen could be more than an electoral slogan of the politicians if the regions exercise well defined (exclusive and shared, as appropriate) competencies in the following sectors:

- Regional economic planning and development;
- Regional transportation infrastructure;
- Environment protection (elaboration of the regional strategy);
- Public utilities supply in the region (electricity, gas, water);
- Service administration in the public health sector;
- Elaboration of a regional strategy for education and research involving the private actors from the economic and social sectors;
- Other competencies (based on agreement between the state representatives and the regional authorities)

3.2.3 The state-region cooperation in the sphere of economic development

In the new territorial configuration, the regions would have to dispose of their own budgets tailored in line with their responsibilities. These budgets will be supplied with taxes and duties levied on the grounds of the Law on public finances, state funds directed for major projects and funds attracted from other sources, Structural Funds, loans, etc. The regional councils might be put in charge of equalization of the local budgets provided that the revenues of the local councils change as well.

The balanced development of all the regions of the country will be possible through reforms involving the state-region, region-county and region-commune cooperation, and by guaranteeing the financial resources needed for the execution of these programs. The Structural Funds should be absorbed by the regions based on their

multiannual economic development plans, in the same way as the French regions, where the prefect of the region is more involved in monitoring the execution of the regional development programs.

4. Conclusions

The rich experience accumulated by France in the 30 years of regionalization is a source of documentation and analysis for theoreticians and practitioners in this field. Although the regional decentralization promoted in the beginning of the 1980s was based on a simple organic law, the extensive reforms carried out over the past 30 years managed to transform France from a centralized state into a decentralized republic in which the subnational actors have access to decision-making due to the fact that the local representatives can, under certain conditions, cumulate offices also as parliamentarians.

The efforts of the local collectivities to become more autonomous have materialized in laws abolishing the monitoring by the prefect of the local authorities and after the establishment of an executive body of the General Council embodied by the elected president of this council (renamed the Departmental Council as per Law No 403/2013). 20 years after the promotion of the Defferre Law, Act II of decentralization amended the constitution by declaring the region as territorial collectivity and enforcing the financial autonomy of the regional, departmental and communal authorities. The territorial collectivities were conferred new competencies transferred from the state and, additionally, had the opportunity to experiment other competencies than the ones stipulated in the law.

Finally, Act III of decentralization announced by the French President in office Hollande soon after winning the presidential elections was preceded by a few laws adopted in 2009-2012 which envisaged the simplification of the institutional architecture and the downsizing of budgetary spending. The objectives of the first bills submitted for adoption in the parliament by the current Socialist government are to mobilize the regions with a view to stimulate economic growth, to strengthen inter-communal cooperation, to boost employment, environment protection and to promote territorial equality.

Regarding Romania, the problems faced by the political class, the civil society and the citizens in the near future concern the revision of the Constitution, the resizing of the parliament and regionalization, a topic occupying the forefront in all the debates concerning democracy, prosperity and good governance. In the light of the three decades of regionalization in France, the Romanian authorities charged with the elaboration of the reform package envisaging the establishment of regions as intermediary levels between the central administration and the local authorities can rightfully ask themselves: “What lessons both necessary and useful can be drawn for a unitary state such as Romania?”

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ahmad, Ehtisham and Brosio, Giorgio (Eds), *Does Decentralization Enhance Service Delivery and Poverty Reduction?*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009.
- Aja, Eliseo, “Spain: Nation, Nationalities, and regions”, in: John Loughlin (Ed.), *Subnational democracy democracy in the European Union: challenges and opportunities*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 229-253, 2001.

- Ansell, Cristopher and Gingrich, Jane, "Trends in Decentralization", in: Cain, Bruce E., Dalton, Russel J., Scarrow, Susan E. (Eds), *Democracy transformed?*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 140-163, 2003.
- Attali, Jacques (Sous la présidence de), 2008, *Rapport de la Commission pour la libération de la croissance française*, available at: www.liberationdelacroissance.fr, last access: March 2009.
- Balladur, Edouard (sous la direction de), 2009, *Il est temps de décider*, Rapport au Président de la République, available at: <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/094000097/0000.pdf>, last access: July 5, 2013.
- Bankauskaite, Vaida et al, "Patterns of decentralization across European Health systems", in: Richard B. Saltman, Vaida Bankauskaite and Karsten Vragbæk (Eds), *Decentralization in health care. Strategies and outcomes*, Berkshire, Open University Press, 22-42, 2007.
- Bartlett, William, Malekovic, Sanja and Monastiriotis, Vassilis (Eds) , *Decentralization and local development in South East Europe*, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
- Baun, Michael and Marek, Dan (2006), "Regional Policy and Decentralization in the Czech Republic", *Regional & Federal Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 4, 409-428.
- Bel, Jean-Pierre (2012), "Soyons clairs: la réforme territoriale sera abrogée", *Le Monde*, 03 Mars.
- Ben Ayed, Choukri (2007), "Entre universalisme et développement local. L'émergence d'une nouvelle école en France?", *Revue internationale d'éducation de Sèvres*, Vol. 46, 25-33.
- Blair, Philip (1992), "Financial equalization between local and regional authorities in European countries", *Local Government Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 4, 7-27.
- Boadway, Robin (2004), "The Theory and Practice of Equalization", *CESifo Economic Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 1, 211-254.
- Borghetto, Enrico and Franchino, Fabio (2010), "The role of subnational authorities in the implementation of EU Directives", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 17, No. 6, 759-780.
- Bouvier, Michel (2007), "Repenser la solidarité financière entre collectivités locales: les nouveaux enjeux de la péréquation en France", *Revue Française d'Administration Publique*, No. 121-122, 75-78.
- Broschek, Jörg (2010), "Federalism and Political Change: Canada and Germany in Historical-Institutionalist Perspective", *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 43, No. 1, 1-24
- Boyer, Jean-Claude et al, *La France. Les 26 Régions*, Paris, Armand Colin, 2005.
- Carriere, Jean-Paul (2007), "Les coopérations entre collectivités: facteur d'intégration à l'Union Européenne?", *Regard sur l'actualité*, No. 331, 45-52.
- Celis, Karen and Meier, Petra (2011), "Convergence and Divergence: the Federalization of Belgian Equality Policies", *Regional & Federal Studies* Vol. 21, No. 1, 55-71.
- Chavrier, Géraldine (2004), "L'Expérimentation locale: vers un État subsidiaire?", in: Gérard Marcou et Hellmut Wollmann (sous la direction de), *Annuaire 2004 des collectivités locales*, Paris, CNRS Editions, 43-52.
- Cole, Alistar, *Governing and Governance in France*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Cole, Alistar, "France: between centralization and fragmentation", in: Loughlin, John, Hendriks, Frank and Lidström, Andres (Eds), *op. cit.*, 307-330, 2010.

- Cotten, Michel (2013), "L'acte III de la décentralisation est bien mal parti", *Tribune*, 24 février, available at <http://www.slate.fr/tribune/68029/decentralisation-acte-III-projet-loi>, last access: July 9, 2013.
- Cugleşan, Natalia (2006), "Multilevel governance in the EU: What Model for Romania?", *Eurojournal.org*, October, 1-14.
- Cuglesan, Natalia (2009), *Predictions and reforms on regional development in Romania after 2007*, paper presented at Különös tekintettel a Magyar-Román-Ukrán hármás határra, Debretin, December 7-8.
- Cugleşan, Natalia (2011), *Governance and public policies in Romania after the accession to the EU*, paper presented at the 12th Biennial EUSA Conference, Boston, March 3-5.
- Darbousset, Charley (2011), *Recherches sur la notion de péréquation en droit public*, Thèse pour le doctorat en droit, Université de la Rochelle.
- Daudigny, Yves (2010), *Rapport d'Information. Fait au nom de la délégation aux collectivités territoriales et à la décentralisation (1) sur l'ingénierie publique*, No.557, Enregistré à la Présidence du Sénat le 15 Juin.
- Deschamps, Robert (2006), "Le fédéralisme belge a-t-il de l'avenir?", *Cahiers de recherche Série Politique Economique*, No.7.
- D'Estaing, Luis Giscard et Le Nay, Jacques (2004), *Rapport d'information No.1836 sur la réforme des contrats de plan Etat-Régions*, présenté devant l'Assemblée Nationale, octobre.
- Dobre, Ana Maria, "Romania: from historical regions to local decentralization via the unitary state", in: Loughlin, John, Hendriks, Frank, Lidström, Andres (Eds), *op. cit.*, 685-714, 2010.
- Dollery, Brian E and Robotti, Lorenzo (Eds), *The Theory and Practice of Local Government Reform*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008.
- Domorenok, Ekaterina, "EU Regional Policy and the process of institution – building in Central and Eastern European Countries", in: Francesco Palermo and Sara Parolaro (Eds), *op. cit.*, 35-58, 2013.
- Douence, Jean-Claude(2004), "Les transferts de compétences en matière de formation professionnelle", in: Gérard Marcou et Hellmut Wollmann (sous la direction de), *Annuaire 2004 des collectivités locales*, Paris, CNRS Editions, 119-124.
- Ghinea, Anca and Moraru, Adrian (2011), *Considerente privind procesul de descentralizare în România. Reforma administrativ-teritorială*, Institutul de Politici Publice Bucureşti, available at: <http://www.ipp.ro/>, last access: March 25, 2013.
- Giordano, Benito and Roller, Elisa (2003), "A Comparison of City Region Dynamics in the UK, Spain and Italy: More Similarities than Differences?", *Regional Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 9, 911-927.
- Gordon, Philip H. and Meunier, Sophie, *The French Challenge: Adapting to Globalization*, Washington D.C., Brooking Institution Press, 2001.
- Guihéry, Laurent (2001), "Fédéralisme fiscal en Allemagne. Quelle réforme de la péréquation financière allemande?", *Economie publique. Etudes et recherches*, Vol. 2, No. 8, 61-95.
- Guihéry, Laurent et Werner, Jan (2005), Les finances publiques en Allemagne Quelles réformes?, *Revue de l'OFCE*, Vol. 3, No. 94, 397-422.
- Guvernul Romaniei (2013), *Raportul strategic național 2012 privind implementarea fondurilor structurale și de coeziune*, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/how/policy/doc/strategic_report/2012/ro_strat_report_2012.pdf, last access: July 12, 2013.

- Hemmings, Philip (2006), "Improving public-spending efficiency in Czech regions and municipalities", 30 pages, in: *Economics Department Working Papers*, No. 499.
- Hollande, François (2012), *Le changement c'est maintenant. Mes 60 engagements pour la France*, available at: http://download.parti-socialiste.fr/projet_presidentiel_2012_francois_hollande.pdf, last access: July 5, 2013.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, Marks, Gary and Schakel, Arjan H, *The rise of regional authority. A comparative study of 42 democracies*, New York, Routledge, 2010.
- Horga Ioan, "The Multilevel Gouvernance (MLG) and the Respect of the Subsidiarity Principle" in I. Horga & I. Suli-Zakar (eds), *Cross-Border Partnership. Whit special regards to the Hunagrian-Romanian-Ukrainian Tripartite Border*, Debrecen and Oradea University Press, 2010 pp. 169-175.
- Horga, Ioan, Iordan Gh. Barbulescu, Adrian Ivan, Mycolia Palincsak, Istvan Suli-Zakar, *Regional and Cohesion Policy – Insights Into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design*, Debrecen University Press & Oradea University Press, 2011, 308p
- Hughes, James, Sasse, Gwendolyn and Gordon, Claire (2004), "Conditionality and Compliance in the EU's Eastward Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-national Government", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 42. No. 3, 523-551.
- Humphreys, Peter C and O'Donnell, Orla (2007) "Leadership in a decentralized public service: some lessons from Ireland", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. 73, No. 1, 65-79.
- Illner, Michal, "The Czech Republic: local government in the Years after the reform", in: Loughlin, John, Hendriks, Frank and Lidström, Andres (Eds), *op. cit.*, 505-527, 2010.
- Institut Thomas More (2010), *Quelles perspectives pour la péréquation en France après la suppression de la taxe professionnelle?*, Rapport présenté à la Commission des Finances du Sénat, Mardi 22 Juin.
- Iordan, Ion, *România, încotro? Regionalizare, Cum? Când? Structuri administrative-teritoriale în România*, București, Ed. CD Press, 2003.
- Ivan, Adrian and Cuglesan, Natalia (2009), "Multi-level governance and decentralization in the unitary states of the European Union. Case Study: France and Romania", *NOVOS. Estudos Juridicos*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 47-59.
- Jamet, Stéphanie (2007), "Faire face aux défis de la décentralisation en France", in: *Documents de travail du Département des Affaires Économiques*, No. 571, 5-30.
- Jones, David K, "Politiques de santé: the territorial politics of French health policy", in: Costa-Font, Joan and Greer, Scott L (Eds), *Federalism and decentralization in European health and social care*, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 208-226, 2013.
- Klárík, László Attila (2004), "Rolul regiunilor în construcția europeană. Studiu de caz asupra regionalizării din Romania", *Revista Transilvană de Științe Administrative*, Vol. 3, No. 12, 76-82.
- Laignel, André (sous la présidence de), *Les finances des collectivités locales en 2010. État des lieux*, Rapport de l'Observatoire des Finances Locales, available at: <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/104000378/0000.pdf>, last access: July 2, 2013.
- Legrand, André (2004), "L'Éducation et la décentralization", in: Gérard Marcou et Hellmut Wollmann (sous la direction de), *Annuaire 2004 des collectivités locales*, Paris, CNRS Editions., 125-138.
- Le Lidec, Patrick (2004), "Pourquoi une nouvelle étape de la décentralisation? Modernisation politique et compétition politique", in: Gérard Marcou et Hellmut

- Wollmann (sous la direction de), *Annuaire 2004 des collectivités locales*, Paris, CNRS Editions, 15-24.
- Loughlin, John (1996), “« Europe of the Regions » and the Federalization of Europe”, *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 26, No. 4, 1996, 141-162.
- Loughlin, John, “Introduction: The transformation of the Democratic State in Western Europe”, in: John Loughlin (Ed.), *Subnational democracy democracy in the European Union: challenges and opportunities*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 7-21, 2001.
- Loughlin, John, *The Subnational Government French Experience*, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- Loughlin, John, Hendriks, Frank and Lidström, Andres (Eds), *The Oxford Handbook of local and regional democracy in Europe*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Marcou, Gérard (1999), “Experiența franceză în regionalizare: descentralizarea regională în statul unitar”, *Altera*, An V, Nr. 9, 7-35.
- Marcou, Gérard (2002), *La Régionalisation en Europe – période 99-2000*, Rapport PE 168498, Parlement Européen, Luxembourg, September 2002.
- Marcou, Gérard and Wollmann, Hellmut (sous la direction de), *Réforme de la décentralisation, réforme de l'État, Régions et villes en Europe, Annuaire 2004 des collectivités locales*, Paris, CNRS Editions, 2004.
- Marcou, Gérard (2012), “Changements et permanences dans le système français d'administration territoriale”, *Revue française d'administration publique*, No. 141, 5-17.
- Matiuta, Cristina , “Decentralization and regional policy in Eastern Europe: Considerations on Romania and Bulgaria”, in: Bartlett, William, Malekovic, Sanja and Monastiriotis, Vassilis (Eds), *op. cit.*, 135-150, 2013.
- Montero, Alfred P (2007), “The Limits of Decentralisation: Legislative Careers and Territorial Representation in Spain”, *West European Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 3, 573-594.
- Mync, Agnieszka (2002), “Process of democratization and decentralization in Poland”, in: Jürgen Rose and Johannes Traut (Eds), *Federalism and decentralization: perspectives for the transformation process in Eastern and Central Europe*, Münster, Lit Verlag, 235-258.
- Némery, Jean-Claude (2004), “Réforme de la décentralization et transferts de compétences”, in: Gérard Marcou et Hellmut Wollmann (sous la direction de), *Réforme de la décentralisation, réforme de l'État, Régions et villes en Europe, Annuaire 2004 des collectivités locales*, Paris, CNRS Editions, 67-84.
- O'Dwyer, Conor (2006), “Reforming Regional Governance in East Central Europe: Europeanization or Domestic Politics as Usual?”, *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 219-253.
- Palermo, Francisco and Parolari, Sara (Eds), *Regional Dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe: New Approaches to Decentralization*, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013.
- Peru-Bălan, Aurelia (2012), “Campania prezidențială din Franța – 2012. Între valorile gaulliste și tradiția stângii franceze”, *Sfera Politicii*, Vol. 20, No. 4(170), 36-49.
- Piattoni, Simona and Brunazzo, Marco, “Italy: the subnational dimension to strengthening democracy since the 1998”, in: Loughlin, John, Hendriks, Frank and Lidström, Andres (Eds), *op. cit.*, 331-354, 2010.
- Profiroiu, Alina and Profiroiu, Marius (2007), “Autonomia financiară a colectivităților locale din România – premisă a succesului descentralizării”, *Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences*, No. 19, 77-85.
- Reynié, Dominique (2004), “L'Apport des assises des libertés locales”, in: Gérard Marcou et Hellmut Wollmann (sous la direction de), *Réforme de la*

- décentralisation, réforme de l'État, Régions et villes en Europe, *Annuaire 2004 des collectivités locales*, Paris, CNRS Editions, 25-36.
- Rondinelli, Denis A (1980), "Government Decentralization in Comparative Perspective: Theory and Practice in Developing Countries", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. 47, No. 2, 133-145.
- Rondinelli, Dennis A, Nellis, John R and Cheema, G. Shabbir, *Decentralization in Developing Countries. A Review of Recent Experience*. World Bank Staff Working Papers, No.581, 1983.
- Rubio, Nathalie (2007), "Les collectivités territoriales et application du droit communautaire", in: *Regard sur l'actualité, La documentation Française*, No. 331, May, 17-29.
- Schmidt, Vivien, *Democratizing France. The political and administrative history of decentralization*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Suciu, Marius, "Decentralization and regional development in Romania. An unfinished reform in search of a "European" Model", in: Palermo, Francisco and Parolari, Sara (Eds), *op. cit.*, 105-146, 2013.
- Swenden, Wilfried (2013), "Conclusion: The Future of Belgian Federalism – Between Reform and Swansong? 2007–11: A Critical Juncture in the Transformation of the Belgian State?", *Regional & Federal Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 3, 369-382.
- Swianiewicz, Pawel, "Poland: Europeanization of subnational government", in: Loughlin, John, Hendriks, Frank and Lidström, Andres (Eds), *op. cit.*, 480-504, 2010.
- Szczerski, Krzystoff, "Securing growth and cohesion in Europeanized conditions. The role of regional development bodies in Poland", in: Palermo, Francisco and Parolari, Sara (Eds), *op. cit.*, 175-200, 2013.
- Suli-Zakar, Istvan, Ioan Horga, *Regional Development in the Romanian - Hungarian Cross-Border Space. From National to European Perspective*, University of Debrecen Publishing House, 2006, 420p.
- Thoenig, Jean-Claude (2005), "Territorial administration and political control. Decentralization in France", *Public Administration*, Vol. 83, No. 3, 685-708.
- Truchet, Didier (2004), "Santé: la centralization ineluctable?", in: Gérard Marcou et Hellmut Wollmann (sous la direction de), *Réforme de la décentralisation, réforme de l'État, Régions et villes en Europe, Annuaire 2004 des collectivités locales*, Paris, CNRS Editions, 139-142.
- Wayenberg, Ellen et al, "Belgium: A Tale of regional divergence?", in: John Loughlin, Frank Hendriks and Andres Lidström (Eds), *op. cit.*, 71-95, 2010.
- Yoder, J.A. (2007), "Leading the Way to Regionalization in Post-Communist Europe: An Examination of the Process and Outcomes of Regional Reform in Poland", *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 424-446.

Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – An Economic Effect of Globalization –

Mădălina Laura CUCIURIANU*

Abstract: *This article examines the role of the European Union in a globalized and interdependent world, with focus on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between European Union and United States, as an economic effect of globalization. For the EU, globalization has several meanings. On one hand, it means becoming a global actor, taking on a larger political role. Globalization also means more international economic integration, but not necessarily an end to the inequalities between the rich and the poor, 'the globalizers' and 'the globalized'. Finally, in this era of globalization, the rhetoric of partnership has grown increasingly powerful. The nature of global trade is changing and for Europe, knowledge, innovation, intellectual property, services and the efficient use of resources are now the keys to competitiveness. As an effect of this, trade policy and the whole approach of EU to international competitiveness need to adapt. Furthermore, this paper highlights the fact that the agreement with the US is by far the most important for EU in this moment. This follows from the size of the US economy. The coherence of the Union's external policies is vital to strengthening the EU's global role and its relations with US. The transatlantic trading relationship is by far the largest in the world and the heart of the global economy. The economic gains from tackling non-traditional, behind-the-border barriers are potentially significant in the relations between EU and US.*

Keywords: *EU, US, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), globalization, global trade.*

Introduction

This paper's main theme is the economic effect of globalization over the European Union, with focus on Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, the most important economic trade in the history of the world. In the first part of the article we discuss about the position of EU in a globalized and interdependent world, the changes and challenges that EU has to face it in a world transformed by the globalization's effects. In the Section 2 of this article we look at the global role of the EU, especially in global trade. In the final section, the analysis concerns about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership as an economic effect of globalization.

Globalization is a phenomenon which affects especially the economy, and also the politics of the world. Analyzing the phenomenon of globalization, its evolution, impacts, trends and its forms, we cannot say that we have a clear definition of this process. Globalization is a controversial topic and that's why we should discuss about its positive and negative aspects¹.

It is thought by many people that globalization has the potential to make the societies richer through trade and also to bring information and knowledge to people around the world. Another perspective over globalization sustains the fact that it is also a thread to traditional cultures (when globalization is identified with modernization, as a

* „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iași, Faculty of Philosophy and Political Social Sciences, PhD Candidate in Political Sciences; laura.cuciurianu@gmail.com.

¹ JoAnn Chirico, *Globalization: Prospects and Problems* (Beaver: Sage Publications, 2013), 33-39.

changing society's process). In many European countries, globalization is more often perceived as a threat than as an opportunity.

The economic process of globalization² can be a resultant of two activities, like the increasing activity of multinational companies and their increasing stronger internationally affirmation.

In *Teaching Guide for Globalization Essays* it is recommended a definition of globalization: *Globalization is a term that came into popular usage in the 1980's to describe the increased movement of people, knowledge and ideas, and goods and money across national borders that has led to increased interconnectedness among the world's populations, economically, politically, socially and culturally*³, but we know that this process have also some economic, political and social implications. Because of its global role, globalization is a challenge for international affairs⁴ and also for global economy.

The position of EU in a globalized and interdependent world can be analyzed from various perspectives, such as: the main drivers of change in the global economy and the shifting role of the EU in global production chain, the growth and competitiveness through innovation and industrial policies at the EU level, the changing role of the EU in global trade negotiations and the areas in which EU has made sufficient progress to increase its competitive position in the global economic landscape.

European Union in a globalized and interdependent world

In these days, the world pass through great changes and the economic and financial crisis has put Europe at the forefront, giving sometimes the impression of a European decline. The reaction of EU was based on its most important principles, such as responsibility, solidarity, converges and improved governance. As a consequence, the current stage of the construction of the European Union will have as an end a better Union, a better Europe. The challenges that Europe faces call for more international implication and coordination.⁵

For the EU, globalization has several meanings. Firstly, it means becoming a global actor, taking on a larger political role⁶. Globalization also means more international economic integration, but not necessarily an end to the inequalities between the rich and the poor, 'the globalizers' and 'the globalized'. Finally, in this era of globalization, the rhetoric of partnership has grown increasingly powerful and as a result of the economic process of globalization we analyze the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.

² Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance* (London: Wiley, 1999), 215-256.

³ Social Science Research Council / After September 11, "Teaching Guide for Globalization Essays," accessed March 5, 2014, http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/teaching_resource/tr_globalization.htm.

⁴ Ulrich Beck, *What Is Globalization* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 157-158.

⁵ "The European Union in a Globalized World – Strategic Prospects" (Public Lecture by Ambassador Pierre Sellal), (Singapore, March 16, 2012). accessed March 6, 2014, http://www.asef.org/images/docs/120309_Programme_SG%20Sellal_final.pdf.

⁶ European Commission, *Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union*, COM 2000 final, vol. 1 (Brussels, 15 July, 1997), accessed March 6, 2014, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/commission_communication_i_agenda_2000_for_a_stronger_and_wider_union_1997-%20en-5f7d6fda-6eb6-464c-80d2-1842936c43b3.html.

To manage the process of globalization, the EU has attempted some policies, using five mechanisms⁷: exercising regulatory influence, expanding policy scope, empowering international institutions, enlarging the territorial sphere of EU influence, and redistributing the costs of globalization. Rather than more specific policy instruments, we should focus on the broader functional mechanisms that represent certain fundamental ways of coping with major strategic problems.

Managing globalization means not only building a framework of rules within which exchange can occur, but also redistributing its costs and benefits. These strategies can play a crucial role in sustaining public support for economic openness. In principle, some of these redistribution efforts are an effort to extend social democracy to the global level.⁸ Such redistribution on the global level includes, for instance, using non-reciprocal trade benefits to improve the economic development of the least advanced countries.

Under what conditions does Europe appear as facilitator or even accelerator of globalization and when does it appear more as a barrier to globalization? This question can be tricky sometimes. The tradition in international political economy would lead us to expect that where the key competition is intra-European, the strongest players will want the fewest global restrictions, and the weakest will want the strongest constraints⁹. Other recent work suggests, however, that rather than the strong setting the regulatory agenda; it is the weakest actors who are most willing to expend political capital to erect barriers to more market integration¹⁰. So where competition is with extra-European players, all European players in a given sector may want to coordinate external barriers (agriculture is an obvious example)¹¹.

The interdependence of states has been growing lately because of the economic trade or capital flows. This can be measured by the mobility of labor or by the mutual military dependence of states. The effects of globalization leave the impression that the world has become a smaller one (international travel has become faster, easier, and cheaper; music, arts, cuisine and cinema have all become cosmopolitan in the world's major centers and beyond)¹².

The role of the EU in a globalized and interdependent world is to maintain its unity, its principles and the position of one of the most important global actors in the world, beside US and other powers. To participate in the globalized economy in an interdependent world, the European Union is increasingly required to look beyond the traditional instruments of diplomacy and trade. There are new international rules covering things like financial markets or labor, health and environmental standards¹³. Stand-alone solutions will not always work. The solution of EU is to have a powerful partner in the global

⁷ Wade Jacoby and Sophie Meunier, "Europe and the Management of Globalization," *Journal of European Public Policy* 17, 3 (2010): 299-317, doi: 10.1080/13501761003662107.

⁸ Ibid., 299.

⁹ Ronald Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments* (New York: Princeton, 1989), 7.

¹⁰ Daniel W. Drezner, *All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes* (New York: Princeton, 2007), 26.

¹¹ Obviously, other European actors may want to give up restrictive agricultural policies in order to win better bargains in their sectors of interest.

¹² Kenneth N. Waltz, "Globalization and Governance," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 32 (1999): 693-700. doi: 10.2307/420158.

¹³ The site of Delegation of European Union to Uganda, accessed March 11, 2014 <http://108.163.191.126/index.php/2012-05-05-21-48-33/globalised-and-interdependent>.

trade, and the perfect one is the US. The most important problems that EU faces as a global actor are global warming, energy dependence and making the euro a world currency.

The globalized and interdependent world need strong bond between global powers¹⁴. Links with the United States are the most important connection of EU's external relations. Beside the transatlantic trade and investment, both sides of the Atlantic share common values and also common interests. That's why the US has supported European integration.

The global role of European Union (global trade)

In its 1997 publication, *Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Europe*, the European Commission proposes a range of ambitious, global roles for the European Union: "The Union must increase its influence in world affairs, promote values such as peace and security, democracy and human rights, provide aid for the least developed countries, defend its social model and establish its presence in the world markets...prevent major damage to the environment and ensure sustainable growth with an optimum use of world resources. Collective action by the European Union is an ever increasing necessity if these interests are to be defended, if full advantage is to be taken of the benefits of globalization and if the constraints it imposes are to be faced successfully. Europe's partners...expect it to carry out fully its responsibilities."¹⁵

The Commission's statement introduces some themes, and the most important is that the European Union is a global actor of increasing significance in a range of policy areas. But the question is how do we recognize the characteristic of a global actor? We cannot infer the fact of being a global actor merely from the internal characteristics of a political unit, however; we must also consider the patterns of constraint and opportunity associated with the political and economic structures within which the EU is located¹⁶. The global role of EU has increased in recent years, and the most important field is economic trade.

What is Europe's role in this changing world dominated by the process of globalization? This question was asked also in 2001 Laeken Declaration¹⁷, and since then, the topic of Europe's global role has become more and more relevant¹⁸. As a response to this question, policy-makers and academics engaged in debates on the potential contribution of European Union to new international changes that have arisen after September 11 and also the new security agenda, the climate change and energy dependency in the world, the changing power relations on the international trade front, the development problems occurred in the poorest countries and the other consequences of the process of globalization¹⁹.

Trade is the most powerful external policy of European Union. Some of the academic people would discuss about the EU's considerable power in external economic

¹⁴ John Whalley, "Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?," *NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 5552* (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996).

¹⁵ European Commission, *Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union*, 27.

¹⁶ Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 15-16.

¹⁷ Laeken Declaration, 2001, accessed March 11, 2014, <http://european-convention.eu.int/pdf/laeken.pdf>.

¹⁸ Jan Orbie, *Europe's Global Role: External Policies of the European Union* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 1.

¹⁹ For excellent recent overviews of the EU's international policies, see Bretherton and Vogler (2006), Elgström and Smith (2005), Lucarelli and Manners (2006), Mayer and Vogt (2006), Hill and Smith (2005), Marsh and Mackensteen (2005).

relations, particularly in external trade policy²⁰. Despite of this, political science literature has elaborated a lot on the institutional setting of EU trade policy²¹. EU has a lot of power instruments, starting with the economic underpinnings of EU power, the division of competences and decision-making process, pointing to the challenges that are raised by the increased politicization of EU trade policy.

Comparing the EU's trade power with other international actors, we reached to the conclusion that the EU is comparable with the United States as regards import and export figures²². Both make up about 20 per cent of the trade in goods and services. The EU and the US are undisputed leaders in international investment flows.

The European Union's agreements with its partners around the globe go beyond trade and traditional development assistance. They cover support for economic reforms, health and education, infrastructure programmes, and in some cases, cooperation in areas like research and environmental policy²³. Promoting trade and opening its market is one side of the EU's international development strategy to maintain the role of global economic power.

The European Union uses its power in the interests of others as well as itself, being conscious of its global weight in economic and commercial terms. The EU, as a global actor, promotes prosperity, supports democratic values around the world, and helps to consolidate stability and well-being for the citizens within its frontiers. Integration of new countries into the EU strengthens its role on the international scene. The EU is considered the world's biggest trader and also the biggest provider of aid to developing countries²⁴. In today's complex world, the EU has added new tools to the traditional instruments of foreign policy. It has, for instance, taken the international lead in tackling the issue of global warming and climate change. Global problems require global solutions.

Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – an economic effect of globalization

The nature of global trade is changing and for Europe, knowledge, innovation, intellectual property, services and the efficient use of resources are now the keys to competitiveness. As an effect of this, trade policy and the whole approach of EU to international competitiveness need to adapt. Furthermore, this paper highlights the fact that the agreement with the US is by far the most important for EU in this moment. This follows from the size of the US economy. The coherence of the Union's external policies is vital to strengthening the EU's global role and its relations with US. The transatlantic trading relationship is by far the largest in the world and the heart of the global economy. The economic gains from tackling non-traditional, behind-the-border barriers are potentially significant in the relations between EU and US.

²⁰ Overseas Development Institute, "The Next Decade of EU Trade Policy. Confronting Global Challenges?", *ODI Research Reports and Studies* (July 2012), accessed March 12, 2014, <http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/6693-eu-trade-policy-international-development-global-challenges>.

²¹ Orbie, 35.

²² European Commission, "Impact Assessment Report on the Future of EU-US Trade Relations," Strasbourg, March 12, 2013, accessed March 12, 2014, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150759.pdf.

²³ European Commission, *The EU in the World. The Foreign Policy of the European Union* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, June 2007), 8.

²⁴ European Commission, "EU Aid Explorer," accessed March 12, 2014, <https://tr-aid.jrc.ec.europa.eu/>.

Throughout the postwar period, the United States and Europe have worked closely to forge a strong political and economic alliance. Transatlantic Trade and Investment have been important components of that partnership²⁵. Trade and investment ties contributed to the postwar revitalization of the European economy, a robust NATO alliance during the Cold War, and the construction of a durable system of world commerce that promoted economic development and democracy around the globe.

Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership can be considered as an effect of globalization and also as a result of this process, and by far, the most successful. This Trade Partnership is not the first attempt on intensification the relationship between the United States and European Union. The purpose of this initiative is to strengthen the bilateral relation by building o more deeply integrated economic zone²⁶.

Globalization had its role in the history of TTIP. After a dynamic growth, many emerging markets, like China and India have slowed down recently, and other countries had developed rapidly so the economic inequality had led to the political tensions like North Africa, Turkey, Brazil. The political instability was a factor of economic uncertainly and generated additional transaction costs for doing business. In this case, globalization was no longer the powerful generator of growth for the United States and European Union that it was once. Both this world's power was affected also by the economic recession, followed by a weak and slow recovery. In this difficult situation, both economies on the sides of the Atlantic need a rethinking agenda of TTIP. This could be the solution of world's economic problems. According to a study realized by the Center for Economic Policy Research²⁷, TTIP could bring economic gains of about €119 billion to the European Union and €95 billion to the United States each year, increasing annual disposable incomes for a family of four by about €545 in the EU and €655 in the United States. These gains would not be at the expense of the rest of the world. Overall, exports would increase 6 percent in the EU and 8 percent in the United States.

Furthermore, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership have the chance to become the most important trade partnership from the history and also to have real results. The purpose of this trade is to eliminate all the impediments in bilateral trade in goods and investments. The main opportunity of the TTIP comes with investment because it drives the transatlantic economy in contrast to the trade-driven transpacific economy. It supposes that a liberalization of investment activities would allow US and European firms to more efficiently construct their value chains. However, they would more easily be able to exchange ideas, skills, and knowledge across the Atlantic and better profit from economies of scale. In the end, this would bring more than just static cost savings as in the case of trade, allowing for new forms of production and processing that stimulate growth rates.

Another reason in supporting the idea of TTIP's importance is that it could become the nucleus of a new Western liberal order. For decades, globalization has spurred economic development, growth, and improvements in the standard of living for millions of people around the world. However, the social and environmental costs of rapid

²⁵ Jeffrey J. Schott and Gary Hufbauer, "Transatlantic Trade Relations: Challenges for 2003," Institute for International Economics, accessed March 13, 2014, http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/2003/2003_Miami_Schott_Hufbauer.pdf.

²⁶ GMF Blog, Expert Commentary. "TTIP Needed for a Post Globalized World", blog entry by Thomas Straubhaar, a non-resident fellow at the Transatlantic Academy, an initiative of the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, DC, posted on 14 October 2013. Accessed March 13, 2014. <http://blog.gmfus.org/2013/10/14/ttip-needed-for-a-post-globalized-world/>.

²⁷ European Comission, "Impact Assessment Report on the Future of EU-US Trade Relations."

economic changes have been neglected. These challenges and the shift of political power from the North Atlantic to Asia, Latin America, and Africa necessitate the restoration of a rules-based international order. TTIP could help assert transatlantic leadership on trade policy, and advance a rules-based system of global economic governance that reflects the shared values and interests of the Atlantic area, possibly extending to financial services, environmental standards, and corruption²⁸. Eventually, TTIP should act like an open club. Perhaps, one day, it could consider inviting new members that are willing to accept a set of shared norms and values.

Conclusions

Although globalization has never ceased to be a subject of economic debate, today more than ever this process provided evidence to those who doubted the power of transmission of the globalization effects across the globe.

Over the past decade, relations between The European Union and the United States have been affected by the globalization of the economy and the fast growth of emerging powers, which represent increasingly appealing trade partners and competitors²⁹. The launched talks over a major transatlantic economic trade represent the best economic deal ever. The United States will continue also to look beyond the EU in the quest for attractive new markets and promising trade and investment exchanges.

EU and the US were along the history, simultaneously, competitors and allies because of the growth of countries like Brazil, India, Russia and China (at least until 2010). Being competitors in the quest for new markets, even in the situation of nowadays, because some of the emerging economies feature an unprecedented combination of political stability, openness to foreign direct investment (FDI), availability of natural resources and internal demand, which makes them the best couple of commercial partners. But also, being allies, since emerging economies challenge the prominent position that both the US and the EU have held in the global economy for decades.

Faced with mounting global competition and growing internal tensions, the EU could have reacted in many ways. First, it could have used monetary policy and in particular the currency lever to sustain its competitiveness in world exchanges, as was done by the United States³⁰. Second, the EU could have accelerated privileged trade agreements with old and new superpowers, in order to secure a share of world exchanges for its own products. However, internal tensions between member states have delayed and hampered the conclusion of trade agreements with important regions of the world such as MERCOSUR, ASEAN and the Gulf. To date, and contrary to what still occurs for the US, the EU does not seem on its way to preserving a leading role in global economic recovery. Whether the prospective major economic deal with the US – the TTIP – is sufficient to reverse this trend remains to be seen. Third and related, the EU could have strengthened and consolidated its single market to secure economies of scale, a more efficient allocation

²⁸ GMF Blog, Expert Commentary.

²⁹ Andrea Renda, “Globalization, the New Geography of Power, and EU Policy Response,” *Transworld. The Transatlantic Relationship and the Future of Global Governance, Working Paper* 10 (March 2013): 1-28, accessed March 13, 2014, http://www.iai.it/pdf/Transworld/TW_WP_10.pdf.

³⁰ Kati Suominen, “Counterproductive Adjustment? United States after the Great Recession”, *Transworld Working Papers* 11 (2013), accessed March 14, 2014, <http://www.transworld-fp7.eu/?cat=21>.

of tasks in production chains, and overall a more appealing offer for world customers. But the single market is still far from complete, especially in services.

A comprehensive agreement between EU and US would include ambitious reciprocal market opening in goods, services, and investment, and would address the challenges and opportunities of modernizing trade rules and enhancing the compatibility of regulatory regimes. An agreement of this kind could generate new business and employment by significantly expanding trade and investment opportunities in both economies; pioneer rules and disciplines that address challenges to global trade and investment that have grown in importance in recent years³¹; and further strengthen the extraordinarily close strategic partnership between the United States and Europe. A significant portion of the benefit of a potential transatlantic agreement turns on the ability of the United States and EU to pursue new and innovative approaches to reduce the adverse impact on trade and investment of non-tariff barriers, with the aim of moving progressively toward a more integrated transatlantic marketplace.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Beck, Ulrich. *What Is Globalization*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.
- Bretherton, Charlotte, and John Vogler. *The European Union as a Global Actor*. New York: Routledge, 2002.
- Chirico, JoAnn. *Globalization: Prospects and Problems*. Beaver: Sage Publications, 2013.
- Drezner, Daniel W. *All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes*. New York: Princeton, 2007.
- European Commission. "EU Aid Explorer." Accessed March 12, 2014. <https://tr-aid.jrc.ec.europa.eu/>.
- European Commission. "Impact Assessment Report on the Future of EU-US Trade Relations." Strasbourg, 12 March 2013.
- European Commission. *The EU in the World. The Foreign Policy of the European Union*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, June 2007.
- European Commission. *Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union*, COM 2000 final, vol. 1, Brussels, 15 July, 1997. Accessed March 6, 2014. http://www.cvce.eu/obj/commission_communication_i_agenda_2000_for_a_stronger_and_wider_union_1997-%20en-5f7d6fda-6eb6-464c-80d2-1842936c43b3.html
- The European Union in a Globalized World – Strategic Prospects." Public Lecture by Ambassador Pierre Sellal. Singapore, March 16, 2012. Accessed March 6, 2014. http://www.asef.org/images/docs/120309_Programme_SG%20Sellal_final.pdf.
- GMF Blog, Expert Commentary. "TTIP Needed for a Post Globalized World", blog entry by Thomas Straubhaar, a non-resident fellow at the Transatlantic Academy, an initiative of the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, DC, posted on 14 October 2013. Accessed March 13, 2014. <http://blog.gmfus.org/2013/10/14/ttip-needed-for-a-post-globalized-world/>.
- High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth. Final Report, February 11, 2013. Accessed March 14, 2014. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150737.pdf.
- Hirst, Paul, and Grahame Thompson. *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance*. London: Wiley, 1999.

³¹ "High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth. Final Report," February 11, 2013, accessed March 14, 2014, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150519.pdf.

- Horga, Ioan, Ariane Landuyt, *Communicating EU Policies beyond the Borders*, (Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2013).
- Horga, Ioan, Grigore Silași, István Süli-Zakar, Stanisław Sagan. *The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighbourhood Policy*. Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2009;
- Jacoby, Wade, and Sophie Meunier. "Europe and the Management of Globalization." *Journal of European Public Policy* 17, 3 (2010): 299-317. doi: 10.1080/13501761003662107.
- Laeken Declaration, 2001. Accessed March 11, 2014. <http://european-convention.eu.int/pdf/lknen.pdf>.
- Orbie, Jan. *Europe's Global Role: External Policies of the European Union*. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2009.
- Overseas Development Institute. "The Next Decade of EU Trade Policy. Confronting Global Challenges?." *ODI Research Reports and Studies* (July 2012). Accessed March 12, 2014. <http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/6693-eu-trade-policy-international-development-global-challenges>.
- Renda, Andrea. "Globalization, the New Geography of Power, and EU Policy Response." *Transworld. The Transatlantic Relationship and the Future of Global Governance, Working Paper* 10 (March 2013): 1-28. Accessed March 13, 2014. http://www.iai.it/pdf/Transworld/TW_WP_10.pdf.
- Rogowski, Ronald. *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments*. New York: Princeton, 1989.
- Social Science Research Council / After September 11. "Teaching Guide for Globalization Essays. Accessed March 5, 2014. http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/teaching_resource/tr_globalization.htm.
- Schott, Jeffrey J., and Gary Hufbauer. *Transatlantic Trade Relations: Challenges for 2003*, Institute for International Economics. Accessed March 13, 2014. http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/2003/2003_Miami_Schott_Hufbauer.pdf.
- Suominen, Kati. "Counterproductive Adjustment? United States after the Great Recession." *Transworld Working Papers* 11 (2013). Accessed March 14, 2014. <http://www.transworld-fp7.eu/?cat=21>.
- The site of Delegation of European Union to Uganda. Accessed March 11, 2014. <http://108.163.191.126/index.php/2012-05-05-21-48-33/globalised-and-interdependent>.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. "Globalization and Governance." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 32 (1999). doi: 10.2307/420158.
- Whalley, John. "Why do countries seek regional trade agreements?." *NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper* 5552. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996.

Book reviews

Imagining and Shaping the EU's Future. Narratives for Europe's 21th Century.

*Alina-Carmen BRIHAN**

Review of: *The Mind and Body of Europe: a New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014. ISBN 978-92-79-37955-0.

As mentioned in the title, the book is dedicated to the initiative of the European Parliament and implemented by the European Commission – called “New Narrative for Europe”, and to its Declaration – named “The Mind and Body of Europe”. The book is, in itself, designed artistically, as an ensemble of faces and voices, images and narratives, known and unknown human beings, each of them with his or her narrative of and for the EU's future, for the 21st century Europe.

The first pages of the book are dedicated to numbers: the number of the EU citizens and that of the member states'. It's an overview of the way in which the EU has grown from six to twenty eight countries; from 171 million people in 1972/1960 to 506 million people in 2013.

The book's first “face” and “voice” is that of the President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, one of the project's initiator. In his speech, titled “Interweaving Narratives”, President Barroso speaks about the urgency and the potential of the project, but also about the way in which it was designed: as a project and a process that involved artists, scientists, writers, intellectuals and all kinds of cultural practitioners, in an effort to reconnect the EU with its citizens¹. In an age of globalization, he strongly believes that “the Europeans have to go on imagining and shaping the future as the predecessors did in their time”². Therefore, the European integration has to be given a new “telos”, a renewed sense of purpose³. And this objective represents a common endeavor and responsibility of both institutions and politicians, and citizens. Expressing his hope that the “New Narrative for Europe” will be “a source of inspiration for everyone in Europe”, President Barroso asserts the need “to continue our narrative, to continue writing the book on the present and the future of the EU project”, and the fact that “many more diverse narratives still need to be interwoven into this book”⁴.

The third part of the book is dedicated to the launch of “New Narrative for Europe”, that took place in Brussels, on April 23, 2013. On this occasion, the former Vice-President of the European Commission and currently a member of the European Parliament, Viviane Reding, delivered a speech on the Europe's need to have a

* PhD candidate in History, Assistant Lecturer within the Department of Political Science and Communication Sciences, University of Oradea. Contact: alina_brihan@yahoo.com.

¹ Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, “Interweaving Narratives,” in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 20.

² Ibid., 23.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., 25.

functioning European public space in order to address its crisis of legitimacy and to connect the EU's political decision-makers with its citizens⁵. As the citizens don't know what means to be citizens of Europe, a new narrative is needed for Europe. In the same time, she stresses that this new narrative has to take place from the bottom up, across the borders of the interlinked European societies⁶. As regards the Declaration "The Mind and Body of Europe", Reding sees it not as the end of a process, but as a "snapshot taken at the beginning of a period of ongoing reflection and debate" and as "a major contribution to a fully functioning European public space"⁷.

Androulla Vassiliou, the Commissioner for Education, Culture, Multilingualism and Youth, believes that communicating a new vision for the future of the EU project constitutes a means to engage the European citizens better⁸. In this regard, she sees the project as an opportunity to stress the fact that Europe is "first and foremost about cultural unity, about celebrating our diversity". For Vassiliou, the "New Narrative for Europe" represents the search for a new legitimacy for the European integration and its essential feature is that it defines the EU in terms of values (commitment to freedom, democracy, equality, solidarity and respect for the fundamental rights and the rule of law), rather than distant aims⁹. A special focus of Vassiliou's speech is on the youth, to whom Europe has to prove that it is a space of opportunities. The fact that the new narrative addresses ideas and messages that could resonate with the young people represents one of its most important aspects¹⁰.

The Hungarian novelist and essayist, Gyorgy Konrad, considers that the protection of freedom is essential even where it is already present, and the fact that the European humanism understands the human existence as an experiment in freedom, is "the soul of the European pluralism"¹¹.

The Danish journalist, Per Nyholm, approaching the bi-directional relation between Denmark and Europe, affirms that they constitute "the two sides of the same page in a tale"; in the same time, he states that the EU's goal must be a united Europe, legitimated by its citizens¹².

The fourth part of the book presents the "voices" of the participants that took part to the First General Assembly, in Warsaw, on July 11, 2013. During this meeting, the former Prime Minister of Poland and President – elect of the European Council, Donald Tusk, expressed his conviction that Europe must remain a community of values, and that these values are embedded in the core of the integration process and in the European

⁵ Viviane Reding, "Stimulating the European Public Space," in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 32.

⁶ Ibid., 33.

⁷ Ibid., 34.

⁸ Androulla Vassiliou, "Europe as a Shared Purpose," in *The Mind and Body of Europe: a New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 34.

⁹ Ibid., 36-37.

¹⁰ Ibid., 37.

¹¹ Gyorgy Konrad, "A European Ars Poetica," in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 39-41.

¹² Per Nyholm, "Denmark in Europe, Europe in Denmark," in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 44-45.

institutions¹³. As a consequence, in his opinion, Europe needs unity based on values, solidarity and a sense of shared responsibility for Europe¹⁴.

The Polish professor of Philosophy, Czeslaw Porebski, begins his speech by asking the question of how far the EU's enlargement should go¹⁵. His approach is based on the analyze of the different positions on what Europe is or it should be, placed between – at one extreme – the thesis that Europe should have no borders at all, and – at the other extreme – that Europe should become a fortress.

Alicja Gescinska, the Polish – Belgian philosopher, regards Europe not only as a continent, a geographical entity or as a political organization, but also as a moral project – seen as an attempt to reinforce values as tolerance, freedom, self-realization and solidarity¹⁶. She states that the primary task for those who sustain democracy is to realize and reinforce these moral values over and over again¹⁷. In this process, the intellectuals have a political and social responsibility – that of the “watchdogs of democracy”. They can counterbalance the populism and the political extremism in the nowadays’ societies, which are great threats for democracy¹⁸.

The Spanish film director and producer, Pere Portabella, supports the improvement of cultural relationships between the European countries, as the current crisis has brought to light a cultural and moral crisis in Europe¹⁹. For him, this means the creation of communication spaces²⁰ so that the cultural debates take a continental dimension²¹. As Europe suffers from a lack of democracy and as the economic space has already been constructed, at this moment, it is the European social space that needs to be built. Portabella believes that culture can have an important contribution in this regard, as a shared cultural space is the basis of a “shared responsibility”²².

¹³ Donald Tusk, “Speech delivered at the Copernicus Centre,” in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 53.

¹⁴ Ibid., 54.

¹⁵ Czeslaw Porebski, “The Borders of the European Union,” in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 56.

¹⁶ Alicja Gescinska, “Intellectuals, Populist Rhetoric and Democracy,” in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 60.

¹⁷ Ibid., 61.

¹⁸ Ibid., 61-63.

¹⁹ Pere Portabella, “Europe as a Space of Communication,” in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 64, 66.

²⁰ See also Ioan Horga, Ariane Landuyt, *Communicating EU Policies beyond the Borders*, Oradea University Press, 2013; Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, Sorin Sipos, *Ethnicity, Confession and Intercultural Dialogue at the European Union Eastern Border*, Debrecen University Press & Oradea University Press, 2011; Ioan Horga, Deepening/Weedening EU Building versus Debordering/Rebordering of EU Frontiers, in I. Horga, A. Landuyt, *Communicating EU Policies beyond the Borders*, Oradea University Press, 2013, ISBN 978-606-10-1162-9, pp. 27-37; Dorin Dolghi, Ioan Horga, « The Relationship between Political Europe and Cultural/Geographical Europe », in Giuliana Laschi, *Oltre I confine: l'UE fra integrazione interna e relazioni esterne*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2012, pp. 73-86.

²¹ Ibid., 65.

²² Ibid., 67.

The fifth part of the book regards the Second General Assembly, organized in Milan, on December 8-9, 2013. In the lines below, will be mentioned some of the positions presented during the meeting. Enrico Letta, the former Prime Minister of Italy, after asking the questions of “What is Europe?” and “What is the European dream going to be ten years from now?”, stipulates that the work of the four presidents (of the European Commission, European Council, Eurogroup; and the governor of the European Central Bank) is “the only roadmap charting a path for the future of Europe”: the banking union, the fiscal union, the economic union and the political union²³. In this regard, Letta reaffirms his country’s support for the accomplishment of these four unions, within the next ten years.

For the former Prime Minister of Slovenia, Alenka Bratusek, the drafting of a new narrative for Europe means a recreation of the moment in which the idea of a EU was created²⁴. Following the discussion on the future of Europe (titled “More Europe – More Slovenia”), organized by the Slovenian Government with representatives of the civil society and the private sector, she presented some of the key messages transmitted by the participants and the lessons that the Slovenian officials drove from them. Her conclusion is that the governments “must find a synergy” with the “awakened EU citizens”, as the active citizenship is the positive collateral result of the recent developments at the European level²⁵.

The French philosopher, Jean – Marc Ferry, believes that “telos, nomos and ethos” are the three elements on which a new narrative on the political Europe should be based²⁶. As regards “telos”, defined as a goal, purpose, objective of the European political project, the author proposes a critical history of the European “telos”. He says that “telos” represents a diagram of the positions on the political shape of the European based interpretations of the European project and the assessment of globalization²⁷, and the view of “telos” determines the decision on “nomos” (seen as the basic legal structures of the EU). Concerning “ethos”, Ferry cites the definition given to it by Paul Ricoeur: “ethos” is characterized by the trinity of translation / hared stories / forgiveness²⁸. In this moment, there is an ethical requirement of the political Europe for a serious debate to be established in each member state. The mutual recognition of the peoples of Europe would bring the common recognition of the rights, values and principles intended to bring them together within a truly democratic Union. Ferry concludes that this is the profound challenge of a new narrative for Europe²⁹.

In his intervention, the Polish professor of Computational Science and Engineering, Michal Kleiber, sees a modern European narrative built on the alliance of

²³ Enrico Letta, “Speech delivered at ISPI,” in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 75-76.

²⁴ Alenka Bratusek, “Speech delivered at ISPI,” in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 82.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 84.

²⁶ Jean-Marc Ferry, “Telos, Nomos, Ethos,” in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 88.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 90.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 92.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 93-94.

science and arts, as they form a solid base for progress and economic growth³⁰. Peter Matjasic, the former President of the European Youth Forum, claims that the “New Narrative for Europe” needs to be based on respect for the rule of law, for human rights and for each other³¹, as only in these conditions the motto “United in diversity” can hold true. He also considers that Europe needs to become a synonym for participatory democracy³².

The sixth part of the book presents the Third General Assembly that took part in Berlin, on February 28 and March 1, 2014. The focus is on two speeches – one delivered by the Chancellor Angela Merkel and the other - by the Secretary – General of Europa Nostra, Sneska Quaedvlieg – Mihailovic. Chancellor Merkel reiterated that the three original motives for the European unification – the promise of peace, the promise of freedom and the promise of prosperity – remain, today, as relevant as ever³³. She says that the EU has to stand up resolutely against extremism and inhumanity. At the same time, she believes that conflicts can and should be resolved by peaceful and diplomatic means³⁴. As regards the “New Narrative for Europe” project, it should allow people to talk about Europe in the citizens’ forums they had set up, and the politicians should pay more attention to what people say to them, but also to each other³⁵. Sneska Quaedvlieg – Mihailovic presents the experience of the “New Narrative for Europe” project. It was a year – long process of intense interaction in which each participant had his or her own personal narrative about Europe³⁶. She also envisages that the present book would serve as an inspiration, as a reference point and as an open invitation to all women and men who live in Europe and care about Europe to take an active part in shaping the future of Europe³⁷. Before the Declaration “The Mind and Body of Europe” to be fully submitted in the seventh part of the book, Sneska Quaedvlieg – Mihailovic makes a summary of the main ideas approached in it. The Declaration is composed of three parts: in the first part, in accordance with the “New Narrative for Europe”, there is a call for a vital return to Europe’s “fundamentals” – its corpus of cultural values that form the basis and inspiration for the integration process; the second part highlights the historical dimension of this process, which is described as both revolutionary and evolutionary; it is also stressed the need for a strong political “embodiment” and leadership of Europe as a state of mind and of the EU as the greatest achievement of the European collective history; in the final part is stated that a new Renaissance of Europe is possible, and that Renaissance meets

³⁰ Michal Kleiber, “The Humanistic and Scientific Sources of the European Narratives,” in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 99.

³¹ Peter Matjasic, “Perceptions Matter: Europe is What You Make of It,” in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 102.

³² *Ibid.*, 103.

³³ Angela Merkel, “Speech delivered at the Academy of the Arts,” in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 114.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 116.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 118.

³⁶ Sneska Quaedvlieg-Mihailovic, “Towards Europe’s New Renaissance,” in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 121.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 122.

cosmopolitanism. And last but not least, she acknowledges that the “New Narrative for Europe” process must continue, since it is vital for the future of Europe³⁸.

As mentioned above, in the seventh part of the book, the Declaration “The Mind and Body of Europe” is fully presented. Besides what has been summarized before, and in accordance to the new cosmopolitanism, it is proposed to imagine Europe as a one great mega city, interconnected by means of transportation and communication. Regarding the European citizens, Europe needs them to raise their voices and to take part in the European public space of debate, by sharing their narratives. In the opinion of the Declaration’s authors, these narratives will tell the story of what it means to be a European in the 21st century³⁹.

The eighth part of the book is devoted to the Round Table organized in Brussels, on May 21, 2014. Some of the narratives of the participants will be recalled in the following lines. Nicola Setari, the curator of the Contour 7, said that the “New Narrative for Europe” is not about making propaganda for the EU, but a process in which there is a large space for critical and skeptical voices that take on a constructive attitude; in his opinion, the real danger lies in anti-European discourses⁴⁰. The Belgian artist, Luc Tuymans, says that is needed something more specific than what is written in the Declaration and that the participants have to develop something grounded on things⁴¹. The architect Kersten Geers specified that a statement about culture in Europe should be short and should include specific projects and an agenda ready to be implemented⁴². Sneska Quaedvlieg – Mihailovic affirmed that one goal of the Declaration was to determine the political leaders and citizens to think about Europe in terms of the values that identify Europe⁴³.

The ninth part of the book presents the Domino Conversation with President Barroso (Venice, 7 September 2014). In this discussion, for example, Carolyn Christov – Bakargiev, an Italian – American art historian, speaks about the danger of building a top – down narrative⁴⁴. Rem Koolhaas, a Dutch architect, said that Europe doesn’t need a new narrative, it only needs a narrative; also, the problem of the European narrative is that it is always constructed around achievement⁴⁵.

The tenth part of the book is dedicated to the New Narrative for Europe Posters, which were presented in the 14th International Architecture Exhibition in Venice, June 7 / September 7, 2014. The messages of the three showed posters were: “A state of mind.

³⁸ Ibid., 122-123.

³⁹ Declaration: “The Mind and Body of Europe,” in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 129.

⁴⁰ “Round Table, Brussels, 21 May 2014,” in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 133.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., 138.

⁴³ Ibid., 137.

⁴⁴ “Domino Conversation with President Barroso. Venice, 7 September 2014, in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 155.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 161-162.

What ideas can you share?"; "A political body. Can you help shape it?" and "A public space. Where is your voice?"⁴⁶.

The eleventh part of the book consists of miscellaneous contributions to the New Narrative for Europe. The German philosopher, Jurgen Habermas, affirmed that an European federal state is not the right response for Europe⁴⁷. As a consequence, the system that he conceives for Europe should be constructed as a heterarchy and not as a hierarchy – which can be encountered in a federal state. Therefore, the EU as a supranational community – satisfying the democratic standards, the principles of equality among states and among citizens - would be respected on the basis of parity, and will be different from a federal model⁴⁸.

Antoine Arjakovsky, the Research Director of the College des Bernardins, declared that we still don't have a European history of European peoples⁴⁹, and the "New Narrative for Europe" should make the European peoples aware of their post-modern, plural identity⁵⁰. Tomas Sedlacek, the Czech economist, claimed that the task is not to invent, create or produce a new artificial narrative for the European integration, but to describe, in a fresh way, the meaning of Europe⁵¹. Olafur Eliasson, the Danish artist, said that the major challenge for the EU is the lack of the "we" feeling⁵²; feelings of identity and identification with others require culture, history and trust. He advocated that if we are to create a European "we" for the future, culture and historical awareness have to be included – not as the only valid "we", but as one that can include other "we" that are also part of it.

Michelangelo Pistoletto, an Italian artist, he affirms his commitment to the "New Narrative for Europe", by illustrating one of his works – "The Third Paradise"⁵³. For Sir Jonathan Mills, now is the moment for compelling narratives, rather than statistics; narratives in which the culture and arts are part of them⁵⁴. Also, the opportunity to participate in a genuinely new narrative for Europe requires to all citizens to embrace the challenge of a cosmopolitan approach to the relationship between "minds, mentalities and

⁴⁶ "New Narrative for Europe Posters," in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 170-176.

⁴⁷ Jurgen Habermas, "Europe, Hungary and the Transnational Democracy Project," in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 182.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 185-186.

⁴⁹ Antoine Arjakovsky, "How to Write a New Narrative for Europe," in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 187.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 189.

⁵¹ Tomas Sedlacek, "Europe: Hidden in Plain Sight," in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 189.

⁵² Olafur Eliasson, "Your Inner We," in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 193.

⁵³ Michelangelo Pistoletto, "The Third Paradise," in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 196-197.

⁵⁴ Sir Jonathan Mills, "Some Reflections on the Declaration," in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 202.

imaginations” and to the one between “nations, localities and institutions”⁵⁵. Jorge Barreto Xavier, professor of Cultural Policy at the Lisbon University Institute, considers that Europe needs new narratives not only in its relation to the present, but also to the past and future⁵⁶. In his opinion, culture is the common field of narratives, the field for the construction of diversity, of identity and cohesion⁵⁷. Costa Carras, the President of Hellenic Society for the Protection of Cultural Heritage and Environment, pleads also for further steps if a sense of shared cultural heritage is to strengthen Europe substantially⁵⁸. He believes that there is a need for those involved with the cultural heritage in each European country to examine the history and nature of its cultural relationships with Europe as a whole⁵⁹; the revived emphasis on the diverse, but shared, European heritage will strengthen both the European idea and the sense of European solidarity⁶⁰.

In his approach of Europe, Plácido Domingo, the famous opera singer and the President of Europa Nostra, welcomes the “New Narrative for Europe” initiative⁶¹, as Europe has a great asset that is underestimated and underused: its art, heritage and culture. He stresses the need for a new drive in Europe, based on culture, but on a “new way of expressing Europe’s core values”. Domingo imagines Europe as a huge concert hall, where the Europeans are a grand orchestra and choir, and where the conductor is the visionary and committed European leaders⁶², leaders who seek to bring Europeans closer.

The twelfth part of the book is reuniting, symbolically, pictures of young or adult people, unknown and diverse as origin, pictures taken on the Rue Neuve street, the pedestrian street in Brussels’ city center. An endeavor that can be seen as symbolic images of Europe’s motto: “Unity in diversity”.

In the final part of the book, there are mentioned two afterwords: one belongs to the journalist Morten Løkkengaard, the promoter of the “New Narrative for Europe” project, and the other one – to Paul Dujardin, the Director of the Centre for Fine Arts, Brussels. In his narrative, Morten Løkkengaard stresses that EU needs a narrative, “a common story that invests our daily life as Europeans with a sense of purpose and

⁵⁵ Ibid., 205.

⁵⁶ Jorge Barreto Xavier, “What Matters is the Present,” in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 205.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 207.

⁵⁸ Costa Carras, “A Revelation of Europe,” in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 208.

⁵⁹ See also: Ioan, Horga, Grigore Silași, István Süli-Zakar, Stanisław Sagan. *The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighbourhood Policy*. Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2009; Ioan Horga, „Media, Identity and Territory: the Meaning of the European Frontiers”, in *Construire l'espace politique européen. Historiography, politiques et territoires*, ed. Ariane Landuyt and Denis Rolland, (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2013): 229-245; Ariane Landuyt, Renaud de la Brosse & Ioan Horga, *The Mass-Media Contribution to Extending the European Union*, (Bruxelles: IISA, 2003); Fabienne Maron, Renaud de la Brosse, Ioan Horga, *Media and The Good Governance Facing the Challenge of the EU Enlargement*, (Bruxelles: IISA, 2005).

⁶⁰ Ibid., 210.

⁶¹ Plácido Domingo, “Europe as Gesamtkunstwerk,” in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 212.

⁶² Ibid., 213.

togetherness”⁶³. He mentions that the new narrative is not needed because the original narrative needs to be replaced, but because “it needs add-ons”. The new narrative must reflect, in his opinion, what we see: “that we have multiple identities, that we are united in diversity, (...), that we need to stand together and show solidarity if we want to survive as a region, and as a culture”⁶⁴. For Paul Dujardin, the initiative should aim at fostering a European public space that provides the framework for a long – term dialogue “aimed at developing the European ‘ethos’ and its social imaginary”⁶⁵. In this regard, the cultural and scientific sectors have a moral responsibility to help at developing the European public space. There have to be found new ways of thinking and imagining approaches to play a role in the policymaking process at the highest level⁶⁶.

As a conclusion, we may say that the book approaches a new endeavor of the European Parliament and the European Commission, aimed at addressing the present EU’s deficit of democratic legitimacy. The “New Narrative for Europe” project and the Declaration “The Mind and Body of Europe” are trying to design a new road for shaping the EU’s future, based on culture. As its initiators and contributors have declared in this book, the project is not an end, but a beginning. It is a starting point for further developments, for further involvement, and the project’s success will depend on its capacity to involve the European citizens in it, to make them part of it. A 21st century Europe shaped not only by politicians and institutions, but also by citizens.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Arjakovsky, Antoine. “How to Write a New Narrative for Europe.” In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 187-189. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Barroso, Jose Manuel Durao. “Interweaving Narratives.” In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 20-28. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Bratusek, Alenka. “Speech delivered at ISPI.” In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 82-85. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, Sorin Sipos, *Ethnicity, Confession and Intercultural Dialogue at the European Union Eastern Border*, (Debrecen: Debrecen University Press & Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2011)
- Carras, Costa “A Revelation of Europe.” In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 207-212. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.

⁶³ Morten Lökkengaard, “The Need for a Narrative,” in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 232.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 233.

⁶⁵ Paul Dujardin, “Reinventing Europe: the Eternal Quest for a Narrative,” in *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, ed. Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 235.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 237.

- Declaration: "The Mind and Body of Europe." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 124-130. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Dolghi, Dorin, Ioan Horga, «The Relationship between Political Europe and Cultural/Geographical Europe», in *Oltre I confine: l'UE fra integrazione interna e relazioni esterne*, ed. Giuliana Laschi, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012): 73-86
- Domingo, Placido. "Europe as Gesamtkunstwerk." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 212-215. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- "Domino Conversation with President Barroso, Venice, 7 September 2014." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 146-170. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Dujardin, Paul. "Reinventing Europe: The Eternal Quest for a Narrative." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 235-238. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Eliasson, Olafur. "Your Inner We." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 192-196. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Ferry, Jean-Marc. "Telos, Nomos, Ethos." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 88-94. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Gescinska, Alicja. "Intellectuals, Populist Rhetoric and Democracy." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 60-64. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Habermas, Jurgen. "Europe, Hungary and the Transnational Democracy Project." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 178-187. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Horga, Ioan, Ariane Landuyt, *Communicating EU Policies beyond the Borders*, Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2013.
- Horga, Ioan, "Deepening/Weedening EU Building versus Debordering/Rebordering of EU Frontiers", in *Communicating EU Policies beyond the Borders*, ed. Ioan Horga and Ariane Landuyt, (Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2013): 27-37
- Horga, Ioan, Grigore Silași, István Süli-Zakar, Stanisław Sagan. *The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighbourhood Policy*. Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2009;
- Horga, Ioan, „Media, Identity and Territory: the Meaning of the European Frontiers”, in *Construire l'espace politique européen. Historiography, politiques et territoires*, ed. Ariane Landuyt and Denis Rolland, (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2013): 229-245.
- Kleiber, Michal. "The Humanistic and Scientific Sources of the European Narratives." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 98-101. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Konrad, Gyorgy. "A European Ars Poetica." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 38-41. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Landuyt, Ariane, Renaud de la Brosse & Ioan Horga, *The Mass-Media Contribution to Extending the European Union*, (Bruxelles: IISA, 2003);

- Letta, Enrico. "Speech delivered at ISPI." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 74-80. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Lokkengaard, Morten. "The Need for a Narrative." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 232-235. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Matjasic, Peter. "Perceptions Matter: Europe is What You Make of It." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 101-104. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Merkel, Angela. "Speech delivered at the Academy of the Arts." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 114-119. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Mills, Sir Jonathan. "Some Reflections on the Declaration." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 202-205. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Maron, Fabienne, Renaud de la Brosse, Ioan Horga, *Media and The Good Governance Facing the Challenge of the EU Enlargement*, (Bruxelles: IISA, 2005).
- "New Narrative for Europe Posters." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 170-176. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Nyholm, Per. "Denmark in Europe, Europe in Denmark." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 41-46. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Pistoletto, Michelangelo. "The Third Paradise." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 196-200. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Porebski, Czeslaw. "The Borders of the European Union." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 56-60. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Portabella, Pere. "Europe as a Space of Communication." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 64-68. European Union, authors, artists and participants, 2014.
- Quaedyvlieg-Mihailovic, Sneska. "Towards Europe's New Renaissance." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 119-124. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Reding, Viviane. "Stimulating the European Public Space." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 32-34. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- "Round Table, Brussels, 21 May 2014." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 130-146. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Sedlacek, Tomas. "Europe: Hidden in Plain Sight." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 189-192. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Tusk, Donald. "Speech delivered at the Copernicus Centre." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 50-56. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.

- Vassiliou, Androulla. "Europe as a Shared Purpose." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 34-38. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.
- Xavier, Jorge Barreto. "What Matters Is the Present." In *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, edited by Emiliano Battista and Nicola Setari, 205-207. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.

The Evaluation of Projects and Programs, a new discipline at the University of Oradea

Book review of *Evaluarea Cooperării teritoriale europene*, edited by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013. ISBN 978-606-10-1168-1

Mariana BUDA¹

Nowadays, the evaluation is a compulsory and essential component within any project at any level. This is the reason why the assessor qualification or the evaluator qualification is found in COR, namely Classification of Occupations in Romania, from a few years ago. But, we can ask ourselves what is actually evaluation? The Ministry of Public Finance, through the Management Authority for Community Support Framework, the Central Evaluation Unit, notes that there is an increasing interest from the side of the society that the managers of publicly funded programs to justify the continuation of the public support in the programs they implement. Parliamentarians, representatives of civil society, representatives of major international donors (World Bank, European Union etc.), and a large number of citizens became concerned about the profitability of projects and programs.²

In this context, since 2013, at the University of Oradea, within the Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Sciences and Communication Sciences, through the Department of International Relations and European Studies, was born the MA Program Assessment of Public Policies and European Public Programs (EPPPE)³, following the implementation of a POSDRU project at the national level. The Project beneficiaries are National School of Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest in partnership with the Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca and University of Oradea. The Master's Degree Program in Assessment of Public Policies and European Public Programs is aimed to people who practice or want to practice activities related to the implementation of public policies and European public programs, but especially activities in the field of the assessment of policies and European public programs. The curricular approach is made from the perspective of the International Relations and European studies field, but - given the nature of specialization - contains many elements of

¹ University of Oradea, Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Sciences and Communication Sciences, Department of International Relations and European Studies. E-mail: mariana.buda@yahoo.com.

² Ministerul Finanțelor Publice, Autoritatea Management pentru Cadrul de Sprijin Comunitar, Unitatea Centrală de Evaluare [Ministry of Public Finances – The Management Authority for Community Support Framework, Evaluation Central Unit], „Evaluarea – componentă esențială în procesul european de formulare și implementare a intervențiilor publice” [The Evaluation - essential component in the European process of formulating and implementing public interventions], accessed February 2, 2015, http://www.evaluare-structurale.ro/pub/doc/Brosura_ro.pdf.

³ Departamentul de Relații Internaționale și Studii Europe, Universitatea din Oradea [Department of International Relations and European Studies], „Descriere” [Description], accessed February 2, 2015, http://www.igri.ro/?page_id=2375.

interdisciplinarity, supposing (especially for the research option) basic knowledge in at least one of the following specializations: Political Sciences, Public Administration, European Administration, International Relations and European Integration, Management, Communication and Public Relations, Philosophy, but also specializations from the fundamental area such as Economics or Sciences.

In the framework of the Master program held in Oradea, a group of academics and graduate students of the Department of International Relations and European Studies received benefits through the project "Inter-university cooperation for developing qualitative courses and master programs in the field of assessment of public programs and policies (EVAL-EPPPE)", project co-funded by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Operational Program Human Resources Development. The volume that is reviewed here, *The Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation*, coordinated by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca contains scientific articles of the beneficiaries of the above mentioned project and comes as a natural continuation of studies and research on the field of evaluation.

The volume *The Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation*, coordinated by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca "sum 16 scientific contributions, which are mainly concentrated on the theme of evaluation, so that each author folds over a target and interest subarea at European level"⁴ from the area of assessment or evaluation.

The volume opens with an Introduction, showing in detail each scientific contribution of the authors of this Supplement. Its authors, Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca make a thorough and well-reasoned insight within each target area from the wide field of evaluation, referring to the articles in volume and their authors.

Evaluarea on-going a Programului de Cooperare Transfrontalieră Ungaria-România (2007-2013) is the first article of the volume. The author, Ioan Horga, is a national expert in cross-border cooperation, given the large number of projects developed in this area and the concerns he has for years about the border. The article describes, both rigorous and critical the Cross-border Cooperation Programme Hungary-Romania⁵, with an emphasis on the evaluation of the project. Otherwise, „the cross-border cooperation in the Euroregional framework represents a new possibility for the former communist countries to cooperate at the micro-level”⁶, especially because the Romanian-Hungarian Border has evolved in time, from a closed one to a totally open and free one.⁷

Comunicarea în evaluarea programelor și politicilor publice, by Luminița Șoproni, is the second article of the volume. Like in many others areas, communicating

⁴ Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca, „Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene” [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], in *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], ed. Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 5.

⁵ Ioan Horga, „Evaluarea on-going a Programului de Cooperare Transfrontalieră Ungaria-România (2007-2013)” [The on-going Evaluation of the Cross-border cooperation Program Hungary-Romania (2007-2013)], in *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], ed. Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 23;

⁶ Cristina Dogot, „Romanian Local Administrations and their Activities in Carpathian Euroregion,” in *Cross-Border Cooperation. Models of Good Practice in Carpathian Region*, ed. Adrian-Claudiu Popoviciu (Bucharest C.H. Beck Publishing House, 2014), 172.

⁷ Constantin-Vasile Țoca, „Different Territorial Levels of Romanian-Hungarian Cross-Border Cooperation,” in *The Frontier Worker – New Perspectives on the Labor Market in the Border Regions*, ed. Adrian-Claudiu Popoviciu (Bucharest: C.H. Beck Publishing House, 2013), 71.

the results of an evaluation is very important for the project and/or for the program. It is, actually, the binding agent between the members of a project or program; it is what contributes to the creation of a cooperative and participatory environment and what lately helps to achieve the best results in the evaluation process⁸. This is the main idea that we find in the article written by Luminița Șoproni, communication expert at the Department of International Relations and European Studies.

Alina Mogoș is the author of the article *Evaluarea Politicii Europene de Vecinătate: Necesitatea Determinării Eficienței Programului în Regiunea Mediteraneană*. An important part of her work is the investigation of the need to undertake an evaluation of the European Neighborhood Policy, but also an advocate for the creation of an independent evaluation of this policy.⁹ The European Neighborhood Policy is a project that can and should be subject to review as any other project. We became aware so, that the assessment, as a discipline can be applied to small projects, at the level of the county cooperation, but also to large projects of European scale, such as Neighborhood Policy.

Another major and spread project "under evaluation" is that of the public diplomacy. Andra Alexandrescu, in her article named *Perspective asupra evaluării diplomației publice* provides a general overview of public diplomacy.¹⁰ The author points out that an evaluation of public diplomacy is difficult to make, because there is no agreed methodology or a general consensus on the need for this process. However, the author makes an assessment, using the data available up to date.

A much applied paper is that of Florin-Lucian Pârvu. He makes an ongoing evaluation: *Evaluare on-going a Programului de Cooperare Transfrontalieră România-Bulgaria, între 2007 și 2013*. The aim of his work is to present the conclusions reached after the development of a mechanism for ongoing analysis regarding the implementation of projects under the Cross-border Cooperation Programme between Romania and Bulgaria in the period 2007-2013.¹¹ The article represents an analysis of existing projects in this region, both submitted and those in progress, specifying areas of cooperation, and problems encountered during implementation.

The next contribution is that of Ioana Borcan, with the article *Implicațiile noului cadru de concepte și recomandări privind monitorizarea și evaluarea politicii europene de coeziune în perioada de programare 2014-2020*. Given that 2013 is the final year of the 2007-

⁸ Luminița Șoproni, „Comunicarea în evaluarea programelor și politicilor publice” [Communication in evaluating programs and policies], in *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], ed. Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 37.

⁹ Alina Mogoș, „Evaluarea Politicii Europene de Vecinătate: Necesitatea Determinării Eficienței Programului în Regiunea Mediteraneană” [Evaluation of the European Neighbourhood Policy: The need to measure Program’s effectiveness in the Mediterranean Region], in *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], ed. Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 43.

¹⁰ Andra Alexandrescu, „Perspective asupra evaluării diplomației publice” [Perspectives on the evaluation of Public Diplomacy], in *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], ed. Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 57.

¹¹ Florin-Lucian Pârvu, „Evaluare on-going a Programului de Cooperare Transfrontalieră România-Bulgaria, 2007- 2013” [The on-going Evaluation of the Cross-border cooperation Program Romania-Bulgaria], in *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], ed. Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 69.

2013 programming period and the year in which they drew conclusions on the management of the implemented projects during this period, Ioana Borcan stress in her article the new monitoring and evaluation framework. She stresses as well the ability of this project to make improvements in front of projects to be implemented in the next period, 2014-2020¹².

Robert Paul Baidic proposes the contribution named *O evaluare statistică a programului de cooperare transfrontalieră Ungaria-România 2007-2013*. The scientific work that he proposes is a practical assessment of a project already implemented and considered a good practice. He analyzes the financial instruments aimed to develop the cross-border region between Romania and Hungary from a comparative perspective both technical and financial.¹³ The methods used in his research, but also the assessment methodology, give consistent to his paper, proved to be a thorough and well documented one.

Continuing with the assessment at the border between Romania and Hungary, Viniciu Măscuș proposes a research about the *Evaluarea programului de cooperare transfrontalieră în domeniul transfrontalier. Studiu de caz: Dezvoltarea rutieră în cadrul cooperării româno-maghiare din regiunea Bihor - Hajdu-Bihar*. The work is also a very pragmatic one, the author stressing the importance of cross-border cooperation in the field of road development in the region. Another important aspect of this work is the evaluation of the program of cooperation in terms of improving the key conditions for a joint sustainable development.¹⁴ The author demonstrates the benefits obtained through cross-border road development projects for the citizens.

Liviu Ștefan Râncioagă's research envisage the *Evaluarea Strategiilor Guvernului României privind cetățenii de etnie rromă*. As the author states, Roma population has become an increasingly debated topic within the European Union. So, there are many projects at this level which tried to improve the livelihood of the population.¹⁵ Liviu Ștefan Râncioagă make an assessment of these projects and their impact on the Roma population.

¹² Ioana Borcan, „Implicațiile noului cadru de concepte și recomandări privind monitorizarea și evaluarea politicii europene de coeziune în perioada de programare 2014-2020” [The implications of the new framework of concepts and recommendations for monitoring and evaluating of European cohesion policy in the programming period 2014-2020], in *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], ed. Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 107.

¹³ Robert Paul Baidic, „O evaluare statistică a programului de cooperare transfrontalieră Ungaria-România 2007-2013”, [A statistical evaluation of the cross-border cooperation program Hungary-Romania 2007-2013], in *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], ed. Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 131.

¹⁴ Viniciu Măscuș, „Evaluarea programului de cooperare transfrontalieră în domeniul transfrontalier. Studiu de caz: Dezvoltarea rutieră în cadrul cooperării româno-maghiare din regiunea Bihor - Hajdu-Bihar”, [Evaluation of cross-border cooperation Program in cross-border cooperation area. Case Study: The Road Development in the framework of Romanian-Hungarian cooperation in Bihor-Hajdu Bihar Region], in *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], ed. Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 145.

¹⁵ Liviu Ștefan Râncioagă, „Evaluarea Strategiilor Guvernului României privind cetățenii de etnie rromă”, [Evaluation of Governmental Strategies regarding Roma citizens], in *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], ed. Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 157.

Programul de Cooperare transfrontalieră Ungaria-România 2007-2013. Proiecte implementate în Bazinul Hidrografic al Crișurilor is a scientific paper proposed by two authors, Farago Tamasz and Polgar Istvan. In their paper, the authors review the programs developed within the Romanian-Hungarian border cooperation 2007-2013, focusing on those that refer to hydrographical tank of the rivers Crișuri.¹⁶

Selective waste sorting is a project initiated across all Europe a few years ago. Selective sorting is a proof of the degree of civilization of a people. A project about selective waste sorting exists in Oradea as well. Erika Timea Anton made a research regarding this aspect and she proposes a paper named *Evaluare privind implementarea sistemului de colectare selectivă a deșeurilor în Oradea*. In her paper, the author examines if the local waste management is in concordance with the principles and objectives of the European Union in the field.¹⁷ She proposes two methods of analysis on which it based then her assessment. Finally, she proposes 11 recommendations to achieve successfully the authorities plan.

Continuing in the civic area, Anamaria-Elisabeta Ceașu proposes the paper *Evaluarea Programului multianual pentru realizarea lucrărilor de protejare și intervenție asupra clădirilor cu valoare cultural arhitecturală situate în Ansamblul Urban – Centru Istoric Oradea*. The proposed evaluation is an ex-ante type, realized with the aim of identifying both the impact that the program it would have on the city of Oradea but also the obstacles that this program might encounter, preventing thereby the smooth running of the program.¹⁸

In some situations, learning in a minority language can pose problems, both for the learners in that minority language, and also for those who teach in this language. In an attempt to solve this problem as much as possible, Milka Mariana Ianoșteac makes a research named *Evaluarea politicii publice „Învățământul în limba maternă”. Studiu de caz: Liceul Teoretic Jozef Kozacek – Budoï*. The author is part of the Slovak minority in Romania, minority that should be able to enjoy all the benefits that a majority State gives to a minority population. These advantages include the learning in a minority language. By evaluating the public policy “Education in mother tongue”, the author evaluates

¹⁶ Farago Tamasz and Polgar Istvan, „Programul de Cooperare transfrontalieră Ungaria-România 2007-2013. Proiecte implementate în Bazinul Hidrografic al Crișurilor”, [Cross-Border Cooperation Program Hungary-Romania 2007-2013. Implemented Projects in the Hydrographical Tank of the Rivers Crișuri], in *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], ed. Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 175.

¹⁷ Erika Timea Anton, „Evaluare privind implementarea sistemului de colectare selectivă a deșeurilor în Oradea”, [The Evaluation regarding the implementation of the selective waste collection in Oradea], in *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], ed. Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 187.

¹⁸ Anamaria-Elisabeta Ceașu, „Evaluarea Programului multianual pentru realizarea lucrărilor de protejare și intervenție asupra clădirilor cu valoare cultural arhitecturală situate în Ansamblul Urban – Centru Istoric Oradea”, [Evaluation of multi annual Program regarding the execution of the protecting works and intervention on the buildings with an architectural cultural value located in the Urban Assembly – Historical Center of Oradea], in *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], ed. Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 205.

actually the impact of this policy on the graduates of the Slovak High School from Budoï and on the process of fall into the labor market of these students.¹⁹

Camelia Ioana Mal makes an analysis of the *Evaluarea programului de ocupare a forței de muncă al ANOFM. Problema șomajului în rândul tinerilor din România*. Through her work, the author makes an evaluation of the Employment Program of the National Agency for Employment for 2012.²⁰ By the analysis of documents, content analysis and an interview, Camelia Ioana Mal assess how this program has achieved its goals and objectives, namely the decrease of unemployment in Romania.

The Labor Market is an area of interest for nowadays students. Andrei Sabău makes an evaluation about *Evaluarea politicilor UE în domeniul gestionării forței de muncă*. Given the fact that European policies on employment, social affairs and equal opportunities contributed to improving the living conditions of citizens, an assessment of European policies has its own and rightful place.²¹ The author based his research on the Commission's annual Reports to European Parliament and Council.

Another interesting evaluation is that of Florin George Șerfezi. He makes „*Evaluarea ex-post a proiectului transfrontalier „Improvement of the cross-border WiFi internet communication and internet access at the level of Oradea Metropolitan Area and Debrecen City”*”. The evaluation suggested by the author is an ex-post one and is about the degree of usefulness and usability of the sites of free WiFi connection in order to carry out the project in which was implemented this free network.²²

The volume concludes with the contribution of the author Andrea Henriett Stan, named *Metaevaluarea Programului Național de evaluare a stării de sănătate a populației 2007-2008*. The author makes an ex-post evaluation of the National Health Program for 2007-2008, in order to identify ways to improve in the future this kind of programs.²³

¹⁹ Milka Mariana Ianoșteac, „Evaluarea politicii publice „Învățământul în limba maternă”. Studiu de caz: Liceul Teoretic Jozef Kozacek – Budoï”, [Evaluation of the Public Policy „Education in Mother tongue”. Case study: Theoretical High School Jozef Kozacek from Budoï], in *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], ed. Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 217.

²⁰ Camelia Ioana Mal, „Evaluarea programului de ocupare a forței de muncă al ANOFM. Problema șomajului în rândul tinerilor din România”, [Evaluation of the Program regarding the employment workforce of ANOFM. The problem of inemployment between young people in Romania], in *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], ed. Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 229.

²¹ Andrei Sabău, „Evaluarea politicilor UE în domeniul gestionării forței de muncă”, [Evaluation of EU politics regarding the management of workforce], in *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], ed. Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 241.

²² Florin George Șerfezi, *Evaluarea ex-post a proiectului transfrontalier „Improvement of the cross-border WiFi internet communication and internet access at the level of Oradea Metropolitan Area and Debrecen City”*, [Ex-post Evaluation of the Cross border Project „Improvement of the cross-border WiFi internet communication and internet access at the level of Oradea Metropolitan Area and Debrecen City”], in *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], ed. Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 257.

²³ Andrea Henriett Stan, „Metaevaluarea Programului Național de evaluare a stării de sănătate a populației 2007-2008”, [Metaevaluation of the National Evaluation Program regarding the state of health of population 2007-2008], in *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of

In conclusion we can state that the evaluation is a key element in the implementation of the programs financed as a consequence of European politics. The process suffered constantly during the time conceptual evolutions, but also elaborated techniques, methods and instruments to be used, progresses in what concerns the project implementation. It is very important as well that the extension of the area of interest and of the number of questions to which it had to answer produced an increasing of the utility and the relevance of the evaluation. This is the reason why nowadays we assist to a continuous trend of the development of the evaluative capacities, both at the level of each member state but also in the European Union.²⁴

In order to have a qualitative assessment in the area of cross-border cooperation programs and in their design and deployment we need to take into account, first, the diversity of actors involved or interested in intervention, located on a side and the other of the border. Then, we have to look at the local socio-economic and cultural realities that define, in the same extent, the context where the program or the evaluation take place. Together with the degree of fulfillment of objectives and judicious allocation of financial resources, the evaluation of programs of cross-border cooperation should target their impact on communities in the border area. The difficulties encountered in data collection, due to the large amount of information, its complexity, lack of time or limited budget, can be overcome by using mixed methods of collecting and calling on secondary sources developed by other organizations. Choosing the right tools and techniques of collecting, appropriate to each program, gives a high degree of accuracy of relevant data, a right analysis and an issuance of good and real judgments for the intervention.²⁵

Brief, we can state that the reviewed Supplement is a quality material that covers a large majority of aspects of the Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation and their implementation. The evaluation capability may be held by several categories of actors from the public or private sphere, which must develop a series of specific skills in this respect. We consider that all these capabilities are very well developed by our Master Program, at the University of Oradea.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alexandrescu, Andra. „Perspective asupra evaluării diplomației publice” [Perspectives on the evaluation of Public Diplomacy]. In *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], edited by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca, 57-68. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013.
- Anton, Erika Timea. „Evaluare privind implementarea sistemului de colectare selectivă a deșeurilor în Oradea” [The Evaluation regarding the implementation of the selective waste collection in Oradea]. In *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene*

European Territorial Cooperation], ed. Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 277.

²⁴ Florentina Chirodea, „Evaluarea programelor de cooperare transfrontalieră. Instrumente, metodologii și particularități,” [Evaluation of Cross border Programs. Instruments, methodologies and particularities] in *Evaluarea cooperării transfrontaliere la frontierele României*, (Oradea: Editura Primus, 2013), accesat în 20th of January 2014, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2445949.

²⁵ Ibid.

- [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], edited by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca, 187-204. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013.
- Baidic, Robert Paul. „O evaluare statistică a programului de cooperare transfrontalieră Ungaria-România 2007-2013” [A statistical evaluation of the cross-border cooperation program Hungary-Romania 2007-2013]. In *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], edited by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca, 131-144. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013.
- Borcan, Ioana. „Implicațiile noului cadru de concepte și recomandări privind monitorizarea și evaluarea politicii europene de coeziune în perioada de programare 2014-2020” [The implications of the new framework of concepts and recommendations for monitoring and evaluating of European cohesion policy in the programming period 2014-2020]. In *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], edited by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca, 107-129. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013.
- Ceașu, Anamaria-Elisabeta. „Evaluarea Programului multianual pentru realizarea lucrărilor de protejare și intervenție asupra clădirilor cu valoare cultural arhitecturală situate în Ansamblul Urban – Centru Istoric Oradea” [Evaluation of multi annual Program regarding the execution of the protecting works and intervention on the buildings with an architectural cultural value located in the Urban Assembly – Historical Center of Oradea]. In *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], edited by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca, 205-216. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013.
- Chirodea, Florentina. „Evaluarea programelor de cooperare transfrontalieră. Instrumente, metodologii și particularități” [Evaluation of Cross border Programs. Instruments, methodologies and particularities]. In *Evaluarea cooperării transfrontaliere la frontierele Românie* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], edited by Ioan Horga, Constantin-Vasile Țoca, Florentina Chirodea (Oradea: Editura Primus, 2013. Accessed January 20, 2014. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2445949.
- Departamentul de Relații Internaționale și Studii Europe, Universitatea din Oradea [Departement of Internatiuonal Relations and European Studies]. „Descriere” [Description]. Accessed February 2, 2015. http://www.igri.ro/?page_id=2375.
- Dogot, Cristina. „Romanian Local Administrations and their Activities in Carpathian Euroregion.” In *Cross-Border Cooperation. Models of Good Practice in Carpathian Region*, edited by Adrian-Claudiu Popoviciu, 172-187. Bucharest C.H. Beck Publishing House, 2014.
- Faragó, Tamász, and Polgár István. „Programul de Cooperare transfrontalieră Ungaria-România 2007-2013. Proiecte implementate în Bazinul Hidrografic al Crișurilor” [Cross-Border Cooperation Program Hungary-Romania 2007-2013. Implemented Projects in the Hydrographical Tank of the Rivers Crișuri]. In *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], edited by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca, 175-186. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013.
- Horga, Ioan, and Constantin-Vasile Țoca. „Introducere” [Introduction]. In *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], edited by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca, 5-22. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013.

- Horga, Ioan. „Evaluarea *on-going* a Programului de Cooperare Transfrontalieră Ungaria-România (2007-2013)” [The *on-going* Evaluation of the Cross-border cooperation Program Hungary-Romania (2007-2013)]. In *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], edited by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca, 23-36. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013.
- Ianoșteac, Milka Mariana. „Evaluarea politicii publice „Învățământul în limba maternă”. Studiu de caz: Liceul Teoretic Jozef Kozacek – Budoii” [Evaluation of the Public Policy „Education in Mother tongue”. Case study: Theoretical High School Jozef Kozacek from Budoii]. In *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], edited by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca, 217-227. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013.
- Mal, Camelia Ioana. „Evaluarea programului de ocupare a forței de muncă al ANOFM. Problema șomajului în rândul tinerilor din România” [Evaluation of the Program regarding the employment workforce of ANOFM. The problem of unemployment between young people in Romania]. In *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], edited by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca, 229-240. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013.
- Mascaș, Viniciu. „Evaluarea programului de cooperare transfrontalieră în domeniul transfrontalier. Studiu de caz: Dezvoltarea rutieră în cadrul cooperării româno-maghiare din regiunea Bihor - Hajdu-Bihar” [Evaluation of cross-border cooperation Program in cross-border cooperation area. Case Study: The Road Development in the framework of Romanian-Hungarian cooperation in Bihor-Hajdu Bihar Region]. In *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], edited by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca, 145-155. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013.
- Ministerul Finanțelor Publice, Autoritatea Management pentru Cadrul de Sprijin Comunitar, Unitatea Centrală de Evaluare [Ministry of Public Finances – The Management Authority for Community Support Framework, Evaluation Central Unit]. „Evaluarea – componentă esențială în procesul european de formulare și implementare a intervențiilor publice” [The Evaluation - essential component in the European process of formulating and implementing public interventions]. Accessed February 2, 2015. http://www.evaluare-structurale.ro/pub/doc/Brosura_ro.pdf.
- Mogoș, Alina. „Evaluarea Politicii Europene de Vecinătate: Necesitatea Determinării Eficienței Programului în Regiunea Mediteraneană” [Evaluation of the European Neighbourhood Policy: The need to measure Program’s effectiveness in the Mediterranean Region]. In *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], edited by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca, 43-55. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013.
- Pârvu, Florin-Lucian. „Evaluare *on-going* a Programului de Cooperare Transfrontalieră România-Bulgaria, 2007- 2013” [The *on-going* Evaluation of the Cross-border cooperation Program Romania-Bulgaria]. In *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], edited by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca, 69-105. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013.
- Râncioagă, Liviu Ștefan. „Evaluarea Strategiilor Guvernului României privind cetățenii de etnie romă” [Evaluation of Governmental Strategies regarding Roma citizens]. In *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], edited by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca, 157-174. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013.

- Sabău, Andrei. „Evaluarea politicilor UE în domeniul gestionării forței de muncă” [Evaluation of EU politics regarding the management of workforce]. In *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], edited by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca, 241-255. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013.
- Stan, Andrea Henriett. „Metaevaluarea Programului Național de evaluare a stării de sănătate a populației 2007-2008” [Metaevaluation of the National Evaluation Program regarding the state of health of population 2007-2008]. In *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], edited by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca, 277-297. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013.
- Șerfezi, Florin George. Evaluarea ex-post a proiectului transfrontalier „Improvement of the cross-border WiFi internet communication and internet access at the level of Oradea Metropolitan Area and Debrecen City” [Ex-post Evaluation of the Cross border Project „Improvement of the cross-border WiFi internet communication and internet access at the level of Oradea Metropolitan Area and Debrecen City”]. In *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], edited by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca, 257-275. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013.
- Șoproni, Luminița. „Comunicarea în evaluarea programelor și politicilor publice” [Communication in evaluating programs and policies]. In *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluation of European Territorial Cooperation], edited by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca, 37-42. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013.
- Țoca, Constantin-Vasile. „Different Territorial Levels of Romanian-Hungarian Cross-Border Cooperation.” In *The Frontier Worker – New Perspectives on the Labor Market in the Border Regions*, edited by Adrian-Claudiu Popoviciu, 71-80. Bucharest: C.H. Beck Publishing House, 2013.

Call for Papers

Romanian Journal of International Relations and European Studies

Place of publication: Romania

Type of publication: print and online

Publication date: September 2015

Published/Edited by: The Romanian Association of International Relations and European Studies

Topics: The editors of the Romanian Journal of International Relations and European Studies (RoJIRES) are encouraging contributions for the third issue of the journal. The main topic of this issue is: “**Jean Monnet Program in Romania**”..

All potential authors are invited to submit an abstract (200-250 words) to office@rojir.ro by May 1th, 2015. By June 1, 2015 the authors will be informed about the acceptance of the July 15th, 2015.

Abstracts may be in Word, WordPerfect, or RTF formats with the following information and in this order: a) author(s), b) affiliation, c) email address, d) title of abstract, e) body of abstract, f) up to 6 keywords.

E-mails should be entitled: “**Jean Monnet Program in Romania**”

Please use plain text (Times Roman 12) and abstain from using footnotes and any special formatting, characters or emphasis (such as bold, italics or underline). Please note that the printed edition is planned for the beginning of October 2015. We acknowledge receipt and answer to all paper proposals submitted.

Authors can also submit articles on other innovative theoretical and empirical issues and approaches.

Book Reviews

We are also looking for reviews of books published between 2013-2014 dealing with developments in the fields of Political Science, International Relations Theory and European Studies. Reviewers must have their own copy of the book. Book reviews should have 1,000 - 1,500 words and should not only present the book, but also critically discuss the main issues it raises. Deadline for book reviews submission is July 15th, 2015.

Deadlines:

Abstract submission: May 1, 2015.

Applicants will be informed about selection: June 1, 2015.

Paper submission: July 1th, 2015.

Contact: For any further information please feel free to contact the editors at office@rojir.ro.