

# Eurolimes

Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies  
“Jean Monnet” European Centre of Excellence

University of Oradea

University of Debrecen

Volume 19

## *Border Cities in Europe*

Edited by

Constantin Vasile ȚOCA, Anatoliy KRUGLASHOV, Zsolt RADICS

References by

Ariane LANDUYT, Vasile CUCERESCU



Spring 2015



# ***Eurolimes***

Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies  
“Jean Monnet” European Centre of Excellence

Editors-in-chief: **Ioan HORGA** (*Oradea*) and **István SÜLI-ZAKAR** (*Debrecen*)

Spring 2015

Volume 19

## ***Borders Cities in Europe***

Constantin Vasile ȚOCA, Anatoliy KRUGLASHOV, Zsolt RADICS

### **Honorary Members**

Paul Alliès (**Montpellier**), Enrique Banús (**Barcelona**), Robert Bideleux (**Swansea**), Erhard Busek (**Wien**), Jean Pierre Colin (**Reims**), George Contogeorgis (**Athene**), Gerard Delanty (**Sussex**), Gennady Feodorov (**Kaliningrad**), Sharif Gemie (**Glamorgan**), Chris G. Quispel (**Leiden**), Moshe Idel (**Jerusalem**), Savvas Katsikides (**Nicosia**), Anatoliy Kruglashov (**Chernivtsi**), Jarosław Kundera (**Wrocław**), Ariane Landuyt (**Siena**), Giuliana Laschi (**Bologna**), Thomas Lundén (**Stockholm**), Kalypso Nicolaidis (**Oxford**), Adrian Miroiu, Iordan Bărbulescu (**București**), Frank Pfetsch (**Heidelberg**), Andrei Marga, Ioan Aurel Pop, Vasile Pușcaș, Vasile Vesa (**Cluj-Napoca**), Carlos Eduardo Pacheco Amaral (**Asores**), Barbu Ștefănescu (**Oradea**), Mercedes Samaniego Boneau (**Salamanca**), Angelo Santagostino (**Brescia**), Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro (**Coimbra**), Dusan Sidjanski (**Geneve**), Maurice Vaisse (**Paris**), Alexis Vahlas, Birte Wassenberg (**Strasbourg**).

### **Advisory Committee**

Josef Abrahám (**Prague**), Florin Lupescu, Simona Miculescu, Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu (**București**), Teresa Pinheiro (**Chemnitz**), Czimre Klára, Kozma Gábor, Teperics Károly (**Debrecen**), Antonio Faur, Alexandru Ilieș, Sorin Șipoș, Ion Zainea (**Oradea**), Ovidiu Ghitta, Adrian Ivan, Nicoale Păun (**Cluj-Napoca**), Didier Francfort (**Nancy**), Tamara Gella (**Orel**), Vasile Cucerescu, Ion Gumenăi, Svetlana Suveica, Octavian Țicu (**Chișinău**), Karoly Kocsis (**Miskolc**), Cătălina Iliescu (**Alicante**), Renaud de La Brosse (**Reims**), Stephan Malovic (**Zagreb**), Maria Marczevska-Rytko, Bogumiła Mucha-Leszko (**Lublin**), Fabienne Maron (**Brussels**), Ivan Nacev (**Sofia**), Gabriela Carmen Pascariu, Alexandru-Florin Platon, George Poede (**Iași**), Mykola Palinchak, Svitlana Mytryayeva (**Uzhgorod**), Stanisław Sagan, Viktoryia Serzhanova (**Rzeszów**), Grigore Silași (**Timișoara**), Lavinia Stan (**Halifax**), George Tsurvakas (**Tessalonik**), Peter Terem (**Banska Bystrica**), Jan Wendt (**Gdansk**)

### **Editorial Committee**


Mircea Brie, Florentina Chirodea, Dorin Dolghi, Cristina Matiuță, Mirela Mărcuț, Mészáros Edina (**Oradea**), Myroslava Lendel, Olha Yehorova (**Uzhgorod**), Gabriela Ciot, Natalia Cugleşan, Dacian Duna (**Cluj-Napoca**), Andreas Blomquist (**Stockholm**), Nicolae Dandis (**Cahul**), Molnar Ernő, Péntes János, Radics Zsolt (**Debrecen**), Gulyás László (**Szeged**), Emanuel Plopeanu (**Constanța**), Sedef Eylemer, Sinem Kokamaz (**Izmir**), Lyubov Melnichuk, Pavlo Molosko, Nataliya Nichayeva-Yuriychuk (**Chernivtsi**), George Anglițoiu, Oana Ion, Nicolae Toderaș, Alina Mogoș, Ana Maria Ghimiș (**București**), Anca Oltean, István Polgár, Alina Stoica, Luminița Soproni, Constantin Țoca (**Oradea**), Laura Grazi, Elena Sergi, Silvia Sassano (**Siena**), Oxana Tsisinska (**Lviv**), Isabel Valente (**Coimbra**)

**Executive Editor:** *Cristina-Maria DOGOT*

**Assistant Editor** (English): *Dana PANTEA*

**Editorial Assistant:** *Elena ZIERLER*

**The full responsibility regarding the content of the papers belongs exclusively to the authors.**



**Image:** Chernivtsi, Centersquare; *Album Czernowitz und die Bukowina 1890-1910*

**Address:** University of Oradea

1st Universităţii Street

410087-Oradea/Romania

Tel/fax: +40.259.467.642

e-mail: [ihorga@uoradea.ro](mailto:ihorga@uoradea.ro), [www.iser.rdsor.ro](http://www.iser.rdsor.ro)

***Eurolimes* is a half-yearly peer-reviewed journal. Articles and book reviews may be sent to the above-mentioned address. The journal may be acquired by contacting the editors.**

*Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies (IERS) is issued with the support of the Action Jean Monnet of the European Commission and in the co-edition with Bruylant (Brussels)*

**Oradea University Press**

ISSN-L: 1841-9259

ISSN 2247 / 8450

## *Cuprins ♦ Contents ♦ Sommaire ♦ Inhalt ♦ Tartalom*

Constantin-Vasile ȚOCA ( <b>Oradea</b> ) ◀ ▶ European Border Cities as Cross-border Cooperation Engines .....	5
<b>I. Border Cities.....</b>	<b>17</b>
Petros PAPAPOLYVIOU and Giorgos KENTAS ( <b>Nicosia</b> ) ◀ ▶ Nicosia: A Divided Capital in Europe.....	19
Ana-Teodora KURKINA ( <b>Munich</b> ) ◀ ▶ Borderland Identities of Bratislava: Balancing between Slovaks, Germans and Hungarians in the Second Half of the 19 <sup>th</sup> Century .....	37
Gennady Mikhailovich FEDOROV, Anna Valerievna BELOVA, and Lidia Gennadjevna OSMOLOVSKAYA ( <b>Kaliningrad</b> ) ◀ ▶ On the Future Role of Kaliningrad Oblast of Russia as an “International Development Corridor” .....	57
<b>II. Cities in the Border Regions.....</b>	<b>69</b>
Corina TURȘIE ( <b>Timișoara</b> ) ◀ ▶ Re-Inventing the Centre-periphery Relation by the European Capitals of Culture. Case-studies: Marseille-Provence 2013 and Pecs 2010 .....	71
Constantin Vasile ȚOCA, Bogdan Mihail POCOLA ( <b>Oradea, Cluj Napoca</b> ) ◀ ▶ Searching for Development of Medium-sized Cities in the European Union: A Study Case on Oradea .....	85
István SÜLI-ZAKAR, Tibor KECSKÉS ( <b>Debrecen</b> ) ◀ ▶ The Historical Borders and the Cross-Border Connections’ Effect on Debrecen’s Spirituality and Cultural Economy .....	99
<b>III. Frontiers cities.....</b>	<b>117</b>
Miruna TRONCOTĂ ( <b>Bucharest</b> ) ◀ ▶ Sarajevo – A Border City Caught between Its Multicultural Past, the Bosnian War and a European Future .....	119
Anatoliy KRUGLASHOV ( <b>Chernivtsi</b> ) ◀ ▶ Chernivtsi: A City with Mysterious Flavour of Tolerance .....	139
Sedef EYLEMER, Dilek MEMİŞOĞLU ( <b>Izmir</b> ) ◀ ▶ The Borderland City of Turkey: Izmir from Past to the Present .....	159
Vasile CUCERESCU, Simion ROȘCA ( <b>Kishinev</b> ) ◀ ▶ Tiraspol – the Border City of Eastern Latinity .....	185
<b>IV. Focus.....</b>	<b>197</b>
Ioan HORGA, Ana Maria COSTEA ( <b>Oradea, Bucharest</b> ) ◀ ▶ Border/Frontier Cities: Between Communication and Fragmentation.....	199

<b>Book reviews .....</b>	<b>213</b>
Julia TSYBULSKA, Olga DEMEDYUK (Lviv) ◀ ▶ The Challenges and Prospects for Development of the Carpathian Region.....	215
Alina-Carmen BRIHAN (Oradea) ◀ ▶ The Road towards the New Europe. The Facets and the Developments of an Ongoing Process.....	221
Dan APĂTEANU (Oradea) ◀ ▶ European Integration: Achievements and Perspectives .....	233
Anca OLTEAN (Oradea) ◀ ▶ Historical Moments in the History of Europe .....	239
<b>Our Partners .....</b>	<b>251</b>
Lyubov MELNICHUK (Chernivtsi) ◀ ▶ Center for Romanian Studies as Another Step towards the New Ukrainian-Romanian Relations .....	253
<b>About Authors.....</b>	<b>255</b>

# European Border Cities as Cross-border Cooperation Engines

Constantin-Vasile ȚOCA<sup>1</sup>

A general research on the works related to the European border cities reveals the fact that scholars do not so frequently approach this matter. One of these very rare sources, that of Decoville, Durand and Feltgen<sup>2</sup> considers the border cities from a new and very interesting perspective for the former communist countries: that of de-marginalisation of the border urban areas, of an upgrading of the status of peripheral regions, and, in the end, of the dynamisation of their economic and cultural life by their very easy to establish external relations in the framework of the process of cross-border cooperation. In the context of the greater consideration allotted to the problem of borders and cross-border cooperation in the EU, consecrating an entire issue of *Eurotimes* to the role of the border cities could be considered as an act of reparation to these urban areas, to their ethnic diversity, multicultural sophistication, political role in key situations, or economical potential for their communities and even region or country. Very often cities situated on the borders have to report their decisions and activities not only to the needs of their citizens, but to the realities of their out-border vicinities or even to the laws of the neighbour countries. In different historical times, to be placed on a border could represent either an opportunity or a risk, and Europe and European cities, during their histories, also faced with the two possibilities. Although differences of the two sides of the borders are inherent and will persist, probably, for long periods of time in the future, after the world wars Europe has experienced many changes when it comes to its border structure<sup>3</sup>, and very often divergent interests have created development regions that are rather homogenous.

The volume no. 19 of *Eurotimes*, *Border Cities in Europe*, deal with two very important concepts: borders and cities, but takes these even further by concentrating on

---

<sup>1</sup> Assistant PhD at University of Oradea, Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Science and Communication Sciences.

<sup>2</sup> Antoine Decoville et al., „Opportunities of Cross-border Cooperation between Small and Medium Cities in Europe,” *Report Written in the Frame of the Spatial Development Observatory, on Behalf of the Department of Spatial Planning and Development – Ministry of Sustainable Development and Infrastructure in Luxembourg*, LISER (2015): 6, accessed August 20, 2015, [http://www.dat.public.lu/eu-presidency/Events/Workshop-3/Opportunities-of-cross-border-cooperation-between-small-and-medium-cities-in-Europe-\\_LISER\\_.pdf](http://www.dat.public.lu/eu-presidency/Events/Workshop-3/Opportunities-of-cross-border-cooperation-between-small-and-medium-cities-in-Europe-_LISER_.pdf).

<sup>3</sup> Karoly Kocsis and Ferenc Schweitzer, *Hungary in Maps* (Budapest: HAS Geographical Institute, 2009): 21-28; Karoly Kocsis, *South Eastern Europe in Maps*, 2nd, Revised & Expanded Edition, (Budapest: Geographical Research Institute, Hungarian Academy of Science, 2007), 26-36; Patrick Picouet and Jean Pierre Renard, *Les Frontieres Mondiales Origines et Dynamiques* (Nantes: Editions Du Temps, 2007), 7-9; Ohli. Rehn, *Europe's Next Frontiers* (Munich: Ed. Nomos, 2006): 13-76; István Süli-Zakar and Ioan Horga, *Regional Development in the Romanian / Hungarian Cross-border Space – From National to European Perspective* (Debrecen-Hungary: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadoja, 2006), 27; István Süli-Zakar, *Borders and Cross-border Co-operations in the Central European Transformation Countries* (Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadoja, 2002), 44-46.

integrative concept around border cities around Europe. Thus the concept of *borders* should be viewed taking into consideration four main points of view<sup>4</sup>:

- Political: state, nation, sovereignty, nationalism, economic policy, geopolitics, regional resettlement, cross-border regionalisation;
- Economic: flows, cross-border interaction and spatial annihilation;
- Cultural: identity, national culture, ethnicity, sex, sexuality, environment, peace and feminist movements, migrations;
- Regional: demarcation of regions, regions and social structures, regions as a result of history, regional identity.

Remigion Ratti points towards a cross-border typology that identifies four main dimensions for the border: institutional border, geopolitical border, socio-territorial border, and socio-cultural borders<sup>5</sup>. Therefore, the current issue of *Eurotimes* is structured in three parts: border cities, cities in the border regions, frontiers cities and border/frontier cities: between communication and fragmentation. The volume ends with a series of literature review of books relevant in this field of interest. The papers presented in this issue of *Eurotimes* have concentrated on analysing European border cities. The cities that have been chosen as review subjects are: Nicosia, Bratislava, Kaliningrad, Debrecen, Oradea, Sarajevo, Chernivtsi, Izmir and Tiraspol.

In the first part of the volume, Petros Papapolyvion and Giorgios Kentas in the article entitled “Nicosia: A Divided Capital in Europe” take a look at the dividing lines that have shaped the city of Nicosia during its history, dating back to the colonial period of Cyprus and the Turkish invasion from 1974. Nicosia is the capital of Cyprus. The authors focus on the challenges that Nicosia has to deal with in the face of strong separation between the Greek and Turkish inhabitants. The solution that was used to create stability was the split of Cyprus in two, since 1974; strengthening this vision is also the constitution, a quite controversial piece of legislation. The issue of local communities has also been explored within this article. The other 5 cities in Cyprus are also divided in two by Greek and Turkish communities. The authors stress the negative effects of separation in Nicosia<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Klára Czimre, *Studia Geografica. Euroregionalis fejlődés az EU csatlakozás kuszobán különös tekintettel Magyarország euroregióira* [Studia Geografica. Euroregional Development at the Verge of EU integration with a special regard on Hungary's euroregions] (Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadoja, 2005), 9.

<sup>5</sup> István Süli-Zakar, *Társadalomföldrajz – területfejlesztés II* [Social Geography and Territorial Development] (Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadoja, 2003), 443.

<sup>6</sup> Dana Pantea, in the article “Cross-border Politics and Its Image in the European Union,” in *Eurotimes* 4, *Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers*, ed. Gerard Delanty et al. (Oradea-Debrecen: Oradea University Press, 2007), 147, quotes Jacques Rupnik who says “The borders of the EU will be shaped as a cross between a democratic and a geopolitical project rather than the other way around: a project shaped by pre-determined historical or cultural borders”. Alina Stoica in the book review “Culture and Pluralism in Europe,” in *Eurotimes* 12, *Communication and European Frontiers*, ed. Luminița Șoproni et al. (Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2011), 213, analyses the book of Georges Contogeorgis, *L'Europe et le monde. Civilisation et pluralisme culturel*, published in 2011. Referring to the book of Georgios Contogeorgis, the author emphasizes the importance of preserving the variety of cultures in Europe: “The second part of prof. Contogeorgis' book analyses the issue of the fundamentals and limits of the European cultural pluralism. (...) The globalization of the model of free and open society has facilitated the intimate contact between cultures. To accumulate ways of life and technologies circumscribed to them is one thing. But to assimilate them is a totally different thing. (...) Historical evolution shows us that any culture can lose some of its traits and win others”.

and argue that the only solution is reconciliation<sup>7</sup>. In 2004 Cyprus entered the European Union opening up more opportunities for cooperation. Nicosia should rise above separatism, one solution to this being a possible reunification as the authors suggest.

Fedorov Gennady Mikhailovich, Belova Anna Valerievna and Osmolovskaya Lidia Gennadjevna in their paper “On the Future Role of Kaliningrad Oblast of Russia as an ‘International Development Corridor’” write about the issues in Kaliningrad<sup>8</sup> and its condition as a Russian enclave in the Baltic Sea region. The authors develop the concept of “development corridor”<sup>9</sup>. Cross-border cooperation can be used as an efficient instrument to move towards this direction and develop the regional economy<sup>10</sup>. Professor Palmovsky, cited by the authors makes reference to a bipolar territorial system with Russia being surrounded by EU countries such as Lithuania and Poland. The article also proposes a SWOT analysis to show strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to economic development in Kaliningrad. Creating a strategic “international development corridor” is viewed as a promising option for the region in the authors’ opinion; the Kaliningrad region can act as a cultural and touristic contact point within this “development corridor”. In this respect authors pay close attention to projects implemented in the tourism area and protection of cultural heritage.

Ana-Teodora Kurkina, in her article entitled “Borderland Identities of Bratislava: Balancing between Slovaks, Germans and Hungarians in the Second Half of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century” defines the concept of borderland as a symbol of cultural and political division.

---

<sup>7</sup> Anca Oltean in the book review of the volume *National and Ethnic Identity in the European Context* (written by David Dunkerley et al.), in *Eurolimes 6, Intercultural Dialogue and the European Space* (Oradea: Oradea University Press, autumn 2008), 197, underlines the fact that the present Europe is no more a Europe of individuals, but of peoples of European Union: “In the chapter *People’s Europe? The Social Dimension of European Integration*, written by Andrew Thompson, several problems are emphasized. The author considers that the social dimension of European Integration was neglected in favour of economic interests of the process of integration. The author considers that at its origins, European integration was more an economic project, but the social dimension of the integration gains more and more importance. More and more, European Union tends to become a Europe of peoples. Now when the problem of a European citizenship gains more and more importance it is obvious that European integration is not anymore a problem of elites, but of all citizens of Europe”.

<sup>8</sup> The Kaliningrad region is a point of cultural contact and tourism development on the “development corridor”.

<sup>9</sup> Cristina Dogot in the article “La culture de l’autrui dans la pensée de Denis de Rougemont,” in *Eurolimes 6, Intercultural Dialogue and the European Space*, ed. Cristina-Maria Dogot et al. (Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2008), 31, makes a distinction based on Denis de Rougemont conception between “l’homme européen” and Russians or Americans, remarking also the cleavages and the difference of values promoted in East and West of Europe in the period of cold war: “Rougemont juge l’eupéen par comparaison et soutient, lui, que les conceptions européennes d’une part, et celle américaine ou russe, d’autre part, sur la nature ou la condition de l’homme exemplaire, diffèrent profondément. En effet, pour les européens le grand homme exemplaire, serait un homme épris d’absolu, à la recherche des valeurs essentielles et des raisons de vivre, tandis que pour les Américains ou pour les Russes ce serait l’individu moyen, l’exemplaire de série, l’homme qui produit et consomme. Selon l’écrivain, l’homme européen, celui de la contradiction, ou l’homme dialectique, est une personne, et l’idée de l’homme représente ‘le trésor de l’Europe’”.

<sup>10</sup> Genady Fedorov and Yuri Rozhkov-Yuryevsky, “The Correlation between the Barrier and Contact Functions of the Kaliningrad Section of the Russian Border,” in *Eurolimes 15, A Security Dimension as Trigger and Result of Frontiers Modifications*, ed. Giuliana Laschi et al. (Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2013), 77-90.

Identity borders are occupying a space of division and intersection in the author's opinion. The concept of "identity" is linked to national identity<sup>11</sup> and was extensively used in political discourse in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Bratislava is perceived as a contested territory that has been marginalised, influenced by a "mental border"; the name Bratislava has been in use after the creation of the Czechoslovak state. At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the Hungarian minority becomes the biggest minority in Bratislava. The Hungarian identity, as defined by the author, is constructed on two elements: the Hungarian language and the devotion towards Hungary. There are also the issues of German heritage and that of non-violence. The German influences can be seen in the architecture of the city (gothic and renaissance buildings). While the Slovaks have adopted the Hungarian model, the Germans have adopted their own identity. The case of Bratislava is thus very specific: situated in a territory populated mostly by Slavic people, the city has strong influences from Hungarian and German models. As a conclusion the author also emphasises the role of the state in the city's identity.

Corina Turşie presents a paper entitled "Re-inventing the Centre-periphery Relation by the European Capitals of Culture. Case-studies: Marseille – Provence 2013 and Pecs 2010" that explores the relationship between centre and periphery in the application of the European Culture Capital programme. The author uses two European cities one from France – Marseille Provence (2013) and one from Hungary – Pecs (2010). By applying data collected through Application (Bid) books, official web sites and ex-post evaluations of the European Commission, the author develops a quantitative content analysis method. Corina Turşie uses history and legislation provided for the European Capital programme to explore the process of application for the title and the effects of heritage regeneration in the two border cities defining local values. The slogans used for the Culture Capital campaigns the "Borderless city" for Pecs and "Sharing the South" for Marseille Provence, while both cities showed interest for international and multicultural values. Through exploring their geographical position, Pecs was thought of as a mediator between East and West – Balkan cultures and Western Catholic and Protestant cultures, while Marseille was designed as Mediterranean euro-metropolis. More recent history has also been used to promote the two cities: Pecs used its socialist heritage while Marseille made connections with "distant lands and colonies". In the author's opinion, urban culture and urban public space need to be reinvented and as such analysed this approach in the two cities: Pecs as "a city of lively public spaces" and Marseille as a "radiant city".

The Romanian-Hungarian border region is analysed through looking at Oradea as border city and its recent history of cross-border cooperation. This cooperation has been steadily developing since 1990 when the border between the two states became much more permeable enabling cross-border communication and a series of results that are convergent from cross-border cooperation. There are numerous authors that have studied the cross-border cooperation relationship between Romania and Hungary and the region

---

<sup>11</sup> Erhard Busek in the article, "Moving Borders," in *Eurolimes 11, Leaders of the Borders, Borders of the Leaders*, ed. Cristina-Maria Dogot et al. (Oradea-Debreceen: Oradea University Press, 2011), 197- 198, writes about the role of immigrants in Austro-Hungarian Empire in XIXth century: "We have to speak about, that a lot of immigrants in the 19<sup>th</sup> century created a very valuable world in the centre of Europe. If I am looking to science, poetry, arts, literature, those who have created this richness of culture here in the centre of Europe are coming of different directions. There were crossing borders very successfully learning from each other by crossing borders and taking pieces of everything with and by this mixture we are creating a lot of new things. You can name it multicultural, multiethnic, or whatever you want, but it is the expression of richness".



around Romania's western border: Ioan Horga<sup>12</sup>, Florentina Chirodea<sup>13</sup>, Luminița Șoproni<sup>14</sup>, János Péntzes<sup>15</sup>, Adrian Claudiu-Popoviciu<sup>16</sup>, Constantin-Vasile Țoca<sup>17</sup>, Mircea Brie<sup>18</sup> as well as Alina Stoica<sup>19</sup>, Cosmin Chiriac<sup>20</sup>, Polgár István<sup>21</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> Ioan Horga, "Valorizarea cercetării științifice din mediul academic pentru evaluarea on-going. Evaluarea programelor de cooperare transfrontalieră" [Gaining value from scientific research for use in on-going evaluation. The evaluation of cross-border cooperation], in *Evaluarea cooperării transfrontaliere la frontierele României* [Evaluating cross-border cooperation at Romania's borders], ed. Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca (Oradea: Editura Primus, 2013), 21-34.

<sup>13</sup> Florentina Chirodea, „Evaluarea programelor de cooperare transfrontalieră. Instrumente, metodologii și particularități” [Evaluating cross-border cooperation programmes. Instruments, methodologies and particularities], in *Evaluarea cooperării transfrontaliere la frontierele României* [Evaluating cross-border cooperation at Romania's borders], ed. Ioan Horga and Constantin Țoca (Oradea: Editura Primus, 2013), 35-48.

<sup>14</sup> Luminița Șoproni, "The Regional Brand – Frontier or Dimension of the New European Identity," in *The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighbourhood Policy*, ed. Ioan Horga et al. (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2009), 115-120.

<sup>15</sup> János Péntzes, "The Question of Territorial Cohesion – Spatial Income Inequalities in Two Different Regions of Hungary," in *Regional an Cohesion Policy – Insight into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the Policy Design*, ed. Ioan Horga et al. (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2011), 98-106.

<sup>16</sup> Adrian-Claudiu Popoviciu and Constantin Țoca, „Romanian – Hungarian Cross-border Cooperation Trough a Possible EGTC Oradea–Debrecen,” in *Regional an Cohesion Policy – Insight into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the Policy Design*, ed. Ioan Horga et al. (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2011), 241-261.

<sup>17</sup> Constantin-Vasile Țoca, *Romanian-Hungarian Cross-border Cooperation at Various Territorial Levels, with a Particular Study on the Debrecen – Oradea Eurometropolis (EGTC)*, (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 205; Constantin Țoca, "Project of the Debrecen – Oradea Cross-border Agglomeration," in *The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighbourhood Policy*, ed. Ioan Horga et al. (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2009), 253-260; Constantin Țoca and Ioan Horga, "Sociological Research. Thinking the Future Together the Debrecen – Oradea Cross-border Agglomeration," in *Neighbours and Partners: On the Two Sides of the Border* (Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadoja, 2008), 73-82.

<sup>18</sup> Ioan Horga and Mircea Brie, „La cooperation interuniversitaire aux frontieres exterieures de l'Union Europeenne et la contribution a la politique europeenne de voisinage,” in *The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighbourhood Policy*, ed. Ioan Horga et al. (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2009), 232-252.

<sup>19</sup> Alina Stoica and Constantin Țoca, „Romanian – Hungarian Cross-border Cultural and Educational Cooperation,” in *Cross-Border Partnership with Special Regard to the Hungarian – Romanian – Ukrainian Tripartite Border*, Ed. Horga Ioan and István Süli-Zakar (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2010), 70-75.

<sup>20</sup> Cosmin Chiriac, "Administrative Units within the Carpathian Euroregion. Comparative Analysis," in *Cross-border Cooperation – Models of Good Practice in Carpathian Region (Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, Hungary and Romania)*, ed. Adrian-Caludiu Popoviciu (Bucharest: C.H. BECK Publishing House, 2014), 159-171; Cosmin Chiriac, "Spatial Data Analysis and Cross-border Cooperation. The Case of Bihor – Hajdú Bihar Euroregion,” *Analele Universității din Oradea, Seria Relații Internaționale și Studii Europene V* (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 136-142.

<sup>21</sup> István Polgár, "Controversies on the Punitive or Redeeming Character of the Trianon Treaty," in *Cross-Border Partnership with Special Regard to the Hungarian – Romanian – Ukrainian Tripartite Border*, ed. Ioan Horga and István Süli-Zakar (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2010), 253-159; István Jozsef Polgár, *Tratatul de la Trianon: Impactul asupra*

The city of Debrecen, the second largest city in Hungary, is analysed from a historical perspective by looking at its various stages of development. First recorded in history in 1235 in *Regestrum Varodiencie* in Oradea, part of the Hungarian Kingdom in the western part of Bihor County, in the 16<sup>th</sup> century Debrecen became one of the cities of the Transylvania Principality together with Oradea. By the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century the Transylvania became part of the Hapsburg Empire, with Debrecen becoming a free city in 1693. During the 19<sup>th</sup> century alongside the Reformation movement, the city started the modernisation process. Today Debrecen is a strong development pole in the region through its university and cross-border and European cooperation, being Hungary's second biggest university centre with research facilities; cross-border cooperation studies have been done through the Institute for Euro-regional Studies<sup>22</sup>.

Through common development strategies and cross-border cooperation initiatives such as PHARE CBC and the Romania-Hungarian cross-border cooperation Programme 2007-2013<sup>23</sup>. The cities of Oradea and Debrecen also started a common development direction "Debrecen-Oradea: Common History, Common Future" with the twin cities sharing a common heritage and building a common future through development programs such as DebOra – a shared metropolis Debrecen - Oradea<sup>24</sup>.

The segment on *Frontier cities* takes a look at Sarajevo, Chernivtsi, Izmir and Tiraspol as multicultural cities and border cities that present interesting case studies. Hence, Miruna Troncotă in her paper on "Sarajevo – A Border City Caught between Its Multicultural Past, the Bosnian War and a European Future" focuses on searching for an identity for the city, 20 years after the siege of Sarajevo. Through an analysis of the last 200 centuries in the city's history the author tries to create an image of the factors that have influenced development both internally and externally as well as understanding the inclusive and exclusive factors that have affected the population. The year 2015 marks the commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide (20 years since the event) and 20 since the war with Bosnia. On the 1<sup>st</sup> of June 2015 the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union has taken effect. The author's perception is that "the

*istoriografiei române și maghiare (1920-2010)* [The Trianon Treaty: The Impact on Romanian and Hungarian historiography] (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2011), 254.

<sup>22</sup> Ioan Horga and István Süli-Zakar, "Scientific Results of the Institute for Euroregional Studies Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence," in *Neighbours and Partners: On the Two Sides of the Border*, ed. István Süli-Zakar (Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadoja, 2008), 7-12.

<sup>23</sup> Ioan Horga, "Evaluarea on-going a Programului de Cooperare Transfrontalieră Ungaria – România (2007-2013)" [On-going evaluation of the cross-border cooperation programme between Hungary and Romania], in *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Assessing European territorial cooperation], ed. Ioan Horga and Constantin Vasile Țoca (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013), 23-36.

<sup>24</sup> Constantin-Vasile Țoca, in "Ethnical Analysis within Bihor – Hajdú Bihar Euroregion," in *Supplement of Eurolimes, Ethnicity, Confession and Intercultural Dialogue at the European Union Eastern Border*, ed. Mircea Brie et al. (Oradea-Debrecen: Oradea University Press / Debrecen University Press, 2011), 13, describes the effort that have been made for consolidation of Bihor – Hajdú Bihar Euroregion: "Nowadays, and more accurately after 1989, the cooperation at the Romanian – Hungarian border at the level of Debrecen and Oradea communities and of Bihor – Hajdú Bihar Euroregion has been more dynamic than ever. We can note an increased cooperation, in a diversity of ethnicities, and cultures, and religions; moreover, the perspectives of a cross – border cooperation and more recently territorial through the newest European cooperation instrument, i.e., Groupings for Territorial Cooperation – EGTC, have led us to debating on a new form of cooperation at the level of the two communities of Debrecen and Oradea, mainly through a possible Eurometropolis Debrecen – Oradea".

memorialisation of the war” is still an effect and it will be determinative in shaping the city’s European evolution towards multiculturalism<sup>25</sup>.

Anatoliy Kruglashov in his article entitled “Chernivtsi: A City with Mysterious Flavour of Tolerance” looks at Chernivtsi as one of the most important cities in Ukraine, with its heritage and traditions that have survived until today. Chernivtsi is the most important city in the region of Bukovina situated in the border region of the Romanian-Ukrainian border. Its ethnic structure is quite diverse, with population that range from Jewish, Ukrainians, Romanians, Polish, Germans, Armenians and Russians; this ethnic diversity is paired with a regional culture of tolerance<sup>26</sup>, with multiculturalism being a way of living. Tartar hordes, The Great Duchy of Lithuania, Poland and Hungary, but also Moldova and the Ottoman Empire have always heavily contested the territory itself. The official birth of the city happened in the time of Alexandru cel Bun’s rule of the Moldovan Principality. In 1775 Bukovina and Chernivtsi became part of Austro-Hungary, with the city developing a lot during that period; it is considered the start of the Europeanisation process for Bukovina. To manage its mixture of different populations in 1850 Bukovina became a Duchy with its own governing structure, with the Vienna Court supporting tolerance among the nations living there. The ethnic groups have all contributed to the development of the region: Ukrainians and Romanians live mostly in rural areas, the Jewish community influenced the urban settlements even though there hasn’t been a united community (separated between traditionalist and modernist), while some of them embraced German culture. While the region was part of the Romanian Kingdom, Chernivtsi became closer to European civilisation. Under soviet regime the region developed differently: the Ukrainian population grew and became the majority and Russian officials controlled important parts of local administration. During this period minorities were not considered a priority and the ethnic structure and organisation became fragmented. The soviet regime did not tolerate local ethnic manifestations. After the split from the Soviet Union, Chernivtsi lost a lot of its German, Polish and Jewish population. The multiculturalism and ethnical diversity that was such a big part of the city is much less visible today. The current system is a bipolar one, with Ukrainians on one side and Romanians and Moldovans on the other side<sup>27</sup>.

<sup>25</sup> Ioan Horga and Ariane Landuyt in the article “Communicating the EU Policies beyond the/Its Borders,” in *Communicating the EU Policies beyond the Borders*, ed. Ioan Horga and Ariane Landuyt (Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2013), 7, underline the importance of having a strategy of communication and cooperation of EU with neighbouring non-EU states: “Today we live in a globalised world, where the relations between states, nations and international entities are complex ones, characterised by an increased level of interdependence. In such a world, where actors interact in myriad ways, strategic comprehension and employment of international communications has become a top priority for governments. As the member states of the United Europe have already recognised the importance of external communication with third countries, the European policymakers had to consider and how to better communicating and send their message abroad. The opinions and attitudes of people situated on the other of the *golden curtain of wealth* have a great significance because they influence the delivery of the EU’s economic and foreign policy objectives”.

<sup>26</sup> Mircea Brie and Ioan Horga, “Le frontiere europene – espressioni dell’identità” [European borders, expressions of identity], *Transylvanian Review, ISI Journal XXIII*, supliment no. 1 (Cluj-Napoca: 2014): 202-216.

<sup>27</sup> Ana Maria Ghimiş in the paper “Ukraine at Crossroads” (book review of the book *Ukraine at Crossroads: Prospects of Ukraine’s Relations with the European Union and Hungary*, edited by Péter Balázs, Svitlana Mytryayeva, Boton Zákonyi. Budapest – Uzhgorod, 2013), in *EuroTimes* 16, *Cross-border Governance and the Borders Evolutions*, ed. Alina Stoica et al. (Oradea-Debrecen: Oradea University Press, 2013), 259, asks herself which will be the politics of Ukraine in the near future:

Sedef Eylemer and Dilek Memişuglu in their article “The Borderland City of Turkey: Izmir from Past to Present” present the city of Izmir, a large metropolis (3<sup>rd</sup> largest city in Turkey) situated on the coast of the Aegean Sea in the Western part of the Anatolian Peninsula with a Mediterranean climate. During the Ottoman rule the city developed a lot as being the source of many civilisations: Muslim, Christian and Jewish. During the 15<sup>th</sup> – 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, the city developed as an important port and since 1923 the city functions under the Turkish republic. The article concludes with a few observations: the urban identity of the city has been influenced by multiculturalism and its historical heritage as well as the fact that economically as a port at the Aegean Sea.

Vasile Cucerescu and Simion Roșca wrote a paper on Tiraspol entitled “Tiraspol – the Border City of Eastern Latinity”, a contested entity under the prism of the Transnistrian conflict. The authors concentrate on detailing a cultural perspective speaking mostly about the relation between culture and geography. In their view, the individual is a much more important component in non-EU states, with a strong ability to influence Brussels.

Ioan Horga and Ana-Maria Costea in the *Focus* section of *Eurolimes* write about “Frontier Cities: Between Communication and Fragmentation”. The article shows that even under influence of globalisation, there can sometimes be barriers that are hidden, invisible. The authors try to explain how border influence city development, while also emphasising the role of the European Union as fortress rather than an open society<sup>28</sup>: there are national borders, there is the Euro zone and non-Euro zone and there is the Schengen area and non-Schengen area<sup>29</sup>. Local autonomous governance and security are areas that are in the competence of the member state (the national state), not the EU. In the authors’ opinion, sometimes border cities transcend national borders. The authors concentrate on countries that are divided by borders such as Nicosia but also talk about cities that influence a border region such as Giurgiu – Ruse. There are also cities that influence a border region such as Oradea – Debrecen (Bihor – Hajdú Bihar) or cities that function as an enclave such as Kaliningrad. The last theme studied by the authors is related to border cities as settlements that have divided communities, cities with integrated cultural borders or cities with social borders.

Considering all these, the current issue of *Eurolimes* on *Border Cities in Europe* analyses the themes of: border cities, cities in the border region and frontier cities in a world marked by globalisation that has both positive and negative influences<sup>30</sup>. The frontier has been the subject of change for a long time. The articles presented in this volume have explored some of these dimensions: boundary – corresponding to the border limit; border – the state border; frontier – territory neighbouring the border<sup>31</sup>.

“Therefore, it is very hard to say where Ukraine belongs today: it belongs to the EU? It belongs to the Custom Union? As Peter Balzs said in his speech ‘it depends on the Ukrainian politics and it depends mainly on the EU positio’ and let me add that it depends also on Russia’s position and influence vis-à-vis the EU as well given the power that this state has over the regional dynamics”.

<sup>28</sup> Ioan Horga and Ariane Landuyt, *Communicating EU Policies beyond the/Its Borders* (Oradea-Romania: Oradea University Press, 2013).

<sup>29</sup> Cristina-Maria Dogot and Ioan Horga, “Enlargement Process, Classic Geopolitics, and EU Internal Priorities,” in *Eurolimes 14, Enlargements, Borders and the Changes of EU Political Priorities*, ed. Ariane Landuyt et al. (Oradea: Oradea University Press / Bruylant, Autumn 2012), 161-180.

<sup>30</sup> Luminița Șoproni, *Relații economice internaționale* [Economic International Relations] (Oradea-Romania: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2004), 295-298.

<sup>31</sup> Ioan Horga, „Why Eurolimes,” *Eurolimes 1, Europe and Its Border: Historical Perspective*, ed. Ioan Horga and Sorin Șipoș (Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2006), 5.

If at first we were talking about closed borders, difficult to permeate, now we can talk about open borders that are very easy to get across. The European Union created a new concept for borders: internal and external borders for the European space. Borders represent a problem as in the current international environment Europe can be viewed more like a fortress than an open gate society. We can identify national borders, Euro and non-Euro zone, and Schengen and non-Schengen area. Border cities sometimes go beyond national delimitations and, in this case, we can begin to talk about Europeanisation, internationalisation: communication channels, instruments and methods used are quite diverse in such a way that cities start to influence the surrounding area or even on a larger scale continents. In the current society borders have not disappeared. There are borders that separate states and communities such as that between Romania and the Republic of Moldova. There are borders that create separation between identities (one from the EU, the other from outside the EU), as is the case of Ukraine that occupies a space between East and West. Looking towards the migration wave from the Middle East we can easily understand why Europe can sometimes be viewed as a fortress. A good example of cities in border regions is also that of Oradea and Debrecen, situated on the Romanian – Hungarian border, both important components of the Bihor – Hajdú Bihar Euroregion, but also part of the Carpathian Euroregion that includes cities from Ukraine, Slovakia and Poland. The cooperation between the two cities can be taken as an example of good practice on different levels of cross-border cooperation through the numerous programmes and instruments used in cooperation.

Literature in this field also mentions concepts such as double cities or twin cities and also bi-national cities. A double city is a pair of two cities of about equal size that are situated close to each other, according to G. Sparrow and O. Heddebaut discuss about bi-national city, those double cities that are divided by a national border, that share a common hinterland and whose inhabitants have a belonging together. In *GeoJournal* 54, Bi-national cities could become a suitable name for such paired border cities, a name that, moreover, does not suffer from the European connotation peculiar to the Euroregions concept. Based on the studies presented in this volume of *Eurolimes*, titled “Border Cities in Europe”, cities that are situated on two sides of the same border can develop on common goals and strategies. Such is the case of Oradea and Debrecen, two small cities that face strong competition in the region from more developed growth poles that have decided to develop together in certain areas in order to become more competitive in a national and regional context.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Brie, Mircea, and Ioan Horga. “Le frontiere europeee – espressioni dell’identità” [European borders, expressions of identity]. *Transylvanian Review, ISI Journal XXIII*, supplement no.1 (Cluj-Napoca: 2014): 202-216.
- Busek, Erhard. “Moving Borders.” In *Eurolimes 11, Leaders of the Borders, Borders of the Leaders*, edited by Cristina-Maria Dogot, Philippe Perchoc and Tőkés Tibor, 194-198. Oradea - Debrecen: Oradea University Press, 2011.
- Chiriac, Cosmin. “Administrative Units within the Carpathian Euroregion. Comparative Analysis.” In *Cross-border Cooperation – Models of Good Practice in Carpathian Region (Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, Hungary and Romania)*, 159-171. Bucharest: C.H. BECK Publishing House, 2014.

- Chiriac, Cosmin. "Spatial Data Analysis and Cross-Border Cooperation. The Case of Bihor – Hajdú Bihar Euroregion." *Analele Universității din Oradea, Seria Relații Internaționale și Studii Europene* V. (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013): 136-142.
- Chirodea, Florentina. „Evaluarea programelor de cooperare transfrontalieră. Instrumente, metodologii și particularități” [Evaluating cross-border cooperation programmes. Instruments, methodologies and particularities]. In *Evaluarea cooperării transfrontaliere la frontierele României* [Evaluating cross-border cooperation at Romania's borders], edited by Ioan Horga and Constantin Țoca, 35-48. Oradea: Editura Primus, 2013.
- Czimre, Klára. *Cross-border Cooperation – Theory and Practice*. Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadoja, 2006.
- Czimre, Klára. *Studia Geografica. Euroregionalis fejlodes az EU csatlakozas kuszoben kulonos tekintettel Magyarorszag euroregioira* [Studia Geografica. Euroregional Development at the Verge of EU integration with a special regard on Hungary's Euroregions]. Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetemi Kiadó, 2005.
- Decoville, Antoine, Frédéric Durand, and Valérie Feltgen. „Opportunities of Cross-border Cooperation between Small and Medium Cities in Europe.” *Report Written in the Frame of the Spatial Development Observatory, on Behalf of the Department of Spatial Planning and Development – Ministry of Sustainable Development and Infrastructure in Luxembourg*. LISER (2015): 1-55. Accessed August 20, 2015. [http://www.dat.public.lu/eu-presidency/Events/Workshop-3/Opportunities-of-cross-border-cooperation-between-small-and-medium-cities-in-Europe-\\_LISER\\_.pdf](http://www.dat.public.lu/eu-presidency/Events/Workshop-3/Opportunities-of-cross-border-cooperation-between-small-and-medium-cities-in-Europe-_LISER_.pdf).
- Dogot, Cristina-Maria. “La culture de l'autrui dans la pensée de Denis de Rougement.” In *Eurolimes 6, Intercultural Dialogue and the European Space*, edited by Cristina-Maria Dogot, Szabó Gyula, Esther Gimeno Ugalde, 22-44. Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2008.
- Dogot, Cristina-Maria, and Ioan Horga. “Enlargement Process, Classic Geopolitics, and EU Internal Priorities.” In *Eurolimes 14, Enlargements, Borders and the Changes of EU Political Priorities*, edited by Ariane Landuyt, Dana Pantea, and István Polgár, 161-183. Oradea: Oradea University Press/Bruylant, Autumn 2012.
- Genady, Fedorov, and Yuri Rozhkov-Yuryevsky. “The Correlation between the Barrier and Contact Functions of the Kaliningrad Section of the Russian Border.” In *Eurolimes 15, A Security Dimension as Trigger and Result of Frontiers Modifications*, edited by Giuliana Laschi, Alexis Vahlas, and Dorin Dolghi, 77-90. Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2013.
- Ghimiș, Ana Maria. “Ukraine at Crossroads,” book review of the book *Ukraine at Crossroads: Prospects of Ukraine's Relations with the European Union and Hungary*, edited by Péter Balázs, Svitlana Mytryayeva, and Boton Zákonyi. Budapest – Uzhgorod, 2013. In *Eurolimes 16, Cross-Border Governance and the Borders Evolutions*, edited by Alina Stoica, Carlos E. Pacheco Amaral, and István Süli-Zakar, 256-260. Oradea-Debrecen: Oradea University Press, 2013.
- Horga, Ioan, and Ariane Landuyt. *Communicating EU Policies beyond the/Its Borders*. Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2013.
- Horga, Ioan, and Mircea Brie. „La coopération interuniversitaire aux frontières extérieures de l'Union Européenne et la contribution a la politique européenne de voisinage.” In *The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighbourhood*

- Policy*, edited by Ioan Horga, Grigore Silași, István Süli-Zakar, Stanislav Sagan, 232-252. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2009.
- Horga, Ioan. "Valorizarea cercetării științifice din mediul academic pentru evaluarea on-going. Evaluarea programelor de cooperare transfrontalieră" [Gaining value from scientific research for use in on-going evaluation. The evaluation of cross-border cooperation]. In *Evaluarea cooperării transfrontaliere la frontierele României* [Evaluating cross-border cooperation at Romania's borders], edited by Ioan Horga and Constantin-Vasile Țoca, 21-34. Oradea: Editura Primus, 2013.
- Horga, Ioan. „Why Eurolimes?.” In *Eurolimes 1, Europe and Its Border: Historical Perspective*, edited by Ioan Horga and Sorin Șipoș, 5-13. Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2006.
- Horga, Ioan, and István Süli-Zakar. "Scientific Results of the Institute for Euroregional Studies Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence." In *Neighbours and Partners: On the Two Sides of the Border*, edited by István Süli-Zakar, 7-12. Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadó -- Kossuth University Press, 2008.
- Horga, Ioan. "Evaluarea on-going a Programului de Cooperare Transfrontalieră Ungaria – România (2007-2013)" [On-going evaluation of the cross-border cooperation programme between Hungary and Romania]. In *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene* [Evaluating European territorial cooperation], edited by Ioan Horga, Constantin-Vasile Țoca, 23-36. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013.
- Horga, Ioan, and Ariane Landuyt. "Communicating the EU Policies beyond the/Its Borders." In *Communicating the EU Policies beyond the Borders*, Ioan Horga and Ariane Landuyt, 5-22. Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2013.
- Kocsis, Karoly, and Ferenc Schweitzer. *Hungary in Maps*. Budapest: HAS Geographical Institute, 2009).
- Kocsis, Karoly. *South Eastern Europe in Maps*. 2nd, Revised & Expanded Edition. Budapest: Geographical Research Institute, Hungarian Academy of Science, 2007.
- Pantea, Dana. "Cross-border Politics and Its Image in the European Union." In *Eurolimes 4, Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers*, edited by Gerard Delanty, Dana Pantea and Karoly Teperics, 142-147. Oradea-Debrecen: Oradea University Press, 2007.
- Pénzes, János. "The Question of Territorial Cohesion – Spatial Income Inequalities in Two Different Regions of Hungary." In *Regional an Cohesion Policy – Insight into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the Policy Design*, edited by Ioan Horga, Iordan Gh. Bărbulescu, Adrian Ivan, Mycolia Palinchack, and István Süli-Zakar, 98-106. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2011.
- Picouet, Patrick, and Jean-Pierre Renard. *Les Frontières Mondiales Origines et Dynamiques*. Nantes: Editions Du Temps, 2007.
- Polgár, István. "Controversies on the Punitive or Redeeming Character of the Trianon Treaty." In *Cross-border Partnership with Special Regard to the Hungarian – Romanian – Ukrainian Tripartite Border*, edited by Horga Ioan and István Süli-Zakar, 253-259. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2010.
- Polgár, István Jozsef. *Tratatul de la Trianon: Impactul asupra istoriografiei române și maghiare (1920-2010)* [The Trianon Treaty: The impact on Romanian and Hungarian historiography]. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2011.
- Popoviciu, Adrian-Claudiu, and Constantin Țoca. „Romanian – Hungarian Cross-border Cooperation trough a Possible EGTC Oradea–Debrecen.” In *Regional an Cohesion Policy – Insight into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the Policy Design*,

- edited by Ioan Horga, Iordan Gh. Bărbulescu, Adrian Ivan, Mycolia Palinchack, and István Süli-Zakar, 241-261. Oradea: Editura Universităţii din Oradea, 2011.
- Rehn Olli. *Europe's Next Frontiers*. Munchen: Ed. Nomos, 2006.
- Stoica, Alina. "Culture and Pluralism in Europe." In *Eurolimes 12, Communication and European Frontiers*, edited by Luminița Șoproni, George Tsourvakas, and Klára Czimre, 211-213. Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2011.
- Stoica, Alina, and Constantin Țoca. „Romanian – Hungarian Cross-Border Cultural and Educational Cooperation.” In *Cross-border Partnership with Special Regard to the Hungarian – Romanian – Ukrainian Tripartite Border*, edited by Ioan Horga and István Süli-Zakar, 253-259. Oradea: Editura Universităţii din Oradea, 2010.
- Süli-Zakar, István, and Ioan Horga. *Regional Development in the Romanian / Hungarian Cross-border Space. From National to European Perspective*. Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadoja, 2006.
- Süli-Zakar, István. *Borders and Cross-border Cooperation in the Central European Transformation Countries*. Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadoja, 2002.
- Süli-Zakar, István. *Tarsadalomfoldrajz – területfejlesztés II* [Social Geography and Territorial Development]. Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kiadó, 2003.
- Șoproni, Luminița. "The Regional Brand – Frontier or Dimension of the New European Identity." In *The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighbourhood Policy*, edited by Ioan Horga, Grigore Silași, István Süli-Zakar, and Stanislav Sagan, 115-120. Oradea: Editura Universităţii din Oradea, 2009.
- Țoca, Constantin-Vasile. *Romanian – Hungarian Cross-border Cooperation at Various Territorial Levels, with a Particular Study of the Debrecen – Oradea Eurometropolis (EGTC)*. Oradea: Editura Universităţii din Oradea, 2013.
- Țoca, Constantin. "Project of the Debrecen – Oradea Cross-border Agglomeration." In *The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighbourhood Policy*, edited by Ioan Horga, Grigore Silași, István Süli-Zakar, and Stanislav Sagan, 253-260. Oradea: Editura Universităţii din Oradea, 2009.
- Țoca, Constantin, and Ioan Horga. "Sociological Research. Thinking the Future together the Debrecen – Oradea Cross-border Agglomeration." In *Neighbours and Partners: On the Two Sides of the Border*, edited by István Süli-Zakar, 73-82. Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadó, 2008.
- Țoca, Constantin-Vasile. "Ethnical Analysis within Bihor – Hajdú Bihar Euroregion." In *Supplement of Eurolimes, Ethnicity, Confession and Intercultural Dialogue at the European Union Eastern Border*, edited by Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, and Sorin Șipoș, 125-131. Oradea-Debrecen: Oradea University Press/Debrecen University Press, 2011.
- Șoproni, Luminița. *Relații economice internaționale* [Economic international relations]. Oradea: Editura Universităţii din Oradea, 2004.



## **I. Border Cities**

**Petros PAPAPOLYVIOU and Giorgos KENTAS** (Nicosia) ◀ ▶  
*Nicosia: A Divided Capital in Europe*

**Ana-Teodora KURKINA** (Munich) ◀ ▶ *Borderland Identities of Bratislava: Balancing between Slovaks, Germans and Hungarians in the Second Half of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century*

**Gennady Mikhailovich FEDOROV, Anna Valerievna BELOVA,**  
and **Lidia Gennadjevna OSMOLOVSKAYA** (Kaliningrad)  
◀ ▶ *On the Future Role of Kaliningrad Oblast of Russia as an  
“International Development Corridor”*



# Nicosia: A Divided Capital in Europe

*Petros PAPAPOLYVIΟΥ<sup>1</sup> and Giorgos KENTAS<sup>2</sup>*

**Abstract.** *Nicosia is a city designed to be divided across many false lines. The rich history of the city reveals the remnants of foreign intervention that imprinted a multi-cultural background on Nicosia, which – at the same time – erected some artificial lines of segregation. Britain’s colonial rule was crucial in fostering the most contemporary lines of division. A given constitution in 1960 made these lines look inevitable, and by 1964 Nicosia (like many other towns in Cyprus) was already divided on the ground. Turkey’s military invasion in 1974 imposed an even deeper line of division across Nicosia (and Cyprus) that engendered some novel problems which are visible up until today. EU accession stimulated some hope for overcoming division, which is relatively elusive.*

**Key words:** *Nicosia, false lines, British colonial heritage, divided capital, Turkish invasion, EU hope*

## ***Introduction***

Nicosia is a divided city. It is maybe one of the rare cases in the contemporary history of Europe where a city is intentionally designed to be divided. That design however is artificial and conceived in a certain historical context which was saturated with a variety of dividing lines. These dividing lines, mostly rooted in the colonial heritage of Cyprus, were transmitted in the post-independence milieu of the island, and they were gradually internalised and intensified by the people of Cyprus, up until 1974 when Turkey invaded the island and draw a deep dividing line across the whole of it. In that respect, to understand the causes and consequences of Nicosia’s divide, one needs to delve into the history of the town in conjunction with the history of Cyprus.

This paper takes stock of the history of Nicosia, looks into the origins of its division, and addresses the challenge of reunification. The discussion develops in two parts. In the first part, we scrutinize the evolution of the city, the growth of its population, the amalgamation of cultural and social elements in the course of time, and the politics that surround Nicosia. In the second part, we examine the dividing lines that emerged during the British colonial rule and the way in which these lines of segregation were multiplied – by intention or contingently –, as well as we look into some sources of hope for the re-unification of Nicosia. Although we are relatively sceptic with the potential of re-unification and the practical implications of such a development, we conclude that it is up to the people of Nicosia to decide on the identity and the future of their town.

## **I. History and development of Nicosia**

This part explores the rich historical background of Nicosia in terms of geography, demographics, social evolution, and politics.

---

<sup>1</sup>Associate Professor of Contemporary Greek History, University of Cyprus.

<sup>2</sup>Assistant Professor of International Politics and Governance, University of Nicosia.

### *Historical evolution*

Nicosia is the capital and largest city of Cyprus. Situated in the centre of the island it is built between two mountain ranges, Troodos and Pentadaktylos, roughly in the middle of the biggest plain known as Mesaoria. Its soil is fertile since the island's main river Pedaios courses through it, and its climate is considered one of the healthiest in Cyprus. Nicosia is the only Cypriot city out of six which is not littoral, but its central location provides easy and speedy access to the other towns, namely Kyrenia (at a distance of 25 kilometres), Larnaka (45 kilometres), Famagusta (52 kilometres), Limassol (82 kilometres) and Paphos (150 kilometres).<sup>3</sup>

Pediaios River was the main cause for the establishment of the first settlements in the Nicosia area during the Chalcolithic period (4000-2500 B.C.). Archaeological finds are in abundance in the Bronze Age (2500-1050 B.C.) and in the Geometric Period (1050-750 B.C.) The city's first name, Ledroi ("Λέδροι" in Greek), and of its King Onasagoras are to be found on an inscription dated to 673/672 B.C. together with those of the other nine kingdoms of Cyprus (Michaelides and Pilides 2012). Thereafter, the island passed in succession to the Assyrians, the Egyptians, the Persians, Alexander the Great and his successors and then to the Romans. The city's patron, Saint Triphyllios, was in the 4th century A.D. the Bishop of Ledra. During the Byzantine Period, Nicosia is recorded as the capital of the island in the close of the 11th century. At that time, the first contemporary wall fortification was constructed.<sup>4</sup>

In the years of the Lusignans (1192-1489), Nicosia reached a high point of development. The Lusignans created a modern city which served as the seat of the King of Cyprus and of the Latin Church, erecting magnificent Gothic monuments; the most important among those was the cathedral of Saint Sophia, later converted into a mosque (the Selimiye Mosque) by the Ottomans, a landmark that dominates the city to this day. Nicosia was a megalopolis by the standards of the age, numbering no fewer than 25,000 inhabitants prior to the Turkish conquest. In 1489, Cyprus came under the control of the Venetians. The Ottoman expansionism and the sack of Constantinople maintained the significance of Cyprus as an outpost of Europe in Asia. In the face of the Ottoman danger, the Venetians reinforced and extended the walls of Nicosia. Giulio Savorgnano undertook the design of the walls in 1567, as they survive today with 11 bastions, a deep moat filled with water from Pedaios River and three gates leading in and out of the city: Paphos Gate, Famagusta Gate and Kyrenia Gate.<sup>5</sup> However, the walls of Nicosia could not withstand the Ottoman onslaught and in September 1570 the troops of Lala Mustafa took the city after a siege of six weeks. The Turkish conquest of Cyprus was completed in July 1571 with the capture of Famagusta.

During Turkish rule Nicosia remained the capital of Cyprus and fell into decline as did the island as a whole, having been transformed into one of the worst administered and poor areas of the Ottoman Empire. The city as an administrative centre was the seat of the Turkish governor and of the Orthodox Archbishop, who was the religious and ethnic leader of the Christian *reaya*. In July 1821, a few months after the outbreak of the Greek Revolution, Archbishop Kyprianos was hanged in the main square of Nicosia; three other bishops of the Church of Cyprus and tens of Greek notables were also executed. In the

<sup>3</sup> Frixos Maratheftis, *Location and Development of the Town of Leucosia (Nicosia) Cyprus* (Nicosia: Nicosia Municipality, 1977).

<sup>4</sup> Tassos Papacostas, "Byzantine Nicosia 650-1191," in *Historic Nicosia*, ed. Demetrios Michaelides (Nicosia: Rimal Publications, 2012), 77-109.

<sup>5</sup> Anna Marangou, *Nicosia. A Special Capital* (Nicosia: Leventis Municipal Museum of Nicosia, 1995).

years that followed Greek independence and the establishment of the Greek Kingdom (1830), the Greeks of Cyprus turned to Athens and articulated their own national demand for Enosis (Union) with Greece, as other Greek islands such as the Ionian Isles, Crete and the islands of the North-Eastern Aegean had done.

In the aftermath of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, the Sultan unexpectedly ceded Cyprus to Britain, in the sidelines of the Congress of Berlin. British rule lasted until 1960 when Cyprus became an independent state. These 82 years saw the greatest and most sweeping changes in the history of Nicosia. During that period, Nicosia undoubtedly took the lead in commerce from Larnaca, which hosted the European consulates during Turkish Rule, as well as in education and cultural life from Limassol.

### ***Population growth, social life, and cultural development***

In the first British census of 1881, the population of Nicosia stood at 11,536 inhabitants, out of a total island population of 186,173 (a percentage of 6.1).<sup>6</sup> In the census of 1946, the population of Nicosia numbered 34,485 inhabitants out of 450,114 living in the whole of Cyprus (7.6%). According to the same census, 24,967 (72.3%) people lived within the walls of Nicosia, compared to 9,518 (27.6%) living in the new town outside the walls. With the addition of the nine suburbs of the town (population 18,839), the population of the urban complex of Nicosia in 1946 stood at 53,324 (12.29% of the population island-wide) (Cyprus, Census 1946). In the latest census of 2011 the inhabitants of the Republic of Cyprus numbered 840,407, with 239,277 (28.4%) of them living in the wider urban complex of Nicosia.

In the matter of the ethnic/religious groups of Nicosia inhabitants during British Rule, the British censuses demonstrate higher population percentages for the Turks in the capital, compared to their island-wide percentages. Nevertheless, the Greeks showed a faster rate of increase. Thus, while in 1881 the figures for Ottomans in Nicosia stood at 5,393 (46.8%), for Greeks 20,768 (60.1%) and 3,387 (9.9%) for other religious denominations, the corresponding figures for 1946 were as follows: Turks 10,330 (30%), Greeks 20,768 (60.1%) and 3,387 (9.9%) for other religious denominations. In respect of the latter, 2,252 were Armenian, 398 Roman Catholic/Latin, 160 Maronite and 63 Jewish. This was clearly a different picture than the island-wide one, since the 1946 census showed 80.3% Greeks, 17.9% Turks and 1.8% “others” living in Cyprus.<sup>7</sup>

In 1881, the inhabitants of Nicosia lived in 21 small neighbourhoods (*mahalle* in Turkish). Most of those went by the names of the churches or mosques of each area [i.e. Aya Sophia, Ayios Antonios, Ayios Ioannis, Phaneromeni, Yeni Djami (Mosque)]. Throughout the British Rule, the majority of Nicosia’s neighbourhoods were divided in respect of the ethnic group of its inhabitants; Turkish or Greek areas of the town were inhabited by each one of the ethnicities in percentages exceeding 80% or 90%. The Turkish-dominated *mahalle* were in the northern part of the city, whilst the Greek quarters were in the south, with small Greek population islets also in the “low neighbourhoods.” Likewise, in the “Armenian quarter” the Armenians were the majority. There was a marked presence of “Others” in the town centre where the Market was situated, with significant numbers also of both Greeks and Turks. Regarding the population of the nine suburbs of Nicosia in 1946, seven of those had a Greek majority of over 86%. In another suburb Greeks and Turks roughly shared the same percentages (54%-44%), while in the

<sup>6</sup> *Report on the Census of Cyprus, 1881, with Appendix*, London, 1884.

<sup>7</sup> *Cyprus, Census of Population and Agriculture 1946. Report and Tables*, London 1949.

smallest suburb, Mintzeli, there was a clear Turkish majority of over 86%.<sup>8</sup> This was due to the fact that the internal migration from the countryside to the towns that came to a head in the period 1931-1950, involved almost exclusively Greek population.

In regard to illiteracy, at its highest island-wide percentage of 73.2% in 1911, Nicosia showed a substantially lower rate of only 51.8% (Cyprus, Census 1911). As it was natural for that period, there were more illiterate women (63.6%) than men (41%). In 1946 things were much better: a 68.2% majority of the Nicosia inhabitants stated that they could read and write. Two percents could only read and 29.7% were totally illiterate (21.6% for men and 38.1% for women). The rate of illiteracy for the whole island was 43.9%.

Concerning the occupational make-up of the population, in the 1946 census were recorded in the city and suburbs of Nicosia 2,379 unskilled workers, 1,116 clerks/store men, 1,079 carpenters, 942 domestic servants of both sexes, 855 shoemakers and shoe factory workers, and 709 textile workers. Those were the fields of employment that attracted most people. Non-manual professions for the same year included 237 primary school teachers and 161 secondary school teachers, 91 doctors, 32 dentists, 47 lawyers, 55 Orthodox clerics and 30 Muslim clerics, 145 bank and insurance employees. The "domestic personnel" of Nicosia constituted a distinct social group representing a sizeable percentage of the internal migration to the urban centres. According to the 1901 census, there were 743 male servants and 558 female servants in the district of Nicosia. Almost all of them worked in Nicosia and came from country villages. A large number of them, 223 boys and 196 girls, were aged 5 to 14 years.

### *Nicosia under British rule*

The British flag was hoisted on Nicosia's Paphos Gate on 12 July 1878; the last Turkish governor Besim Pasha formally surrendered the rule of the island to Vice Admiral Lord John Hay. The first High Commissioner, Sir Garnet Wolseley, has chosen as the location for the construction of his residence a rise across the Pediaios riverbed, near Agioi Omologites. The High Commissioner's residence was a stylish prefabricated mansion that had been loaded on ships bound for Ceylon, only to be redirected since it was no longer needed there. Following the destruction of the Government House during the October revolt of 1931, a new building went up on the same site, which serves since 1960 as the Presidential Palace of the Republic of Cyprus. At the same time, the Secretariat buildings were constructed along the road connecting Nicosia with Government House. Many government offices, the Land Registry and the Courts remained in the old town, in Serai Square. This was the city's main square, where all the official ceremonies took place, as well as the place where the decrees for the annexation of Cyprus to the British Crown in 1914 and its conversion to a colony in 1925 were read out.

One of the first foreign visitors to the city following the British take-over in 1878, William Hepworth Dixon, described Nicosia as "the little sister of Damascus." In general, the descriptions by foreign visitors speak of a dirty and neglected town that can hardly "be considered as habitable by Europeans," without a sewerage system, plagued by stagnant waters that are the source of infection and malaria, and a boisterous market full of animals that make movement difficult for humans. The aim of the British was, as in any other of their colonies, to "civilize" the natives and in addition to establish in Cyprus a model administration centre for the Middle East and the Ottoman Empire. In contrast to other colonies, there was no transfer of British settlers, nor was there any need for large military installations. The town in which most of the British lived was Nicosia and this is where

---

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

the main contact and blending of West and East took place. The modernisation came in stages. The most crucial changes include the re-organisation of the administration, the improvement in public hygiene, the creation of a road network (up until 1878 only a deplorable road connected Nicosia to Larnaka), the entrenchment of a feeling of security, the administration of justice, the freedom of expression and the press (the first printing press came to Cyprus only in 1878), the change of mentality in personal appearance, living and everyday life. The civil liberties conceded by the British were also very important. Elections for the Legislative Council were held for the first time in 1883 enabling the proportional representation of the inhabitants on the basis of the 1881 census. Twelve deputies were elected from separate Greek and Turkish electoral rolls: nine “non-Muslim” and three “Muslim”, according to the terminology of the British administration. The twelve elective members were flanked by six other “official” members, one of whom – the High Commissioner- was the President of the Legislative Council and had a casting vote in case of a tie. The Legislative Council was preserved until 1931 when it was abolished as a result of the October uprising. While it was a democratic concession, it in effect legalised the national and political segregation of Greeks and Turks and formalised the British-Turkish alliance, as the British deputies customarily voted along with the Turkish deputies against the Greek demands on all occasions.

In the years 1878-1960, Nicosia became the main stage for political confrontation. It was not only the seat of the British High Commissioner (named Governor since Cyprus became a colony in 1925) and of the Legislative Council but also that of the religious leaders, the Cypriot Archbishop, who held an ethnarchical and political role since the years of Ottoman Rule, and of the Muslim Mufti. At the same time it was the seat of the most prestigious educational institutions of the island, separately for the Greeks, Turks, Britons and Armenians.

Apart from the railway which started running in October 1905 connecting Nicosia with Famagusta, Mesaoria, Morphou and Troodos, a regular intercity bus service had been set up since the 1910s. The railway was abolished as from New Year’s Day 1952, having been considered the vestige of an expiring world, financially non-viable and overcome by new realities. In the same period after World War II, the Nicosia Airport was developing fast into a hub for the South-eastern Mediterranean with the airplanes of “Cyprus Airways” (founded in 1947) connecting Cyprus with Athens and London, Rome, Alexandria and Cairo, Beirut, Ankara and Constantinople, as well as Palestine, Syria and Iraq. Nicosia, as the seat then of three Diplomatic delegations accredited to Cyprus, namely the Consulates of Greece, the United States and Turkey, and a grown administrative, commercial and financial centre, attracted large numbers of visitors, both local and foreign. Since the end of the 1940s, a new ultramodern hotel had opened, soon to evolve into one of the most famous tourist accommodations in the Middle East, the “Ledra Palace Hotel”. This landmark of Nicosia and jewel of Cypriot tourism has been closed since the time of the Turkish invasion in 1974, as it is situated within the “Buffer Zone.”

### ***Uprising in Nicosia and its aftermath***

The end of World War II saw a revival of the expectations for freedom and union of Cyprus with Greece. Following the disappointing results of the first appeal on the Cyprus problem to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1954, an armed liberation struggle seemed the only way out for the deliverance of Cyprus. The struggle of EOKA (“National Organization of Cypriot Fighters”) began on 1st April 1955 with bomb attacks and acts of sabotage and continued with raids and ambushes by small guerrilla groups against military targets. The anticolonial struggle took popular dimensions with the

participation of the population in various forms of protest, such as “passive resistance” and vehement student demonstrations. The British reacted by declaring a “state of emergency” and exiling Archbishop Makarios, Kyrenia Bishop Kyprianos and two of the latter’s closest associates to the Seychelles (March 1956). During the governorship of Marshal John Harding the measures against EOKA became harsher, with the courts imposing the heaviest penalties, frequent curfews and the imprisonment of hundreds of Greek Cypriots. The repressive measures came to a head with the execution by hanging of nine Greek Cypriot members of EOKA, aged between 18-25 years, for “terrorist acts”, in the Nicosia Central Prisons in 1956-1957.

Since early 1956, the Turks of Cyprus with the support of Turkey had responded to the activity of EOKA by creating the “Volkan” organisation and its successor TMT (“Turkish Resistance Organization”), under the dominant slogans “Cyprus is Turkish” and “Partition or death.” The Greek-Turkish clashes peaked in the summer of 1958. In Nicosia, churches were torched and tens of Greek shops were destroyed, while many Greeks were forced to flee their houses in the Turkish neighbourhoods of Nicosia. In September 1958, under pressure of implementing the “Macmillan Plan”, which provided for a status of triple dominion over Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios accepted an independence solution. On 17-19 February 1959, the agreement on Cypriot independence was signed in London, following a preliminary agreement between Greece and Turkey in Zurich on February 11.

The Cyprus constitution was a complicated text, which incorporated in full the provisions of the Zurich – London agreements, without the possibility of amending them. The constitution of the Republic of Cyprus bore the seeds of division, since it expressly defined the bi-communal character of the new state, conceding disproportional rights and super-privileges to the Turkish Cypriots who constituted 18% of the population. The Greek Cypriots would elect the President of the Republic for a five-year term, while the Turkish Cypriot Vice President would be respectively elected by his community, having a right of veto on defence and foreign policy issues; he would also propose three Turkish Cypriot ministers out of the ten members of the Council of Ministers. The House of Representatives would have 50 members with the two communities electing their Representatives separately in a ratio of 7 to 3 (35 Greeks and 15 Turks). A separate simple majority of the representatives of each community was needed for any change in matters of electoral law, taxation and Municipalities. In the Police and Civil Service the proportion of Greeks and Turks in all ranks should be maintained at a ratio of 7:3, whilst in the 2,000 - strong Cyprus army the ratio was 6:4. Finally, in the five greater cities of Cyprus, the Turkish inhabitants would have their own separate Municipalities.

The Cyprus Constitution incorporates the “Treaty of Guarantee” and the “Treaty of Alliance,” which had also been agreed in February 1959. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertook the obligation as “guarantor powers” to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, by preventing the union of Cyprus with another state or its dismemberment. Moreover, the three countries held the right of unilateral intervention in order to restore the status of the Treaties. Britain would maintain military bases in an area of 99 square miles. The Cypriot independence was officially proclaimed on 16 August 1960. The first serious disagreements in the relationship of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots appeared on matters regarding the immediate implementation of the 7:3 ratios in the civil service and the setting of boundaries for the separate municipalities. As a means of pressure the Turkish Cypriot MPs refused to vote for the taxation bills in 1961. The crisis culminated in the bi-communal troubles that broke out in Nicosia on 21 December 1963. Prior to this,



Archbishop Makarios had proposed to Vice President Fazil Kutchuk the amendment of 13 points in the Cypriot constitution, which the Greek Cypriots claimed that created insurmountable problems to the democratic functioning and viability of the state. The Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish government rejected Makarios' proposals by arguing that they violated the spirit of the treaties of establishment of the Republic and "turned into a minority" the Turkish Cypriot community, thus posing great risks to its safety.

One of the most important consequences of the Greco-Turkish clashes in the Christmas of 1963 was the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriot state and legislative officials, and also of most of the civil servants into the areas under the control of Turkish Cypriot armed groups. The generalisation of the conflict was averted through the intervention of Britain. In the course of the negotiations, the commander of the British forces in Cyprus general Young marked on a map of Nicosia the "Green Line". The boundaries that would in the course of time, assume through their preservation a symbolism similar to that of the wall that went up in post-war Berlin.

## II. Challenges of a divided capital

Drawing on the history, the social evolution, and the political surroundings of Nicosia, this part looks into the challenges that it faces as a divided city after Cyprus' national independence in 1960. Both the division and the hope of re-unification of Nicosia are situated in the overall situation of Cyprus.

### *So many dividing lines*

One would not grasp the depth and breadth of the division of Nicosia unless they understand the rationale behind the many dividing lines across the whole island. In that respect the micro-division of Nicosia is part and parcel of many other macro-divisions in Cyprus. In that respect, the division of Nicosia is rooted in a holistic account of causes and consequences of the *de facto* division of Cyprus and it thus may function as a symbol of a divided island. Although intertwined and quite complex, these causes and consequences emerge from four basic sources: First, the colonial heritage of Britain in Cyprus,<sup>9</sup> second, third-party involvement and intervention in the domestic affairs of Cyprus,<sup>10</sup> third, ineffectiveness of international institutions and governance,<sup>11</sup> and forth failure of the government of Cyprus and the two large communities of the island to consolidate the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.<sup>12</sup> Bearing in mind the first three factors, the latter was almost futile.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> William Mallinson, *A Modern History of Cyprus* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005).

<sup>10</sup> Laurence Stern, *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and Failure of American Diplomacy* (New York: Time Books, 1977); George Ball, *The Past Has Another Partner* (New York: Norton, 1982); Monteagle Stearns, *Entangled Allies: US Policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992).

<sup>11</sup> John Terence and Nicholas Rees, *United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Routledge, 2005); George Kalliarakis, *The Dynamics of Failure: The Derailed UN-mediation Processes on Cyprus and Kosovo* (Diss.) (München: University of München, 2013).

<sup>12</sup> Mallinson, *A Modern History of Cyprus*. One may also take into account many other macro-dividing lines which are not examined here; e.g. intra-community segregation in terms of politics, economics, ideology and social status, third-state involvement and manipulation (e.g. beyond diplomatic etiquette activities of third-state Ambassadors), various degrees of interactions between the inhabitants of Nicosia in terms of background, origin, legal status (e.g. unregulated immigrants), and the like.

<sup>13</sup> Stephen Xydis, *Cyprus; Reluctant Republic* (Michigan: Mouton & Co: 1973).

Some accounts on post-1964 and post-1974 Cyprus Problem,<sup>14</sup> including accounts that elaborated on the case of Nicosia,<sup>15</sup> focus on a dyadic approach of the Greek Cypriot vs. Turkish Cypriot divide. By idealising the so-called inter-communal or bi-communal aspect of the Cyprus Problem, these accounts omit or underestimate the perplexity of the situation. Considering the aforementioned four sources of divides in Cyprus, one needs to examine the interplay between domestic and foreign factors that made the emergence of multiple dividing lines across Cyprus possible. Under the colonial rule of Britain, Cypriots developed some false lines of segregation,<sup>16</sup> based on arbitrary political means of oppression. The major outcome of that practice was the artificially constructed ‘ethnic communities’ of Cyprus, the central source of future dividing lines. Under the British colonial rule, the majority inherited population of Greeks was subjugated into an ‘ethnic community’ of an equivalent political status with the minority population of Muslims and Muslim converts – mainly remnants of the Ottoman rule in Cyprus.<sup>17</sup> These two groups were given the name of Greek Cypriot community and Turkish Cypriot community respectively. These false lines of (political, ethnic and social) division were further deteriorated in the aftermath of the declaration of the independent state of Turkey in 1923.<sup>18</sup> In 1950s, Britain’s policy of ‘divide and rule’ was instrumentalised to its maximum degree in two directions: first, by involving Greece and Turkey in Cyprus<sup>19</sup> and second, by employing all stratagems available for containing an anti-colonial struggle.<sup>20</sup> The former re-introduced a dividing line in Cyprus while the latter aggravated the inter-communal divide.<sup>21</sup>

Britain’s foreign policy in 1950s advanced a Greco-Turkey divide over Cyprus and empowered the domestic ‘ethnic divide’ among Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Coupled with old dividing lines, these new or re-elaborated dividing lines were inherited to the newly born state of Cyprus (the Republic of Cyprus). The struggle to come to terms with so many dividing lines was proved unsuccessful. In the course of the Zurich and London Agreements, Britain, Turkey and Greece reached a consensus over a peculiar “balance” in Cyprus<sup>22</sup>. That “balance” however actually comprised of multiple lines of segregation in Cyprus that were visible in all aspects of the new state’s life. In the context of the Treaty

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Thomas Diez and Nathalie Tocci, *Cyprus: A Conflict at the Crossroads* (Manchester: University of Press, 2009).

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Yiannis Papadakis, “Nicosia after 1960: A River, a Bridge and a Dead Zone,” *GMJ: Mediterranean Edition* 1 (2006): 1-16.

<sup>16</sup> We prefer using ‘false’ (instead of ‘fault’) lines of segregation or division in order to stress the artificiality of these ‘lines’. ‘Fault lines’ denote a boundary between incompatible ideas or beliefs. We believe that most of such incompatibilities are fake.

<sup>17</sup> Theodore Papadopoulos, *Social and Historical Data on Population* (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Center, 1965). For a post-modern discussion see *Cyprus and the Politics and Memory*, ed. Rebecca Bryant and Yiannis Papadakis (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012).

<sup>18</sup> Andrew Borowiec, *Cyprus: A Troubled Island* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 2000).

<sup>19</sup> Mallinson, *A Modern History of Cyprus*.

<sup>20</sup> James Corum, “British Strategy Against the Cyprus Insurgents, 1955-1959,” in *Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency*, ed. James Corum (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2008), 79-122.

<sup>21</sup> Among Britain’s tactics against the Greek rebellion were to afford the operation of a Turkish para-military organisation (TMT) in Cyprus and to use Turkish Cypriots in non-combatant counter-insurgency operations; see David French, *Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-insurgency on Cyprus, 1955-1959* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

<sup>22</sup> Giorgios Kentas, “The Peculiar Concept of “Balance” between Turkey and Greece in Cyprus,” in *Great Power Politics in Cyprus: Foreign Interventions and Domestic Perceptions*, ed. Michalis Kontos (Cambridge: Cambridge Publishers, 2013).

of Establishment, Britain curtailed the sovereignty of Cyprus in various ways and places, by maintaining two military bases, physical control over other location in Cyprus, as well as by maintaining special rights and privileges over Cyprus and its government.<sup>23</sup> That post-colonial regime maintained old, as well as engendered new, dividing lines that affected both the state and the people of Cyprus in a practical manner. The status of the population leaving within the so-called British Sovereign Bases, as well as their rights and obligations, had to be arranged under the provisions of the Treat of Establishment.<sup>24</sup> The Greco-Turkey divide in Cyprus was (re)arranged in the context of a given Treaty of Alliance between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey that provided for the permanent station of a Greek and a Turkish military contingent on the island that would not answer to the government of Cyprus, but they would function under special provisions of that Treaty.<sup>25</sup> Greco-Turkish disputes were amplified and became an additional source of division and strife in Cyprus.<sup>26</sup>

The third source of Cyprus' macro-divisions emerged out of the Cold War contingency and the strategy and calculations of US and Soviet Union in the region.<sup>27</sup> The East-West divide had serious implications in both the position of Cyprus in East Mediterranean and the Middle East, as well as in domestic politics.<sup>28</sup> Superpower choices were quite problematic for Cyprus and its people.<sup>29</sup>

The fourth dividing line concerns the provisions of "an unworkable Constitution"<sup>30</sup> that re-elaborated and naturalised inter-communal segregation in all aspects of life in Cyprus. The ethic element of the dividing lines across Cyprus was actually an epiphenomenon of the surrounding environment and the imperial regime imposed on the island in 1960. The dyadic structure of the state of Cyprus was such that forced Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to develop and sustain multidimensional dividing lines and approaches in politics, economics, social affairs, and everyday life.<sup>31</sup> Once internalised however the internal element of ethnic division acquired its own 'logic' and 'dynamics' that gave it an impetus of its own right. As it is explained in the section that follows these dividing lines were also forced upon cities and their inhabitants. Nicosia – like all major cities of Cyprus – were primed to be ethnically divided by default.

In that context of so many dividing lines, the government of Cyprus could not assume control over its domestic affairs. The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus

---

<sup>23</sup> Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959* (London: Clarendon Press, 1998); Mallinson, *Britain and Cyprus*.

<sup>24</sup> For example, individual possession of land in the British military bases is dealt with under special provisions that prevent the owners to develop their land.

<sup>25</sup> Giorgos Kentas, *I Asfalia sto Plaisio Lisis toy Kypriakou: I Diethis Diastasi* [Security in the context of a Cyprus problem settlement: the international dimension] (Athens: Livanis, 2013).

<sup>26</sup> In the context of the first and the second dividing lines, one should also take into account the Treaty of Guarantee between Cyprus, Britain, Turkey and Greece, that gave some special role and privileges to these three foreign states in the domains of foreign and security policy of the Republic of Cyprus; see Kentas, *I Asfalia sto Plaisio*.

<sup>27</sup> Ball.

<sup>28</sup> Achilles Emilianides, *Kinovouleftiki Siniparxi Ellinokiprion kai Tourkokiprion 1960-1963* [Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot co-existence in Parliament 1960-1963] (Nicosia: Epifaniou, 2003).

<sup>29</sup> Brendan O'Malley, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001).

<sup>30</sup> Thomas Adams, "The First Republic of Cyprus: A Review of an Unworkable Constitution," *The Western Political Quarterly* 19 (1966): 475-470.

<sup>31</sup> Criton Tornaritis, *Cyprus Constitution and Other Legal Problems* (Nicosia, 1980).

provided for a number of steps for the gradual evolution of political institutions and arrangements that were necessary for a transitional period. The colonial legacy of false dividing lines, third party intervention amid the Cold War and intensified inter-communal strife give rise to a number of crises that culminated in a constitutional deadlock and violence in 1963-64. That situation added even more lines of segregation, which were relatively more tangible and visible than old ones. As already mentioned, Nicosia was the centre of that struggle and the locus of the first geographical dividing line in post-independent Cyprus, the so-called Green Line.

Both locally and internationally that situation was dealt with as an internal affair of the Republic of Cyprus. UN Security Council Resolution 186/1964 spelled out the terms of restoration of order in Cyprus and a UN Peacekeeping Mission (UNFICYP) was delegated to Cyprus.<sup>32</sup> The years that followed were troublesome. In 1974, the divide across Nicosia and beyond was further enhanced. Turkey used a short-lived –still unsuccessful– coup by Greek junta proxies in Cyprus<sup>33</sup> as a pretext to invade the island.<sup>34</sup> Hence a long artificial line that stretches from Deryneia (a small town at the southeast edge of Famagusta bay) up until the coast of Pyrgos Tillirias (a small village at the northwest edge of Morphou bay)<sup>35</sup> divided Cyprus in two parts.

The Turkish invasion extended the de facto division of towns, villages, communities and people across the whole island. Some 200,000 Greek Cypriots (40% of the Greek population) and some 65,000 Turkish Cypriots (over half of the Turkish population)<sup>36</sup> (as well as other small communities of Cyprus)<sup>37</sup> were forced out of their towns, villages, and homes to become displaced persons in their own country. A long ceasefire line of some 180 kilometres that comprises of a Buffer Zone—that entails 4% of Cyprus territory assigned to the UN to patrol the ceasefire line—creates a sense of a ‘Dead Zone’. On top of that ‘zone’ and the pre-existing 3% of the Cyprus territory occupied by the British military bases, almost 36% of the territory of Cyprus came under the military control of Turkey.

---

<sup>32</sup> Cyprus Conflict Net, “The Galo Plaza Report, 1965,” accessed March 03, 2015, [http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/galo\\_plaza\\_report.html](http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/galo_plaza_report.html).

<sup>33</sup> Greece was under the rule of a military junta between 1967 and 1974; see Christopher Woodhouse, *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels* (London: Granada, 1985).

<sup>34</sup> For the illegitimacy of Turkish invasion see Costas Melakopides, *Making Peace in Cyprus* (Kingston: Center for International Relations, Queen’s University, 1996).

<sup>35</sup> That dividing line maintained, or created some new, enclaves in Cyprus. For example, the Greek communities of Pyrgos and Pigenia, and other small communities of Tilliria, were isolated from other Greek communities on the island as of 1964. In that particular case, Kokkina (a Turkish military pocket) stands in between Pyrgos and Pachyammos as an artificial barrier. Although, these two communities are less than two kilometers away one from the other, inhabitants have to drive for forty-five minutes to an hour a mountain distance of some twenty-five kilometers. Similar cases concerned Turkish Cypriots as of 1964.

<sup>36</sup> For an analysis on the way in which Turkish Cypriots were forced by Turkey to settle in the occupied north part of Cyprus see Claire Palley, *An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004* (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005).

<sup>37</sup> Apart from Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the Republic of Cyprus entails of three small religious communities, the Maronites, the Latins, and the Armenians. See Achilles Emilianides, *Religion and Law in Cyprus* (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2011).

### *The Nicosia divide*

The consequences of Turkey's invasion are visible in many towns and villages of Cyprus that were forcefully cut in two between July 20 and August 16 1974. Some of these places however were divided in a peculiar way even before that event. Nicosia demonstrates its own peculiarities, which are worth considered.

Nicosia was actually not meant to be a united city. The dyadic, dividing, structure of the Constitution of Cyprus provided *inter alia* that “[s]eparated municipalities shall be created in the five towns of the Republic, that is to say, Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca and Paphos by Turkish inhabitants thereof”.<sup>38</sup> In these towns, the Greek electors shall elect the Greek municipality and the Turkish electors shall elect the Turkish municipality. The same article provides for the set up of a coordinating body “composed of two members chosen by the council of the Greek municipality, two members chosen by the council of the Turkish municipality and a President chosen by agreement between the two councils of such municipalities in such town. Such co-ordinating body shall provide for work which needs to be carried out jointly, shall carry out joint services entrusted to it by agreement of the councils of the two municipalities within the town and shall concern itself with matters which require a degree of co-operation.”<sup>39</sup> Articles 174-177 provide for practical arrangements in towns with separate municipalities; tax, fees and services (Article 174), licence and permit (Article 175), town planning (Article 176), range of jurisdiction and performance (Article 177).<sup>40</sup>

The dividing line of ‘separate municipalities’ (“a microcosm of the Cyprus Problem”) was proved so forceful to undermine the very foundations of the whole Republic.<sup>41</sup> Systematic efforts to address that issue between 1959 and 1963 failed. The dividing lines of the British rule within municipality councils were enriched by Turkey's quest for a geographical separation of municipalities and furnished the background for the very idea of separate municipalities in the context of the Zurich and London Agreements.<sup>42</sup> These historically embedded positions of Britain and Turkey over geographic, demographic and governmental arrangements in Cyprus did not leave space for reconciliation and compromise in the years that followed independence. Moreover, conflicting perceptions among Greek and Turkish Cypriots on general governing arrangements left the issue of separate municipalities in limbo for a long period, long enough to fuel a formidable deadlock in 1963.<sup>43</sup>

Looking into the historical record one may discern the political depth of that issue and understand why Nicosia had such a faith. In 1958, the *Time* magazine published an article exemplifying Britain's plan for a settlement to the Cyprus Problem as it was

---

<sup>38</sup> *Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus*, 1960, Article 173. The same article provided that in four years time after independence the President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall examine whether that separation shall continue. That however never happened. See Diana Markides Weston, *Cyprus 1957-1963: From Colonial Conflict to Constitutional Crisis. The Key Role of the Municipal Issue* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> Article 178 provides for arrangements to other localities of Cyprus “with the rule of proportional representation of the two Communities”.

<sup>41</sup> Markides Weston, *Cyprus 1957-1963*.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> Diana Markides Weston, “The Issues of Separate Municipalities in Cyprus 1957-1963: An Overview,” *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 8 (1998): 177-204.

delivered to the Greek and Turkish governments.<sup>44</sup> Among other things that article talks about riots by Greeks who claimed the right to self-determination and the union of Cyprus with Greece, as well as inter-communal clashes that led into the drawing of the ‘Mason-Dixon’ Line separating the Greek and Turkish sectors in the old city of Nicosia. What the *Time* magazine conceals however is what Nancy Crawshaw reveals as an intentional ploy by the British to instigate inter-communal violence and turn international attention to that direction instead to the direction of the anti-colonial struggle of the Greeks.<sup>45</sup>

The ‘Mason-Dixon’ Line opened up the question on whether Nicosia (and other towns in Cyprus) could ever be united or remain ethnically, religiously, and racially divided. In 1960s and 1970s constitutional arrangements and domestic political struggle – which in some occasions entailed the use of physical force – showed that the division of Nicosia, as it emerged during the colonial era, was primed to become even sharper. The strategic ambition of Turkey and the incommensurable perceptions among Greek and Turkish Cypriots led into a series of violent entanglement in Nicosia and beyond.

In the post-1974 setting, the Nicosia divide obtained a new dimension, that of a forced geographic, demographic, religious and racial homogeneity. Turkey claimed ‘Lefkosha’ (Nicosia in Turkish) as the capital of a new regime, which in 1983 declared unilaterally its independence under the name “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, a pseudo-state recognised only by Turkey.<sup>46</sup> Ever since, Turkey has been attempting to impose an Ottoman legacy on the capital by changing the names of places and streets, demolishing Greek monuments and premises, converting churches into mosques, and erasing all elements of Greek-Orthodox presence in Nicosia and beyond.<sup>47</sup> That vandalism however was not reciprocated by the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus, which maintain Turkish and Muslim monuments and other places. Looked from its southern part, Nicosia maintains a multi-cultural flair; looked from its northern part Nicosia seems to have been transformed into a Turkish town.<sup>48</sup>

### ***The only divided capital in the EU***

There are many divided cities in the world. In an interesting study Calame and Charlesworth juxtapose Nicosia with four other divided cities, namely Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, and Mostar.<sup>49</sup> What stands out in the case of Nicosia is that it is the only capital across the 28 member states of the European Union (EU) that is arbitrarily divided by the military might of a candidate state for accession to the EU, i.e. Turkey. The challenge of the re-unification of Nicosia entails a challenge of the re-unification of a whole state and a challenge of addressing the abovementioned deeply embedded dividing lines.

<sup>44</sup> “Cyprus: Along the Mason-Dixon Line,” *Time*, 23 June 1958, accessed March 12, 2015, <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,810347,00.html>.

<sup>45</sup> Nancy Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978).

<sup>46</sup> UN Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550 condemned that unilateral declaration and called upon all states to refrain from any action that would assist secession in Cyprus.

<sup>47</sup> Sevina Zesimou, “Seeing Beyond the Walls: Maps, Power and Ideology in Nicosia,” *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 8 (1998): 252-83.

<sup>48</sup> Paradoxically Turkey’s attempt to impose an ethnic homogeneity in Cyprus was soon undermined by Ankara’s orchestrated policy of mass migration of Turks to Cyprus with the aim of undermining the demographic structure of the island. In few years time Turkish Cypriots became a minority in occupied areas of Cyprus.

<sup>49</sup> Jon Calame, and Esther Charlesworth, *Divided Cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).

Greek Cypriots, the authorities of the city of Nicosia and the government of the Republic of Cyprus seem to invest a lot in the EU factor. It was just after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 when the slogans “Nicosia: the only divided capital in Europe” and “The last divided capital” appeared. A year later the government of Cyprus made an application to the EU and in 2004 Cyprus joined the EU. The accession of the island to the EU gave some hope for swift re-unification under EU law and the principles on which the EU is founded. Although the main goal of EU accession was the settlement of the Cyprus Problem – and hence the re-unification of the whole island – that goal was not reached.

In 1990s, Turkish Cypriots were relatively sceptic toward the EU. EU accession was considered a Greek Cypriot project that must be opposed. Things changed in December 2002 when Cyprus was invited to join the Union and Turkish Cypriot Leader Denktash and the newly elected AK party in Turkey rejected a second draft UN proposal (the well-known Annan Plan) for the solution of the Cyprus Problem.<sup>50</sup> Reacting to that, more than 30,000 Turkish Cypriots marched in Nicosia in late December 2002 in a pro-EU, pro-solution rally. Negotiations on the Annan Plan continued in March 2003, but once more Turkey and Turkish Cypriots rejected a third draft proposal.<sup>51</sup> Few weeks later, in April 2003, the President of Cyprus, Mr. T. Papadopoulos, signed the Act of Accession to the EU. Negotiations on the Annan Plan resumed one year later, in February 2004, but no agreement was reached. In the context of an agreement between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders (T. Papadopoulos and M. Talat respectively), the UN Secretary General, Mr. Kofi Annan, used his digression and finalised a fifth draft proposal that was put in two simultaneous referenda in the Turkish and Greek communities respectively. Voters in the occupied northern part of Cyprus (i.e. Turkish Cypriots and Turkish settlers) found that proposal appealing and endorsed it by 65% while voters in the areas under the control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus found that plan wanting and reject it by 76%.<sup>52</sup>

Concerning Nicosia, that plan would have not re-unified it but it would have re-divided it anew. Having that plan been endorsed, a permanent boundary would cut, not only the town of Nicosia, but all Cyprus, in two zones in accordance with provisions on the delineation of constituent state boundaries.<sup>53</sup> According to the Plan “[i]n towns (namely Nicosia and Famagusta) and built up areas in general, the final boundary shall be demarcated in such a way as to take into account as an overriding concern ownership of properties in the area of the boundary”.<sup>54</sup> Access and connecting roads across the two constituent states will belong to either the Greek or the Turkish State.<sup>55</sup> For example, “[t]he highway connecting north Nicosia and Famagusta is under the territorial administration of the Turkish Cypriot State for its entire length.”<sup>56</sup> The detailed

---

<sup>50</sup> The first draft was submitted in November 11 2002 and the second draft was submitted in December 10 2002, few days before the EU Summit that invited Cyprus to join the EU.

<sup>51</sup> United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus”, April 1, 2003,” accessed March 02, 2015, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2003/398](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2003/398).

<sup>52</sup> For a comprehensive discussion of the Annan plan, its ramifications for Cyprus, and its aftermath, see Palley; for a critical approach on the Greek Cypriot decision see Lord Hannay, *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005).

<sup>53</sup> United Nations, “The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem” (Annan Plan), accessed March 02, 2015, <http://www.unficyp.org/media/Other%20official%20documents/annanplan.pdf>, Annex VI, Article 1).

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., Article 2.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

description of the course of the boundary between the constituent states is spelled out in Attachment 1 of Annex VI. In that context, apart from a quite general reference that “[t]he seat of the federal government shall be greater Nicosia”,<sup>57</sup> there are no other references that create the sense of a (re)unification Nicosia. Actually that proposed plan did not even mention that Nicosia would be the capital of Cyprus.

In that context, Cyprus would have been re-unified under a *suis generis* federal structure of two constituent states, but Nicosia would be permanently divided in two pieces among the Greek and the Turkish State. The best that such an arrangement would offer to the north and south Nicosia(s) would be a chance to cooperate with financial and logistic support of the federal government.<sup>58</sup> Beyond that, Nicosia would have been divided permanently and thus remained the only divided ‘capital’ in the EU.

### ***Reconciliation and crossing points***

Apart from a symbol of a divided capital, Nicosia offers a promising chance for communication and reconciliation among Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Up until early 2000s, communication between the two communities was difficult due to restrictions on free movement imposed by Turkey. Occasional meetings however were held in Ledra Palace, a former Hotel in the buffer zone of Nicosia district, which is used by the UN. Those meetings were relatively controversial in both the Greek and the Turkish communities, but officially Greek Cypriot leadership encouraged these meetings, while Turkish Cypriot leadership prevented and/or censored them. Greek Cypriots and the recognised government of Cyprus advocate peaceful co-existence among the two communities, while Turkish leadership and Turkey argue that, on grounds of historical experience, Greek and Turkish Cypriots cannot leave together, but side-by-side.

A frequent sponsor of bi-communal meetings and events in Nicosia (and abroad) is the US, which is one of the major supporters of programs of rapprochement through USAID, Fulbright and other governmental agencies that support and finance individuals and NGO programs. Some other relatively low profile countries facilitate bi-communal meetings in the buffer zone of Nicosia. In 1980s, the government of Czechoslovakia initiated periodical meetings of Greek and Turkish Cypriot political parties. The idea was to help Cypriots understand the concept and practice of federalism in a ‘successful federation’.<sup>59</sup> After the demise of the Czechoslovakian federation (under a so-called velvet divorce) in 1993, political parties meetings in Nicosia are hosted under the auspices of the Embassy of Slovakia.

The mayor of Nicosia Lellos Demetriades and the de facto attempted one of the most ambitious projects of reconciliation in Nicosia elected mayor of the occupied part of Nicosia Mustafa Akinci. That project concerned the coordination and co-management of the sewerage system of Nicosia. Together they also designed a common planning strategy for Nicosia, called “Nicosia Master Plan”.<sup>60</sup> Calame and Charlesworth observe that the “urban planning process and physical interventions undertaken by the communal Nicosia Master Plan team did not provide solution to the problem of partition but did develop

---

<sup>57</sup> Ibid. Annex I, Article 7.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., Annex I, Article 16, par. 6.

<sup>59</sup> During 1980s and up until early 1990s political figures of Cyprus Left considered Yugoslavia as a successful model of federation for Cyprus, see KYKEM, *Omospondia kai Kypriako* [Cyprus problem and federation] (Nicosia: KYKEM Publication, 1990).

<sup>60</sup> Lellos Demetriades, “The Nicosia Master Plan,” *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 8 (1998): 169-176.



viable future scenarios, putting them a large step ahead of their counterparts in other divided cities”.<sup>61</sup>

Bi-communal communication and contact changed dramatically in 2003, when Turkey decided to partially lift restrictions on free movement in Cyprus. That decision came in April 23, 2003, just a few days after Cyprus signed its Act of Accession to the EU (April 16, 2003), amid pressure from Turkish Cypriots who felt that they are about to miss a historic opportunity to join the EU. As a result, a crossing point was announced in Nicosia, the Ledra Palace crossing point (for pedestrians only). In the course of time, two more crossing points opened in Nicosia, Ledra street (for pedestrians only), and Agios Dhometios (for vehicles).

With the accession of Cyprus to the EU in May 2004 communication and reconciliation was further improved. Cyprus Act of accession provides that the whole island of Cyprus joined the EU, but the implementation of EU legislation is suspended in the areas where the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control, up until a comprehensive solution is reached. That implies that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots are EU citizens, who enjoy all rights and assume all responsibilities provided by EU legislation. In the course of few years, more than 90,000 Turkish Cypriots applied and acquired IDs and passports of the Republic of Cyprus. Moreover, in 2004 a Green Line Regulation was adopted by the Council of the EU that lays down special rules concerning goods, services and persons crossing the line between the areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus exercises effective control and the areas in which it does not. That Regulation gave some impetus in business collaboration between the two communities.

Bi-communal contact, cooperation and collaboration are accelerating across Cyprus, with Nicosia leading most of initiatives. The central question is whether the citizens of Nicosia and the rest of Cypriots are already accustomed to the dividing lines of the past and the present or whether they are willing to rise above them. This is an under-research area that must be pursued.

### **Conclusion**

Nicosia is in search of a soul and an identity; is it really meant to be a divided city or would its fortune change in the future? The historical record suggests that Nicosia cannot be united in a conventional way – one name, one municipality, one mayor, one civic identity – but if ever it would be re-united it will have to learn to live across lines of segregation. Everything comes down to a question on whether the designs for Nicosia should anticipate a united city or a divided city in permanent. This is a question to be answered by the people of Nicosia, the people of Cyprus.

### **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

- Adams, Thomas. “The First Republic of Cyprus: A Review of an Unworkable Constitution.” *The Western Political Quarterly* 19 (1966): 475-470.
- Ball, George. *The Past Has another Partner*. New York: Norton, 1982.
- Borowiec, Andrew. *Cyprus: A Troubled Island*. Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 2000.
- Cyprus and the Politics and Memory*, edited by Rebecca Bryant and Yiannis Papadakis. London: I.B. Tauris, 2012.

---

<sup>61</sup> Calame and Charlesworth, *Divided Cities*, 202.

- Calame, Jon, and Esther Charlesworth. *Divided Cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.
- Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus*, 1960.
- Corum, James. "British Strategy Against the Cyprus Insurgents, 1955-1959." In *Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counter-insurgency*, edited by James Corum, 79-122. Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2008.
- Crawshaw, Nancy. *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978.
- "Cyprus: Along the Mason-Dixon Line." *Time*, 23 June 1958. Accessed March 12, 2015. <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,810347,00.html>.
- Cyprus. Report and General Abstracts of the Census of 1911, Taken on the 2<sup>nd</sup> April, 1911*. London, 1912.
- Cyprus. Report and General Abstracts of the Census of 1931, Taken on April 27-28, 1931*. Nicosia 1932.
- Cyprus. Census of Population and Agriculture 1946. Report and Tables*. London 1949.
- Cyprus Conflict Net. "The Galo Plaza Report, 1965." Accessed March 03, 2015, [http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/galo\\_plaza\\_report.html](http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/galo_plaza_report.html).
- Demetriades, Lellos. "The Nicosia Master Plan." *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 8 (1998): 169-176.
- Diez, Thomas, and Nathalie Tocci. *Cyprus: A Conflict at the Crossroads*. Manchester: University of Press, 2009.
- Emilianides, Achilles. *Religion and Law in Cyprus*. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2011.
- Emilianides, Achilles. *Kinovouleftiki Siniparxi Ellinokiprion kai Tourkokiprion 1960-1963*. [Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot co-existence in Parliament 1960-1963] Nicosia: Epifaniou, 2003.
- French, David. *Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-insurgency on Cyprus, 1955-1959*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Hannay, Lord. *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2005.
- Historic Nicosia*, edited by Demetrios Michaelides. Nicosia: Rimal Publications, 2012.
- Hocknell, Peter. "Cooperation, Coexistence or Conflict? Rethinking Transboundary Resource Management in Nicosia." *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 8 (1998): 223-51.
- Holland, Robert. *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959*. London: Clarendon Press, 1998.
- Kalliarakis, George. *The Dynamics of Failure: The Derailed UN-mediation Processes on Cyprus and Kosovo*. Diss. München: University of München, 2013.
- Kentas, Giorgos. "The Peculiar Concept of "Balance" between Turkey and Greece in Cyprus." In *Great Power Politics in Cyprus: Foreign Interventions and Domestic Perceptions*, edited by Michalis Kontos, 133-159. Cambridge: Cambridge Publishers, 2013.
- Kentas, Giorgos. *I Asfalia sto Plaisio Lisis toy Kypriakou: I Diethis Diastasi* [Security in the context of a Cyprus problem settlement]. Athens: Livanis, 2013.
- Keshishian, Kevor Krikor. *Nicosia, Capital of Cyprus Then and Now*. Nicosia 1978.
- KYKEM, *Omospondia kai Kypriako* [Cyprus problem and federation]. Nicosia: KYKEM Publication, 1990.
- Lefcosia. The Island's Capital*, edited by Chrysanthos Chrysanthou. Nicosia: Fileleftheros, 2012.
- Mallinson, William. *A Modern History of Cyprus*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005.

- Mallinson, William. *Britain and Cyprus: Key Themes and Documents Since World War II*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2011.
- Marangou, Anna. *Nicosia. A Special Capital*. Nicosia: Leventis Municipal Museum of Nicosia, 1995.
- Maratheftis, Frixos. *Location and Development of the Town of Leucosia (Nicosia) Cyprus*. Nicosia: Nicosia Municipality, 1977.
- Markides Weston Diana. *Cyprus 1957-1963: From Colonial Conflict to Constitutional Crisis. The Key Role of the Municipal Issue*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.
- Markides Weston, Diana. "The Issues of Separate Municipalities in Cyprus 1957-1963: An Overview." *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 8 (1998): 177-204.
- Melakopides, Costas. *Making Peace in Cyprus*. Kingston: Center for International Relations, Queen's University, 1996.
- Michaelides, Agnes. *Chora, I Palia Lefcosia* [Chora: the old Nicosia]. Nicosia, 1977.
- Michaelides, Demetrios, and Despina Pilides. "Nicosia from the Beginning to Roman Ledroi." In *Historic Nicosia*, edited by Demetrios Michaelides, 1-74. Nicosia: Rimal Publications, 2012.
- O'Malley, Brendan. *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2001.
- Palley, Claire. *An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004*. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005.
- Papacostas, Tassos. "Byzantine Nicosia 650-1191." In *Historic Nicosia*, edited by Demetrios Michaelides, 77-109. Nicosia: Rimal Publications, 2012.
- Papadakis, Yiannis. "Nicosia after 1960: A River, a Bridge and a Dead Zone." *GMJ: Mediterranean Edition* 1 (2006): 1-16.
- Papadopoulos, Theodore. *Social and Historical Data on Population*. Nicosia: Cyprus Research Center, 1965.
- Report on the Census of Cyprus, 1881, with Appendix*. London, 1884.
- Stearns, Monteagle. *Entangled Allies: US Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992.
- Stern, Laurence. *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and Failure of American Diplomacy*. New York: Time Books, 1977.
- Stylianou Andreas, and Judith Stylianou. *The History of Cartography of Nicosia*. Nicosia: Leventis Municipal Museum, 1989.
- Terence, John, and Nicholas Rees. *United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*. New York: Routledge, 2005.
- Tornaritis, Criton. *Cyprus Constitution and Other Legal Problems*. Nicosia: 1980.
- United Nations. "The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem." Annan Plan. March 31, 2004. Accessed March 02, 2015. <http://www.unficyp.org/media/Other%20official%20documents/annanplan.pdf>.
- United Nations. "Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus." 1 April 2003. Accessed March 02, 2015, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2003/398](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2003/398).
- Xydis, Stephen. *Cyprus, Reluctant Republic*. Michigan: Mouton & Co: 1973.
- Woodhouse, Christopher. *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels*. London: Granada, 1985.
- Zesimou Sevina. "Seeing Beyond the Walls: Maps, Power and Ideology in Nicosia." *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 8 (1998): 252-283.



# Borderland Identities of Bratislava: Balancing between Slovaks, Germans and Hungarians in the Second Half of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century

Ana-Teodora KURKINA<sup>1</sup>

**Abstract:** *The article regards the urban space of Bratislava as an area contested by several national groups with their competing state-building strategies in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when the city's status of a cultural and social crossroad started to be challenged by its' inhabitants and their respective political agendas. While offering a category of a "mental borderland" rather than a geographical one, the paper investigates the ways in which the three major groups living in the city attempted to claim it, presenting it as a centre of their culture, while reinterpreting its landscape and history. Although the case of Bratislava-Pressburg -Pozsony fits into the context of entangled histories, connecting the social and cultural networks of the region, the approach used in the current article is more comparative, since it regards the Slovaks, Germans and Hungarians as opposing parties, whose status of a "privileged" group was changing radically during the decades. The idea of resistance is highlighted as a driving mechanism of one's group's successful claim. Moreover, borders are seen as categories that are socially produced within the multinational and multicultural environment of Bratislava. The article states that the city's diverse character and multiple legacies were successfully claimed by groups most accustomed to "resisting" its "privileged" and "better standing" opponents. Therefore, the previously widely underestimated Slovak population finally turned Bratislava into its capital in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.*

**Key words:** *borderland identity, state-building, Bratislava's cityscape, Magyarisation, assimilation policies in the Austro-Hungarian Empire*

## **Introduction. Picturing a borderland**

The notion of a "borderland" itself indicates marginalisation<sup>2</sup> that provokes cultural and political division. Separating states and nations, geographical borders become the most obvious markers of political boundaries, often serving as indicators of disputed zones, where different nation and state-building programs overlap and clash.<sup>3</sup> The cases of such territorial debates are numerous;<sup>4</sup> yet, they mostly encompass lands that lie on a

---

<sup>1</sup> Graduate School for East and Southeast European studies, LMU Munich/UR Regensburg, Ph D candidate.

<sup>2</sup> Misra Sanghamitra, *Becoming a Borderland: The Politics of Space and Identity in Colonial Northeastern India* (New Deli: Routledge, 2011), 1-5.

<sup>3</sup> Vasile Nitsiakos, *On the Border: Transborder Mobility, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries along the Albanian-Greek Frontier* (Berlin: Lit, 2010), 44-55.

<sup>4</sup> For further details, see the Macedonian case in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Anastasia N. Karakasidou, *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). For the case of the borderland of Dobruja, see Constantin Iordachi, *Citizenship, Nation- and State-building: The Integration of*

certain geographical border,<sup>5</sup> while non-border cities and towns, where distinctly different and often opposing groups of populations co-exist, are usually described as “multicultural”<sup>6</sup> rather than “borderland”, unless they are situated on the edge of a state.

The idea of a border as a buffer zone<sup>7</sup> suggests immediate existence of various cultural and political entanglements taking place in a space, where several states or nations intersect. However, this approach slightly limits the idea of a borderland to geography, while its cultural aspects remain less explored. Gloria Anzaldúa explains that intersectionality as such is an ever-present factor that highlights identities, while putting people between genders, ethnicities, classes etc.<sup>8</sup> Hence, the “identity border” represents a far more suitable notion for describing a clash of mind-sets, state-building projects and complicated ways of coexistence that inevitably mark any “boundary”.

Referring to identity as a catalyst that highlights a cultural, geographical or political division,<sup>9</sup> the current article addresses not a “traditional” borderland space, situated on an actual line separating several states, but rather a crossroad, where these lines meet. Following this tactic, Bratislava,<sup>10</sup> an “unexpected” Slovak capital,<sup>11</sup> with its changing cultural landscape, claimed by several national groups inhabiting the city, offers a demonstrative example of a real mental borderland, where “struggles and reconciliations of identities” leave traces not only on its architectural image and its subsequent interpretation, but also on its political structure. Therefore, the aim of the current analysis is to present a cityscape as a contested identity border,<sup>12</sup> where “multiculturalism” inflames under certain circumstances that contribute to the rise of one group with its state-building agenda over another one. In order to view the example of Bratislava as a case of competing nation and state-building projects, one should first clarify the notion of a “space based identity” and that of a “core group”, a “more privileged” national and/or social cluster of people, whose position, as it is shown later, was often in flux.

---

*Northern Dobrogea into Romania, 1873-1913* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, Center for Russian & East European Studies, 2002).

<sup>5</sup> David H. Kaplan, *Boundaries and Place: European Borderlands in Geographical Context* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 7-9, 259.

<sup>6</sup> As an example see the 20<sup>th</sup> century cases described in Alisdair Rogers, *Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities* (Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 2001), 1-15.

<sup>7</sup> Marek Szczepanski, “Cultural Borderlands in Sociological Perspective (The Case of Upper Silesia),” *Polish Sociological Review* 121 (1998), 69-82.

<sup>8</sup> Gloria Anzaldúa, *Borderlands: La Frontera* (San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1999), 1-8.

<sup>9</sup> Madeleine Hurd, *Borderland Identities: Territory and Belonging in Central, North and East Europe* (Eslöv: Förlags Ab Gondolin, 2006). On the linguistic border in Eastern Europe, see Dieter Hubert Stern, *Marginal Linguistic Identities: Studies in Slavic Contact and Borderland Varieties* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006), 103-161.

<sup>10</sup> In this work the city will be mostly called by its contemporary official name “Bratislava” in order to avoid misunderstanding.

<sup>11</sup> For information of the centres and ideas of the Slovak national revival, see Imrich Sedlák, *Pavol Jozef Šafárik a slovenské národné obrozenie: zborník z vedeckej konferencie* [Pavol Jozef Šafárik and the Slovak national revival: the conference proceedings] (Martin: Matica Slovenská, 1989).

<sup>12</sup> For a similar approach in the Romanian case, see Marius Turda, “Transylvania Revisited: Public Discourse and Historical Representation in Contemporary Romania,” in *Nation-building and Contested Identities: Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies*, ed. Balázs Trencsényi et al. (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001), 198-200.

The current article, when focusing on a certain cityscape, refers to “identity” as “regionally fixed”<sup>13</sup> and strongly connected to the national ideas that gained their importance and new meaning in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the way it happened in the case of Bratislava, claimed by Hungarians, Germans and Slovaks.<sup>14</sup> The idea of common cultural, ethnic and linguistic ties was never a novelty,<sup>15</sup> although the issue of a deeply enrooted idea of a shared background that predated modern nations with their following “identities” did not play a similar significant role before the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, its existence did lay a basis for the 19<sup>th</sup> century identity debates that would involve also the process of culturally “marking the territory”. Therefore, the current research views nations as “interest clubs”, expanding Abner Cohen’s idea of nations as groups of people “defending and advancing their common interests”.<sup>17</sup> In the case of Bratislava, this “common interest” became a cityscape; therefore, one may switch from the notion of a national identity to that of an identity of a place that underwent a series of interpretations in order to become a Slovak capital in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>18</sup>

The identity disputes were orchestrated by three of the major groups in the city that are featured in the current article: the Germans, the Hungarians and the Slovaks.<sup>19</sup> Each of them passed through a period of being a “core” and a “non-core” group.<sup>20</sup> In addition, those were the nation-building strategies of these groups and their successes in “marking” the architectural, cultural and public<sup>21</sup> space of Bratislava that determined the city’s shifting “borderland” identities.

The example of overlapping and conflicting agendas makes 19<sup>th</sup> century Bratislava a representative case of various “entangled histories”.<sup>22</sup> However, the approach chosen for this article is rather comparative, since it explains the successes of one group’s

---

<sup>13</sup> On the regional aspect of identity, see Kazimiera Wódcz, *Regional Identity, Regional Consciousness: The Upper Silesian Experience* (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 1995), 7-13. For an international and cultural perspective, see Janette Sampimon, *Becoming Bulgarian: The Articulation of Bulgarian Identity in the Nineteenth Century in Its International Context: An Intellectual History* (Amsterdam: Pegasus, 2006), 1-23.

<sup>14</sup> Peter Brock, *Slovenské národné obrodenie 1787-1847: k vzniku modernej slovenskej identity* [The Slovak national revival 1787-1847: approaching the Slovak modern identity] (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2002).

<sup>15</sup> Pierre Van de Berghe, *The Ethnic Phenomenon* (New York: Elsevier, 1981), 15-37, 58-83.

<sup>16</sup> Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 15-18; Ernst Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 47-50.

<sup>17</sup> Abner Cohen, “Variable in Ethnicity,” in *Ethnic Change*, ed. Charles Keyes (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981), 306-310.

<sup>18</sup> Alexandar Kiossev, “Legacy or Legacies. Competition and Conflicts,” in *Europe and the Historical Legacies in the Balkans*, ed. Raymond Detrez and Barbara Segaert (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008), 49-69.

<sup>19</sup> The case of the Jewish population is not regarded in the current article, since this highly important group did not pursue any state-building agenda and were much less involved in the identity debates in Bratislava. For further details regarding the city’s Jewish history, see Robert A. Neurath, *Bratislava, Pressburg, Pozsony: Jewish Secular Endeavors, 1867-1938* (Bratislava: Alexander Robert Neurath, 2010).

<sup>20</sup> For further elaboration on the term core-group and its place in a state-building strategy, see Harris Mylonas, *The Politics of Nation-building: Making Co-nationals, Refugees, and Minorities* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 5-9, 23-35.

<sup>21</sup> Hans Speier, “The Rise of Public Opinion,” in *Propaganda*, ed. Robert Jackall (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 27.

<sup>22</sup> Michael Werner, *De La Comparaison À L'histoire Croisée* (Paris: Seuil, 2004).

agenda by opposing its tactics to those of the others and viewing them as a parallel.<sup>23</sup> Those parallels turn Bratislava into a “mental borderland”, a contested territory that, although not at all “marginalised”<sup>24</sup> in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and beyond, notably became a geographical space, whose identity aspects, including its name, were constantly subjected to manipulations. Since all the three groups were referring to the same cityscape they were sharing, it was not simply the urban “identity” that shifted, but rather the accents and the ways of its interpretation.

Nowadays the Slovak capital and once an important centre of the Habsburg Empire, Bratislava changed its names several times during the period of its existence: from the Latinised “Posonium” and Hellenised “Istropolis” to the Slavic version of “Presporok”, from the German “Pressburg” to the Hungarian “Pozsony”.<sup>25</sup> The current name Bratislava, although known and used by Slovak-oriented (and Slavic-oriented) inhabitants of the city, was officially adopted only in 1919 after the creation of a new Czechoslovak state.<sup>26</sup> The city is still called differently by the representatives of several ethnic groups living on the territory of contemporary Slovakia and the neighbouring countries, who once played a significant role in creating its specific cultural landscape.

Modern Bratislava with its culture and architecture was formed at the zenith of the Habsburg Empire, in the 18-19<sup>th</sup> centuries. One should bear in mind that the city played a significant role in the life of the region even long before that, nevertheless, it was the imperial legacy that gave an impulse to its cultural development.<sup>27</sup> In 1536, the city became the capital of Royal Hungary under the imperial rule of the Habsburgs. In subsequent years, the Hungarian Diet was moved to Bratislava and the city became the coronation place for Hungarian kings and queens. The strategic, political and cultural importance of Bratislava reached its peak in the 18<sup>th</sup> century after the coronation of Maria Theresa.<sup>28</sup> However, a period of extreme significance was followed by the decrease of the city’s weight in the Empire.

By the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Bratislava was still culturally and politically essential to many people in the state, but its influence and imperial status could not be compared to that of Budapest, Vienna or Prague. Bratislava was no more the coronation place for the Hungarian monarchs or a vitally important Austrian centre, and its image started changing rapidly through the magyarisation of the population, the opposition of the Slovak national movement and the distinct voices of its German population. The current article concentrates on the ways and strategies these three groups used in order to mark their urban space. Highlighting the necessity of examining the interconnections between

---

<sup>23</sup> Cyril Edwin Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 13-18.

<sup>24</sup> Bratislava’s socio-economic development demonstrates that the city was hardly a backward town. Pieter Van Duin, *Central European Crossroads: Social Democracy and National Revolution in Bratislava (Pressburg), 1867-1921* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009); Vladimír Horváth, Darina Lehotská, and Ján Pleva, *Dejiny Bratislavy* [The history of Bratislava] (Bratislava: Obzor, 1979).

<sup>25</sup> Anton Špiesz, *Bratislava v stredoveku* [Bratislava in the Middle Ages] (Bratislava: Perfekt, 2001), 9-11.

<sup>26</sup> Van Duin, 1-4.

<sup>27</sup> Ján Lacika, *Bratislava. Poznávame Slovensko* [Bratislava. Getting to know Slovakia] (Bratislava: Dajama, 2000), 62-65.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 32-36.



them, one may refer also to “the inclusion of its history with a broader framework, in our case, Central European developments”.<sup>29</sup>

In Bratislava, beginning almost from its first mention in the chronicles in 907,<sup>30</sup> one may find three dominant groups, the presence of which has been shaping the image of the city for centuries: these are the Hungarians, the Germans and the Slovaks. The Renaissance burial monuments of the representatives of the Hungarian aristocracy can be found in St. Martin’s cathedral<sup>31</sup> (from 1563 to 1830 the coronation church of the Kingdom of Hungary) along with the later masterpiece of Georg Rafael Donner,<sup>32</sup> a famous Austrian baroque sculptor. And in the same city some decades later, a young Slovak poet Janko Matúška wrote a profoundly patriotic poem reacting to the dismissal of his much-respected teacher Ľudovít Štúr from Bratislava Lutheran Lyceum.<sup>33</sup> The poem “Lightning over the Tatras” later became the Slovak national anthem.<sup>34</sup> Artistic activity and political life of people who belonged to different cultures was flourishing within one city, whose destiny they shaped. Therefore, the city represented a border on a mental map and a competition that took place between groups adhering to different types of agendas and propagating them in their pursuit of culturally and politically appropriating a city.

In Bratislava the three major national groups have been coexisting for centuries, however, it was the middle and the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century that sharpened the distinctions between them resulting in active Magyarisation, Slovak and (much less fervent) German resistance to it. This period of Bratislava’s history is essential for the understanding of its later development, as well as for perceiving the reasons that explain why the city finally became a Slovak capital with predominantly Slovak (or “Slovakised”) population.<sup>35</sup>

In the current work, Bratislava is presented as a place whose destiny in the 19<sup>th</sup> century was created by various representatives of its three dominant national groups. The influence of the city’s Jewish population, although it did exist, will be omitted, because of its partial autarchy and its much-outnumbered status.<sup>36</sup> The main attention will be focused on the forming Slovak, Hungarian and German identities and their reflections in the city’s past and present of the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The key events of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and their analysis is left aside, although some references to them have to be made in the course of analysis.

The amount of the existing literature regarding Bratislava as its main subject can hardly be considered exhaustive. Mikuláš Gažo’s and Štefan Holčík’s book *Bratislava pred sto rokmi a dnes*<sup>37</sup> [Bratislava one hundred years ago and nowadays] brings up to the

<sup>29</sup> Eva Kowalská, „The Creation of Modern Society in Slovakia and Its Evaluation in Slovak Historiography,” in *Nations, Identities, Historical Consciousness: Volume Dedicated to Prof. Miroslav Hroch* (Praha: Seminář Obecných Dějin Při Ústavu Světových Dějin FF UK, 1997), 68.

<sup>30</sup> Peter Salner, “Ethnic Polarisation in an Ethnically Homogeneous Town,” *Czech Sociological Review* 9, 2 (2001): 235-246.

<sup>31</sup> Géza Pálffy, „A Pozsonyi Márton templom késő reneszánsz és kora barokk siremlékei (16-17.század)” [The late Renaissance and Baroque burial monuments of the Church of Saint Martin in Bratislava], *A Művészettörténeti Értesítő* [The art history review]LI, (2002), 1-2.szám.

<sup>32</sup> Andor Pigler, *G.R. Donner élete és művészete* [The life and work of G.R. Donner] (Budapest: Bisztrai-Farkas, 1933), 33.

<sup>33</sup> Zdenka Sojková, *Knížka o životě Ludovíta Štúra* [A book about Ľudovít Štúr’s life] (Bratislava: Slovensko-český klub, 2005).

<sup>34</sup> Dušan Kováč, *Kronika Slovenska* [The Slovak Chronicle] (Bratislava: Fortuna Print, 1998).

<sup>35</sup> Political and social history of Bratislava in the 20<sup>th</sup> century is unfortunately left aside in the current work.

<sup>36</sup> Neurath, 5-8.

<sup>37</sup> Ivan Lacina and Vladimír Tomčík, *Tvoja Bratislava* [Your Bratislava] (Bratislava: Mladé letá, 1992).

reader the atmosphere of a multicultural and a multi-ethnic capital, but one may argue its basis of evidence. The work of Jan Lacika actively used in this text mainly focuses on the Slovak history of the place, but, because of the wideness of the chosen topic, is not detailed enough.<sup>38</sup> It should also be admitted that the work presents mostly Slovak point of view, which does not make it less trustworthy, but only frames its specific character. The two more recent volumes that address the parallel identities of the city and offer valuable ethnographical information are the works of Pieter van Duin and Eleonóra Babejová<sup>39</sup>. Both authors demonstrate good knowledge of sources and inquiring interest in the destiny of the city, however, both of them concentrate their attention more on the social than on the cultural issues.

Information about Bratislava's architectural and artistic heritage can be found in separate sources that do not regard Bratislava-Pressburg-Pozsony as a special environment that stimulated the artistic activity of its residents and, therefore, reflected their nation and state-building agendas.<sup>40</sup> The topic of Bratislava's architectural landscape and its development during the 19<sup>th</sup> century as well as the destinies of its earlier monuments is barely touched upon. Moreover, very little is written about the image of Bratislava in the literature of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The lack of information and appropriate and easily accessible sources can be viewed as one of the reasons why Bratislava as a city space in the 19<sup>th</sup> century still requires profound research and exploration.

One of the crucial questions that may arise in the mind of a researcher who is willing to understand the unusual cultural landscape of Bratislava in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century is connected to the city's historical identity and relates to the its Slovak, German or Hungarian character and the views of its inhabitants. Hence, one should first define the status of the cultural and political heritage of Bratislava in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

### *Slovak visions*

Ľubomír Lipták in his article "Bratislava als Hauptstadt der Slowakei" [Bratislava as the capital of Slovakia] notes that the mere notion that the city could be the capital of Slovakia was untypical.<sup>41</sup> The author also underlines that the name Bratislav, Břetislav or Bratislava was used exclusively by Slovak patriots, but not by large masses. Therefore, it was almost unfamiliar to the local Germans and Hungarians, who used their versions of Pressburg and Pozsony instead of a word with distinct Slavic connotations. Another researcher, Jan Lacika, writes that the Czech-sounding version of Břetislav was first suggested in 1839 by Pavol Jozef Šafárik, who connected the name of the city to Břetislav I, the legendary ruler of Bohemia.<sup>42</sup> However, the Slovak version "Bratislava"<sup>43</sup> was attributed to Ľudovít Štúr, who, also being influenced by the Pan-Slavic idea, saw the references to "Slavic brothers" in the meaning of the word. In the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup>

---

<sup>38</sup> Lacika.

<sup>39</sup> Eleonóra Babejová, *Fin-de-siècle Pressburg: Conflict & Cultural Coexistence in Bratislava 1897-1914* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2003); Van Duin.

<sup>40</sup> György Enyedi, *Social Change and Urban Restructuring in Central Europe* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1998), 142.

<sup>41</sup> Ľubomír Lipták, "Bratislava als Hauptstadt der Slowakei" [Bratislava as the capital of Slovakia], in *Heroen, Mythen, Identitäten, Die Slowakei und Österreich im Vergleich* [Heroes, myths, identities: Slovakia and Austria in comparison], ed. Hannes Stekl and Elena Mannova (Wien: Facultas, 2003), 135.

<sup>42</sup> Lacika, 6.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

century, no great and distinct Slovak centre existed.<sup>44</sup> Unlike the neighbouring Prague, which was also multi-ethnic but still home to the Czech national revival of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and an important Czech centre,<sup>45</sup> Bratislava was the Slovak metropolis only in the minds of a thin layer of Slovak patriots. In Prague, such eminent representatives of the national intelligentsia like Jan Neruda, Karolina Světa, Václav Levý and many others were living and working in their capital, describing it and linking their own destinies to it.<sup>46</sup> Many of them were born in Prague, and those who were not spent significant parts of their lives or died there. This was not the case of Bratislava.

Among the distinguished figures of the Slovak national revival of the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, it is hard to find anyone born in Bratislava. Pavol Jozef Šafárik was born in Kobeliarovo (Kisfeketepatak) and spent his life living between Serbia, Slovakia, Bohemia, Hungary and Germany.<sup>47</sup> Jan Kollár studied in the Lutheran lyceum in Bratislava, but he was born in Mosovce and lived mostly in Pest<sup>48</sup> and Vienna. Ľudovít Štúr was born in Uhrovec and died in Modra. The romantic symbol of the Slovak national revival were the Tatra mountains, but not the metropolis Bratislava and much less the river Danube.<sup>49</sup> Slovak patriots were idealising their rural roots, but the rural population they were trying to attract cared very little about their Slovak and Slavic roots, as they did about Bratislava. However, Bratislava was present in the minds of Slovak activists.

Štúr unsuccessfully tried to promote his ideas in the Lutheran lyceum, taking the place of the recently deceased eminent professor Juraj Palkovic. Lawyers and patriots influenced by Pan-Slavic ideology like Vendelín Kutlík and Jozef Miloslav Hurban<sup>50</sup> followed the same pattern trying to present Bratislava as *their* Slovak capital, but not as a Hungarian or a German place.

The majority of them envisioned a great Slavic union in which the Slovak and the Czech lands would be free from Habsburg power.<sup>51</sup> However, this “romanticised idea” of freedom did not presuppose the expulsion of the representatives of other nationalities from Bratislava (or from Prague, for instance). Not a single eminent Slovak figure in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century expressed a thought of sending the Germans and the Hungarians away from Bratislava. Their reluctance can be easily explained by their marginal position. While the German core-group and the Hungarian “core-group-to-be” were dwelling in Pozsony and Pressburg forming its upper social strata, the Slovak intellectuals were

---

<sup>44</sup> Dušan Kováč, *Nemecko a nemecká menšina na Slovensku (1871-1945)* [Germany and the German minority in Slovakia (1871-1945)] (Bratislava: Veda, 1991), 16-18.

<sup>45</sup> For a general overview, see J. F. N. Bradley, *Czech Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century* (Boulder: East European Monographs), 1984.

<sup>46</sup> Matthew Campbell, *The Voice of the People Writing the European Folk Revival, 1760-1914* (London: Anthem Press, 2012), 35-45.

<sup>47</sup> Hugh Chisholm, “Schafarik, Pavel Josef,” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911).

<sup>48</sup> Peter Petro, *A History of Slovak Literature* (McGill Queen's University Press, 1995), 66.

<sup>49</sup> Ľubomír Lipták, “Die Tatra im Slowakischen Bewusstsein” [The Tatra mountains in the Slovak consciousness], in *Heroen, Mythen, Identitäten, Die Slowakei und Österreich im Vergleich* [Heroes, myths, identities. Slovakia and Austria in comparison], ed. Hannes Stekl and Elena Mannova (Wien: Facultas, 2003), 265.

<sup>50</sup> Babejová, *Fin-de-siècle Pressburg*, 95.

<sup>51</sup> As one of the most prominent examples, see Joseph M. Kirschbaum, *Pan-Slavism in Slovak Literature Ján Kollár-Slovak Poet of Panslavism (1793-1852)* (Cleveland: Slovak Institute, 1966).

mainly concentrated on resistance and identity forging,<sup>52</sup> but had no means of expanding their state-building project further.

The apex of their “vision” was an idealised pan-Slavic union or, generally, recognition of a Slovak nation.<sup>53</sup> In this case, the “recognition” was a crucial notion, since the status of the Slovaks was that of an “unrecognised” and largely ignored “ethnic group” with less long-lasting nation-forging disputes than the Germans and fewer means to assert their national status than the Hungarians.<sup>54</sup> The most obvious challenge they were facing was “recognition”, since any Slovak “vision” of Bratislava could only come true with the change of the status of the Slovak nation either within the borders of Austria-Hungary or separately.

In her book dedicated to Bratislava, Eleonóra Babejová sheds light on the influence of the social situation on the city’s population, while highlighting a special “Pressburger identity” and describing it in the following way: “Its main components were multi-linguality, lack of specific ethnic identification and ascription, and loyalty to Pressburg”.<sup>55</sup> This specific identity had been deeply enrooted in the minds of many of the city’s inhabitants and even visitors who spent a significant amount of time in the city. Among such “Pressburgers” of the 18<sup>th</sup> century were Johann Nepomuk Hummel, an Austrian composer and pianist brought up within the German culture, an inventor of Hungarian origin, Wolfgang von Kempelen, a German-Austrian sculptor Franz Xaver Messerschmidt,<sup>56</sup> who moved to Bratislava and spent the last years of his life in the city. Another eminent Austrian sculptor, Georg Raphael Donner, also lived in Bratislava, although he was not born and did not die there. Nevertheless, he did hold the city as his own home and his influence on the works and style of many Slovak and Hungarian sculptors can hardly be overestimated.<sup>57</sup> These examples are numerous, and they all prove that in the 18<sup>th</sup> century the “Pressburger” identity was strong and did exist. One could still feel it in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup>; however, that was the period when the notions of “appurtenance” and “identity” became involved with the nationalist ideology, switching accents from “the identity of a citizen” to that of a Slovak, Hungarian or German.

One cannot assert that before the revolution of 1848 or the establishment of the Dual-monarchy the inhabitants of Bratislava did not know that they were Hungarian nobles, German burgers or Slovak peasants coming from the countryside. They were definitely aware of their origins: but the “Pressburger” identity was the main one and it dominated city life. The picture remained similar, but not the same in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century when the local Hungarians and Slovaks (and to a lesser-extent Germans) began to care much more about their national identity and attempted to promote Bratislava with its

---

<sup>52</sup> György Csepeli, *Grappling with National Identity: How Nations See Each Other in Central Europe* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2000).

<sup>53</sup> Kirschbaum, *Pan-Slavism*, 13.

<sup>54</sup> Kowalská, 67-74.

<sup>55</sup> Babejová, 85.

<sup>56</sup> Mária Potzl-Maliková, *Franz Xaver Messerschmidt a záhada jeho charakterových hláv* [Franz Xaver Messerschmidt and the puzzle of his characteristic heads ] (Bratislava: Albert Marenčin Vydavateľ'stvo), 2004.

<sup>57</sup> Darina Chudomelková, *Donner a jeho okruh na Slovensku* [Donner and his circle in Slovakia] (Bratislava: Tvar, 1954). This work is a rare example of an investigation of Donner’s influences in Slovak and Hungarian art with many examples of works created by artists living in Bratislava and imitating Donner’s masterpieces or learning from him. The author also provides the reader with many valuable quotations illustrating the attitude of Donner’s circle to the great sculptor and his contribution to the development of art in Central Europe.

landmarks as “their” city.<sup>58</sup> That competition dramatically changed the statuses of the privileged Germans by enhancing the city’s Hungarian population. And, while the Germans were to a large extent uneager and unprepared to face Hungarianisation, the Slovaks, accustomed to being a “marginalised” and “unrecognised” group were ready to resist it.

### ***Mapping Hungary, shifting accents, erasing borders***

The Hungarian element became extremely active after the establishment of the Dual-Monarchy, when the Hungarians seized being a non-core group and achieved the status similar to the Germanic inhabitants of the empire.<sup>59</sup> Eleonóra Babejová points out that after a short period of stagnation and a series of epidemics, Bratislava gained part of its former prestige because of the administrative changes in 1867.<sup>60</sup> The dominant role belonged to Budapest, but Pozsony was still significant for the Hungarians because of its strongly associated past with that of the Hungarian nation, granting it a place in the Hungarian nation-building program. In addition, the benevolent location between Vienna and Budapest, good drinking water and fresh air also contributed to the city’s growing significance.<sup>61</sup>

Before referring to the Magyarisation of the city and the activities of the Hungarian nationalistic circles, one should briefly regard the history of the city viewed by its Hungarian and German population. In his impressive work about the history of Pozsony / Pressburg published in 1903, both in Hungarian and in German, Tivadar Ortvay thoroughly explores the history of the city, giving quotations from numerous sources and skilfully describing almost all the aspects of its past.<sup>62</sup> He professionally deals with the collected materials, but one aspect may still surprise the reader. The author concentrates only on the Hungarian legacy and heritage of the city. He does admit the existence of the Germans, but the presence of the Slovaks passes almost unnoticed in his massive work.

Two years later another interesting book was published. In 1905 Emil Kumlik created “Pozsony und der Freiheitskampf 1848-49” [Bratislava and the struggle for freedom].<sup>63</sup> One may probably consider the author a representative of the old “Pressburger” identity: he is of Slovak origin, he writes in German and he uses the Hungarian name “Pozsony” instead of the German name “Pressburg”. In his work, he focuses mostly on unity, thinking of Bratislava as a place where all three cultures create one identity out of parallel ones. The first, the impressive study of Tivadar Ortvay, is an example of the Hungarian view of Bratislava’s history, typical not only for the turn of the centuries, but also for the period after the establishment of the dual monarchy, the second, although published already in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, preserves the atmosphere of Imperial Austrian-German culture, that describes the way the German middle-class population viewed it, a sort of a nostalgic “multicultural ideal”.

---

<sup>58</sup> Peter Brock, *The Slovak National Awakening: An Essay in the Intellectual History of East Central Europe* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), 7.

<sup>59</sup> Arthur James May, *The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951).

<sup>60</sup> Babejová, 22.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Ortvay Tivadár, *Pozsony város története* [The history of Bratislava] (Pozsony: 1903). 2<sup>nd</sup> volume. The current article refers to the second volume, although there are three of them. Two are available in Hungarian and the third one could be found only in German.

<sup>63</sup> Emil Kumlik, *Pozsony und der Freiheitskampf 1848-49* [Bratislava and the struggle for freedom], (Pozsony: K. Stampfel. 1905).

Pieter van Duin in his profound study dedicated to Bratislava, brilliantly describes the methods and the consequences of the Magyarisation of the city.<sup>64</sup> The oppressive program was introduced only after the establishment of the dual monarchy, when Hungarian nationalists acquired enough rights to conduct their own policy. The Slavs and the Romanians, although they did make attempts to get autonomy and recognition of their national rights in the Empire,<sup>65</sup> never managed to gain the status of Hungary with its political and social-liberties.<sup>66</sup> However, in the Slovak case, even the intellectuals and representatives of the “National revival” were far from being united, not even taking into account the rural masses, who seemed to express little interest for the national cause.

Ludovít Štúr and his circle, who believed in creation of Slovakia with Slovak language not being considered a dialect or a version of Czech or any other Slavonic language, but still joint with its Slavic brothers, did not achieve any success in agitating the rural Slovak-speaking people. Štúr’s dreams and hopes crashed after the events of 1848-49. His bitter disappointment became even more desperate in the beginning of the fifties. His personal tragedy can be fully perceived only after realising that his contemporaries could never bring his romanticised national ideas to life.<sup>67</sup> Ludovít Štúr died in a hunting accident near Modra some years later. After his tragic death, his ideas began to spread more rapidly than ever before, laying the foundation of the Slovak national ideology.<sup>68</sup>

Pieter van Duin and Eleonóra Babejová both describe in great detail the severe methods of Magyarisation introduced in the city that, however, were not unique for Bratislava. The “Magyarisation” of Croatia represents a similar story with the same goals of appropriating urban spaces primarily under the banner of modernisation.<sup>69</sup> Bratislava, similarly to a number of multinational spaces in other parts of Greater Hungary was supposed to become a city of one language and people loyal to this language and to the Hungarian state. However, one should notice that those goals were originally introduced not because of the national hatred towards one’s nationality, but because of the need of the country’s industrial modernisation and a dominance of an idea of a nation-state rather than adherence to the federative principles. Without one official language and a “simplified” identity, modernisation of a state would have been an unlikely prospect.<sup>70</sup> As David P. Caleo explains it: “In short, higher human progress required accepting and relishing the diversity of nations. But maintaining that diversity meant a world of nation-states with all

---

<sup>64</sup> Van Duin, 25-113.

<sup>65</sup> On the case of Romanian national movement in Austro-Hungarian Transylvania, see Keith Hitchins, *A Nation Affirmed: The Romanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1860-1914* (Bucharest: Encyclopaedic Pub. House, 1999). For further information on the Serbian movement in Voivodina and its reactions to Magyarisation, see Leften Stavros Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453* (New York: Rinehart, 1958), 255-266.

<sup>66</sup> Brock, *The Slovak National Awakening*, 52. Ludovít Štúr and his Young Slovaks called for Slovak autonomy first within Hungary and later as a separate crown land of the Habsburg monarchy.

<sup>67</sup> Bernhard Giesen, *Intellectuals and the German Nation: Collective Identity in an Axial Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 80-95.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> For an interesting case of Croatian resistance to Austro-Hungarian dominance, see Stefano Petrungaro, “Fire and Honor. On the Comparability of Popular Protests in Late 19th Century Croatia-Slavonia,” in Sabine Rutar, *Beyond the Balkans. Towards an Inclusive History of Southeastern Europe* (Berlin: Lit, 2014), 247-265.

<sup>70</sup> Myron Weiner, *Modernization; the Dynamics of Growth* (New York: Basic Books, 1966), 23.

its innate potential for conflict”.<sup>71</sup> This fact explains to some extent the reason for the establishment of such strategy that soon became very oppressive.

While in the fifties the people who declared themselves Hungarians were outnumbered by the German majority and a rather large number of Slovaks, by the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the situation changed completely, the Hungarians being the majority in the city.<sup>72</sup> The main “victims” of this process, however, were not the Slovaks, whose position in the state was much weaker, but the prosperous educated middle-class Germans. Eleonóra Babejová explains it the following way: “Pressburg was seen as a defensive bastion on Hungary’s frontier against the spreading Germanisation”.<sup>73</sup> The fight against Germanisation and the widely spread German language in the city was made the priority of the nationalistic Toldy kor, an overly patriotic Hungarian organisation active in the city. The same chauvinistic group also organised the ostracism of a Slovak lawyer and Professor Vendelin Kutlik, who shared pan-Slavic views. The Hungarian nationalistic students even broke the windows of his house in Bratislava.<sup>74</sup>

The position of the local Germans was politically and culturally better than that of the Slovaks, since had never been “officially” marginalised. Their transformation into an “unwanted” non-core group was much more subtle. A person could be accused of Pan-Slavic views and arrested even for reading a Slovak book in public in Pozsony.<sup>75</sup> One could never imagine the same being done to a German Pressburger. Nevertheless, in the 60s Pan-Germanism became a threat just as great as Pan-Slavism.<sup>76</sup> Moreover, unlike the Slovaks, used to being a non-core group in opposition, the Germans were unprepared to face the methods of rapid Magyarisation. Being a privileged nation, who could freely speak their language, establish schools and being the majority in the city, they suddenly became subjects to a de-nationalising process. Middle-class Germans wanted to preserve their position in the city and many of them did finally adopt Hungarian identity.<sup>77</sup>

However, it should be underlined that even the ethnic Hungarian population of the kingdom of Hungary had internal debates regarding the methods and aims of Magyarisation. Such people as Lajos Mocsary of the Independence party strongly criticised the Hungarian Prime Minister Kalman Tisza<sup>78</sup> and his attempt not to recognize the multi-ethnic character of the kingdom. Nevertheless, since “modernisation” was viewed as an ultimate goal of the project, the policy continued to flourish, being “reversed” only with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Another important aspect that should be explained in order to fully clarify the ethnic situation in Pozsony after the establishment of the Dual monarchy is that the Magyar chauvinism was not one based on blood, origin and social status, but one defined

<sup>71</sup> David. P. Calleo, “Reflections on the Idea of a Nation-state,” in *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe*, ed. Charles A. Kupchan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 23.

<sup>72</sup> Van Duin, 31-43.

<sup>73</sup> Babejová, 156.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 98.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid. Also, for further details on the policy of Magyarisation see Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, *A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 136-139.

<sup>76</sup> Van Duin, 80-81.

<sup>77</sup> The adoption of a “convenient” Hungarian identity (that in many cases was also easily reversed with the change in the core-group statuses) was common not only in Slovakia, but also in Transylvania, Croatia etc. See, Ioan Lupaș, *The Hungarian Policy of Magyarization* (Cluj-Napoca: Romanian Cultural Foundation, 1992), 17-20.

<sup>78</sup> Van Duin, 31.

by language and devotion to Hungary.<sup>79</sup> In the 19<sup>th</sup> century those who felt Hungarian and willingly adopted the Hungarian identity and language, were considered Hungarians by society. For this reason, even such eminent people like Hungarian revolutionary and recognised national hero Lajos Kossuth who denied the existence of the Slovak nation being of Slovak origin himself,<sup>80</sup> could become famous Hungarians and contribute to the cultural and political development of the Hungarian nation. The key-notion in this case was the lack of knowledge and understanding, since Kossuth's non-recognition of Slovaks was truly motivated by his misconception of the entire idea of "being a Slovak", but not by his "extreme Hungarian chauvinism".

Peter Brock notes that "Magyar nationalism was linked primarily to the state, not to the language"<sup>81</sup>, one still can doubt that affirmation regarding the principles of the Magyarisation in Pozsony, oriented mostly on the introduction of Hungarian into all spheres of life in the city. The national state did count, but the road to a completely united society went through the unification of the language. In Pozsony a person was considered a Magyar if he or she saw Hungarian primarily as their Mother tongue regardless of one's ethnic background.

Another important aspect that should not be omitted is the social position of the people who became subjects to Magyarisation. Van Duin's book clarifies that the Slovaks were mostly servants, sellers, workers or peasants coming from neighbouring villages and in some cases, representatives of the Germanised lower middle class, while the German population made part of the Upper Middle class. The local Hungarians were either the descendants of the noble families or the important intellectual elite of the city.<sup>82</sup> However, that does not mean that there were no Hungarian or German workers in the city, who felt that their interests coincided more with those of the Slovak low-class people than with those of the more prosperous layers of Hungarian and German population. They did exist and that fact made the national picture more complicated and mixed with the contradictions not only between different nationalities, but also between different social strata. The privileged class was more inclined to accept their new status, since they had more to lose and gain by becoming part of the core-group.<sup>83</sup> Since the German mainly made up the Upper Middle Class, they were more exposed to active Magyarisation and had much less experience in dealing with assimilation than the local Slovaks.

### *German legacies and non-resistance*

The Germans view on their Pressburg seems to be to some extent different from that of the Slovaks and the Hungarians. Their language had always been recognised in the

---

<sup>79</sup> George Barany, *Stephen Széchenyi and the Awakening of Hungarian Nationalism*, 1791-1841 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).

<sup>80</sup> Piotr Stefan Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present* (London: Routledge, 1992), 50-63; Paul Lendvai, *Tízszáz év Magyarország népének története* [Thousand years of the Hungarian people] (Praha: Academia, 2002), 457. An example of another famous Hungarian politician, writer and publicist of a Slavic origin could be a Croat-Slovak Táncsics Mihály.

<sup>81</sup> Brock, *The Slovak National Awakening*, 38.

<sup>82</sup> For a more detailed picture, see Sándor Varga, *Magyarok Szlovákiában: Adatok, Dokumentumok, Tanulmányok* [Hungarians in Slovakia: Data, Documents, Studies] (Bratislava: Nemzetiségi Dokumentációs Centrum, 1993).

<sup>83</sup> Christian Promitzer, *(Hidden) Minorities: Language and Ethnic Identity between Central Europe and the Balkans* (Wien: Lit, 2009), 75-109. Since the Germans had never been seen as minority, unlike many other groups inhabiting the empire, they appeared to be much less prepared to "resist" it.



Empire as well as their existence, for a long period of time they were officially and unarguably the majority in the city. Moreover, their enormous impact on the “image” of the cityscape could not remain unnoticed by the Slovaks and the Hungarians: the architectural portrait of Bratislava seems to be most influenced by its German population.<sup>84</sup> German “Pressburg” was present not only in the name of the German-language newspapers, it was in the architectural image of the city, an obvious “marker”, yet, never used as such by the German population slowly departing to the margins of their city’s political life.

Pressburg did possess the reminiscences of the late gothic and renaissance art, which was very important for the city’s landscape<sup>85</sup> (like St. Martin’s cathedral with its interior, for instance), but it was the baroque oriented to the Austrian Imperial fashion that was flourishing in the city. Its bloom resulted in the construction of numerous palaces of Hungarian and German nobles (Grossalkowich palace, Kutscherfeld palace, Erdody palace, etc.). In his massive work dedicated to the influences of the Austrian baroque on the contemporary Slovak lands, Jan Papco constantly notes the architectural masterpieces created under the Austrian influence and in most cases by Austrian-German architects had a great impact on the Slovak population of the city.<sup>86</sup> Without them, one can hardly imagine the development of any Slovak architectural school in Pressburg.

The middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, still aware of its rich baroque heritage, gradually turned Presburg to historicism. Situated extremely close to Vienna, the city was again trying to imitate the tendencies spread in the Imperial capital of the time. However, an inquiring observer could still notice that a paradigm shift had occurred: the important city buildings were projected not only by the Germans, but also by the Hungarians and even the Slovaks, who were referring to the Austrian tradition.<sup>87</sup> That tradition did not get “privatised” by the local Germans. Instead, they remained rather indifferent to its influence on the Slovak and Hungarian developments.

One of the results of such a development was a Slovak architects Milan Michal Harminc, born in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, who worked in Budapest, became famous and died in Pressburg.<sup>88</sup> He later projected the main building of the Slovak national museum. Being brought up within the Habsburg Empire, Harminc became one of those who contributed to the development of historicism in Pressburg. Some time before Harminc started his career, the Viennese architects, Ferdinand Fellner and Hermann

---

<sup>84</sup> Jörg Garms, “Die Residenz von Pressburg. Bau- und Ausstattungsprojekte in mariatheresianischer Zeit” [The residence of Pressburg. Construction and furnishing projects in the time of Maria Theresia], *Barockberichte* [The Baroque reports] 55/56 (2011): 589-602.

<sup>85</sup> J. Bálogh, “A reneszánsz kor művészete” [The renaissance art], in *A magyarországi művészet története* [The history of the Hungarian art], ed. Fülep L. Szerk, D. Dercsényi and A. Zádor (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1973), 191-256, and see also Pálffy.

<sup>86</sup> Ján Papco, *Rakúsky Barok a Slovensko : Nové Nálezy, Atribúcie / Österreichisches Barock Und Die Slowakei: Neue Funde, Attributionen* [The Austrian Baroque and Slovakia: new findings, attributions] (Prievidza: Patria I, 2003).

<sup>87</sup> Adolph Stiller, *Architektur Slowakei: Impulse Und Reflexion / Architektura Slovenska: Impulzy a Reflexia* [The Slovak architecture: impulses and reflections] (Salzburg: Pustet, 2003).

<sup>88</sup> Jana Pohaničová and Matúš Dulla, *Michal Milan Harminc – architekt dvoch storočí 1869 – 1964* [Michal Milan Harminc, the architect of the two centuries] (Bratislava: Trio Publishing, 2014). It should be noted that Harminc was never very devoted to historicism. During his long lifetime he was experimenting with styles trying to catch up with the new tendencies and epochs.

Helmer, built an elegant neo-renaissance Opera House in Pressburg.<sup>89</sup> Their company was the one creating theatres and opera Houses almost everywhere in Central and Eastern Europe. Bratislava did not become an exception. Its Opera House was created with the latest imperial trends of the epoch. Moreover, among the famous Hungarian architects active in Bratislava one should definitely mention Ignac Álpar as one of the most well known, but not the only one.<sup>90</sup> Although a Hungarian by origin, Álpar was still dwelling within the boundaries of Austrian and German architectural traditions, perceiving the mixed character of the city and contributing to its development. The German traditions were very alive in the minds of the people changing Pressburg's landscape, yet, they slowly turned it into "Hungarian" and "Slovak", while the German intellectual circle did not invest much energy in justifying its claims over Pressburg by relating to its architectural landmarks. Therefore, one may see the indifference of the German population of Pressburg as the most important key-factor of their subsequent loss of influence and status of a core-group.<sup>91</sup> While both Slovaks and Hungarians willingly adopted and altered German cultural cityscape, the German population did not get involved in the identity debates, allowing two other groups to take the dominant position.

In the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century even under the influence of Magyarisation (that was overturned as quickly as it was introduced later in the 20<sup>th</sup> century), Austrian/German architectural and linguistic domination and the Slovak national movement, the Germans turned out to be unprepared to adhere to their core-group status. The local Slovaks, being used to their marginal position, quickly adopted the lessons of Hungarisation and applied them later, when they in their turn became a core group. The Germans, on the other hand, were more successful in blending in with the core-group, while highlighting primarily their "Pressburger" identity, not the "national" one. As an example, the story provided by Eleonóra Babejová may be presented. In her book, the author writes about the sad destiny of a Pan-Slavist and a lawyer Vendelin Kutlik and another lawyer and Slovak patriot sharing the same views, Michal Mudron, who was much more successful in his life than Kutlik. The author explains this, pointing out that Mudron's Slovak identity did not contradict with his Pressburger identity. Therefore he was able to integrate easier. The combination of these two qualities made him a real citizen of Pressburg-Pozsony-Bratislava, respected and recognised not only by the Slovaks, but also by the Germans and the Hungarians.<sup>92</sup> Therefore, he was able to integrate easier into the core-group, serving as a mediator and paving a path for the future Slovakisation, while many of his compatriots remained "marginalised".

Bratislava's case is very specific: the city situated in the midst of the predominantly Slavic lands and still considered first a Hungarian and then a German centre, had to overcome several historical "obstacles" to become a Slovak capital. Examining Bratislava, one should take into account the fact that it has usually remained in

---

<sup>89</sup> Jacek Purchla, *Theatre Architecture of the Late 19th Century in Central Europe* (Cracow: International Cultural Centre, 1993), 20, 29, 42.

<sup>90</sup> Alpar projected several schools in Bratislava and achieved a big success in the city. For further detail, see Martin Kusý, *Architektúra na Slovensku 1848-1918* [Architecture in Slovakia 1848-1918] (Bradlo, 1995).

<sup>91</sup> The aftermath of the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century events is analysed in Andreas Schriefer, *Deutsche, Slowaken und Magyaren im Spiegel deutschsprachiger historischer Zeitungen und Zeitschriften in der Slowakei* [The Germans, the Slovaks and the Hungarians in the mirror of the German historical journals and newspapers in Slovakia] (Komárno: Forum Institute, 2007).

<sup>92</sup> Babejová, 96-98.

the shadow of the neighbouring metropolises (especially in the 19<sup>th</sup> century),<sup>93</sup> although frequented by eminent individuals almost from all the corners of the Habsburg Empire, it was still considered to be less important than Vienna, Budapest or Prague. Bratislava may be compared to some extent to those three cities: it is multinational like Prague or Vienna, the imperial capital, it is linked to the Danube and bears the reminiscences of the Hungarian aristocratic culture just like Budapest, but it was not a centre, but a “mental borderland”, contested by national groups just the way borderlands usually are. Its multinational character is more distinct than that of the 19<sup>th</sup> century national capitals, its geographical position is too close to Vienna and its Hungarian element was far more active than the Slovak was in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

### *Conclusions*

The example of Bratislava's multiple identities in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and their interpretations by the three national groups inhabiting the city clearly demonstrates the dominant role of an active state-building agenda in the process of claiming a borderland - geographical, mental or cultural. Independently of the disputed territory's character, the idea of resistance remains a driving mechanism essential for a group's successful claim. Moreover, borders become categories that are socially produced within the multinational and multicultural environment of Bratislava, a city not situated on a geographical boundary separating several states. Therefore, the Slovaks, the Hungarians and the Germans mostly relied on cultural, political, linguistic and class differences in order to brand their presence in the city as dominant. While before the 19<sup>th</sup> century various class divisions were seen as decisive, the series of “national revivals” turned cultural and linguistic markers into main indicators of belonging to a certain group, highlighting identities that had previously been less important. Those markers were used by Bratislava's inhabitants as mobilising factors that could “activate” the national group from within.

The city's diverse character and multiple legacies were successfully claimed by groups most accustomed to “resisting” its “privileged” and “better standing” opponents. As a result, the Slovaks, as the title of Kirschbaum's book eloquently puts it,<sup>94</sup> were well prepared for struggling against more advantaged core-groups primarily due to their predominantly peasant background and their lower social and political status in the Austro-Hungarian empire. Therefore, the previously underestimated Slovak population was used to resisting assimilation attempts and quickly reversed them after gaining the status of a core-group in the city. Positioning Bratislava as an essential element of their state-building agenda, the Slovaks finally turned it into their capital in the beginning of the 20th century following several decades of active identity debates.

Bratislava's identities, contested by three major groups inhabiting the city in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, did not disappear, dissolve or turn to be entirely Slovak. After Bratislava stopped being an identity “battleground”, the accented features of its cityscape and lifestyle shifted, leaving the Slovak legacies more highlighted than the Hungarian and the German ones. Some decades would pass before Bratislava would turn into an almost mono-ethnic Slovak city (at least considered mono-ethnic)<sup>95</sup> but its past would still be influential within it. It remained a “borderland” with its own ethnic and cultural mixture, which produced a Slovak capital in 1919.

---

<sup>93</sup> For further information on the idea of “imperial representation,” see Felix Driver, *Imperial Cities: Landscape, Display and Identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).

<sup>94</sup> Kirschbaum, *A History of Slovakia*.

<sup>95</sup> Salner, 235-237.

Branded as a multicultural crossroad nowadays, Bratislava is a cultural border, although much less contested than in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. This last remark may lead the argument to a slightly different direction, making the case of Bratislava not simply a story of a city, where cultural and ethnic boundaries intersect, but making the Slovak state itself a place, where these overlapping identities create a dominant culture.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anzaldúa, Gloria. *Borderlands: La Frontera*. San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1999.
- Babejová, Eleonóra. *Fin-de-siècle Pressburg: Conflict & Cultural Coexistence in Bratislava 1897-1914*. Boulder: East European Monographs, 2003.
- Bálogh, Jolán. "A reneszánsz kor művészete" [The art of the Renaissance]. In *A magyarországi művészet története* [The history of the Hungarian art], edited by Fülep L. Szerk, Dezső Dercsényi, and Anna Zádor, 191-256. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1973.
- Barany, George. *Stephen Széchenyi and the Awakening of Hungarian Nationalism 1791-1841*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968.
- Berghe, Pierre Van de. *The Ethnic Phenomenon*. New York: Elsevier, 1981.
- Black, Cyril Edwin. *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History*. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.
- Bradley, J. F. N. *Czech Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century*. Boulder: East European Monographs, 1984.
- Brock, Peter. *Slovenské národné obrozenie 1787-1847: k vzniku modernej slovenskej identity* [The Slovak national revival 1787-1847: approaching the Slovak modern identity]. Bratislava: Kalligram, 2002.
- Brock, Peter. *The Slovak National Awakening: An Essay in the Intellectual History of East Central Europe*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976.
- Brook, Stephen. *Vanished Empire: Vienna, Budapest, Prague: The Three Capital Cities of the Habsburg Empire as Seen Today*. New York: W. Morrow, 1988.
- Calleo, David. P. "Reflections on the Idea of a Nation-state." In *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe*, edited by Charles A. Kupchan, 15-37. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995.
- Campbell, Matthew. *The Voice of the People Writing the European Folk Revival, 1760-1914*. London: Anthem Press, 2012.
- Chisholm, Hugh. "Schafarik, Pavel Josef." In *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11<sup>th</sup> edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911.
- Cohen, Abner. "Variable in Ethnicity." In *Ethnic Change*, edited by Charles Keyes, 306-331. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981.
- Csepeli, György. *Grappling with National Identity: How Nations See Each Other in Central Europe*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó 2000.
- Chudomelková, Darina. *Donner a jeho okruh na Slovensku* [Donner and his circle in Slovakia]. Bratislava: Tvar, 1954.
- Driver, Felix. *Imperial Cities: Landscape, Display and Identity*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999.
- Duin, Pieter Van. *Central European Crossroads: Social Democracy and National Revolution in Bratislava (Pressburg), 1867-1921*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2009.
- Enyedi, György. *Social Change and Urban Restructuring in Central Europe*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1998.

- Garms, Jörg. "Die Residenz von Pressburg. Bau- und Ausstattungsprojekte in mariatheresianischer Zeit" [The residence of Pressburg. Construction and furnishing projects in the time of Maria Theresia]. *Barockberichte* [Baroque reports] 55/56, (2011): 589-602.
- Gellner, Ernst. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- Giesen, Bernhard. *Intellectuals and the German Nation: Collective Identity in an Axial Age*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Hitchins, Keith. *A Nation Affirmed: The Romanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1860-1914*. Bucharest: Encyclopaedic Pub. House, 1999.
- Hobsbawn, Eric. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Horváth, Károly V., Darina Lehotská, and Ján Pleva. *Dejiny Bratislavy* [The history of Bratislava]. Bratislava: Obzor, 1979.
- Hurd, Madeleine. *Borderland Identities: Territory and Belonging in Central, North and East Europe*. Eslov, Sweden: Forlags Ab Gondolin, 2006.
- Iordachi, Constantin. *Citizenship, Nation- and State-building: The Integration of Northern Dobrogea into Romania, 1873-1913*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, Center for Russian & East European Studies, 2002.
- Kaplan, David H. *Boundaries and Place: European Borderlands in Geographical Context*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002.
- Karakasidou, Anastasia N. *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997.
- Kiossev, Alexandar. "Legacy or Legacies. Competition and Conflicts." In *Europe and the Historical Legacies in the Balkans*, edited by Raymond and Barbara Segaert, 49-69. Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008.
- Kirschbaum, Joseph M. *Pan-Slavism in Slovak Literature : Ján Kollár --Slovak Poet of Pan-Slavism (1793-1852)*. Cleveland: Slovak Institute, 1966.
- Kirschbaum, Stanislav J. *A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.
- Kováč, Dušan. *Kronika Slovenska* [The Slovak Chronicle]. Bratislava: Fortuna Print, 1998.
- Kováč, Dušan. *Nemecko a nemecká menšina na Slovensku (1871 - 1945)* [Germany and the German minority in Slovakia (1871-1945)]. Bratislava: Veda 1991.
- Kowalská, Eva, „The Creation of Modern Society in Slovakia and Its Evaluation in Slovak Historiography.” In *Nations, Identities, Historical Consciousness: Volume Dedicated to Prof. Miroslav Hroch*, edited by Miloš Řezník, 65-79. Praha: Seminár Obecných Dejin Pri Ústavu Svetových Dejin FF UK, 1997.
- Kumlik, Emil. *Pozsony und der Freiheitskampf 1848-49* [Bratislava and the struggle for freedom]. Pozsony: K. Stampfel, 1905.
- Kusý, Martin. *Architektúra na Slovensku 1848-1918* [Architecture in Slovakia 1848-1918]. Bratislava: Bradlo, 1995.
- Lacika, Ján. *Bratislava. Poznávame Slovensko* [Bratislava. Getting to know Slovakia]. Bratislava: Dajama, 2000.
- Lacina, Ivan, and Vladimír Tomčík. *Tvoja Bratislava* [Your Bratislava]. Bratislava: Mladé letá, 1992.
- Lendvai, Paul. *Tisíc let Maďarského národa* [Thousand years of the Hungarian people]. Praha: Academia, 2002.
- Lipták, Ľubomír. "Bratislava als Hauptstadt der Slowakei" [Bratislava as the capital of Slovakia]. In *Heroen, Mythen, Identitäten, Die Slowakei und Österreich im*

- Vergleich* [Heroes, myths, identities. Slovakia and Austria in comparison], edited by Hannes Stekl and Elena Mannova, 135-173. Wien: Facultas, 2003.
- Lipták, Ľubomír. "Die Tatra im Slowakischen Bewusstsein" [The Tatra mountains in the Slovak national consciousness]. In *Heroen, Mythen, Identitäten, Die Slowakei und Österreich im Vergleich*, edited by Hannes Stekl and Elena Mannova, 261-288. Wien: Facultas, 2003.
- Lupaş, Ioan. *The Hungarian Policy of Magyarization*. Cluj-Napoca: Romanian Cultural Foundation, 1992.
- May, Arthur James. *The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951.
- Mylonas, Harris. *The Politics of Nation-building: Making Co-nationals, Refugees, and Minorities*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Neurath, Robert A. *Bratislava, Pressburg, Pozsony: Jewish Secular Endeavors, 1867-1938*. Bratislava: Alexander Robert Neurath, 2010.
- Nitsiakos, Vasile. *On the Border: Transborder Mobility, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries along the Albanian-Greek Frontier*. Berlin: Lit, 2010.
- Pálffy, Géza. "A Pozsonyi Márton templom késő reneszánsz és kora barokk siremlékei (16-17.század)" [The late Renaissance and Baroque burial monuments of the Church of Saint Martin in Bratislava]. *A Művészettörténeti Értesítő* [The art history review] LI (1-2 szám), 2002.
- Papco, Ján. *Rakúsky Barok a Slovensko: Nové Nálezy, Atribúcie /Österreichisches Barock Und Die Slowakei: Neue Funde, Attributionen* [The Austrian baroque and Slovakia: new findings, attributions]. Prievidza: Patria I, 2003.
- Petro, Peter. *A History of Slovak Literature*. Montreal and Kinston: McGill Queens's University Press, 1995.
- Petrungaro, Stefano. "Fire and Honor. On the Comparability of Popular Protests in Late 19th Century Croatia-Slavonia." In *Beyond the Balkans. Towards an Inclusive History of Southeastern Europe*, edited by Sabine Rutar, 221-236. Berlin: Lit, 2014.
- Pigler Andor. *G.R. Donner élete és művészete* [The life and work of G.R. Donner]. Budapest: Bisztrai-Farkas, 1933.
- Pohaničová, Jana and Matúš Dulla. *Michal Milan Harminc – architekt dvoch storočí 1869 – 1964* [Michal Milan Harminc, the architect of the two centuries]. Bratislava: Trio Publishing, 2014.
- Potzl-Malíková, Mária. *Franz Xaver Messerschmidt a záhada jeho charakterových hláv* [Franz Xaver Messerschmidt and the puzzle of his characteristic heads]. Bratislava: Albert Marenčin Vydavateľ'stvo, 2004.
- Promitzer, Christian. *(Hidden) Minorities: Language and Ethnic Identity between Central Europe and the Balkans*. Wien: Lit, 2009.
- Purchla, Jacek. *Theatre Architecture of the Late 19th Century in Central Europe*. Cracow: International Cultural Centre, 1993.
- Rogers, Alisdair. *Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001.
- Salner, Peter. "Ethnic Polarisation in an Ethnically Homogeneous Town." *Czech Sociological Review* 9, 2 (2001): 235-246.
- Sampimon, Janette. *Becoming Bulgarian: The Articulation of Bulgarian Identity in the Nineteenth Century in Its International Context: An Intellectual History*. Amsterdam: Pegasus, 2006.
- Sanghamitra, Misra. *Becoming a Borderland: The Politics of Space and Identity in Colonial Northeastern India*. New Delhi: Routledge, 2011.

- Schriefer, Andreas. *Deutsche, Slowaken und Magyaren im Spiegel deutschsprachiger historischer Zeitungen und Zeitschriften in der Slowakei* [The Germans, the Slovaks and the Hungarians in the mirror of the German historical journals and newspapers in Slovakia]. Komárno: Forum Institute, 2007.
- Sedlák, Imrich. *Pavol Jozef Šafárik a slovenské národné obrozenie: zborník z vedeckej konferencie* [Pavol Jozef Šafárik and the Slovak national revival: the conference proceedings]. Martin: Matica Slovenská, 1989.
- Sojtková, Zdenka. *Knížka o životě Ludovíta Štúra* [A book about Ľudovít Štúr's life]. Bratislava: Slovensko-český klub, 2005.
- Speier, Hans. "The Rise of Public Opinion." In *Propaganda*, edited by Robert Jackall, 147-167. New York: New York University Press, 1995.
- Stavrianos, Leften Stavros. *The Balkans since 1453*. New York: Rinehart, 1958.
- Stern, Dieter Hubert. *Marginal Linguistic Identities: Studies in Slavic Contact and Borderland Varieties*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006.
- Stiller, Adolph. *Architektur Slowakei: Impulse Und Reflexion/Architektura Slovenska: Impulzy a Reflexia* [The Slovak architecture: impulses and reflection]. Salzburg: Pustet, 2003.
- Szczepański, Marek. "Cultural Borderlands in Sociological Perspective (The Case of Upper Silesia)." *Polish Sociological Review* 121 (1998), 69-82.
- Špiesz, Anton. *Bratislava v stredoveku* [Bratislava in the Middle Ages]. Bratislava: Perfekt, 2001.
- Tivadár, Ortway. *Pozsony város története* [The history of Bratislava]. Pozsony, 1903.
- Turda, Marius. "Transylvania Revisited: Public Discourse and Historical Representation in Contemporary Romania." In *Nation-building and Contested Identities: Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies*, edited by Balázs Trencsényi, Dragoș Petrescu, and Cristina Petrescu, 197-206. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001.
- Varga, Sándor. *Magyarok Szlovákiában : Adatok, Dokumentumok, Tanulmányok* [Hungarians in Slovakia: Data, Documents, Studies]. Bratislava: Nemzetiségi Dokumentációs Centrum, 1993.
- Wandycz, Piotr Stefan. *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present*. London: Routledge, 1992.
- Weiner, Myron. *Modernization; the Dynamics of Growth*. New York: Basic Books, 1966.
- Werner, Michael. *De la comparaison À l'histoire croisée*. Paris: Seuil, 2004.
- Wódz, Kazimiera. *Regional Identity, Regional Consciousness: The Upper Silesian Experience*. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 1995.





# On the Future Role of Kaliningrad Oblast of Russia as an “International Development Corridor”

*Gennady Mikhailovich FEDOROV<sup>1</sup>,  
Anna Valerievna BELOVA<sup>2</sup>,  
Lidia Gennadjevna OSMOLOVSKAYA<sup>3</sup>*

**Abstract:** *Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation has a unique position in the Baltic Sea Region due to its physiographic situation and, thereby, it plays an active role in geopolitical and economic processes that occur in the Baltic Sea Region. This, first of all, happens owing to its exclave position that causes to a great extent a necessity for close cross-border integration for the developing economy of the Oblast. The article considers new spatial forms of international economic integration (NSFIEI) contributing to the development of border regions; distinguishing of the border regions as international “development corridors” has been substantiated within the general region classification; the place of Kaliningrad Oblast regarding the level of economic development and maturity of external relations among the border regions of Russia has been shown; its role as an “international development corridor” of Russia and EU has also been viewed. The comparative method and the technique of economic geography classification have been applied.*

**Key words:** *border regions, international development corridor, Kaliningrad Oblast of Russia*

## ***Introduction***

Kaliningrad Oblast - a Russian exclave in the Baltic Sea Region with an area of 15 thousand km<sup>2</sup> and population of 970 thousand people - has both disadvantages and advantages related to its geographic position. The advantages are quite objective, i.e. they exist regardless of any market-determined factors. These are seaside location, natural conditions favourable compared to most Russian regions, neighbourhood with the EU countries and relative proximity of economically developed regions of Russia. At the same time, the disadvantages (exclave region) are subjective, as they are associated with changing political relations between Russia and other countries of the Baltic region, especially those where transit communication routes between Kaliningrad Oblast and other Russian regions run. This article examines the possibility of using the objective advantages in the development of Kaliningrad Oblast, in this context their full-scale implementation is

---

<sup>1</sup> Dr. of geography, Professor, Director of Director of the Institute of Environmental Management, Territorial Development and Urban Construction, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Kaliningrad. E-mail: Gennady\_fedorov@mail.ru.

<sup>2</sup> Specialist of the Centre for monitoring of Regional markets, Institute of Environmental Management, Territorial Development and Urban Construction, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Kaliningrad E-mail: polyotkina@mail.ru.

<sup>3</sup> Assistant of Director, Institute of Environmental Management, Territorial Development and Urban Construction, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Kaliningrad. E-mail: LOsmolovskaya@kantiana.ru.

possible only provided elimination of the subjective drawbacks represented by the current deterioration of political relations between Russia and the EU countries.

### *The concept of “development corridor”*

Developers of development strategies for Kaliningrad Oblast relate its socio-economic prospects, in most cases, with increased cross-border cooperation. It is referred to participation of existing or emerging new spatial forms of international economic integration (NSFIEI) in the activity. The specific character of internal and external cross-border links enables researchers to distinguish various forms of territorial socio-economic systems as NSFIEI. At the macro level they are represented by large regions, growth triangles, mega corridors, and transboundary coastal zones. The meso-level comprises European regions, development corridors and Scandinavian groups. At the micro level, cross-border industrial-districts, transboundary clusters, polycentric border bridge regions can be distinguished<sup>4</sup>. All of them are nuclei of the cross-border meso- and micro-regions formed around them.

Unlike the inner regions formed within a country, cross-border regions often have less close ties between their parts belonging to different countries, as compared with these parts' ties with neighbouring regions of their own country. However, they largely determine not only the internal economy structure and special character of social life of national border regions, but also, in some cases (for example, when it comes to international regions - development corridors), a place in the domestic territorial division of labour.

One of the forms of international integration is a bipolar territorial system - Tricity (Gdansk - Gdynia - Sopot) - Kaliningrad, developed by Polish professor Tadeusz Palmovsky.<sup>5</sup> He substantiated the concept of the bipolar territorial system. With the view of developing this idea, Kaliningrad scientists proposed to form a tripolar system including Klaipeda as well and development of production functions of the European regions (**Figure 1**).<sup>6</sup> The establishment of cross-border clusters on both sides of the border of Russia and EU countries is so well argued.<sup>7</sup> There are proposals aiming at joint use of resources of Vistula and Curonian Lagoons and their coasts by Russia, Poland and Lithuania.<sup>8</sup> A number of works has been devoted to improvement of cross-border cooperation forms engaging Kaliningrad Oblast and neighbouring Polish and Lithuanian regions.<sup>9</sup> Consecutive development of these concepts resulted in substantiation of the formation of cross-border regions.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Nikolay Vladimirovich Kaledin et al., “Networking as a Fundamental Factor in Cross-border Region Formation,” *Geology, geography. Newsletter of St. Petersburg State University* 4 (2008): 130-139.

<sup>5</sup> Tadeusz Palmovsky, “New Baltic Bipolar Model of Inter-regional Cooperation,” *Newsletter of the Kaliningrad State University* 6 (2004).


<sup>6</sup> Valentin Sergeevich Korneevets and Gennady Mikhailovich Fedorov, “European Regions – A New Interaction Format,” *Cosmopolis* 2, 21 (2008): 78-85.

<sup>7</sup> Anadey Sergeevich Mikhailov, “International Cluster Geography in the Baltic Region,” *Baltic region* 1, 19 (2014): 149-163.

<sup>8</sup> Elena Gennadiyevna Kropinova, “Cooperation between Russia and EU in the Field of Innovative Tourism Development by the Example of Cooperation Programme ‘Lithuania – Poland – Russia’,” *Baltic region* 4, 18 (2013): 67-80.

<sup>9</sup> Nikolay Maratovich Mezhevich, *Cross-border Cooperation and Activity Practice of the European Regions in the North-West of Russia and Belarus: Practical Experience, Legislative Support* (St. Petersburg: SPb University Publishing House, 2009); Nina Yurievna Oding and Gennady Mikhailovich Fedorov, “Russian Participation Activation in the Cross-border Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region,” *Newsletter of I. Kant RSU* 3 (2009): 63-69; *North-west of Russia in the Baltic Sea Region: Problems and Prospects of Economic Interaction and Cooperation*, ed. Jacek

**Figure 1.** *The tripolar system: Tricity (Poland) – Kaliningrad (Russia) – Klaipeda (Lithuania).*



**Source:** Gennady Mikhailovich Fedorov, *Do you know the Kaliningrad region?* (Kaliningrad: IKBFU publisher, 2009), 178.

Another interesting idea is related to development of the concept of the regions – “development corridors”, where various NSFIEI can be combined. The regions can be divided into certain types depending on their qualitative characteristics that determine the direction and rate of development. According to the well-known classification of John Friedmann, the notion of international “development corridors” dates back to the classification of regions proposed by Friedmann who identified the following types of regions: core regions, upward-transition regions, downward-transition regions, resource-frontier regions, and development corridors. Friedmann’s classification was made in terms of known centre-periphery concept, involving polarisation of the regions amplified at all territorial levels. According to this concept, marginal, peripheral, i.e. border areas most often become depressed. The most effective is cooperation between of countries and border regions of different countries in the event that each of them has a fairly high level of socio-economic development. However, the border territories of two neighbouring countries, which have different but complementary resources, developing their cross-border cooperation may turn into new growth poles.

The greatest effect, in accordance with the concept of “growth triangles”, can be provided subject to implementation of a joint development strategy by three neighbouring regions, each of which has one of the following resources - natural, human, financial (and / or technological).<sup>11</sup> The “development corridors” are rapidly developing since they are

---

Zaukha et al. (Kaliningrad: IKBFU publisher 2008); Aleksandr Anatolievich Sergunin, “Russia and the European Union in the Baltic Region: Thorny Path to Partnership,” *Baltic region* 4, 18 (2013): 53-66; Gennady Mikhailovich Fedorov et al., *Russia in the Baltic Sea Region: 1990-2012* (Kaliningrad: IKBFU Publisher, 2013), 252.

<sup>10</sup> Valentin Sergeevich Korneevets, *International Regionalization in the Baltic Sea Region* (St. Petersburg: SPb University Publishing House, 2010); Gennady Fedorov and Valentin Korneevets, *Theoretical Aspects of Forming the Trans-border Regions. Human Resources — The Main Factor of Regional Development* (Klaipeda: Klaipeda University Press, 2010), 46-52; Gennady Fedorov, “Border Position as a Factor of Strategic and Territorial Planning in Russian Regions in the Baltic,” *Baltic region* 14, 21 (2014): 71-82.

<sup>11</sup> John Friedmann, *Regional Development Policy* (Cambridge: Mass.: MIT Press, 1968).

located between the “core regions” and in their development they use the innovations that are created in each of them.

Fedorov and Klemeshev introduced the notion of an “international development corridor”. According to the researchers, a border region can potentially become such a development corridor if certain conditions are fulfilled. Among those, we can name the international relations and active cooperation in the sphere of services, and developing market relations.

International regions - development corridors of neighbouring countries include, first of all, business entities, connected by means of close economic ties - not so much aimed at meeting the needs of the border regions themselves, but at the transit service between two countries. Accordingly, the political cooperation between the authorities, political organisations of neighbouring states and cultural relations between the entities of education, science, health, sports and culture get closer. All of these cross-border ties are formed on an equal basis, i.e. they are horizontal. They provide for international networks formation, which are localised as sector and cross-sector international clusters and, ultimately, the territorial system in the form of cross-border region - an international network covering the whole territory of cooperating border regions of neighbouring countries.

### ***Russian border regions and “development corridors”***

Table 1 shows the breakdown of Russian border regions (with land border) in terms of the level of economic development (by the value of gross regional product) and the level of foreign trade development (by the foreign trade turnover).

**Table 1.** *The breakdown of border regions of the RF according to the level of economic development and the degree of involvement in the RF foreign trade.*<sup>12</sup>

<i>Level of economic development</i> GRP, thousand roubles per capita, 2013	<i>Level of foreign trade development</i> Foreign trade turnover, thousand US dollars per capita, 2012			
	20.00 – 5.01 <i>With extremely active foreign trade</i>	5.00 – 1.01 <i>With active foreign trade</i>	1.00 – 0.51 <i>Poor development of foreign trade</i>	0.50 – 0.01 <i>Extremely poor development of foreign trade</i>
550 – 376 <i>Highly developed</i>	<b>Leningrad,</b> Belgorod, Tyumen Oblasts			
375 – 226 <i>Medium developed</i>	<b>Kaliningrad Oblast</b>	<b>Republic of Karelia;</b> Krasnodar, Khabarovsk, and Primorski Krai; <b>Murmansk,</b> Orenburg, Kursk, Voronezh, Novosibirsk, Amur, Samara, and Chelyabinsk Oblasts	Omsk Oblast	Jewish Autonomous Region
225 – 151 <i>Less developed</i>		Republic of Buryatia; Bryansk, Astrakhan, Saratov; <b>Pskov,</b> Smolensk, Rostov, and Volgograd Oblasts	Altai Krai, Zabaykalsky Krai; Kurgan Oblast	

<sup>12</sup> Note: The regions bordering on the EU countries are marked in bold.

150 – 76 <i>Least developed</i>			Karachay-Cherkess Republic	Republics: Kabardino-Balkarian, North Ossetia-Alania, Ingushetia, Chechnya, Dagestan, Altai, and Tyva
------------------------------------	--	--	----------------------------	---

**Source:** Compiled by authors based on the data of: “Federalnaya Slujba Gosudarstvennoy Statistiki” [Federal State Statistics Service], accessed April 20, 2015, <http://www.gks.ru/>. Highly and medium developed subjects of the Russian Federation with most dynamic foreign trade, i.e. highly developed in terms of economy, qualify, first and foremost, for the regions – international “development corridors” (Tyumen, Leningrad, and Belgorod Oblasts) and the medium developed Kaliningrad Oblast.

Tyumen Oblast can be excluded from the study owing to the fact that it is not involved in the cross-border trade and does not export hydrocarbons to Kazakhstan which it borders on. Therefore, the main conditions for the establishment of the “development corridor” are not fulfilled here: there are no mutual goods and capital flows.

In connection with the latest political events, the intensity of the international cooperation between Belgorod Oblast and the border Kharkov Region of the Ukraine has declined significantly. Until recently, a typical “international development corridor” has been shaping up here. Both regions are economically advanced; they were involved not only in the cross-border trade, but also in the exchange of technologies, labour resources, innovations, etc.<sup>13</sup> A distinguishing feature of the cooperation was also the establishment of joint ventures on both sides of the border. Thus, for example, as of data of the year 2011, among all the foreign entities in Belgorod Oblast approximately 70 % were enterprises with Ukrainian capital<sup>14</sup>. At present, these relationships have been basically terminated, in consequence of which the region has lost its functions of an “international development corridor”.

In the long term, the medium developed regions featuring dynamic foreign trade can transform into “international development corridors”. These regions on condition of the intensification of international cooperation with border regions will be able to approximate to the indices of Kaliningrad Oblast. For the subjects of the Asian part of Russia (Khabarovsk and Primorski Krai; Orenburg, Novosibirsk, Amur, Samara, and Chelyabinsk Oblasts), this seems feasible provided that the border regions of Kazakhstan and China, which now feature an average and low level of economic indicators, are developing. The Primorski Krai can today be considered as a forming “international development corridor”. While at the moment it is, like in the case of Tyumen Oblast, mainly functioning as a transit area for the export of natural resources, it is also dynamically developing as a common centre for international cooperation in the other spheres in the Far East. For the Russian regions bordering on Ukraine (Krasnodar Krai, Kursk and Voronezh Oblasts) this will be facilitated by the rehabilitation of the cross-border relations and cooperation.

The formation of “international development corridors” in this group's subjects (Republic of Karelia and Murmansk Oblast) bordering on the European Union and Norway seems difficult at the moment. This is to a certain degree connected with a

<sup>13</sup> *Russian-Ukrainian Borderzone: Twenty Years of Divided Unity*, ed. Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kolosov and Olga Ivanovna Vendina (Moscow: Novy Hronograf, 2011).

<sup>14</sup> “Federalnaya Slujba Gosudarstvennoy Statistiki” [Federal State Statistics Service], accessed April 20, 2015, <http://www.gks.ru/>.

relatively close position of Leningrad Oblast and St. Petersburg which are centres of the main flows of commodities, services, capital etc. Besides that, the Republic of Karelia and Murmansk Oblast as well as the bordering regions of Finland and Norway feature a low level of the population density and that of the infrastructure development which also hampers cooperation intensification.<sup>15</sup> The Leningrad Oblast has for a long time been considered as a “development corridor” along with St. Petersburg which has the status of the only “core region” in the North-West Russia. It is only Kaliningrad Oblast that can compete with St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region as regards the role of “development corridor” (which is confirmed by the data in **Table 2**).

### ***Specific character of Kaliningrad Oblast***

Kaliningrad Oblast does not have a considerable internal natural and economic potential; it is developed under difficult environmental conditions.

**Table 2.** *Strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the economic development in the Kaliningrad region.*

<p><b><i>Strengths:</i></b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Similarity to developed regions of Russia.</li> <li>2. Similarity to developed countries of Europe.</li> <li>3. Mild climate (as compared to some other parts of Russia).</li> <li>4. Access to the sea.</li> <li>5. Availability of mineral resources (amber, oil).</li> <li>6. High intensity of land-utilisation.</li> <li>7. Dense transport network.</li> <li>8. Well-developed market conditions (as compared to the other regions of Russia).</li> <li>9. High level of public education.</li> <li>10. Availability of scientific and research potential.</li> <li>11. Regulations of the Special Economic zone and the Federal Special Program of regional development</li> <li>12. Cooperation with neighbour states.</li> </ol>	<p><b><i>Weaknesses:</i></b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Spatial isolation.</li> <li>2. Differences in land-utilisation conditions.</li> <li>3. Cold climate (as compared to the average European).</li> <li>4. Lack of deep-water ports.</li> <li>5. Poor energy supply.</li> <li>6. High power load.</li> <li>7. Poor quality of transport communications.</li> <li>8. Poor-developed market conditions (as compared to the European countries).</li> <li>9. Disbalance between the specialists' training and the needs of the economy.</li> <li>10. Poor demand for science.</li> <li>11. Unstable conditions of economic activity.</li> <li>12. Geopolitical inconsistency.</li> </ol>
<p><b><i>Opportunities:</i></b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Access to the Russian market.</li> <li>2. Development of external relations.</li> <li>3. Low salaries and wages.</li> <li>4. Use of cheap marine transport.</li> <li>5. Exploitation of local raw materials.</li> <li>6. Intensification of social and economic relations in the region.</li> <li>7. Gateways to European transport network.</li> <li>8. High pace of development.</li> <li>9. Integration in the European education system.</li> <li>10. International scientific and research</li> </ol>	<p><b><i>Threats:</i></b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Autarchy.</li> <li>2. Difficulties in entering the EU market.</li> <li>3. Heightened costs.</li> <li>4. Competition on the part of the Baltic countries ports.</li> <li>5. Potential obstacles in the energy delivery.</li> <li>6. Accute ecological problems.</li> <li>7. Removal of the region from the European transport network.</li> <li>8. Decreasing pace of development.</li> <li>9. High unemployment rate and low labour</li> </ol>

<sup>15</sup> Valentin Sergeevich Korneevets, *International Regionalization in the Baltic Sea Region* (St. Petersburg: SPb University Publishing House, 2010).

projects. 11. External relations development. 12. Baltic sea – “sea of peace”.	productivity. 10. Degradation of scientific and research potential. 11. Economic stagnation. 12. Potential threat of conflicts.
--	--

The ambiguity of development conditions determines existing numerous strategies and proposals for the region's development, whereas it is the strategy of international “development corridor” that seems to be very promising to us. It enables us to take Strengths into account and eliminate Weaknesses, use Opportunities and avoid Threats. A distinguishing feature of the Kaliningrad Oblast as a “development corridor”, whose characteristics have already been considered by the *Eurolimes* journal earlier<sup>16</sup>, is the fact that it is located not between the Russian regions but between the regions of Russia and those of EU. That is, the innovation flows for it can take place both from Russian and West European regions. On the basis of this, the Kaliningrad Oblast (as well as any other region with similar functions) can be named a “development corridor”. The aim to penetrate the economic space of the Baltic Sea Region was set as early as in 2003. All the strategies of the socio-economic development of Kaliningrad Oblast have been considering external economic relations as an important factor of the regional development.

***Kaliningrad region as connecting point of cultural and tourism development within the “development corridor”***


A crucial condition for the implementation of favourable prerequisites of the Kaliningrad Oblast development<sup>17</sup> (that is also typical of other border regions) is the commitment of neighbours living on both sides of the border to intense and mutually beneficial economic cooperation and tourism development. This factor is taken into consideration in the strategy of the socio-economic development of the Oblast [Strategy of the socio-economic] and other documents regarding the region's development.

The Kaliningrad region, as the border exclave of Russian Federation, is active actor of different cross-border and trans-border joint projects within different Programmes co-financed by the European Union. It is important to pay the attention to joint projects implemented for tourism development and heritage protection. During 15 years, within the period from 2005 till 2015 there were 200 joint projects with Kaliningrad region were implemented, 81 of them aimed on tourism development, culture and heritage protection within three Programmes as INTERREG III B BSR Neighbourhood Programme, Baltic Sea Region Programme 2007-2013, South Baltic Programme, Lithuania-Poland – Kaliningrad Region of RF INTERREG III A Neighbourhood Programme, CBC ENPI Lithuania-Poland-Russia Programme 2007-2013 (**Figure 2, 3**).

<sup>16</sup> Yuri Rozhkov-Yuryevsky and Gennady Fedorov, “The Correlation between the Barrier and Contact Functions of the Kaliningrad Section of the Russian Border,” in *Eurolimes* 15, *A Security Dimension as Trigger and Result of Frontiers Modifications*, ed. Giuliana Laschi et al. (Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2013), 77-90.


<sup>17</sup> Konstantin Konstantinovich Gimbitsky et al., “The Development of Kaliningrad Regional Economy: A New Stage of Restructuring,” *The Baltic Region* 1, 19 (2014): 41-53, accessed April 15, 2015, [http://journals.kantiana.ru/eng/baltic\\_region/1713/4874/](http://journals.kantiana.ru/eng/baltic_region/1713/4874/).

**Figure 2.** Cross-border and trans-border EU projects with Kaliningrad region in period 2005-2015 years.



**Source:** Compiled by authors based on the data of official web pages of Programmes: “Baltic Sea Region. INTERREG III,” accessed May 20, 2015, <http://www.bsrinterreg.net/contacts.html>; “Triple Jump. Projects of Lithuania, Poland and Kaliningrad Region of Russian Federation Neighbourhood Programme,” accessed May 20, 2015, [http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/archive/country/commu/docoutils/interregiia\\_triplejump.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/country/commu/docoutils/interregiia_triplejump.pdf); “Lithuania-Poland-Russia ENPI Cross-border Cooperation Programme 2007-2013,” accessed May 20, 2015, <http://lt-pl-ru.eu/en,11>.

**Figure 3.** Number of EU projects implemented with Kaliningrad region on different spheres of tourism and culture development.



**Source:** Compiled by authors based on the data of official web-pages of Programmes: “Baltic Sea Region. INTERREG III”; “Triple Jump. Projects of Lithuania, Poland and Kaliningrad Region of Russian Federation Neighbourhood Programme”; “Lithuania-Poland-Russia ENPI Cross-border Cooperation Programme 2007-2013”.



Most of those projects were soft projects, and a lot of tourism products, Strategies and Programme documents were elaborated within the projects, as well as experience exchange and educational seminars and workshops. Last Programme, CBC ENPI Lithuania-Poland-Russia Programme 2007-2013, brought the opportunity to implement the infrastructure projects and make the new objects as for tourism development, culture and traditions promotion, as well as heritage protection. Most significant infrastructure projects are follows:

- 1) CROSSROADS 2.0 – Lagoons as crossroads of tourism and interactions of people of South-Eastern Baltic.

The new interactive tourism object was constructed in Kaliningrad region – the open-air museum of Viking epoch, “Ancient Sambia”. This museum was constructed as a small settlement of Viking age on Curonian Spit of Kaliningrad region. The interactive excursions are organising in this museum, and, mini-festivals “Days of Ancient Handicrafts”, representing the historical reconstruction of ancient life within the region. The next object of tourism and heritage infrastructure is reconstructed museum Fishing Farmstead in Neringa, Lithuania. The next soft, but very important activity of CROSSROADS 2.0 project is organisation of the huge event – festival of historical reconstruction and music “People of Ancient Baltic”. The festival was organised annually, in 2013 and 2014 in Kaliningrad region and Poland. And, as the sustainability indicator, it is important to mention that in 2015 this festival was organised without project financial support.

- 2) Baltic Amber Coast. Development of cross-border area through building up and modernisation of tourism infrastructure.

The wooden promenade was constructed in Kaliningrad region (Yantarny settlement), which became an attraction as for guests of the Kaliningrad region, and for its inhabitants.

- 3) Next project (case-study), which is important to mention, is project “Museums over borders”.

This project was implemented with partner from Elblag, Elblag museum. The main infrastructural effect of the project is reconstruction of museum from Kaliningrad region, Fridland Gate. For this moment the interest to the museum Fridland Gate is quite high, and the number of visitors increased.

Among the competitive advantages that promote the further development of tourism and culture in Kaliningrad Oblast as an “international development corridor” the following can be identified:

- a large number of state border crossing points (the Oblast ranks first in Russia);
- a developed transport infrastructure (the construction of a deep-water port is being considered that will increase the cargo handling capacities); and
- a high migration attractiveness of the Oblast.

One of the steps towards the Oblast's development as a “cooperation corridor” was the establishment in the summer 2012 of the local border traffic between the Kaliningrad Oblast and the neighbouring Polish regions, which created new opportunities for culture and tourism development of border regions.

### ***Conclusions***

Border regions are often referred to as lagging behind, being less profitably located in the national marketplace. However, in the face of active international ties connecting primarily core regions and advanced regions of some countries with the corresponding region types in other countries, there emerge specific types of border regions serving these ties, namely the international development corridors. Those include,

among the Russian regions belonging to the North-West Federal District, above all, St. Petersburg with the Leningrad region and Kaliningrad Oblast. Adjoining territory of foreign countries also belong to the type of regions - international development corridors. Speaking about Kaliningrad region as “development corridor”, it is obviously, that the region is very active in implementation of common international projects co-financed by the EU. And the tourism development and promotion activities play significant role in cross-border and trans-border cooperation between Kaliningrad region and Poland.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- “Baltic Sea Region. INTERREG III.” Accessed May 20, 2015. <http://www.bsrinterreg.net/contacts.html>.
- Belova, Anna Valerievna. “Instrumenty nauchno-tehnicheskogo sotrudnichestva Rossii I Evropejskogo Soyuzu v innovatsionnoj sfere” [Instruments for scientific and technical cooperation of Russia and EU in sphere of innovations]. *Baltijski Region* [Baltic region] 4, 14 (Kaliningrad, 2012): 137-149.
- “Federalnaya Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoy Statistiki” [Federal State Statistics Service]. Accessed April 20, 2015. <http://www.gks.ru/>.
- Fedorov, Gennady Mikhailovich, Yury Mikhailovich Zverev, and Valentin Sergeevich Korneevets. *Russia in the Baltic Sea Region: 1990-2012*. Kaliningrad: IKBFU Publisher, 2013.
- Fedorov, Gennady, and Valentin Korneevets. *Theoretical Aspects of Forming the Trans-border Regions. Human Resources — The Main Factor of Regional Development*. Klaipeda: Klaipeda University Press, 2010.
- Fedorov, Gennady. “Border Position as a Factor of Strategic and Territorial Planning in Russian Regions in the Baltic.” *Baltic region* 14, 21 (2014): 71-82.
- Friedmann, John. *A General Theory of Polarized Development*. Cambridge: Mass.: MIT Press; Ford Foundation; Urban and Regional Development Advisory Program in Chile, 1967.
- Friedmann, John. *Regional Development Policy*. Cambridge: Mass.: MIT Press, 1968.
- Gimbitsky, Konstantin Konstantinovich, Anastasia Leonidovna Kuznetsova, and Gennady Mikhailovich Fedorov. “The Development of Kaliningrad Regional Economy: A New Stage of Restructuring.” *The Baltic Region* 1, 19 (2014): 41-53. Accessed April 15, 2015. [http://journals.kantiana.ru/eng/baltic\\_region/1713/4874/](http://journals.kantiana.ru/eng/baltic_region/1713/4874/).
- Kaledin, Nikolay Vladimirovich, Valentin Sergeevich Korneevets, and Tatiana Nikolaevna Chekalina. “Networking as a Fundamental Factor in Cross-border Region Formation.” *Geology, Geography. Newsletter of St. Petersburg State University* 4 (2008): 130-139.
- Klemeshev Andray Pavlovich, and Gennadya Mikhailovich Fedorov. “From an Isolated Exclave to a “Development Corridor”: Alternative Development Strategies of the Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea.” Kaliningrad: Immanuel Kant State University Press, 2005.
- Korneevets, Valentin Sergeevich, and Gennady Mikhailovich Fedorov. “European Regions – A New Interaction Format.” *Cosmopolis* 2, 21 (2008): 78-85.
- Korneevets, Valentin Sergeevich. “International Regionalization in the Baltic Sea Region.” St. Petersburg: SPb University Publishing House, 2010.
- Kropinova, Elena Gennedievna, Natalia Aleksandrovna Zaitseva, and Maksim Moroz. “Approaches to the Assessment of the Contribution of Tourism into the

- Regional Surplus Product: Case of the Kaliningrad Region.” *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* 6, 3 S5 (2015): 275-283. Accessed May 24, 2015. DOI: 10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n3s5p275.
- Kropinova, Elena Gennadiyevna. “Mezhdunarodnaja kooperacija v sfere turizma I formirovanije transgranichnogo turistskogo regiona na Baltike” [International cooperation in tourism sphere and establishment of trans-border tourist region on Baltic]. *Vestnik Baltijskogo federalnogo Universiteta im/ I/ Kanta* [Vestnik of I. Kant Baltic Federal University] 1 (2010): 113-119.
- Kropinova, Elena Gennadiyevna. “Cooperation between Russia and EU in the Field of Innovative Tourism Development by the Example of Cooperation Programme ‘Lithuania – Poland – Russia’.” *Baltic region* 4, 18 (2013): 67-80.
- “Lithuania-Poland-Russia ENPI Cross-border Cooperation Programme 2007-2013.” Accessed May 20, 2015. <http://lt-pl-ru.eu/en,11>.
- Mezhevich, Nikolay Maratovich. *Cross-border Cooperation and Activity Practice of the European Regions in the North-West of Russia and Belarus: Practical Experience, Legislative Support*. St. Petersburg: SPb University Publishing House, 2009.
- Mikhailov, Andrey Sergeevich. “International Cluster Geography in the Baltic Region.” *Baltic region* 1, 19 (2014): 149-163.
- North-west of Russia in the Baltic Sea Region: Problems and Prospects of Economic Interaction and Cooperation*, ed. Jacek Zaukha, Leonid Eduardovich Limonov, and Nina Yurievna Oding. Kaliningrad: IKBFU Publisher, 2008.
- Oding, Nina Yurievna, and Gennady Mikhailovich Fedorov. “Russian Participation Activation in the Cross-border Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region.” *Newsletter of I. Kant RSU* 3 (2009): 63-69.
- Palmovsky, Tadeusz. “New Baltic Bipolar Model of Inter-regional Cooperation.” *Newsletter of the Kaliningrad State University* 6 (2004): 66-75.
- Fedorov, Gennady, and Yuri Rozhkov-Yuryevsky. “The Correlation between the Barrier and Contact Functions of the Kaliningrad Section of the Russian Border.” In *Eurotimes 15, A Security Dimension as Trigger and Result of Frontiers Modifications*, edited by Giuliana Laschi, Alexis Vahlas, and Dorin Dolghi, 77-90. Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2013.
- Russian-Ukrainian Borderzone: Twenty Years of Divided Unity*, edited by Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kolosov and Olga Ivanovna Vendina. Moscow: Novy Hronograf, 2011.
- Sergunin, Aleksandr Anatolievich. “Russia and the European Union in the Baltic Region: Thorny Path to Partnership.” *Baltic region* 4, 18 (2013): 53-66.
- “Strategy of the Socio-economic Development of the Kaliningrad Oblast for a Long-term Perspective.” Approved by the Resolution of the Government of the Kaliningrad Oblast of 02/08/2012 No583. Accessed April 15, 2015. <http://economy.gov39.ru/DEP-strateg/strategicheskoe-razvitie/>.
- “Triple Jump. Projects of Lithuania, Poland and Kaliningrad Region of Russian Federation Neighbourhood Programme.” Accessed May 20, 2015. [http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/archive/country/commu/docutils/interregiia\\_triplejump.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/country/commu/docutils/interregiia_triplejump.pdf).



## **II. Cities in the Border Regions**

**Corina TURŞIE** (Timișoara) ◀ ▶ *Re-Inventing the Centre-periphery Relation by the European Capitals of Culture. Case-studies: Marseille-Provence 2013 and Pecs 2010*

**Constantin-Vasile ȚOCA** (Oradea) and **Bogdan Mihail POCOLA** (Cluj Napoca) ◀ ▶ *Searching for Development of Medium-sized Cities in the European Union: A Study Case on Oradea*

**István SÜLI-ZAKAR** and **Tibor KECSKÉS** (Debrecen) ◀ ▶ *The Historical Borders and the Cross-Border Connections' Effect on Debrecen's Spirituality and Cultural Economy*



# **Re-Inventing the Centre-periphery Relation by the European Capitals of Culture. Case-studies: Marseille-Provence 2013 and Pecs 2010**

**Corina TURŞIE<sup>1</sup>**

**Abstract:** *The European Capital of Culture (ECoC) Program was initiated in mid 80's, as a modality to promote the richness and diversity of European cultures. It soon became evident that the Program's impact went beyond the cultural and political aspects and that the designation was a marketing opportunity for cities to improve image on a national and European scale, a regeneration tool in itself. ECoC is today about cities re-inventing their identities, re-narrating their history in a European context. The peripheral position, the unwanted heritage of the cities' past, soon became elements to be exploited and re-invented. The study is focused on two border cities that won the ECoC title and their ability to use the title as a regenerative tool, in order to foster their European identity, to favourably reorient their geography and to reposition themselves on Europe's map: Marseille-Provence 2013 (a Western Europe big city/region with an ex-colonial past and a peripheral position complex) and Pecs 2010 (a small Eastern peripheral city with a communist past). Applying qualitative content analysis on three types of documents: Application (Bid) books, official web pages and ex-post European Commission's evaluations, the article intends to identify the narratives used by these border cities to comply with the European dimension of the ECoC project.*

**Key words:** *European Capital of Culture, centre-periphery, urban regeneration, local narratives, European dimension.*

## ***Introduction. Why study EcoC border cities in 2015?***

2015 is an important year for Romania from the point of view of participating to the European Capital of Culture (ECoC) Program and designating it's the winning city for the year 2021. According the ECoC Program's Timetable, each of the Member States concerned, have to publish a Call of submissions of applications no later than six years before the ECoC year is due to begin. After that, interested cities have ten months to submit applications consisting in the Program which the candidate city plans to realize for the given year; the assessment of candidatures is realised in each country by a mix Selection Panel, composed by national and European experts. So, by the end of this year we will find out which are the official Romanian candidate cities and what is the content of their Bid Book – the slogan and concept of the candidature and the proposed Cultural program.

As a relative new member of the European Union (EU), situated at its Eastern border, non-member of the Schengen Area nor the Euro Area, Romania is in a peripheral position related to the Western core of European countries. It will be challenging to see how our candidate cities will construct, through their bids, their image and identity in relation with the European identity – the “European dimension” of the city being the main selection criteria of the Program. Cities with peripheral European position won the ECoC

---

<sup>1</sup> PhD Lecturer at the Department of Politics, West University of Timișoara.

title in the past, and they can be useful and inspiring best-practice case studies. This is *rationale* of this paper. A discussion related to core-periphery concepts in relation with the ECoC and the Program's evolution will precede, within the economy of this article two proposed ECoC border cities case studies.

***Core-periphery within the European Capital of Culture Program. Exploring the European dimension of ECoC border cities***

After the EU Eastern enlargement (2004), ECoC Program was seen as a tool aimed at influencing the cultural unity in a renewed Union, where new Member States had the opportunity to bring to the front their culture and to feel as equals with the older Member States. The designation procedure has changed starting with 2009: the EU has annually designated two ECoCs – one from an old and one from a new Member State. Moreover, from 2010, cities' candidacies are being judged following two criteria: "European dimension" and "City and citizens". Since 2010, Central and Eastern European cities prepared applications presenting themselves through their culture and city space as "European". Several cities, carrying "the physical and mental heritage of the past socialist regimes, have aimed at strengthening their belonging to the European cultural and social sphere through the ECoC designation and the regeneration project it enables"<sup>2</sup>.

A lot of cities geographically situated in a border, marginal and peripheral European position competed for the title and even have won it. In this new phase of the ECoC program the discussions on Europe and European identity became the major focus of the implementation of the program. In addition, the discussions of defining Europe and European cultural identity have inter-wined with the aims of urban transformation and regeneration. The goal of this paper is to identify the discursive connection between urban regeneration and the European dimension (or the idea of Europe or Europeanisation). I want to explore the articulation of local narratives of ECoC border cities in the broader European context. I also want to discuss how border or peripheral ECoCs use the transformation of their cities to reinvent their image with the purpose of place branding and place marketing in relation to the idea of Europe/European dimension.

Within the ECoC programme, it was argued that "the European dimension is most visible when the ECoC candidates reflect their own history as a part of European history, particularly when hinting at their involvement with the major ideologies of the XIX<sup>th</sup> and XX<sup>th</sup> centuries, such as National Socialism, Communism and Colonialism"<sup>3</sup>. ECoC is about cities re-inventing their identities, re-narrating their history in a European context. But how ex-communist or ex-colonial cities deal with their past? How they narrate their past in order to fit in the European dimension of the ECoC program? The purpose of this paper is to identify the narratives used by these border cities to comply with one particular selection ECoC criteria: the European dimension of the city.

The focus of this investigation is on two ex-ECoCs, from an old EU member state, France – Marseille-Provence (2013) and from a new EU member state, Hungary – Pécs (2010). Putting to the side the obvious scale difference regarding the number of inhabitants, the two cities have been chosen from several reasons: the geographical position (at the time of their application for the title they were both border cities of the European Union, prior to Romania's accession); they are situated at the most challenging

<sup>2</sup> Tuuli Lahdesmaki, "European Capital of Culture Designation as an Initiator of Urban Transformation in the Post-socialist Countries," *European Planning Studies* 22-3 (2014): 483.

<sup>3</sup> Nicole L. Immler and Hans Sakkers, "(Re) Programming Europe: European Capitals of Culture: Rethinking the Role of Culture," *Journal of European Studies* 44, 1 (2014): 16.



EU borders: Southern and respectively, Eastern; the ex-colonial, respectively ex-communist past of the city/country; that fact that they hold the title since 2010 (the introduction of the two selection criteria for holding the title and the existence of ex-post evaluation Reports of the European Commission).

The research data consist of Application (Bid) books, official web pages and ex-post European Commission's evaluations. The method used was the qualitative content analysis with the purpose of a close reading of these documents and discussing cities plans for transformation through various views on urban issues.

### ***Centre-periphery economic discrepancies and the Soul of Europe***

While EU was advancing in pursuing its economic projects such as the Single Market or the Euro Area, a cold, technocratic multispeed integration became visible, or a so called Europe of concentric circles of policy participation.<sup>4</sup> Due to some states' inability to implement policies on the long run, different strata of Members States, gathered around a hard core (more often composed by France, Germany or Great Britain) became visible. The core-periphery relation is most likely to be encountered in studies of economic underdevelopment and dependency and tend to draw on the Marxist tradition of analysis. It can be understood in relation with Wallerstein's world systems theory.

Social and economic inequalities became for the first time visible after the 1981 and 1986 enlargement, when Greece<sup>5</sup>, Spain and Portugal joined the European Community. A North-South, rich-poor development axis became evident. The development discrepancies became even more spatial visible in a core-periphery, West-East axis, after the 2004 EU enlargement. Moreover, following the current global economic crisis we are witnessing the revival of the division between the allegedly diligent North and the lazy South. Peripheral states in crisis such as Greece, Cyprus, Spain, Slovenia partially perceived<sup>6</sup> their situation as being "publicly humiliated by the centres of the EU and the North", putting them in "a condition of internal postcoloniality, whereby the periphery has become the resource (in economic, financial and cultural-moral sense) for the reproduction of the power regimes of the centre"<sup>7</sup>.

Started as an economic integration project, European Union soon found itself in the situation of searching for its soul, because, paraphrasing Jacques Delors, nobody can fall in love with the Common Market. The discourses of European identity and cultural identity as common ground to build solidarity may have been introduced in the 80s to compensate for economic disparities and democratic deficit. In fact, the use of the word "Capital" makes us think of Centre, in contrast with 'Hinterland', province and periphery. But the ECoC title is no longer about big capital cities, as it was the case at its beginning. Since more than a decade ago, the title was held mostly by cities coming from *hinterland* and not by capital cities *per se*. In the context of cultural "capital", the Program allows cities to shift of the perception of centre-periphery, to move the attention from traditional core-periphery distinction and to put themselves in the spotlight. I will present next a general overview of the evolution of the ECoC Program.

<sup>4</sup> Alex Warleigh, *Flexible Integration. Wich Model for the European Union?* (London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002).

<sup>5</sup> No wonder that the initiative for creating what we call today "European Capital of Culture" came in 1985 at the suggestion of the Greek Minister of Culture, Melina Mercouris.

<sup>6</sup> The electoral high results of left-wing parties in Greece (Syriza) and Spain (Podemos) in general elections (2015) and European elections (2014) reflect this perception.

<sup>7</sup> Ksenija Vidmar Horvat, "Rebordering the Perspective on EU: A View from the Slovenian Periphery," *Javnost-The Public* 21-3 (2014): 93.

### *Historical and legislative framework of the ECoC Program*

The “European Capital of Culture” is a title awarded for one year in the name of a city, by the European Union, following a selection process, period within the city organizes a series of cultural events with a strong European dimension. Its main objectives are to safeguard and promote the diversity of European cultures and to highlight common features and also, to foster the contribution of culture to the long-term development of the cities.

This Initiative had a dynamic history. It started as European “City of Culture” award, in 1985, with the purpose to “bring the people of the Member States closer together”<sup>8</sup>. There were no specific selection criteria at that time, in principle, each Member State, in alphabetical order, was given the possibility to host the event. Alterations of the chronological order were allowed, by agreement. Nominations would be made two years in advance. Also, Member States were responsible for financing the event. Because of these arrangements, until 1999, the Cities of Culture were, in fact, big Western European cities, with a strong cultural profile, such as: Athens (1985), Florence (1986), Berlin (1988), Paris (1989), Madrid (1992).

Glasgow – EcoC 1990 was the first industrial city to hold the title, peripheral in relation with the former shiny cultural cities, and it created the precedent of using culture as a regeneration tool for other troubled cities.

The first years of the Initiative seem inspired by a top-down entrepreneurial vision. „Entrepreneurial strategies”<sup>9</sup> are market oriented, targeting purely economic objectives: economic growth based on tourism, „city competitiveness”<sup>10</sup>, promoting the city’s image, organising spectacular mega-events in the city centre. An example of such strategy is the so-called „Bilbao effect” or „Barcelona model”<sup>11</sup>, Spanish cities which „have become Meccas of urban regeneration from industrial cities of a post-authoritarian regime to culturally vibrant magnets of visitors, and all in only a few decades”<sup>12</sup>. Bilbao became famous in 1997 with the inauguration of the Guggenheim Museum; as for Barcelona, the 1992 Olympic Games represented a catalyst for urban regeneration and major infrastructure development. This vision is related to the “old” (since the ‘50s) *rationale* of cultural policy-making, promoting “high quality art” (...) maintaining prestigious facilities for ‘high’ culture marketed to wealthy visitors, which emphasizes ‘exclusiveness’<sup>13</sup>. These elite “flagship” schemes are meant to “enhance urban competitiveness”<sup>14</sup>.

---

<sup>8</sup> “Resolution of the Ministers Responsible for Cultural Affairs, Meeting within the Council, of 13 June 1985 Concerning the Annual Event ‘European City of Culture,’” *Official Journal of the European Communities*, C 153, 22 June 1985.

<sup>9</sup> Phil Hubbard, “Urban Design and City Regeneration: Social Representations of Entrepreneurial Landscapes,” *Urban Studies* 33-8(1996): 1441-1461.

<sup>10</sup> Michael E. Porter, “The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City,” *Harvard Business Review* (May-June 1995): 55-71.

<sup>11</sup> Sara Gonzalez, “Bilbao and Barcelona ‘in Motion’. How Urban Regeneration ‘Models’ Travel and Mutate in the Global Flows of Policy Tourism,” *Urban Studies* 48 (2011): 1397-1418; Joaquim Rius Ulldemolins, “Culture and Authenticity in Urban Regeneration Processes: Place Branding in Central Barcelona,” *Urban Studies* 20, 10 (2014).

<sup>12</sup> Gonzales, 1397.

<sup>13</sup> Franco Bianchini, „Rethinking European Cities: The Role of Cultural Policies,” in *Cultural Policy and Urban Regeneration*, ed. Franco Bianchini and Michael Parkinson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 19.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

Critics of the entrepreneurial model argued that: it only creates a regeneration of the city centre, following a “top-down” approach; it is a “branding engineering”<sup>15</sup> consisting in investments in big events as the city is being built as a “place for consumption”<sup>16</sup>, “for the tourists”<sup>17</sup>, rather for its inhabitants. There is a tension between the logic of building prestigious facilities for wealthy visitors and opening up public access to them. In the former vision, culture has just an instrumental role, cities evaluating the success of their cultural activities according to economic standards, rather than public benefits. Arts are being marketed and “have moved (...) from being administered as a public service to being managed as businesses paying their way in increased property values, job creation and tourism.”<sup>18</sup> This logic aims “at rethinking cultural production and participation as a key competitive asset, at strengthening and refurbishing industrial heritage buildings and facilities into cultural uses and cultural quarters”<sup>19</sup>. This approach was mostly criticised for missing key aspects of development sustainability, especially from the social point of view.

The European „City of Culture” award was, at its origins, an intergovernmental initiative, the decision for nominating the cultural cities being taken by member states representatives. The first delegation of some cultural competencies to the Community was the result of the Treaty of Maastricht, in 1992. After that, in 1999 an EU Decision<sup>20</sup> offered to the Initiative „European City of Culture” the status of Community Action, a new name – „European Capital of Culture”, a financing scheme, new selection criteria and new evaluation criteria. It was also adopted a chronological list of states nominated to hold the title until 2019, following the principle „one year- one state”. The Council was responsible for the official nomination of ECoCs, following one or more proposals from the member states. Candidate cities were supposed to propose a cultural project responding to a specific theme of European interest. At that time, the general objectives of the Programme were „to highlight the richness and diversity of European cultures and the features they share, as well as to promote greater mutual acquaintance between European citizens” (art. 3). It didn’t exist any mention of the goal of urban development, even though in the art. 5-6 of the Preamble of the 1999 EU Decision were highlighted the flaws of the City of Culture Initiative, in terms of lack of sustainability and community development: “the positive impact has none the less not always produced results lasting beyond the duration of the project itself (...) this initiative is important both for strengthening local and regional identity and for fostering European integration”.

One of the few comparative evaluative studies of the ECoC Programme was released in 2004 and it collected information related to 21 cities, which held the title between 1995 and 2004. The study highlighted the change in the Program’s purpose, towards a bottom-up, participative vision: even though most ECoC cities assumed most often objectives referring to “the need to raise the international profile of the city and its

---

<sup>15</sup> Pierluigi Sacco et al., “Understanding Culture-led Local Development: A Critique of Alternative Theoretical Explanations,” *Urban Studies* (10 December 2013): 7, accessed May 14, 2014, <http://usj.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/12/17/0042098013512876>.

<sup>16</sup> Gonzales, 1397.

<sup>17</sup> Sharon Zukin, *The Cultures of Cities* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995).

<sup>18</sup> Miles Malcom, “Interruptions: Testing the Rhetoric of Culturally Led Urban Development,” *Urban Studies* 42(2005): 894.

<sup>19</sup> Sacco et al., 7.

<sup>20</sup> “Decision No. 1419/1999/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 Establishing a Community Action for the European Capital of Culture Event for the Years 2005 to 2019,” *Official Journal* L 166 (1999): 1.

region, to attract visitors and to enhance pride and self-confidence”<sup>21</sup>, other cities included in their objectives “expanding the local audience for culture, making improvements to cultural infrastructure, developing relationships with other European cities and regions, promoting creativity and innovation and developing the careers/talents of local artists”<sup>22</sup>. Most ECoCs aimed “to reach a wide audience and increase participation in culture”<sup>23</sup>, but for some cities analysed in the quoted study, this was a high priority, which can be anchored in the progressive strategies of cultural development.

The *progressive* or *capability* strategy, distinguishes from the market approaches of cultural activities, focusing instead on the distribution of benefits to the citizens. In this case, the success of development is not measured in terms of economic growth, but “the goal is to reduce socio-economic disparities and raise overall standards of living through redistributive policies and the encouragement of citizen participation”<sup>24</sup>. Also, if the entrepreneurial strategy is focused on city competitiveness, and internationalisation, the non-market oriented strategy values “decentralized, community based provision of more popular cultural activities, targeted in particular at low income and marginalized social groups”<sup>25</sup>, aiming to “protect and develop indigenous local and regional identities, and the culture of often socially and economically disadvantaged immigrant community”<sup>26</sup>.

This strategy gives value to the access to culture and seems to be inspired by Amartya Sen capability theory<sup>27</sup>, even though his theory was not created for cultural contexts, but to explain underdevelopment instead. Following Sen, the persistence of development discrepancies are the result of the fact that poorness equals lack of information and experience which allow individuals to set goals and to transform existing resources into welfare. In a similar logic, access to culture is reduced because individuals do not have the capabilities necessary to evaluate the positive benefits of cultural experiences. Progressive cultural strategies seek to obtain a raised, bottom-up, access and participation of citizens to culture, the support of local cultural production, and they also seek to enhance the community identity and to revitalize the disadvantaged areas. Local authorities may decide to transform unused properties into community cultural centres and to stimulate the interest for local cultural heritage<sup>28</sup>. Also, local governments may try to develop “the function of the city centre as a focus for public social life, genuinely accessible for all citizens.”<sup>29</sup> This strategy was also criticised as promoting parochialism. For example, the cultural strategy implemented by Cork, European Capital of Culture 2005, was considered as being parochial, “as a consequence of self-referential exasperation of local issues”<sup>30</sup>.

Community development and social inclusion were amongst their most important objectives for ECoCs Copenhagen, Brussels, Rotterdam, Helsinki, Graz, and Stockholm. Helsinki used the slogans “a City of Children and a City for All” and Rotterdam “Vital City” and “young@rotterdam” among others. Over half the cities studied had projects for

<sup>21</sup> “European Cities and Capitals of Culture Study Prepared for the European Commission,” Part. I (Bruxelles: Palmer-Rae Associates, august 2004): 14.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>24</sup> Carl Grodach and Anastasia Loukaitou- Sideris, “Cultural Development Strategies and Urban Revitalization,” *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 13, 4 (2007): 355.

<sup>25</sup> Bianchini, 19.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Amartya K. Sen, *Comodities and Capabilities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).

<sup>28</sup> Grodach and Loukaitou- Sideris, 355.

<sup>29</sup> Bianchini, 19.

<sup>30</sup> Sacco et al., 9.

people with disabilities, the socially disadvantaged (The First Homeless street-soccer World Cup in Graz; a theatre group working in Bruges prison) and minority groups. In a few cities projects were developed especially for women, the elderly (Art in elderly people's homes in Helsinki) and the unemployed. As we have seen, many ECoC cities have gone further the official objectives of the ECoC programme, in stating explicit social, economic or tourism objectives. The introduction of such objectives into the ECoC Community Action has both shaped and reflected broader trends in cultural policy.

ECoC legislative framework was again modified in 2005 and 2006, in order to allow newer EU Member States (which joined EU in 2004 and 2007) to participate to the Programme, therefore the principle of nomination became, starting with 2009, „one year-two States”- an old Member State and a new one.<sup>31</sup> Central and Eastern peripheral ex-communist countries became eligible to hold the title. EU enlargements enriched the diversity of the cultural heritage, but identifying and promoting its common features was put to challenge. This is the reason why a new EU Decision<sup>32</sup>, from 2006, introduced two criteria of selection: the “European dimension” of the Cultural Programme (“the programme shall foster cooperation between cultural operators, artists and cities from the relevant Member States and other Member States in any cultural sector; highlight the richness of cultural diversity in Europe; to bring the common aspects of European cultures to the fore” - Art. 4.1); and the second one, “City and Citizens” (the programme shall: “foster the participation of the citizens living in the city and its surroundings and raise their interest as well as the interest of citizens from abroad; be sustainable and be an integral part of the long-term cultural and social development of the city”- Art. 4.2). The challenge met by cities coming from peripheral European positions was to highlight their European identity dimension.

The selection procedures described in the 2006 EU Decision were applied starting with 2010<sup>33</sup>. That was the starting point of the internal national bidding system for the designation of ECoC. Before that, and back until 1999, ECoCs were directly designated by the Council, following the nomination of governments, without any mandatory internal competition between different competing cities. Sibiu 2007 did not compete with any Romanian city; it was directly nominated to receive this title, before Romania was even an EU member state.

ECoC framework was modified in 2014<sup>34</sup>, with new rules for the period 2020-2033. These are the rules based upon the candidature of Romanian cities for ECoC 2021 will be judged. The new rules are adding to the original objectives of the ECoC (“to highlight the richness and diversity of European cultures and the common features they share”) a new objective: “to foster the contribution of culture to the *long-term development of cities* in accordance with their respective strategies and priorities (art.

---

<sup>31</sup> “Decision No. 649/2005/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 April 2005,” *Official Journal* L 117 (2005): 20.

<sup>32</sup> “Decision No. 1622/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 Establishing a Community Action for the European Capital of Culture Event for the Years 2007 to 2019,” *Official Journal of the European Union* L 304 (2006).

<sup>33</sup> Given the time-scale of ECoC implementation, preparation of which begins 6 years before the title year, the 2006 Decision maintained the application of the 1999 Decision to the ECoC for 2007, 2008 and 2009 and foresaw transitional provisions for the titles for 2010, 2011 and 2012.

<sup>34</sup> “Decision No. 445/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 Establishing a Union Action for the European Capitals of Culture for the Years 2020 to 2033 and Repealing Decision No 1622/2006/EC,” *Official Journal of the European Union*, L132/1-14 (2014).

2).”<sup>35</sup> This new objective is motivated in the Preamble of the 2014 EU Decision as being the result of the fact that cities holding the title in the past have progressively added this new dimension by using the leverage effect of the title to stimulate their more general development. In particular, past evidence has shown “the potential of the European Capitals of Culture as a catalyst for local development and cultural tourism (Preamble)”<sup>36</sup> Moreover, cities are now encouraged to embed the ECoC cultural programme in a long-term culture-led development strategy, having a sustainable impact on local economic, cultural and social development.

The European Capital of Culture Program rapidly made evident that its impact goes beyond the cultural and political aspects as “cities recognized that the designation was a marketing opportunity to improve image on a national and European scale and constituted a sort of regeneration tool.”<sup>37</sup> The peripheral position, the unwanted heritage of the cities’ past, soon became elements to be exploited and re-invented within the general ECoC purpose of promoting the diversity and richness of European cultures. In the following part of the paper, the focus will be on two border cities that won the ECoC title and their ability to use the title as a regenerative tool, in order to foster their European identity, to reorient their geography and to reposition themselves on Europe’s map.

***Border European Capital of culture cities. Local narratives of Pecs 2010 and Marseille-Provence 2013.***

We have explored the candidature and promotional materials on urban regeneration in the two selected ECoC border cities, in order to discover what kind of meaning and values are related to urban regeneration of these cities, so that they express the European dimension requested by the Program. Special attention was being paid to traces of colonialist, respectively communist heritage, and the discourse used to deal with the heritage of the past. We have gathered the main cities local narratives in a few ideas, articulated in a European context.

*What is the urgency for winning ECoC title? Culture as a catalyst for image change and local development*

Both cities have a certain urgency seen as a problem that belongs to the city and that can be solved through the cultural year. This urgency can be understood by the candidacy slogan. Pecs run its bid under the slogan “Borderless city”. During its history, the city suffered from having a peripheral position in relation to Budapest and Western Europe and this position was turned central into the application, through a reinterpretation of the centre-periphery relation. Pecs’s message to Europe highlighted the rich cultural experience of a border region that has Pecs in its centre.

Marseille-Provence used the slogan “Sharing the South” and assumed as a mission the sustainable development of both shores of the Mediterranean Sea, as “an exemplary Euro-Mediterranean region”. The city always suffered from a Southern/peripheral complex, due to the fact that during its history it has been perceived as peripheral in relation with Paris and also had a negative reputation due to the big number of immigrants, mostly from Northern Africa. Through the ECoC title Marseille wanted to

---

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>37</sup> GiannaLia Cogliandro, “European Cities of Culture for the Year 2000: A Wealth of Urban Cultures for Celebrating the Turn of the Century” (Final Report) (Bruxelles: Association of the European Cities of Culture of the year 2000, AECC/AVEC, 2001): 8.

respond to the challenge of demographic, economic, ecologic and cultural asymmetry between the North and the South shore of the Mediterranean Sea. This North-South divide is obvious even from the *motto* of the Bid:

“Even today, we can still find a clear-eyed understanding in France and a consideration with regard to those rare and rarely satisfied men who are too great to be fulfilled by any form of patriotism and who, as Northerners, know how to love the South and in the South, love the North – those natural Mediterranean, those good Europeans” (Friedrich Nietzsche)<sup>38</sup>.

### *Internationalising the city*

In its Bid Book Pecs presents itself as a regional/international spokesperson, with the role of presenting “the cultural diversity of its international cultural region that is open towards the Balkans”<sup>39</sup>. Its peripheral European position is transformed into a central one, with the goal “to become one of the cultural centres of an international region at the border of Western and South-Eastern Europe.”<sup>40</sup> Marseille assumes as a goal to build an image for the Marseille-Provence region that is “international, creative and welcoming”. “Sharing the South” strategy refers in itself to the creation of a “permanent hub for intercultural, Euro-Mediterranean dialogue in Marseilles”<sup>41</sup>.

### *Multiculturalism*

Pecs is presenting itself as a multicultural city, as opposed to the past homogenous socialist identity. In the past “it developed cultural layers of Latin, Turkish, German, Croatian and Hungarian origin. Today it is the most important centre of German, Croatian and Romany culture in Hungary.”<sup>42</sup> The purpose of the city is to bring to the light the multicultural richness of one of the “least-known borders of Europe”<sup>43</sup>.

Marseille is referring to itself as “the most cosmopolitan European city (...) with some thirty ethnic groups who have settled and coexist here. Generous and hospitable for the last 20 centuries, it is an intercultural city *par excellence*.”<sup>44</sup> Even though immigration control has always been a problem for Marseille, in its Bid Book it presents this situation as a challenge and opportunity, as a European laboratory: “Marseilles is a privileged testing ground of cultural integration at a time when issues related to immigration are increasingly central to European construction.”<sup>45</sup>

### *Exploiting the geographical position*

In the application materials of the investigated ECoCs, the location of the designated cities was discussed “both as a geographical and mental condition”<sup>46</sup>. Cities are

---

<sup>38</sup> “Marseille-Provence 2013, European and Mediterranean Application to Become the European Capital of Culture.” (2008): 3, accessed January 5, 2015, [http://www.mp2013.fr/pro/files/2012/02/MP13\\_DP\\_EN.pdf](http://www.mp2013.fr/pro/files/2012/02/MP13_DP_EN.pdf).

<sup>39</sup> “European Capital of Culture Pecs 2010, Borderless City,” (2006): 9, accessed January 5, 2015, [http://www.pecs2010.hu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/pecs2010\\_english.pdf](http://www.pecs2010.hu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/pecs2010_english.pdf).

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

<sup>41</sup> “Marseille-Provence 2013,” 21.

<sup>42</sup> “European Capital of Culture Pecs 2010,” 17.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>44</sup> “Marseille-Provence 2013,” 203.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 203.

<sup>46</sup> Lahdesmaki, 491.

“keen to portray themselves in central positions no matter where they are on the map”<sup>47</sup>. Pecs narrate itself as “mediator” between East and West, between “the cultures of the Balkans and Western Europe”<sup>48</sup>, a “gateway open to the Balkans and parts of Europe which do not yet belong to the European Union”<sup>49</sup>. Pecs reveals its will to belong to the Western Europe and it raises the religious argument: “A culture is seen as Western or Eastern according to its religious traditions, and a culture built on either Islamic or Orthodox Christian traditions is today generally considered as Eastern.”<sup>50</sup> After 1989, Hungary focused on Westernisation and Pecs has been particularly important due to its UNESCO World Heritage Site status (the pre-Christian necropolis), so that “historically Christian city has overridden its more recent socialist past”<sup>51</sup>. Using symbols derived from Catholic and Protestant ideology was seen as “a strategy to find meaningful semantic alternatives to the preponderance of socialist imagery and architecture.”<sup>52</sup>

Marseille presents itself as a European cultural metropolis situated in the centre of the Euro-Mediterranean region. Its main acknowledged potential is the geographical one: “strategically located in the middle of the Latin Arc that unites metropolises along the Northern bank of the Mediterranean”<sup>53</sup>. Marseilles reorients its geography and does not present itself as a Southern European city, but instead, as a city situated on the North shore of the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, the concepts of North and South used in the Bid Book are referring to the two different shores of the Mediterranean Sea, and not, as we would expect, to the North or South of Europe. As an interesting detail, one promotional material of Marseille-Provence 2013 presented a reversed North-South map of Europe, Marseille being in the North, as an open point towards the Mediterranean Sea.

### *Dealing with the past legacy*

Following the positive evaluation of the European Commission of Linz ECoC 2009, in its honest demarche of acknowledging its National-Socialist history as a part of its identity and, other ECoC cities have aimed to link their darkest and unwanted past to the idea of European identity in an attempt of making peace with their history. Pecs assumed as an important message to Europe that it “wishes to place a particular emphasis on the cultural legacy of East-Central European socialism.”<sup>54</sup> The proximity of the 20th anniversary of the political transition in the countries of East-Central Europe, was seen by Pecs as “a grand opportunity to examine more closely the cultural heritage of East-Central European socialism and the consequences of the political transition.”<sup>55</sup> The socialist period is seen as a troubled part in Pecs’s history “which we have not yet been able to consign to history”; its heritage “is deeply engraved in our attitudes, we live in its buildings, its objects surround us all.”<sup>56</sup>

---

<sup>47</sup> Immler and Sakkers, 15.

<sup>48</sup> “European Capital of Culture Pecs 2010,” 7.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>51</sup> Cynthia Imogen Hammond, “Renegade Ornament and the Image of the Post-Socialist City,” in *Halb-Vergangenheit. Stadtische Raume und urbane Lebenswelten vor und nach der Wende* [Half-past. Urban space and urban lifestyles before and after the turn], ed. Timea Kovacs (Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2010): 187.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 186.

<sup>53</sup> “Marseille-Provence 2013,” 203.

<sup>54</sup> “European Capital of Culture Pecs 2010,” 21.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 22.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 22.



At its turn, Marseille acknowledged as a part of its “Sharing the South” strategy a thematic project called “Overseas and the Colonial World”. In conjunction with the creation of an Overseas Memorial, the archives department of the City of Marseilles organised educational workshops for students, devoted to the history of both colonisation and Marseilles. That is the only mention of the colonial past of Marseille in its Bid Book. But the most challenging ideas of the Bid document are the attempt of Marseille to turn its weak points - immigration, unemployed and lack of European devotion from the part of the immigrant population- into advantages -the aged and old North of Europe will need the working force of the overwhelmingly young South, and Marseille holds the door open for them.

*Reinventing urbanity. The role of public spaces*

The urban development of cities is being developed with the purpose of accommodating people and their activities. Pecs considers one of the pillar of its application the fact that it is “the city of lively public spaces”, as opposed to the “limited public spaces”<sup>57</sup> existent during the communist-era, when “the streets of Pecs (...) have been perceived as state property, rather than the common property of the people.”<sup>58</sup>

The renovation of squares, parks and pedestrian streets in order to attract local people to spend time in the inner city in a new way, are examples of opening up the city to its citizens. It may attract new residents, shops and investors. These transformations obey the planning principles conceptualised as New Urbanism, which stress “the rediscovery of the city centre and its activities, pedestrian-friendly urban design, diversity and openness of public space, urban aesthetics, and quality of design and sustainability and good quality of life as a base for urban planning.”<sup>59</sup> The regeneration ideologies and planning principles related to New Urbanism are present in Pecs’ Bid Book: “The reconstruction of the historical centre of a city for the purpose of boosting tourism may give the entire district a museum-like character, and thereby drive out all the people living there, with the consequent loss of their multi-faceted way of life.”<sup>60</sup>

In the same spirit, besides “Sharing the South” as an international Strategy, Marseille proposed also a local strategy designated “La Cité Radieuse” (The Radiant City) that corresponds to the goal of developing “artistic and cultural activity as a force for the renewal of the city by conjugating four issues: the quality of public space, cultural irrigation of the area, the appeal of the metropolis and widespread public participation”<sup>61</sup>.

Besides the transformation of the city centre, the practice of transforming the former industrial estates to a new cultural use – a practice which started in the Western countries in the 80s- is also used as a progressive bottom-up regeneration strategy. In general, the investigated ECoCs aimed to modernize and repair the city image through various construction projects. The preparations for the cultural year included initiatives of improving the existent general infrastructure of the city (transport network, neighbourhoods inhabited by miners and workers) and constructing new one, in particular cultural infrastructure (new museum, concert halls, libraries). Pecs particularly underwent a large scale transformation in order to upgrade itself: the construction of a Music and Conference Centre and a Regional Library.

---

<sup>57</sup> Hammond, 187.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 189.

<sup>59</sup> Lahdesmaki, 489.

<sup>60</sup> “European Capital of Culture Pecs 2010,” 34.

<sup>61</sup> “Marseille-Provence 2013,” 21.

Similar to the case of Pecs, the sustainability of Marseille-Provence 2013 can be measured through its infrastructure legacies. The renovation of the Marseille waterfront was the main urban regeneration project and the most representative one, considering Marseille's assumed role of a metropolis situated at the intersection of the cultural and economic exchanges between Europe and the Mediterranean Sea. Two new symbolic locations were built in Marseille's Port: the Museum of the European and Mediterranean Civilizations and the Mediterranean Regional Centre. Recreation and shopping areas were also created in the old Port, area that used to be Marseilles worst district. Marseille's regeneration project can be seen as a community building project through the emphasis of Euro-Mediterranean identity and solidarity.

Moreover, regarding the aspect of community building and encouraging public participation to culture, Marseille's main project was called "Euro-Mediterranean Workshops". It was meant to represent the intersection between art and society: artists from all disciplines (mostly visual arts) have taken over for a limited period of time spaces not usually associated with culture (public institutions, companies), bringing about unique encounters between art and society. For example, a musical director organised within a period a two months a choral concert with the employees of the Credit Bank of Marseille; another artist directed a short movie called "Disorder", filmed during five months at the Psychiatric Hospital, consisting in monologues and conversations.

The largest component of the regeneration project in the case of Pecs was also a community building one: the establishment of a cultural quarter in a former large industrial site, the Zsolnay Porcelain Factory - in that part of the building complex of the factory from which production has already been removed. The project also included building a thematic park of industrial history. We can interpret this project with the words from the Bid Book: "Cities today are seen as a collection of "places" and "non-places". It is common to designate as a "place" those buildings and spaces that provide a unique character for a city and are linked to its mythology."<sup>62</sup> The Zsolany factory is dating from the turn of the XX<sup>th</sup> century and the Zsolany family ran it until its confiscation by the Communists in 1948. It was once "the pride of the Hungarian commerce"<sup>63</sup> and it has been a tourist site from its foundation. After the fall of the communism the factory remained in the state property and it degraded itself and it was argued for the clear quality loss between the pre and post World War II products. Opening a new civic centre in this location, associated with the Austro-Hungarian temporal layer of Pecs's identity, symbolize a return to a Golden Age which existed before the communist period.

### **Conclusions**

After the analysis of the two cases, we can conclude that both cities tried to reorient their geography in order to place themselves in a Central position, instead of the actual peripheral one. Both cities presented visions of re-inventing the Southern and Eastern European periphery.

In the case of Pecs, the cultural year was used as an instrument for image change, which consisted in the emphasis of a Central position of the city at the intersection of Western Europe and the Balkans, a Christian Western cultural tradition and a regional/international image of a multicultural city. Belonging to an ex-communist country, the city's identity was rebuilt appealing to a late XIX<sup>th</sup> century pre-communist Golden Age, the period of the flourishing Zsolany porcelain factory, keeping a flavour of past monarchic Hungarian times.

<sup>62</sup> "European Capital of Culture Pecs 2010," 39.

<sup>63</sup> Esther Vecsey, "Zsolany Porcelain. A Hungarian Tradition," *Ceramics Technical* 13 (2001): 90.

Those times were made accessible to the public through the inauguration of the new Zsolany cultural centre on the unused premises of the factory, as the major regeneration project of the city. Community building and the sustainability of the project are its major results. In the case of Marseille, the cultural year was used to shift the city's position from a Southern Europe peripheral city, confronting immigration and acute unemployment, to an alleged Central position within a Euro-Mediterranean area. The title was also an opportunity to attract public funding in order to build major infrastructure and bidding in the name of the Provence Region probably facilitated this goal. Similar to Pecs, one of Marseilles strong points as an ex-ECOC is considered to be the sustainability of its legacy, through its built infrastructure. The renovation of the waterfront and the construction of the Museum of European and Mediterranean Civilizations at the entrance of the Old Port of Marseille are the main infrastructure investments. They have symbolically added value related to the attempt of Marseille to present itself as a Euro-Mediterranean metropolis, minimising, under the multiculturalism discourse, the French colonial past and the current acute immigration and integration issues.

Besides Pecs and Marseille, an extensive future study could include other ECoC cities having a border or marginal position, questioning the articulation of their local narratives in a broader European context: Tallin 2011 (Finland port), Turku 2011 (Estian port-city), Maribor 2012 (Slovakian city, near the Croatian border, Eastern border of the European Union at that time, Schengen border), Kosice 2013 (Slovenian city, near the Ukrainian border, Schengen border), Umea 2014 (Swedish port), Riga 2014 (Latvian port, Schengen border).

### ***Acknowledgement***

This work was supported by the strategic grant POSDRU/159/1.5/S/140863, Project ID 140863 (2014), co-financed by the European Social Fund within the Sectorial Operational Program Human Resources Development 2007 – 2013.

### **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

- Bianchini, Franco. „Rethinking European Cities: The Role of Cultural Policies.” In *Cultural Policy and Urban Regeneration*, edited by Franco Bianchini and Michael Parkinson, 1-20. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993.
- Cogliandro, Gianna Lia. “European Cities of Culture for the Year 2000: A Wealth of Urban Cultures for Celebrating the Turn of the Century.” Final Report. Bruxelles: Association of the European Cities of Culture of the year 2000, AECC/AVEC, 2001.
- “Decision No. 445/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 Establishing a Union Action for the European Capitals of Culture for the Years 2020 to 2033 and Repealing Decision No 1622/2006/EC.” *Official Journal of the European Union* L132/1-14 (2014).
- “Decision No. 1419/1999/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 Establishing a Community Action for the European Capital of Culture Event for the years 2005 to 2019.” *Official Journal* L 166 (1999).
- “Decision No. 649/2005/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 April 2005.” *Official Journal* L 117 (2005).
- “Decision No. 1622/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 Establishing a Community Action for the European Capital of Culture Event for the Years 2007 to 2019.” *Official Journal of the European Union* L 304 (2006).

- Ecorys. "Ex-post Evaluation of 2010 European Capitals of Culture. Final Report for the European Commission DG Education and Culture." 2011.
- Ecorys. "Ex-post Evaluation of the 2013 European Capitals of Culture. Final Report for the European Commission DG Education and Culture. December 2014.
- "European Capital of Culture Pecs 2010, Borderless City." (2006). Accessed January 5, 2015. [http://www.pecs2010.hu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/pecs2010\\_english.pdf](http://www.pecs2010.hu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/pecs2010_english.pdf).
- "European Cities and Capitals of Culture. Study Prepared for the European Commission." Part. I. Bruxelles: Palmer-Rae Associates, August 2004.
- Gonzalez, Sara. "Bilbao and Barcelona 'in Motion'. How Urban Regeneration 'Models' Travel and Mutate in the Global Flows of Policy Tourism." *Urban Studies* 48 (2011): 1397-1418.
- Grodach, Carl, and Anastasia Loukaitou- Sideris. "Cultural Development Strategies and Urban Revitalization." *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 13, 4 (2007): 348-370.
- Hammond, Cynthia Imogen. "Renegade Ornament and the Image of the Post-Socialist City." In "Halb-Vergangenheit. Stadtische Raume und urbane Lebenswelten vor und nach der Wende" [Half-past. Urban space and urban lifestyles before and after the turn] edited by Timea Kovacs, 181-246. Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2010.
- Horvat, Ksenija Vidmar. "Rebordering the Perspective on EU: A View from the Slovenian Periphery." *Javnost-The Public* 21, 3 (2014): 93-108.
- Hubbard, Phil. "Urban Design and City Regeneration: Social Representations of Entrepreneurial Landscapes." *Urban Studies* 33-8(1996): 1441-1461.
- Immler, Nicole L., and Hans Sakkers. "(Re) Programming Europe: European Capitals of Culture: Rethinking the Role of Culture." *Journal of European Studies* 44, 1 (2014): 3-29.
- Lahdesmaki, Tuuli. "European Capital of Culture Designation as an Initiator of Urban Transformation in the Post-socialist Countries." *European Planning Studies* 22-3 (2014): 481-97.
- Malcom, Miles. "Interruptions: Testing the Rhetoric of Culturally Led Urban Development." *Urban Studies* 42 (2005): 889-911.
- "Marseille-Provence 2013, European and Mediterranean Application to Become the European Capital of Culture." (2008): 3. Accessed January 5, 2015. [http://www.mp2013.fr/pro/files/2012/02/MP13\\_DP\\_EN.pdf](http://www.mp2013.fr/pro/files/2012/02/MP13_DP_EN.pdf).
- Porter, Michael E. "The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City." *Harvard Business Review* (May-June 1995): 55-71.
- "Resolution of the Ministers Responsible for Cultural Affairs, Meeting within the Council, of 13 June 1985 Concerning the Annual Event 'European City of Culture'." *Official Journal of the European Communities*, C 153, 22 June 1985.
- Sacco, Pierluigi, Guido Ferilli, and Giorgio Tavano Blessi. "Understanding Culture-led Local Development: A Critique of Alternative Theoretical Explanations." *Urban Studies* (10 December 2013): 1-17. Accessed May 14, 2014. <http://usj.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/12/17/0042098013512876>.
- Sen, K. Amartya. *Comodities and Capabilities*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.
- Ulldemolins, Joaquim Rius. "Culture and Authenticity in Urban Regeneration Processes: Place Branding in Central Barcelona." *Urban Studies* 20-10 (2014): 3026-3045.
- Warleigh, Alex. *Flexible Integration. Wich Model for the European Union?*. London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002.
- Vecsey, Esther. "Zsolany Porcelain. A Hungarian Tradition." *Ceramics Technical* 13 (2001): 88-91.
- Zukin, Sharon. *The Cultures of Cities*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995

# Searching for Development of Medium-sized Cities in the European Union: A Study Case on Oradea

Constantin Vasile TOCA<sup>1</sup>,  
Bogdan Mihail POCOLA<sup>2</sup>

**Abstract.** *Smaller cities from Central and Eastern Europe face the difficult task of creating a niche segment for their economies in the hopes of becoming sustainable and profitable despite their restrictions. Borders can provide an answer to some situations where the neighbouring region presents similar characteristics and development goals and as such can benefit from cross-border cooperation to grow faster. In our study case of Oradea we try to identify what attributes define a medium-sized city in Eastern Europe and what are the opportunities that provide economic benefits while creating a unique identity and an environment for growth. We explore history, demographics, development strategies, institutional and conceptual limitations and cross-border cooperation frameworks that help to define Oradea as a border city.*

**Keywords:** *local identity, multicultural space, strategic development, cross-border cooperation*

## **Introduction**

Europe has been defined for a very long time by a distinctive organisational structure that underwent frequent changes, in line with political shifts in power and redrawing of national and regional borders. This has determined certain areas within Central and Eastern Europe to face changes in terms of identity, authority and ideology; these patterns of change that have occurred in a relative short time period (19<sup>th</sup> and mostly 20<sup>th</sup> century) have had lasting effects on the population and their organisation. The generation changes have been quite few (at around 3-4) and as such the mix of old and new mentalities have developed border settlements in very particular ways<sup>3</sup>. Border cities provide an excellent study case for interactions among groups (ethnic, religious, national minorities) and the way these social connections have influenced the development of communities around them. This premise provides opportunities to also research particularities of border regions as opposed to more centralised parts of EU member states and identify what makes these cities so unique and important to understanding the developing of active mixed communities within the EU.

---

<sup>1</sup> Assistant professor at the University of Oradea, Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Science and Communication Sciences.

<sup>2</sup> Phd. candidate in International Relations and Security Studies, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babeş-Bolyai University, beneficiary of “Calitate, excelență, mobilitate transnațională în cercetarea doctorală” [Quality, excellence, and transnational mobility in doctoral research] project, co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Human Resources and Development 2007-2013.

<sup>3</sup> Ed Taverne and Cor Wagenaar, “Border Cities: Contested Identities of the European City,” *European Review*, ed. Theo d’Haen, 13, 2 (Cambridge University Press: May 2005): 201.

The paper will focus on Oradea, a city situated at the border between Romania and Hungary, with rich historical connections with both nations. Oradea has been heavily influenced during its recent history by political events that changed the way the city functions in areas such as economy and architecture. As part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the diverse ethnical and religious identities that lived in Oradea created a common heritage that is very much reminiscent of Central Europe<sup>4</sup>. Given the background of the city and its surroundings we will be focusing on aspects that define it terms of multiculturalism, competitiveness and unique characteristics that make Oradea stand out from other border countries in the region. This study will also cover, in brief, the cross-border cooperation initiatives between Romania and Hungary and the common goals and projects that have been a part of the development strategy of Oradea over the last years.

### *Historical perspective on the evolution of Oradea*

The city of Oradea has a rich history that expands for well over 800 years within the region. The city has always been the centre of political, administrative and economic power within the present borders of Bihor County and has influenced the surrounding area through its cultural appeal, markets, buildings and institutions<sup>5</sup>. During the centuries, Oradea has undergone changes in terms of its regional influence and significance. It is safe to say that the city was not constructed from scratch but rather it evolved during a period of time, changing its role and function. Western and Central European influences have made their way to Oradea and created cultural, political or military focus for the surrounding area. For example, during the Renaissance period Oradea was influenced by Italian style and culture in a strong capacity, with influences that stretched farther than religion (an important pillar in the city's development during its history) to the merchants and craftsmen around the city; the city was also recognised by its Italian denomination: Varadino<sup>6</sup>. Association and integration of new and foreign cultures has always been one of Oradea's stables in terms of its cultural evolution.

While in the XIV-XV centuries the focal point of the city was on culture and religion, by the middle of the XVI century Oradea developed a lot in terms of political and military power. Local and regional borders are redrawn and fought for and as such, the city moves into a different direction<sup>7</sup>. The military operations that went on in and around Oradea since that point affected the population and the neighbouring settlements in significant capacity. The siege of the Ottomans on Oradea citadel in 1598 ended with significant changes in terms of regional politics: Oradea came under the rule of the Hapsburgs from 1598-1606<sup>8</sup>. Sieges such as these were not uncommon as one happened earlier in 1556-1557 on account of the Protestant Reformation, with changes to the social

---

<sup>4</sup> Mircea Pașca, "Oradea Around 1900: An Architectural Guide" (Oradea: Arca Publishing House, 2010), 7.

<sup>5</sup> Constantin-Vasile Țoca, "Oradea oraș frontalier – o analiză istorică" [Oradea, border city – an historical analysis], *Politici imperiale în estul și vestul spațiului românesc* [Imperial politics in Eastern and Western Romanian space], ed. Sorin Șipoș et al. (Oradea: University of Oradea Press, 2010), 559.

<sup>6</sup> Liviu Borcea and Gheorghe Gorun, "Istoria Orașului Oradea" [The history of Oradea] (Oradea: Cogito Publishing, 1996), 101.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>8</sup> Constantin Daicoviciu et al., "Din Istoria Transilvaniei" [From the History of Transylvania] (Oradea: Academia Republicii Populare Române, 1960), 82.

and economic balance of Oradea: change of administration, transfer of Catholic properties and wealth, a general shift in local authority and power for the region<sup>9</sup>.

The citadel of Oradea became the subject of military mobilisation between 1691 and 1692 as well as 1703-1711 there the conflict was focused on Hapsburg imperial forces. After the events of 1711 the citizens of Oradea gained the favour of imperial forces and received additional privileges for loyal service of the crown. The fact that military conflicts became less frequent after this period meant that the city was able to look towards developing the economy and strengthening the local manufacturing branches and guilds. The evolution of Oradea was continued through the development of religious and educational rights for citizens.

Due to its multiculturalist population, Oradea had always had a difficult time in balancing ethnicity, nationality, political ideas and rights for the people that lived in and around the city. Important steps for gaining religious and civil rights for the Romanian population were achieved through the help of local religious leaders. An important contribution to civil and political rights of the Romanian community in Transylvania was given by the Greek-Catholic churches that fought for equal rights among citizens. The document *Supplex Libellus Valachorum* was drafted as a petition for Emperor Leopold the 2<sup>nd</sup> in 1791; important religious leaders that influenced this change in Oradea were Samuil Vulcan and Ignatie Darabant. Significant changes in the school system and education was the primary result of these efforts, creating more opportunities for Romanian ethnics.

Following small movements during the XIX century, Oradea was developed along the lines of administration and infrastructure. During this time the administrative structure of the city became much more compact as neighbouring settlements around the citadel of Oradea united into one single administrative construct. By the end of the XIX century the city centre area was under heavy construction. Favourable economic circumstances and changing architectural trends in Central Europe determined a period of heavy architecture change especially in the central area. Powerful businesses and wealthy influent families started to build and redesign the face of the city using as inspiration the Vienna Secession movement. The identity of Oradea as a city today is heavily influenced by the architectural style that was used at the start of the XX century. During the XX century Oradea, as well as all other cities in Eastern and Central Europe suffered through political changes, military conflicts, population rise and fall, administrative reform and reconstruction. Given its different ethnic fundamentals comprised of Romanians, Hungarians, Gypsies, Jews, Italians, Slovaks and others, the change of political borders and afterwards the closed communist system had an important impact on demographics. Oradea lost much of its Jewish population during World War II, while other nationalities declined in numbers (Hungarians, Slovaks have much lower population percentage during the second half of the XX century).

### ***The border city: what does it mean and how can it define a city***

Border cities exist in a newly defined logic of disappearing borders, characterised by a level of competitiveness much greater than previous national models<sup>10</sup>. In the context

<sup>9</sup> Țoca, "Oradea oraș frontalier – o analiză istorică," 560.

<sup>10</sup> Steven Brakman et al., "The Border Effect of EU Integration: Evidence for European Cities and Regions" (paper presented at the Urban Development: Patterns, Causes, Foundations and Policy Conference, December 2010) (Rotterdam: Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies, Erasmus University of Rotterdam), 2, accessed October 15, 2015,

of European Union enlargement and global market competition, cities that are closer to the border will have an advantage in cross-border trading and have better chances of developing industry; research indicates this tendency to be stronger in the case of smaller cities given the historical data that links population loss and economic decline with cities that have existed in the logic of the nation state<sup>11</sup>.

Defining a city based on its characteristics is not enough to warrant the definition of a specific identity. Particularities can only be presented when put into context, in our case that of borders (or border cities), that will shape the research discourse in a way that highlights certain characteristics. Oradea, as defined through the concept of “border city”, needs to further be elaborated as a study case in comparison with other border cities within the EU in order to correctly assess particularities. In this regard we will also be taking a look at how Oradea has developed in this role of border city within the competitive national environment as well as in relation to regional and international context; this last idea will be developed through presenting the relation between Oradea and Debrecen as similar cases for Europe’s border cities and their development. These cities and their communities are required to function within a new framework that integrates that of border cities within the EU: the global city – derived from the shift from cross-border economics and development to a global market that involves actors from all over the world in the economic and social architecture of a city<sup>12</sup>. Oradea as a study case for the concept of global cities does present a number of structural differences as opposed to the one presented by Saskia Sassen, Oradea and its regional influence being on a much smaller scale with limited importance for large global firms.

The effects of institutions on local and regional organisational structures can also create context. The influence of local institutions’ initiatives and their relation with national and supranational authorities provides insight into development strategy decisions and outcomes that end up shaping the image of border city. As Yuri Kazepov points out, the primary elements that differentiate cities in the European space are linked to particular institutional arrangements that shape local actors through the implementation of structure, constraints and opportunities; the author also puts great emphasis on the city’s perspective of itself and its role on a regional, national and supranational level<sup>13</sup>. The city as a social and administrative construct is always connected to the surrounding areas and the communities that thrive in this space. In a centralised state such as Romania we find that central government, representative of the nation-state, has a heavy influence on the working institutional relations at the local level and as such the scope of local development is rather limited as long as it is dependent on cooperation with central institutions in terms of finance and economic policy<sup>14</sup>. Authors Gordon Macleod and Mark Godwin explore solutions to this issue of heavy dependence of local actors to centralised state in the form of policy networks<sup>15</sup>. Commentating on R.A.W. Rhodes study on policy

---

[http://www.ihs.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/ihs/Marketing/Marketing\\_Projects/marrewijk\\_\\_brakman\\_\\_garretsen\\_\\_borders\\_and\\_remoteness\\_dec\\_2010e.pdf](http://www.ihs.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/ihs/Marketing/Marketing_Projects/marrewijk__brakman__garretsen__borders_and_remoteness_dec_2010e.pdf).

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>12</sup> Saskia Sassen, “The Global City: Introducing a Concept,” *Brown Journal of World Affairs* XI, 2 (Brown University, Spring 2005): 27-28.

<sup>13</sup> Yuri Kazepov, “Cities in Europe: Changing Contexts, Local Arrangements and the Challenge to Social Cohesion,” *Cities of Europe*, ed. Yuri Kazepov (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005), 7.

<sup>14</sup> Gordon Macleod and Mark Goodwin, “Space, Scale and State Strategy: Rethinking Urban and Regional Governance,” *Progress in Human Geography* 23, 4 (Sage Journals, December 1999), 508.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 510.



networks in the UK<sup>16</sup>, they subscribe to the existence of multiple types of policy networks, differentiated on the level of integration and prevalence of community policies at a local level. In R.A.W. Rhode's view, local and regional authorities or departments, through the implementation of policy networks, are able to define their own level of autonomy, within governmental constraints<sup>17</sup>. This is an important note in understanding the current evolution of local administration policy on mid and long-term development of Oradea.

### ***Ethnic and confessional demographics in Oradea***

Oradea shares an important part of its history with that of Hungary for around 800 years. The communities that make up the city have developed with cooperation in mind between its two main ethnical groups: Romanians and Hungarians. This level of cooperation even extended to institutionalised constructs such as the Bihor – Hajdú-Bihar Euroregion. This form of cooperation is built on the principles of cross-border cooperation, diminishing differences between border regions, building strong form of civic cooperation between communities, providing models of integration, prevention of negative heritage and strengthening aspects that further cohesion and integration within the European Union<sup>18</sup>.

The cross-border cooperation aspect that links the two communities has been much stronger since the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century as indicated by growing number of initiatives that target ethnic diversity, cultures and religion as well as institutional cooperation<sup>19</sup>. This new framework for cooperation is influenced by a change in perspective around the static ideas of state-nation-territory-border<sup>20</sup>. While the debate on this concept can also lead towards discussing aspects of assimilation and integration of minorities, in most cases the cities and regions of Europe are defined through another group of concepts: people, culture and history<sup>21</sup>. This association between space and heritage is more prevalent in Romania's central and western spaces as these were, for a long time, a meeting place for different nationalities, beliefs and ethnicities. It has become a staple for regions and communities in these places to exhibit diversity and plurality in ideas, forms of expression and formulas for community development.

Examples of ethnic and confessional diversity can be found by looking closer into Oradea's history over the 20<sup>th</sup> century. A study by Florentina Chirodea on the Law Academy in Oradea between 1919 and 1934 indicates strong fluctuations in ethnic and confessional background of the students attending the school, in a way representative of the process of transition from Austro-Hungarian rule to Romania in the interwar period<sup>22</sup>.

---

<sup>16</sup> See R. A. W. Rhodes, "Policy Networks. A British Perspective," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 2, 3 (Sage Journals, July 1990): 293-317.

<sup>17</sup> Macleod, 511.

<sup>18</sup> Czímre Klára, "Cross-border Cooperation – Theory and Practice" (Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadoja, 2006), 84.

<sup>19</sup> Constantin-Vasile Țoca, "Ethnical Analysis within Bihor – Hajdú-Bihar Euroregion," in *Ethnicity, Confession and Intercultural Dialogue at the European Union's Eastern Border*, ed. Mircea Brie et al. (Oradea: University of Oradea Press, 2011), 131.


<sup>20</sup> Mircea Brie, "Ethnicity, Religion and Intercultural Dialogue in the European Border Space," in *Ethnicity, Confession and Intercultural Dialogue at the European Union's Eastern Border*, ed. Mircea Brie et al. (Oradea: University of Oradea Press, 2011), 13.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Florentina Chirodea, "Ethnic and Religious Structure. Aspects from the Western Border of Greater Romania. The Academy of Law Students in Oradea (1919-1934)," *Ethno-confessional*

While the confessional and ethnic structure of students shifted along the 15 years of the Academy's existence, the geographical representation of the students has not changed very much<sup>23</sup>. A significant impact in developing Oradea as a city in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century was played by the large Jewish community that was part of the city's cultural landscape. Following the events of the Second World War and subsequent migration of the Jewish population outside of Romania, this community has become much less numerous with less than 300 members of the Jewish community still remaining. Their impact has remained visible throughout the city though, through architecture that preserves the image of a vibrant community. Present day demographics show a population that has remained mostly stable in terms of representation over the last two decades, with a balance of 65-70% for the Romanian population and 20-25% for Hungarian population with the rest being divided among Germans, Slovaks, Roma populations and other ethnical denominations. In terms of religious confession the balance is between 55% Orthodox, 13% Protestant, 9% Roman Catholic, 4.5% Pentecostal and 3.5% Baptist.

**Figure 1:** *Ethnic distribution of population in Oradea*



**Source:** ZMO, Oradea's local development strategy, 2014.

Multiculturalism is another aspect that defines Oradea as a city. Considering the historical exchanges between different nations that have made the city their home throughout history, there needs to be a discussion on the effects that the concept of multiculturalism has on a city's identity. Promoting multiculturalism has been part of movement in Western Europe over the last decades, a movement that aims to reduce the negative effects of population majorities (ethnic, religious, racial, etc.) in areas where civilisations and cultures meet<sup>24</sup>. Cătălin Turliuc expresses a critical view on the effects and strength of multiculturalism in opposition to nationalism; in his views, multiculturalism has created weak identity ties and has also lead to the illusion of tolerance on a societal level<sup>25</sup>. Other scholars argue that values such as diversity, pluralism and multiculturalism are

---

*Realities in the Romanian Area*, ed. Mircea Brie et al. (Oradea: University of Oradea Press, 2011), 136-137.


<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 139.

<sup>24</sup> Cătălin Turliuc, "Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Minorities' Rights in 20<sup>th</sup> Century Romania," *Ethno-confessional Realities in the Romanian Area*, ed. Mircea Brie et al. (Oradea, University of Oradea Press, 2011), 219.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 220.

fundamentally European and the process of integration cannot be conditioned by the existence of cultural unity<sup>26</sup>. It is necessary for each territory, region or community to find the best way to coexist and thrive together as these are the foundations of building a local identity that can be used to great effect in defining communities and cities.

**Figure 2:** *Religious distribution of population in Oradea*



**Source:** ZMO, Oradea's local development strategy, 2014.

Whether or not multiculturalism as a concept has failed has a lot to do with the historical and cultural restrictions of a given space. In the case of Oradea multiculturalism can be defined through the ethnics and religious diversity of its inhabitants, but also on a visual level through the architectural and civic heritage present all around the city.

### ***The development strategies that shape Oradea***

Identifying the specific nature and identity of Oradea on a regional and national level needs to start from the development strategy that has been used to build the city over time to the current state. Changes in urban development strategies have been analysed before and have also been used to determine shifts in regional and national power as well as directions for economic, social and cultural development of communities. Chris Collinge argues that one of the most important factors in determining the evolution of local governance has to do with the relative balance between state and regional power and its impact on local growth<sup>27</sup>. Other authors such as Yuri Kazepov define the context in which cities start to develop their own economic and financial identities and needs based on the increased power gained through supranational institutions (as is the case of the EU, pressing for more local autonomy and local governance) and the increased mobility of capital, goods as well as services and labour<sup>28</sup>.

In this regional and local context the city of Oradea has adopted a strategy meant to make it competitive on this level. Some of the strategic decisions have been made based on the strength of its ability to foster growth in the region (having more population and

<sup>26</sup> Brie, 15.

<sup>27</sup> Chris Collinge, "Spatial Articulation of the State: Reworking Social Relations and Social Regulation Theory," Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, Birmingham, 1998, accessed October 15, 2015, <http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/business/management/collinge/spatial-articulation.pdf>.

<sup>28</sup> Kazepov, 3.

stronger economy than neighbouring cities such as Satu Mare and Arad), but also on the competitiveness required to stand up to larger cities such as Cluj-Napoca and Timișoara – both cities having larger population, stronger economies and situated on traffic nodes of similar importance.

Situated very close to the border with Hungary (around 20 km to the first village in Hungary) Oradea has been shaped by its proximity to larger cities in the near vicinity that create a very competitive environment for this medium-sized city (in terms of population) and by its proximity to the border: this geographical location has somewhat marginalised the city from an economic point of view in favour of larger poles of development such as Cluj-Napoca and Timișoara – viewed as region development poles in the context of Romania's regional development strategy. Across the border, Hungary's Northern Great Plain area that neighbours this region has seen a steady decline in wealth in the last 25 years as Western Hungary became a much greater attraction point for foreign investment and concentrated qualified human resources and production facilities in the processing and automotive industry<sup>29</sup>. This trend can be seen as mirroring the developmental slope in Romania as well, with the capital city having a much stronger development rate and with growing inequalities among regions<sup>30</sup>. The similarities between the two regions across the border have shaped the cross-border partnership that has become a pillar for regional and local development.

The two main documents that we will be taking a look at are the City Development Strategy for 2015-2020 (short term) and the Masterplan for 2030 detailing the urban development concept envisioned by local authorities. These two strategies will be referenced throughout the paper in an effort to accurately assess their relevance to Oradea as a regional competitor and development pole and as distinct identity within the "border city" concept and framework we have described up until now.

The strategy for development in the next 5 years has in plan a vision for a new decade, 2020. The focus will be local economy expansion through new investments, attracting capital as well as research and innovation. The people living in Oradea will benefit from improved life and working conditions, less pollution, quality services from local administration and better-paid jobs<sup>31</sup>. This general focus is expanded further into 5 objectives: increased competitiveness, improved infrastructure and connectivity, increased life quality measures, preservation of local heritage, increased public services quality. Looking further onto the 2030 development plan we can see a more nuanced approach towards development. The 2030 strategy focuses on increasing the city's mobility and flexibility in terms of local, regional and national transport systems. It is clear that some of the current frustrations about Oradea's competitive level has to do with accessibility towards business and tourism. The focus on economy shifts to innovation and improvement of human resources, with an emphasis on research, innovation and study. The idea of globalisation and the need for constant renewal in the economic sector stands at the base of Oradea's mid-term analysis of development and change. This focus can also be a good way to describe the current problematic areas that the local economy and administration are faced

---

<sup>29</sup> János Péntes, "The Question of Territorial Cohesion – Spatial Income Inequalities in Two Different Regions of Hungary," *Regional and Cohesion Policy. Insights into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design*, ed. Ioan Horga et al. (Oradea, University of Oradea Press, 2011) 101.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 100.

<sup>31</sup> Zona Metropolitană Oradea [Oradea Metropolitan Zone], "Strategia de dezvoltare locală a municipiului Oradea" [Oradea development strategy], 2014, 72.

with in their attempt to boost local competitiveness. The third objective for 2030 aims to improve local administration services, natural and man-made heritage and give citizens more options for cultural and sportive events. The fourth objective for 2030 focuses on building a better government system that includes: spatial planning and marketing, property management and instruments for finance and co-finance<sup>32</sup>.

City development is planned based on several sectors of interest, each with its own set of measures and expected results. Oradea's strategy is constructed around economic development, industrial development, increased qualification of workforce, developing transport infrastructure, administrative infrastructure, developing and improving public transport, improved urban planning, citizen safety improvements, make information more available in use for promoting and marketing tourist attractions, use local tourist attractions to their fullest potential, creating new tourist attractions, developing social heritage, developing social economy (such as start-ups or helping vulnerable groups), increase community involvement and voluntary work, access to vulnerable groups to education, improving lifelong learning, creating conditions for cultural and sports activities, better use of current cultural resources<sup>33</sup>.

Local administration is also interested in building a performance-based system for local health care. The objectives in this field range from improving qualifications for medical personnel, improving prevention systems and activities. All these sectors are complemented with environmental policies and objectives aimed at waste management and public administration policies for better quality services and increased transparency<sup>34</sup>. While most of the proposed objectives and sectors for development that are in plan for change in 2030 are detailed in some capacity, we cannot say just yet how feasible these proposed projects will be. In the end, the current development plans for 2020 and 2030 are too much connected to the present model of administration and as such will be subject to change.

### ***Impact of cross-border cooperation***

The emphasis on cross-border cooperation comes as a result of changes within the EU's regional policy that promoted new objectives with the 2007-2013 programmer. These objectives are outlined as: increased convergence, competitiveness among regions and territorial cooperation<sup>35</sup>. These changes have had significant influence on border regions that share similar economic and demographic structures within central and Eastern Europe as they boost local and regional financial autonomy irrespective of the level of centralisation of the national state; given the high level of centralisation in Romania and Hungary as well as the demographic similarities and shared cultural heritage, the development of a cross-border cooperation between Oradea and Debrecen has not been a big surprise. The benefits of cross-border cooperation have become much more evident in the context of globalised economies and markets. István Süli-Zakar and Mihály Tömöri describe this situation from the perspective of labour division; given the change from

---

<sup>32</sup> Oradea City Hall, "Planul Urbanistic General. Conceptul de Dezvoltare Urbană. Masterplan Oradea 2030" [General Urban Plan. Concept of Urban Development. Masterplan Oradea 2030], 2013, 27.

<sup>33</sup> Oradea City Hall, "Planul Urbanistic General. Conceptul de Dezvoltare Urbană. Masterplan Oradea 2030" [General Urban Plan. Concept of Urban Development. Masterplan Oradea 2030], 2013, 94.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 95.

<sup>35</sup> Constantin-Vasile Țoca, "Romanian-Hungarian Cross-border Cooperation at Various Territorial Levels, with a Particular Study of the Debrecen-Oradea Eurometropolis" (Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2013), 34.

marginal and periphery regions to a new state of function, border have, in some cases, become a cost factor for companies willing to invest<sup>36</sup>. Strengthening cross-border partnerships and cooperation provide significant leverage in managing these situations.

Increasing the level of local and regional autonomy for more centralised areas of the EU, the Euroregion model represents a voluntary association on an administrative institutional level, designed to reduce isolation as well as build frameworks for cultural cooperation and rebuilding of communities across borders<sup>37</sup>. These forms of cooperation function also as determinants for constructive exchanges between communities and positive drivers for European integration through good neighbourhood policies<sup>38</sup>. Out of the influencing factors<sup>39</sup> that affect the success of cross-border cooperation Oradea, with its unique attributes (demographics, geographical position and history), meets almost all of them:

- Geographical position – close to the Romanian-Hungarian border, Oradea and Debrecen are separated by roughly 50 km;
- Common history;
- Common culture – derived from common historical heritage and the presence of a strong Hungarian minority in Oradea;
- Economic development – both cities are present in regions that offer economic challenges in terms of competitiveness and resource management;
- Linguistic competences – strong Hungarian minority in Oradea and Bihor county presents an opportunity for learning the language and thus achieving convergence in this aspect as well;
- Common strategies – both cities have universities, thermal resources and a competitive strategy for attracting foreign investment.

Evidence of the convergence factor between the two cities and the region that they exist in can be determined through the examination of the ethnic communities that reside in the area and that have common heritage and culture:

Cooperation between the two cities has developed a lot in recent years, giving in to a European-wide trend of increased cooperation in border regions through harmonising policies in areas such as economy, services, medicine and education<sup>40</sup>. The rationale behind these focuses is given through the EU cohesion policy objectives that aim to encourage local actors to come together in order to solve common problems and set development goals that benefit more people. There are over 24 different projects that have been financed through the Romania – Hungary cross-border cooperation programme that directly benefit local administration in Oradea or institutions that function within the city. It is important to analyse the strategic impact that these projects have in developing the local economy and communities within the city. By studying the projects and their targeted areas for implementation we can begin to correlate the information with the strategic development documentation that defines Oradea's investment cycle and understand how significant is the impact provided through the cross-border cooperation programme.

---


<sup>36</sup> Süli-Zakar, 142.

<sup>37</sup> Toca, "Romanian-Hungarian Cross-border Cooperation," 46.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 47.

<sup>39</sup> Czimre, 84.

<sup>40</sup> Süli-Zakar, 145.

**Figure 3:** Ethnic distribution in major settlements in the Bihor – Hajdú-Bihar Euroregion

**Source:** Țoca, “Romanian-Hungarian Cross-border Cooperation,” 57.

**Table 1:** Projects financed through the HU-RO cross-border cooperation programme in Oradea.

No.	Project leader	Field of interest	Number of projects implemented
1	University of Oradea	Research, development and education	10
2	Zona Metropolitană Oradea	Infrastructure development plans, communication infrastructure	3
3	Universitatea Creștină Partium	Social integration, education	2
4	Municipality of Oradea	Communication infrastructure, health, road infrastructure, business, tourism, culture	8
5	Chamber of Commerce and Industry Bihor	Business training	1
6	County Council Bihor	Health, environment	2
7	Ordinul arhitecților Bihor	Education	1

**Source:** Own research based on data provided by the HU-RO programme, accessed October 15, 2015, [http://www.huro-cbc.eu/en/financed\\_projects/](http://www.huro-cbc.eu/en/financed_projects/).

As shown in the table presented above, the current plans that have been in development in relation to Oradea’s cross-border cooperation programme are in line with

certain developmental objectives that are part of the 2020 and 2030 strategies. Infrastructure, connectivity, business, health care and research are all part in building Oradea as a competitive environment for local and regional economic actors. The current plans for investments and development concentrate on road infrastructure, medical facilities and enhanced business opportunities in sectors that have disadvantaged for a long time in Oradea. The current level of development is very much dependent on the view that local administration presents; it is important to keep in mind that the outline we have discussed and analysed is only an outline for future progress.

### ***Conclusions***

In researching the concept of medium-sized cities in this region of Europe, we have tried to understand what are the ideas behind development in terms of community, economy, culture, society and administration. Through this research the results show that in order to gain a competitive edge in economy and society, local administration needs to match the flexibility of its projects with transparency and efficiency. Low populated areas are more susceptible to losing important demographics to other developmental poles in the region and as such must constantly find opportunities to attract human resources.

The opportunities that have developed from Romania's accession to the EU for Oradea have allowed the city to build better infrastructure and begin to build an identity for the city. The tourism sector for Oradea has developed a lot in the last 10 years and interest for future projects in tourism point towards further development in this sector. This type of research needs further investigations as the regional and local realities will change in the future. Coming back to this type of research will need to provide focus on how the city's identity has grown and what part of the current strategical decisions will pay off.

### **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

- Borcea, Liviu, and Gheorghe Gorun. *Istoria Oraşului Oradea* [The History of Oradea]. Oradea: Cogito Publishing, 1996.
- Brakman, Steven, Harry Garretsen, and Charles van Marrewijk. "The Border Effect of EU Integration: Evidence for European Cities and Regions." Paper presented at the *Urban Development: Patterns, Causes, Foundations and Policy Conference*, 1-23. Rotterdam: Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies, Erasmus University of Rotterdam, December 2010. Accessed on October 15, 2015. [http://www.ihs.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/ihs/Marketing/Marketing\\_Projects/marrewijk\\_\\_brakman\\_\\_garretsen\\_\\_borders\\_and\\_remoteness\\_dec\\_2010e.pdf](http://www.ihs.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/ihs/Marketing/Marketing_Projects/marrewijk__brakman__garretsen__borders_and_remoteness_dec_2010e.pdf).
- Brie, Mircea. "Ethnicity, Religion and Intercultural Dialogue in the European Border Space." In *Ethnicity, Confession and Intercultural Dialogue at the European Union's Eastern Border*, edited by Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, and Sorin Şipoş, 11-18. Oradea: University of Oradea Press: 2011.
- Chirodea, Florentina. "Ethnic and Religious Structure. Aspects from the Western Border of Greater Romania. The Academy of Law Students in Oradea (1919-1934)." *Ethno-confessional Realities in the Romanian Area*, edited by Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, and Sorin Şipoş, 135-157. Oradea: University of Oradea Press, 2011.
- Collinge, Chris. "Spatial Articulation of the State: Reworking Social Relations and Social Regulation Theory." Centre for Urban and Regional studies, Birmingham, 1998.



- Accessed October 15, 2015. <http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/business/management/collinge/spatial-articulation.pdf>.
- Daicoviciu, Constantin, Ștefan Pascu, and Victor Cheresteșiu. "Din Istoria Transilvaniei" [From the History of Transylvania]. Oradea: Academia Republicii Populare Române, 1960.
- Kazepov, Yuri. "Cities in Europe: Changing Contexts, Local Arrangements and the Challenge to Social Cohesion." In *Cities of Europe*, edited by Yuri Kazepov, 3-42. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2005.
- Klára, Czimre. "Cross-border Cooperation – Theory and Practice." Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadoja, 2006.
- Macleod, Gordon, and Mark Goodwin. "Space, Scale and State Strategy: Rethinking Urban and Regional Governance." In *Progress in Human Geography* 23, 4 (Sage Journals, December 1999): 503-527.
- Pașca, Mircea. "Oradea Around 1900: An Architectural Guide." Oradea: Arca Publishing House, 2010.
- Pénzes, János. "The Question of Territorial Cohesion – Spatial Income Inequalities in Two Different Regions of Hungary." In *Regional and Cohesion Policy. Insights into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design*, edited by Ioan Horga, Iordan Gh. Bărbulescu, Mykolia Palinchak, and István Süli-Zakar, 98-107. Oradea, University of Oradea Press: 2011.
- Rhodes, R.A.W. "Policy Networks. A British Perspective." *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 2, 3 (Sage Journals, July 1990): 293-317.
- Süli-Zakar, István, and Mihály Tömöri. "The Changes of Multilevel Governance in the Countries of the Eastern Periphery of the EU." In *Regional and Cohesion Policy. Insights into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design*, edited by Ioan Horga, Iordan Gh. Bărbulescu, Mykolia Palinchak, and István Süli-Zakar, 139-152. Oradea: University of Oradea Press, 2011.
- Taverne, Ed, and Cor Wagenaar. "Border Cities: Contested Identities of the European City." *European Review*, edited by Theo d'Haen, 13, 2 (Cambridge University Press: May 2005): 201-206.
- Turliuc, Cătălin. "Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Minorities' Rights in 20<sup>th</sup> Century Romania." In *Ethno-confessional Realities in the Romanian Area*, edited by Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, and Sorin Șipoș, 203-225. Oradea: University of Oradea Press, 2011.
- Țoca, Constantin-Vasile. "Ethnical Analysis Within Bihor – Hajdú-Bihar Euroregion." In *Ethnicity, Confession and Intercultural Dialogue at the European Union's Eastern Border*, edited by Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, and Sorin Șipoș, 125-133. Oradea: University of Oradea Press, 2011.
- Țoca, Constantin-Vasile. "Oradea, oraș frontieră – o analiză istorică" [Oradea Border City – an Historical Analysis]. In *Politici imperiale în estul și vestul spațiului românesc* [Imperial politics in Eastern and Western Romanian space], edited by Sorin Șipoș, Ioan Horga, Igor Șarov, Mircea Brie, and Ion Gumenăi, 559-569. Oradea: University of Oradea Press: 2010.
- Țoca, Constantin-Vasile. "Romanian-Hungarian Cross-border Cooperation at Various Territorial Levels, with a Particular Study of the Debrecen-Oradea Eurometropolis." Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2013.

*Strategy documents*

Oradea City Hall. “Planul urbanistic general. Conceptul de dezvoltare urbană. Masterplan Oradea 2030” [General Urban Plan. Concept of Urban Development. Masterplan Oradea 2030], 2013.

Zona Metropolitană Oradea [Oradea Metropolitan Zone]. “Strategia de dezvoltare locală a municipiului Oradea” [Oradea development strategy], 2014.

# The Historical Borders and the Cross-Border Connections' Effect on Debrecen's Spirituality and Cultural Economy

István SÜLI-ZAKAR<sup>1</sup>,  
Tibor KECSKÉS<sup>2</sup>

**Abstract:** *In the current paper we wanted to investigate the historical process which resulted in Debrecen's contemporary (cultural) traditions and formed the city's self-image. In the course of the research which was after the city's historic past we investigated the role of the changing borders and the possibilities of the cross-border Euroregional cooperation as well. The nearby border has effect on the city's economic and tourist life. In the last years (during the urban regeneration), many projects were realised, which beside the reconstruction of the cityscape, promoted the increase of the city's attractive force as well. Debrecen's cultural economy rests partly on those infrastructure developments, which were carried out during the last one and a half decade. Both the citizens and the tourists can choose from different (cultural) programmes that are offered by the city. Although Debrecen is one of the biggest region centres of Hungary and it has a huge gravitation zone, the cross-border cooperation can strengthen the city's leading position. Debrecen has close and good connection with Oradea. This connection rests on the two cities' common historic past and their common interest. The analysis based mainly on own researches and the knowledge of the city's spiritual and cultural life.*

**Keywords:** *periphery, urban regeneration, tourism, cultural economy, cross-border connection, Euroregion, Eurometropolis*

## **Introduction**

Debrecen, as regards its population, is the second largest city in Hungary. The city can be found in the eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain, about 25 kms from the Hungarian-Romanian border. Debrecen lay in the inside part of the country, far away from the borders during the centuries. Under the terms of the Trianon Treaty, which ended the World War I, Debrecen got the eastern frontier of the country, near the new Hungarian-Romanian border. Although the marking out of the new border did not change essentially the city's language and religious composition, Debrecen (similarly to other settlements, which got near the new borders) had to face lots of new challenges (economic difficulties, social problems, periphery situation). The changes, which took place during the last decades – Hungary and Romania's joining to the European Union – caused a new situation and created new possibilities in both countries and the border regions' connection.

Numerous studies and essays have already dealt with Debrecen's borderland position and the city's cross-border connections. Including, the lecturers of the

---

<sup>1</sup> Professor emeritus, University of Debrecen, Department of Social Geography and Regional Development Planning.

<sup>2</sup> Geography, History and English teacher, research worker.

Department of Social Geography and Regional Development Planning (University of Debrecen) and those who have a connection with the Department have already treated this topic from different aspect. In the first part of this essay we would like to sketch the historical process that has established Debrecen's spiritual and cultural heritage and the inhabitants' identity in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The borders of Hungary changed many times in the 20<sup>th</sup> century and it affected both the city and its inhabitants seriously. The borders' role has changed a lot since the fall of the communist regime and it has direct effect on the border regions' life. We are going to demonstrate, in a separate section, the border's effect on the city's cultural life and cultural economy. Then we would like to examine those possibilities, which are provided by the joining to the European Union and finally the developing relations between Debrecen and Oradea (Nagyvárad).

### *The city's past and the past's heritage*

Debrecen (thanks to its College and the University of Debrecen) is one of the best studied Hungarian cities. We know a lot about the city's present and the near past, but we have only insufficient knowledge about its early history.

We do not know exactly when Debrecen was established, but the name of the city (according to the remained sources) was mentioned at first in *Regestrum Varadiense* (a collection of judgements, which was registered in Várad (Oradea) in 1235. Debrecen, as regards its geopolitical position, lay in the inside part of the Hungarian Kingdom, in the north-western part of the historical Bihar Comitatus.<sup>3</sup> Oradea (the comitat or county seat) and Debrecen belonged to the same administrative unit till almost 800 years. While Oradea was the county seat, Debrecen had economy and educational functions.<sup>4</sup>

Debrecen lay on one of the most important trade-routes of the Hungarian Kingdom, which linked Oradea with Košice (Kassa) and it had a beneficial effect on the city's industry and the development of the business life. It opened up (new) possibilities for the city's merchants and indirectly for the craftsmen to have a connection with Oradea and the Transylvanian cities and beside them they could reach Wallachia and Moldova as well. Northwards they could reach (via Košice) the Polish cities. It indicates Debrecen's lively business life that the city gained many times the right of holding fairs during the Middle Ages. Nowadays the fairs belong to the city's oldest traditions. As a result of the city development Debrecen obtained the title of market-town (*oppidum*) in the 14<sup>th</sup> century. Partly the citizens' demand for learning may have led to the foundation of (as we know) the first municipal school. The city's far-famed college (Reformed College) was developed from this school during the 16<sup>th</sup> century.

The 16<sup>th</sup> century brought many important changes both in the country and the city's life. The medieval Hungarian state's central area got under the control of the Ottoman Empire. The northern and the western part of the country, under the name of Hungarian Kingdom, got into the Austrian Habsburg's hands, while the eastern part kept its relative sovereignty under the name of Principality of Transylvania. Debrecen's geopolitical position suddenly changed. The city, which was in the inside part of the country for a long time, suddenly it found itself on the border (on the periphery) of three country regions. The city, which belonged to Bihar County, became (with Oradea) one of

<sup>3</sup> Comitatus was the former name of the Hungarian counties (*vármegye*).

<sup>4</sup> István Süli-Zakar, "A trianoni magyar-román határon átnyúló kapcsolatok" [The Trianon Hungarian – Romanian cross-border connections], in *Partium: társadalom, területfejlesztés* [Partium: society, regional development], ed. Ferenc Szilágyi and Zoltán Zakota (Oradea / Nagyvárad: Partium Kiadó, 2014), 28.

the frontier cities of the Principality of Transylvania. This situation, which lasted about 150 years, was not favourable to the peaceful production, the steady growth and the building. On the other hand, the city's contemporary identity's roots can be traced back to this stormy, vicissitudinous and eventful 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries. The city's leaders came from among the richest merchants and beside them lots of craftsmen and (as Debrecen is a city of the Great Hungarian Plain) farmers lived in the city as well. We can read about the city's merchants, that "they are all Hungarian" and "they are self-sacrificing supporters of the national thought, the Magyarisation; they are the spreaders, supporters of culture, school and the church."<sup>5</sup> The city's inhabitants, who preserved the homogeneity of the Hungarian character under the Turkish occupation of Hungary gave up their Catholic faith in the 16<sup>th</sup> century and instead of it chose the much more puritan Calvinist (Reformed) faith. The Reformed Church, which took possession of the municipal school (Reformed College), had influence on (beside the religious life) the city's spiritual and cultural life. The city became one of the mental and spiritual centres of the Reformed Church in Hungary within a short time (Calvinist Rome<sup>6</sup>). The Reformed College's (est. 1538) gravitation zone reached shortly farther regions (mainly in the Great Hungarian Plain and Transylvania) inhabited by Hungarians, and while it played important educational and scientific part during the next centuries, established the mental base of the city's university.

At the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, when the great part of Turkish occupied areas became liberated and the Principality of Transylvania merged into the Habsburg Empire, Debrecen's periphery location – in physical sense – ended. Moreover Debrecen gained the highest title, the free royal town in 1693, which could be conferred on the cities in the feudal Hungary. In spite of the seeming favourable circumstances the city's development stopped. One of the reasons might have been that the leaders of the city, similarly to the inhabitants, adopted the reformed faith and the incident mentality. This fact awoke distrust in the Catholic Habsburg Court. At the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, with the Habsburgs' help, the Catholics could settle down in the city again. Hereupon the city's religious homogeneity, which lasted almost 150 years ended. While the small Catholic community was engaged in the laying down of the bases (church-building, school organisation) of the communal life, the city's war-weary reformed inhabitants sank into poverty and now they made preparations for self-defence. They watched every new initiation, which came from the Court with suspicion. We can say in other words, that they gave up their own innovative readiness voluntarily and chose obstinately the refusal. The city's development, compare with other Hungarian cities, became slower. Debrecen in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, within both the country and the county got into a half-periphery position. At that time Debrecen belonged with Oradea to Bihar County. Because of the poor quality roads it was more difficult to keep contact with the country's innovations centres (Pozsony-Bratislava, Buda, and Pest).

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century from the point of view of Debrecen a series of important, positive tendencies began. In the first half of the century the reformation movement, which showed on country level made possible the slowly modernisation of the economic

---

<sup>5</sup> Lajos Zoltai, "Debrecen sz. kir. város története a legrégibb időktől 1693-ig" [Debrecen free royal town's history from the earliest time till 1693], in *Magyar városok fejlődése – Magyarország városai és vármegyéi I. Debrecenz. kir. város – A város múltja, jelene és jövője rövid áttekintésben* [Hungarian cities' development – Hungary's cities and counties I. Debrecen free royal town – The city's past, present and future in a short review], ed. Gyula Kiszely (Budapest: Vármegyei könyvkiadó, 1931), 60.

<sup>6</sup> Calvinist Rome refers to the city's leading religious role.

life and the society as well. Partly this changing attitude made possible the Jews' settling down in Debrecen from the 1840s. Firstly the merchants and the craftsmen's strata became stronger by them. During the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 and the War of Independence Debrecen was the capital city of the country for almost a half year. The government resided in the city and the parliament held its meetings here as well. Besides the fact that these events made Debrecen for a short time, the most important city of the country it had important, positive effect on the city's self-image and the citizens' mentality: Debrecen became the protector of the country's independence (őrváros). Hungary's general economic and social development continued (temporarily in hostile political surroundings) after the failure of the War of Independence. In the case of the city the making of the railway lines played important part in the development. Debrecen preceded its similar size rivals when the railway reached the city in 1857. The railway reached Nyíregyháza, Miskolc, Kassa (Košice), Nagyvárad (Oradea) and the Transylvanian cities only some years later. In the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century many railway lines were built, whose starting point was Debrecen. The direct railway connection between Debrecen and the nearby Oradea was born in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Debrecen – Nagykereki – Oradea railway line). The importance of the railway in the city's life is invaluable. Besides it promoted the manufacturing industry's development in Debrecen it formed, along the railway lines, a considerable gravitation zone for the city. The administrative reform in 1876 resulted in further positive changes for the city. In consequence of it Debrecen broke away from the Oradea headed Bihar County and became the centre the newly organised Hajdú County. Beside the newly gained administrative function Debrecen was the economic, educational, cultural and the religious centre of northeast Hungary at that time. The city's building stock, which became determinant historical and morphological element of the city centre, began to take shape at that time. By the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century Debrecen became the centre of not only the north Hungarian Great Plain areas, but its gravitation zone went beyond the borders of the county and with variable degree and intensity but it extended gradually to the country's north-eastern region as well. Debrecen's biggest rivals were Košice and Oradea at that time. Both Debrecen and Pozsony (Bratislava) got a university at the same time (1912). The establishment of the university had great importance in many respects. It helped the city's spiritual and cultural development and preserved its regional leading part.<sup>7</sup> The outbreak of the World War I then its losing circumscribed Debrecen's further large-scale plans.

### ***Changing borders – the borders' changing role***

When Hungary's new borders were marked out in 1920, the features of the settlement's network and the functional connections among the settlements were not taken into consideration and because of them the existed and active gravitation zones broke off and fell to pieces.<sup>8</sup> While Debrecen got to the eastern borderland (periphery) of the country, the city lost a big part of its traditional gravitation zone. The daily economic,

<sup>7</sup> István Süli-Zakar and Tibor Kecskés, "Tourism and Cultural Economy of the Historical Towns from the Point of View of Towns' Rehabilitation (Example of Debrecen)," in *Enhancing Competitiveness of V4 Historic Cities to Develop Tourism*, ed. Zsolt Radics and János Péntes (Debrecen: DIDAKT Kft., 2014), 195.

<sup>8</sup> János Péntes, "Vonzásvizonyok vizsgálata a román-magyar határtérségben" [Gravitation states' research in the Romanian – Hungarian border region], in *Partium: társadalom- és térszerkezet* [Partium: society and configuration], ed. Ferenc Szilágyi and Zoltán Zakota (Nagyvárad: Dokumentum Kiadó, 2013), 107.

cultural and human connections, which had worked previously in natural way, broke off overnight. During the war, the built up injuries aroused lots of tension and tempers on both sides of the border and they made more difficult the restart after the war. During the World War II, with the reannexation of Northern Transylvania to Hungary, the former state was partly restored. After the war, during the communist regimes, the strengthening of the borders' military and defence's function were the main characteristic features. In spite of that Hungary and Romania belonged to the same political and power block, the Hungarian – Romanian border became a closed border. One part of the former border stations was closed down and so the (international) traffic concentrated only on five border stations.<sup>9</sup>

In the eastern block's countries, the events, which took place in 1989-90, caused a new situation on both sides of the Hungarian – Romanian border. After the change of regime, from the beginning of 1990s the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe could move freely. At the beginning of the 1990s new border stations were opened one after the other and the frontier traffic increased considerably. Mainly the shopping tourism's growth was behind the increase of the trips' number and especially the border regions' inhabitants were concerned in it. Different relationships – built on the cultural and financial similarities and interests – were formed successively among those settlements, which lie on both sides of the border. Naturally the fact that there are communities on both sides of the border, which belong to the same ethnic groups, was a motivational factor in the deepening of the border regions' relationships. It had a positive effect on the concerned regions' relationships and it deepened the cooperation among them. The member states of the Schengen Agreement introduced visa regime for Romanian citizens between 1994 and 2002. It had negative effects on the Hungarian – Romanian cross-border cooperation. At about the millennium the former socialist countries' joining came closer to the European Union. Romanian citizens did not need visa to the Schengen states after 2002. Hungary in 2004 and Romania in 2007 joined to the European Union.

From the two countries' joining we could meet with more and more positive motion and change. While the two countries' border was transformed into more formal, their cooperation became closer as well. We have witnessed “the change of the functional role of borders, by changing their perception from border-barriers to linking-borders.”<sup>10</sup> We can say, related to it, that “the new political and economical situation promoted at European level aims to standardize border role policy between countries and transform them into areas of convergence, closure, major economic and cultural interest (...). And in parallel, the military function lost supremacy in favour of a purely administrative function.”<sup>11</sup> We could study in the last decade that how the Hungarian – Romanian borderland could change from a hard, closed, debarring border into a soft, open and recipient borderland.<sup>12</sup> “In the two decades after the events of 1989-1990 we have witnessed not only a shaping of the geographical border in terms of boosting the cross-border traffic flow or the cross-border cooperation, but also a mutation from the ethno-national mentalities to a cosmopolitan mentality. In fact, actually speaking, it is not only a

---

<sup>9</sup> Süli-Zakar, “A trianoni magyar-román ...,” 30.

<sup>10</sup> Alexandru Ilieș, *Euroregional Cross-border Cooperation Premises at the Eastern External Border of EU. Romania – Borders and Borderlands* (Gdansk-Pelplin, Poland: Geography Institute of University of Gdansk –Bernardinum, 2010), 54.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 55.

<sup>12</sup> Süli-Zakar, “A trianoni magyar-román ...,” 31.

revelation of culture of cohabitation, but a rediscovery of a coexistence pattern previous to drawing national borders.”<sup>13</sup>

***The Hungarian – Romanian border’s role in Debrecen’s tourism and its effect on the city’s cultural economy***

In spite of that Romania, contrasted with Hungary, has not belonged to the member states of the Schengen Agreement yet and the border between the two countries (compared with the communist period) has become soft notably and the trips have become easier from one country to the other one. As we have already mentioned, Debrecen can be found about 25 kms from the Hungarian-Romanian border. The city is easily accessible from Romania. From the direction of Valea lui Mihai (Rom.) it can be reached both by car and train. Debrecen has direct transport geography connection with northern Bihor and Sălaj County’s settlements. From the direction of Oradea, which is hardly further than 60 kms from Debrecen, it is easier to use the highway than travel by train. The direct railway connection, which existed between the two cities, discontinued after 1920, and later (after the World War II) one section of the track was demolished in the border region. Debrecen, similarly to Oradea has an international airport. In our opinion the air transport’s possibility, in relation to the cities’ connection, has not been put to account yet. Beside the city’s transport connections and the possibilities, which come from them, the city marketing also plays a great part in Debrecen’s tourism.

The tourists who visit the city can arrive with different purposes. Because of the nearby border the shopping tourism has great importance, but lots of tourists come from Romania to attend a cultural or a sport event and beside them we have to mention the health tourism as well. We can find, on both sides of the border, European famous spas or spas with regional importance which are visited by many tourists who come from the other country. The Debrecen spa is also very popular among those tourists who come from Romania. Major share of the foreign guests who use the city spa’s tourism services – partly because of the geographical closeness – come from the neighbouring countries, including Romania (Partium, Transylvania). We can say that the “medical vacations play an increasingly significant role year by year in the motivation behind the trips of tourists arriving in both countries, but especially in Hungary.”<sup>14</sup>

Although not all tourists’, who visit Debrecen, first aim is a cultural programme, but after all, because of the useful way of passing the time, some of them insert a museum or an exhibition visiting into their programme, or they watch a performance and maybe they attend a cultural programme too. “One of the main aims of travelling is the demand to learn about other people and their culture. (...) So, culture is an important attractive force for tourism, tourism provides audience for cultural events, and generally enhances the production, protection, extension and sale of cultural goods.”<sup>15</sup>

Nowadays the conference tourism plays more and more important part in the two countries’ relationship. The conference tourism has important part in Debrecen’s cultural economy as well. We have to mention here the exemplary cooperative relationship, which

<sup>13</sup> Ioan Horga and István Süli-Zakar, “Contributions of Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen to Shaping the Border into a Space for Knowledge and Development,” *Analele Universităţii din Oradea / Relaţii Internaţionale şi studii Europene II* (Oradea: Editura Universităţii din Oradea, 2010): 170.

<sup>14</sup> Lóránt Dávid, Zoltán Bujdosó, and Géza Tóth, “Tourism Planning in the Hajdú-Bihar – Bihor Euroregion,” in *Neighbours and Partners: On the Two Sides of the Border*, ed. István Süli-Zakar (Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadó, 2008), 328.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 330.



has been formed between the University of Debrecen and the University of Oradea. The universities in addition to organise conferences and international seminars, they often organise tutor and student exchange programmes and they participate in the development of common projects as well. "From the tourist point of view (...) the business aim is represented, too, as there are several companies on cities belong, where partnerships, international cooperation, even multinational companies develop and are involved on both sides of the border."<sup>16</sup> There are lots of families, which have family connections on the other side of the borders and many people visit, because of the family relations, the border regions' settlements. In relation to it we have to mention that the language and the cultural consciousness, which can connect the same ethnic groups on both sides of the borders, have great importance. So we can say that the language is an important factor for the cultural identity.<sup>17</sup>

During the last 10-15 years, owing to the different urban regeneration projects, Debrecen's those quarters (the city centre, Nagyerdő – Great Forrest), which are the most popular among the tourists, underwent considerable reconstructions. In the case of Debrecen, the city centre (mainly the area of the cultural district) and the Great Forrest mark out the city's traditional cultural-spiritual fields of force. We can find here those institutions and those required infrastructures, which can offer places for different city-level cultural programmes.

Owing to the building-reconstruction projects the city's building stock was renewed and modernised in the last one and a half decade, while many new pedestrian squares and streets were also formed.<sup>18</sup> Every important historic building, which has religious, historical or cultural importance and is popular among the tourists, was renewed in the near past. The Reformed Great Church, which is the city's symbol, stands out among the historic buildings, but we have to mention the Reformed College, Déri Museum and the name of Csokonai National Theatre as well. The Outdoor Stage of the Nagyerdő was also modernised and reconstructed in 2014. The city grew richer with numerous new buildings (Főnix Hall, Kölcsey Centre, **MODEM Centre for Modern and Contemporary Arts, Agora Science Centre**) during the last years. The building of Lovarda<sup>19</sup> got a new (cultural) function and was also renewed at the beginning of the new millennium. These institutions, with their high quality programmes and services play important part in Debrecen's cultural and tourist life. We could see the change and the dynamic development of Debrecen's cultural economy during the last two decades.<sup>20</sup>

Almost every bigger institution project of the last years had a connection with the development of Debrecen's cultural economy. Unambiguously the strengthening of the tourist character was behind the reconstruction of the Great Church in 2013-2014. Within

---

<sup>16</sup> Constantin Țoca and Ioan Horga, "Sociological Research. Thinking the Future together the Debrecen-Oradea Cross-border Agglomeration," in *Neighbours and Partners: On the Two Sides of the Border*, ed. István Süli-Zakar (Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadó, 2008), 76.

<sup>17</sup> Alina Stoica and Constantin Țoca, "Romanian – Hungarian Cross-Border Cultural and Educational Relations," in *Cross-Border Partnership / With Special Regard to the Hungarian – Romanian – Ukrainian Tripartite Border*, ed. Ioan Horga and István Süli-Zakar (Debrecen-Oradea: University of Debrecen Press – University of Oradea Press, 2010), 73.

<sup>18</sup> Tibor Kecskés, "Debrecen belvárosának a rehabilitációja az 1990-es évektől napjainkig" [The rehabilitation of Debrecen Downtown since the 1990s], *Debreceni Szemle – 2014 válogatás* [Debrecen Review – 2014 selection], 1, 22 (2015): 49-53.

<sup>19</sup> The name of Lovarda comes from the former stable where the hussars' horses were kept.

<sup>20</sup> Süli-Zakar and Kecskés, "Tourism and Cultural Economy ...," 217.

the church building, beside others, a church history exhibition, and a multifunctional communal hall and between the two towers an outdoor lookout was formed while the inner place became suitable for concerts. In the Kölcsey Centre (opened in 2006) different theatre performances, concerts, exhibitions, balls, parties and conferences can be organised. The Főnix Hall (from 2002) was the host of many local and international sport programmes. Beside the sport events, concerts and different cultural programmes can also be organised here. Lots of performers, artists and visitors, who attend these programmes, have come from the neighbouring Romania. The exhibitions of Déri Museum, MODEM and the church history exhibition of the Reformed College are also visited by many foreign tourists. The church art collection and the exhibition of the Reformed College are also visited by many Hungarian groups over the frontier. Many of them come from Transylvania (Romania) and from the Zakarpattia Oblast (Ukraine). In their case the religious and cultural identities play important part. The audience of Csokonai National Theatre mainly comes from the city or from its neighbourhood, but sometimes (because of the near border) artists, visitors or organised groups can arrive from Romania, as well. It may probably have language and cultural reasons that in the case of cross-border human connections the Hungarian – Hungarian contacts more often occur than the Hungarian – Romanian contacts.<sup>21</sup>

As we have already mentioned connected with different urban regeneration projects, many pedestrian squares and streets were formed in the city centre of Debrecen in the last years. A part of them has both relaxing function and can be used as a place for different cultural programmes. Debrecen's new pedestrian squares and pedestrian streets besides that they give place for many important programmes and supporting programmes they have also increased the city's and the city centre's attractive force. In these programmes we can welcome performers, artists and different art groups, who often come from the other part of the border. The main square, which can be found in front of the Great Church serves equally as a place for bigger city programmes (Flower Carnival and its supporting programmes, International Festival of Military Bands, Christmas Fair, different commemorations, political mass meetings etc.), while the square's shady parks have important recreation role as well. The different gastronomical days ("Mangalica" Pig Festival, Turkey Days etc.), which have been held on the main square for some years, are partly based on the local and the regional's traditional farming and eating habits. These gastronomical programmes have become deservedly popular among both the Hungarian and the foreigner visitors. However we have to mention that the audience or spectators of those programmes, which are offered by the city, come first of all from the city's inhabitants and from among who live in the city's surroundings. We can say that, the programme tourism has important tradition in this region and numerous festivals are organised every year. On the other hand their characteristic feature is that they have only local or regional attractive force.<sup>22</sup> The different fairs are especially very popular among

---

<sup>21</sup> István Szűcs, "Az Észak-alföldi Régió határokon átvélő együttműködésének perspektívái" [The Northern Great Plain Region's cross-border cooperation perspectives], in *A régiók Magyarországa II. Hálózatok és labirintusok* [The regions' Hungary II. Networks and labyrinths], ed. Tamás Kaiser, Attila Ágh and Judit Kis-Varga (MTA Szociológiai Kutatóintézet, 2007), 182.

<sup>22</sup> István Szűcs, "Területi kormányzás alapjai és perspektívái az Észak-alföldi Régióban: Észak-alföldi Régió, az Európai Unió keleti kapuja" [The bases of the regional government and its perspectives in the Northern Great Plain Region: The Northern Great Plain Region, the eastern gate of the European Union], in *A régiók Magyarországa I. A regionális intézményrendszer*

the tourists. In these fairs we can meet both hucksters and buyers who come from the other side of the border. The fair of the craftsmanship products, which are on higher level, is mainly organised in the city's main square. Debrecen's big trade fair, which is based on the city's time-honoured customs, is organised twice a year (in May and in September). We have already concluded, in connection with Debrecen's cultural economy, that it gains more and more importance in the city's everyday life.<sup>23</sup>

The cities' different (cultural, economic etc.) effects on their surroundings are well known. The changing role of the borders have contributed to the cities' (Debrecen, Oradea) gravitation zones' expansion over the border. In that case if between these cities a kind of closer cooperation was realised they could join their forces and they would have more important effect on their surroundings. We can conclude that the smaller settlements in the border regions can enjoy the benefits from the positive effects of the fast growing bigger cities' (or the cross-border Eurometropolises') cultural economy.<sup>24</sup>

### ***Debrecen's cross-border (Euroregional) relationships***

In our region the borders' social-economic development's hindering effect is well known and we can ascribe great importance to the borders' dividing role in the backwardness of the borderland.<sup>25</sup> We can talk about the borders' dividing function in past tense, but the periphery position and the backwardness, which have come from the closeness of the border and have existed for decades, are difficult to change overnight. However Western European examples demonstrate that the borderland position do not mean disadvantage for the social-economic development in itself, moreover it can be definitely advantageous too. Let's think the Western European examples, where the borders' dividing function has ended and the cooperation, what is based on the mutual interest, has become conspicuous. Hungary's north-eastern region, within the country, is in a periphery position in geographical sense and it often means a multiple disadvantageous position.<sup>26</sup> Debrecen's position is specific in this sense. On the one hand Debrecen, as an innovation centre, has important positive effect on its surroundings. On the other hand the neighbouring, underdeveloped (mainly borderland) regions can also have negative effect on the city (uneducated and unskilled workforce's moving to the city, the neighbourhood's limited business potential, indifference – which comes from the social-cultural backwardness – for the city's different cultural programmes etc.). From the point of view of this region's development there is an important role the cross-border contacts and cooperation. The contacts can occur in established or regular – on county, micro region, association, and self-government level – and in irregular forms.

From the beginning of the 1990s (following the Western European examples) more and more people (researchers, businessmen, politicians etc.) urged in the Central

*körvonalai* [The regions' Hungary I. The regional institutional system's profile], ed. Tamás Kaiser, Attila Ágh and Judit Kis-Varga (MTA Szociológiai Kutatóintézet, 2007), 261.

<sup>23</sup> Süli-Zakar and Kecskés, "Tourism and Cultural Economy...", 214-217.

<sup>24</sup> István Süli-Zakar, "Debrecen-Nagyvárad eurometropolisz közös fejlesztését megalapozó kutatások" [Debrecen – Oradea's historical cooperation], in *A településföldrajz aktuális kérdései* [The Timely Questions of the Urban Geography], ed. Zoltán Csapó and Zsolt Kocsis (Szombathely: Savaria University Press, 2010), 41; István Süli-Zakar, "A határon átnyúló kapcsolatok általános bemutatása" [The Cross-Border Connections' General Presentation], in *Partium: társadalom- és Térszerkezet* [Partium: society and configuration], ed. Ferenc Szilágyi and Zoltán Zakota (Nagyvárad: Dokumentum Kiadó, 2013), 22.

<sup>25</sup> Süli-Zakar, "A határon átnyúló kapcsolatok ...," 16; Süli-Zakar, "A trianoni magyar-román ...," 24.

<sup>26</sup> Süli-Zakar, "A határon átnyúló kapcsolatok ...," 15.

European countries the cooperation among the borderland regions and the strengthening of the regional cohesion. At the beginning of the 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the unification of the European markets led to the growing importance of the development of the (Central) European border regions. In more direct way, these processes also led “to the opening of the borders and the creation of zones and regions characterised by economic, cultural and historical cooperations.”<sup>27</sup> We can add that it is a generally accepted opinion – all over Europe – that “the Euroregions play a serious role in the integration processes” and the “Euroregions most of all are expected to moderate the regional differences. Nevertheless, they have a similarly significant role in the conservation of the local and regional identities through their cultural relations and programmes.”<sup>28</sup>

“The general objectives of the Euroregion aim: to maintain and develop good neighbourly relations, identifying areas of potential cross-border cooperation; organizing and coordinating those activities that promote collaboration between its members in social, economic, cultural, educational, health, environment and tourism.”<sup>29</sup> In Central and Eastern Europe mainly the cultural heritage and the strong historical ties can be the connecting links among the nations, and they can help the achievement and the increase of the cooperation among the countries.

Recognising the importance of the cooperation, the North and Western European model of the regionalism gradually became a Europe-wide model and by the end of the 1990s, in the Central and Eastern European countries both on local and regional level, more and more cross-border cooperation was realised and it increased the Euroregions’ number.<sup>30</sup> Hungary is the originator and participant of numerous Euroregional cooperations in the Central European region. We can set down that Hungary’s all counties – and its many cities and chambers of commerce – are also participants in some kind of Euroregional cooperations.<sup>31</sup> The country’s Euroregions, which have concern with the Hungarian – Romanian border regions are the next: Carpathian Euroregion, Danube–Criş–Mureş–Tisa Euroregion, Bihar-Bihar Euroregion, and Hajdú-Bihar – Bihar Euroregion. The Carpathian Euroregion’s deed of foundation – it was the first cross-border cooperation between Hungary and the bordering countries – was ratified in Debrecen in 1993.

Close cooperation formed between Hajdú-Bihar County (Hungary) and Bihar County (Romania) as well as between the two county seats, Debrecen and Oradea during the last years. (Both counties are members of the Carpathian Euroregion.) Hajdú-Bihar – Bihar Euroregion, which was organised in 2002, ensures organised framework for this cooperation. This Euroregion is “an ideal “ground” for cultural tourism, as it is the meeting area of two nations and two different cultures, however, the cultural roots are vividly alive today as well.”<sup>32</sup> The region’s one of the most important natural sources is the medicinal water. Health resorts or spas, which attract a mass of people from both inland and from the area of the neighbouring country, can be found on both sides of the border. Tourism is one of the most important sections of the market economy. In Hungary Békéscsaba – Gyula – Debrecen –

<sup>27</sup> Klára Czimre, “Cross-border Cooperation – Theory and Practice – For Geographers and Geography Teachers” (Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadó, 2006), 108.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 109.

<sup>29</sup> Stoica and Țoca, “Romanian – Hungarian Cross-border ...,” 70.

<sup>30</sup> Czimre, “Cross-Border Co-operation ...,” 109-110.

<sup>31</sup> István Süli-Zakar and Klára Czimre, “A határon átnyúló (CBC) kapcsolatok Magyarország körül” [The cross-border (CBC) connections around Hungary], in *Debreceni Szemle* 1, 15 (Jan 2007): 50.

<sup>32</sup> Dávid, Bujdosó and Tóth, “Tourism Planning in ...,” 330.

Hajdúszoboszló, while in Romania Moneasa – Tinca – Băile Felix – Oradea – Săcuieni are those settlements that have the most important thermal water springs in the border region. “The rising spa tourism tends to become a real economic engine for the region.”<sup>33</sup> Beside the thermal waters, other important attractive forces are, in tourist sense, the Hortobágy puszta (Hungarian steppe) in Hungary and the climatic health resorts in Romania.

We think it necessary to mention, that “the process of creating an economically and socially dynamic area within the Hungarian-Romanian border space is based on developing a new culture of diversity.”<sup>34</sup>

One of the most typical characteristic features of all borderland regions is the cooperation, which has begun in the human sphere. The common language and the family relationships may stand behind the fact that the Hungarian – Hungarian connections are more common than the Hungarian – Romanian connections in the human sphere.<sup>35</sup> It is also true in the case of the Hungarian – Romanian border region that beside the cultural and educational-scientific common projects more and more plans were realised in the field of economy during the last years. We can consider positive thing that the business connections have become closer in the borderland regions and in many places common interest has shown among the regions’ market participants.<sup>36</sup> However in many cases it shows problems, in connection with the Euroregional cooperation, that there are significant differences (different institution systems, the partners’ different sphere of authority etc.) between the two sides of the border that can make more difficult the cooperation.<sup>37</sup>

Whereas a kind of rivalry is occurring nowadays among the regions, so the importance of the regions’ marketing is reevaluated. The region marketing’s aim is, in our case, the stressing of the cross-border investment opportunities in the Hungarian – Romanian borderland region. We should not forget that the stake of the contention is very big, as the region’s marketing can confirm the carrying out of the region’s development plans.<sup>38</sup>

### ***Debrecen – Oradea: Common past – common future?***

Debrecen and Oradea have common historical and cultural roots and though these centuries-old ties after Trianon and during the communist period became weaker, the two cities established closer links during the last two decades. Debrecen and Oradea are twin towns to each other. This manifold cooperation that characterizes the two cities’ relationship includes all fields of the life and it cannot be listed. We have to mention that in Central and Eastern Europe there were twin towns and similar county connections (maybe between those counties, which can be found on both side of the border) during the socialist period as well. These connections were mainly formals and they were hardly more than a protocol or a cultural relationship.<sup>39</sup>

The cooperation between the two cities, which lie about 60 kms from each other, is promoted by the similar size, the similar number of inhabitants, the similar geographical (borderland) position and the problems, which come from it (periphery position within the

<sup>33</sup> Horga and Süli-Zakar, “Contributions of Institute for Euroregional Studies ...,” 172.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 173.

<sup>35</sup> István Szűcs, “Az Észak-alföldi Régió határokön,” 182.

<sup>36</sup> Szűcs, “Területi kormányzás,” 269.

<sup>37</sup> Süli-Zakar, “A határon átnyúló kapcsolatok ...,” 26.


<sup>38</sup> Szűcs, “Területi kormányzás,” 270.

<sup>39</sup> Süli-Zakar and Czimre, “A határon átnyúló (CBC) kapcsolatok ...,” 27.

countries). The positive Western European examples of the regional cooperation has also anticipated both the two (border divided) neighbouring counties and the cities' advance.

From the 1990s, both Debrecen and Oradea's leaders, have favoured (among others) the economic, cultural and scientific strengthening of the cooperation. Jean Monnet Research Institute (Institute for Euroregional Studies "Jean Monnet" European Centre of Excellence – Oradea/Debrecen), which was founded some years ago, took in hand the common projects' scientific establishment. The elaboration of the innovation-directed, cross-border common economic development and cooperative projects contribute the establishment of Euroregions and Eurometropolises. Researches have been started (among other things) in favour of the establishment Debrecen – Oradea cross-border Eurometropolis (DebOra Project).

**Figure 1.** Debrecen – Oradea cross-border Eurometropolis (DebOra)



**Source:** edited by the authors.

Debrecen and Oradea, these two county seats, that are about 60 kms from each other, organize their surroundings into a common agglomeration. The insufficient developments of the transport network and the fact, that there is not motorway and direct railway connection between the neighbouring county seats have disadvantageous effects on the two cities' transport connection. The former direct railway connection has not been re-established yet and for the moment the motorway making also bypasses this borderland region. The motorway making and the development of the air transport are in the interest of both cities. We have mentioned before, in connection with it, that the establishment of the regional airport system can result in a considerable improvement of the accessibility of the Central and Eastern European countries and the border regions. We are convinced that

the Debrecen Airport can have important role in this system.<sup>40</sup> Debrecen is one of the regional centres of the country and it gives the city free hand. At the same time Oradea (in Romania) plays second fiddle within the North-western Region and the city's gravitation zone (apart from the church functions) hardly outreaches the county's borders.<sup>41</sup>

Nowadays the cultural, educational and the tourist cooperation play important role in the two cities' relationship. Besides the daily shopping tourism, that takes a direction to the other city, the visiting of the other city's different cultural programmes (concerts, theatrical performances, exhibitions etc.) is also important. But beside these programmes, the thermal water based health tourism, the conference tourism, the sport tourism and the programme tourism (gastronomical days, travel fairs etc.) also plays important role in the two cities' relationship.

Debrecen Flower Carnival, which is held on 20<sup>th</sup> August, stands out from the cultural programmes. The Carnival has been held since the 1960s and more than 100.000 visitors arrive in Debrecen to see the flower-decorated cars' procession every year. We can say that this event is the biggest tourist attraction of the city and for the sake of it lots of tourists come from different parts of the world. Beside others lots of performers and tourists come from the nearby Oradea as well. Debrecen wanted to share the Carnival's "experience" with Oradea, when the Carnival's export arose at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In course of the "Open Window to Europe" programme, the flower-decorated cars from Debrecen procession Oradea's street as well. The Oradea Flower Carnival (similarly to Debrecen's) provides possibility to organize different supporting programmes (folk music festivals, folk dance groups' appearance etc.). One part of the performers also visited the minor towns and villages in both Bihor County (Romania) and Hajdú-Bihar County (Hungary) during the last years. We have to mention several of the common cultural programmes, the Euroregional Music Festival, which is organised every year. In course of it (among others) the Oradea Philharmonic has given some successful concerts and different folk singers, classical music and light music bands could give concerts both in Bihor and the neighbouring Hajdú-Bihar counties.<sup>42</sup>

The statement that in the increasing rivalry for the investments, projects and the qualified experts the cities lay special emphases on the environment, the culture and the integrated city management, concerns the Hungarian – Romanian border's cities too. The number of the neighbouring cities' cooperation increased during the last years and by the help of it they could unite their sources and possibilities.<sup>43</sup> If we look into the projects, we can conclude that – during the last years – those big cities, which are near the borders (gateway function) got into a favourable situation: as the base of multinational companies and organisations, they could attract important projects to themselves. These gateway cities' diplomatic and business life become lively and these cities increase their international marketing role, the importance of both the higher education and the conference tourism as well.<sup>44</sup> In Eastern Hungary the next cities have gateway city

<sup>40</sup> Süli-Zakar, "A határon átnyúló kapcsolatok ...," 24.

<sup>41</sup> Csaba Miklós Kovács, "Nagyvárosi együttműködések, közös metropoliszi övezetek a román-magyar határ mentén" [Big city cooperation, common metropolis areas along the Romanian – Hungarian border], in *Partium: társadalom- és térszerkezet* [Partium: society and configuration], ed. Ferenc Szilágyi and Zoltán Zakota (Nagyvárad: Dokumentum Kiadó, 2013), 58.

<sup>42</sup> Stoica and Țoca, "Romanian – Hungarian Cross-border ...," 73-74.

<sup>43</sup> Bálint Filep, "A nagyvárosok az európai és a magyar területi politikában" [The big cities in the European and the Hungarian regional politics] (Pécs – Győr: Széchenyi István Egyetem Regionális- és Gazdaságtudományi Doktori Iskola, Publikon Kiadó, 2014), 147.

<sup>44</sup> Süli-Zakar, "Debrecen-Nagyvárad eurometropolisz ...," 42.



function: Debrecen, Békéscsaba, Szeged and Nyíregyháza. On the other side of the border, the next Romanian cities have the same function: Satu Mare, Oradea and Arad.

**Figure 2.** A flower-decorated car in Oradea with Debrecen's symbol the Great Church on top.



**Source:** Personal blog article, “Virágkarneval nagyváradi története 2006-2011” [Flower Carnival Oradea History 2006-2011], accessed May 20, 2015, <http://egyvaradiblogjanagyvaradrol.blogspotHu/2013/08/viragkarneval-nagyvaradi-tortenete-2006.html>.

### **Conclusions**

Debrecen, this typical Hungarian city, which can be found in the eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain, could grow in peace for centuries inside of the country. Beside the industry and the commerce (because of geographical reasons) the agriculture also played a great part in the past. Debrecen's merchants had close commercial contacts with remote regions as well. Nowadays the fairs belong to the city's lively traditions. Only the Turkish period brought bigger change in the city's life. While the city's ethnic composition did not change, the citizens became reformed. Debrecen's famous school, the Reformed College originated at that time. At the age of Habsburgs the city's true-born Hungarian citizens<sup>45</sup> had a strong dislike of the royal court. The city's development continued in the 19<sup>th</sup> century till the outbreak of the World War I. While Debrecen's economic and administrative role grew, the city became the religious, cultural and educational centre of Northeast Hungary by the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

The new borders, which were determined in 1920, were not favourable to the city's development (periphery position). While the new border cut off Debrecen from its natural partners (Oradea and the Transylvanian cities) it lost a considerable part of its gravitation zone. As we could see, the borders' function changed many times during the last century. “The Hungarian-Romanian border, (...) from the fall of communism and (...) from the Trianon Treaty, has changed its status of hard, close, exclusive border to that of soft, open,

<sup>45</sup> Their nickname was “cívís,” which comes from the Latin word “civis” and means *citizen*. Debrecen is the city of cívís (cívísváros).



inclusive frontier.”<sup>46</sup> This change has made possible (following the Western European examples) the organisation of the common historical, cultural tradition and business interests based Euroregions since the 1990s. We can say that by now the Euroregions and the Eurometropolises, in the eastern periphery of the European Union, have become organic part of everyday life.<sup>47</sup> Those Euroregion organisations, which refer to the Hungarian – Romanian section of frontier, are based on the mutual partnership. The language and family ties that can occur on both sides of the border can make stronger this union. In the Hungarian – Romanian borderland region the thermal water, the common history and the culture-based tourism is one of the most important factors of the economic life.

In Debrecen’s life (in the cultural economy) the tourism plays more and more important part. One part of the tourists, who visit the city come from the neighbouring Romania. The city centre and the Great Forest are, from the point of view of tourism, the most important part of the city. Owing to the urban regeneration important changes and improvements took place during the last two decades. The renewed and the newly built cultural institutions with the renewed public squares are the perfect scenes for different (cultural) programmes.

Debrecen always had close and special relationship with Oradea. The two cities’ relationship has become closer since the change of regime. Their cooperation (we can say it) covers the life’s every part. The geographical neighbourhood, the similar sizes, the economic interests (see city competition) and the collectively organised agglomeration zone urge the two cities on the closer cooperation in the future. We consider, as regards the two cities, far the most important thing Debrecen and Oradea’s cross-border cooperation and their growing into a Eurometropolis.<sup>48</sup>

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Czimre, Klára. “Cross-border Co-operation – Theory and Practice – For Geographers and Geography Teachers.” Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadó, 2006.
- Dávid, Lóránt, Zoltán Bujdosó, and Géza Tóth. “Tourism Planning in the Hajdú-Bihar – Bihor Euroregion.” In *Neighbours and Partners: On the Two Sides of the Border*, edited by István Süli-Zakar, 323-332. Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadó, 2008.
- Filep, Bálint. “A nagyvárosok az európai és a magyar területi politikában” [The big cities in the European and the Hungarian regional politics]. Pécs – Győr: Széchenyi István Egyetem Regionális- és Gazdaságtudományi Doktori Iskola, Publikon Kiadó, 2014.
- Horga, Ioan, and István Süli-Zakar. “Contributions of Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen to Shaping the Border into a Space for Knowledge and Development.” *Analele Universității din Oradea / Relații internaționale și studii Europene* II (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2010): 170-183.

---

<sup>46</sup> Horga and Süli-Zakar, “Contributions of Institute for Euroregional Studies ...,” 170.

<sup>47</sup> István Süli-Zakar, “A határok és a határon átnyúló kapcsolatok ártérkelődése Kelet-Közép-Európában” [The bases of the regional government and its perspectives in the Northern Great Plain Region: The Northern Great Plain Region, the eastern gate of the European Union], in *Közép-Európai Közlemények* [Central European Publications] 4-5, 2 (2009), 143.

<sup>48</sup> Süli-Zakar, “Debrecen-Nagyvárad eurometropolisz ...,” 42.

- Horga, Ioan, "Multilevel Governance (MLG) and Subsidiary Principle in White Paper of MLG of the Committee of the Region (CoR)." In *Regional and Cohesion Policy – Insights into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design*, edited by Ioan Horga, Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, Adrian Ivan, Mykolia Palincsak, and István Süli-Zakar, 158-164. Debrecen & Oradea: Debrecen University Press & Oradea University Press, 2011.
- Horga, Ioan, Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, Adrian Ivan, Mykolia Palincsak, and István Süli-Zakar. *Regional and Cohesion Policy – Insights Into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design*, Debrecen & Oradea: Debrecen University Press & Oradea University Press, 2011.
- Ilies, Alexandru. *Euroregional Cross-border Cooperation Premises at the Eastern External Border of EU. Romania – Borders and Borderlands*. Gdansk-Pelplin, Poland: Geography Institute of University of Gdansk – Bernardinum, 2010.
- Kecskés, Tibor. "Debrecen belvárosának a rehabilitációja az 1990-es évektől napjainkig" [The Rehabilitation of Debrecen Downtown since the 1990s]. *Debreceni Szemle – 2014 válogatás* [Debrecen Review – 2014 selection], 1, 22 (2015): 47-57.
- Kiszely, Gyula (ed.) "Magyar városok fejlődése – Magyarország városai és vármegyéi I. Debrecen sz. kir. város – A város múltja, jelene és jövője rövid áttekintésben" [The Hungarian cities' Development – Hungary's cities and counties I. Debrecen free royal town – The city's past, present and future in a short review]. Budapest: Vármegyei könyvkiadó, 1931.
- Kovács, Csaba Miklós. "Nagyvárosi együttműködések, közös metropoliszi övezetek a román-magyar határ mentén" [Big city cooperation, common metropolis areas along the Romanian – Hungarian border]. In *Partium: társadalom- és térszerkezet* [Partium: society and configuration], edited by Ferenc Szilágyi and Zoltán Zakota, 56-84. Nagyvárad: Dokumentum Kiadó, 2013.
- Pénzes, János. "Vonzásviszonyok vizsgálata a román-magyar határtérségben [Gravitation states' research in the Romanian – Hungarian border region]." In *Partium: társadalom- és térszerkezet* [Partium: society and configuration], edited by Ferenc Szilágyi and Zoltán Zakota, 103-133. Nagyvárad: Dokumentum Kiadó, 2013.
- Stoica, Alina, and Constantin Țoca. "Romanian – Hungarian Cross-border Cultural and Educational Relations." In *Cross-border Partnership / With Special Regard to the Hungarian – Romanian – Ukrainian Tripartite Border*, edited by Ioan Horga and István Süli-Zakar, 70-75. Debrecen-Oradea: University of Debrecen Press – University of Oradea Press, 2010.
- Süli-Zakar, István. "A határok és a határon átnyúló kapcsolatok ártértékelődése Kelet-Közép-Európában" [The Borders and the Cross-border Connections' Rethinking in East-Central Europe]. In *Közép-Európai Közlemények* [Central European Publications] 4-5, 2 (2009): 137-144.
- Süli-Zakar, István. "Debrecen-Nagyvárad eurometropolisz közös fejlesztését megalapozó kutatások" [Researches on Debrecen – Oradea Eurometropolis's common development]. In *A településföldrajz aktuális kérdései* [The Timely Questions of the Urban Geography], edited by Zoltán Csapó and Zsolt Kocsis, 38-52. Szombathely: Savaria University Press, 2010.
- Süli-Zakar, István. "A határon átnyúló kapcsolatok általános bemutatása [The cross-border connections' general representation]." In *Partium: társadalom- és térszerkezet* [Partium: society and configuration], edited by Ferenc Szilágyi and Zoltán Zakota, 11-37. Nagyvárad: Dokumentum Kiadó, 2013.

- Süli-Zakar, István. “A trianoni magyar-román határon átnyúló kapcsolatok” [The Trianon Hungarian – Romanian cross-border connections]. In *Partium: társadalom, területfejlesztés* [Partium: society, regional development], edited by Ferenc Szilágyi and Zoltán Zakota, 23-49. Oradea/Nagyvárad: Partium Kiadó, 2014.
- Süli-Zakar, István. “Debrecen-Nagyvárad történelmi együttműködése” [Debrecen – Oradea’s historical cooperation]. In *Partium: társadalom, területfejlesztés* [Partium: society, regional development], edited by Ferenc Szilágyi and Zoltán Zakota, 127-133. Oradea/Nagyvárad: Partium Kiadó, 2014.
- Süli-Zakar, István, and Klára Czimre. “A határon átnyúló (CBC) kapcsolatok Magyarország körül” [The cross-border (CBC) connections around Hungary]. *Debreceni Szemle* [Debrecen Review] 1, 15 (Jan 2007): 27-51.
- Süli-Zakar, István, and Tibor Kecskés. “Tourism and Cultural Economy of the Historical Towns from the Point of View of Towns’ Rehabilitation (example of Debrecen).” In *Enhancing Competitiveness of V4 Historic Cities to Develop Tourism*, edited by Zsolt Radics and János Péntes, 194-220. Debrecen: DIDAKT Kft., 2014.
- Szücs, István. “Területi kormányzás alapjai és perspektívái az Észak-alföldi Régióban: Észak-alföldi Régió, az Európai Unió keleti kapuja” [The bases of the regional government and its perspectives in the Northern Great Plain Region: The Northern Great Plain Region, the eastern gate of the European Union]. In *A régiók Magyarországa I. A regionális intézményrendszer körvonalai* [The regions’ Hungary I. The regional institutional system’s profile], edited by Tamás Kaiser, Attila Ágh, and Judit Kis-Varga, 251-305. MTA Szociológiai Kutatóintézet, 2007.
- Szücs, István. “Az Észak-alföldi Régió határokon átvívelő együttműködésének perspektívái” [The Northern Great Plain Region’s cross-border cooperation perspectives]. In *A régiók Magyarországa II. Hálózatok és labirintusok* [The regions’ Hungary II. Networks and labyrinths], edited by Tamás Kaiser, Attila Ágh, and Judit Kis-Varga, 174-191. MTA Szociológiai Kutatóintézet, 2007.
- Țoca, Constantin, and Ioan Horga. “Sociological Research. Thinking the Future together the Debrecen-Oradea Cross-border Agglomeration.” In *Neighbours and Partners: On the Two Sides of the Border*, edited by István Süli-Zakar, 73-82. Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadó, 2008.



### **III. Frontiers cities**

**Miruna TRONCOTĂ** (Bucharest) ◀ ▶ *Sarajevo – A Border City Caught between Its Multicultural Past, the Bosnian War and a European Future*

**Anatoliy KRUGLASHOV** (Chernivtsi) ◀ ▶ *Chernivtsi: A City with Mysterious Flavour of Tolerance*

**Sedef EYLEMER** and **Dilek MEMİŞOĞLU** (Izmir) ◀ ▶ *The Borderland City of Turkey: Izmir from Past to the Present*

**Vasile CUCERESCU** and **Simion ROȘCA** (Kishinev) ◀ ▶ *Tiraspol – The Border City of Eastern Latinity*



# Sarajevo – A Border City Caught between Its Multicultural Past, the Bosnian War and a European Future

Miruna Troncotă<sup>1</sup>

**Abstract.** *The analysis is devoted to the city of Sarajevo and its turbulent history as being an illustrative case for how political borders have been symbolically reconstructed on ethnic lines in the Balkans for the last five centuries. Key historical periods such as the Austro-Hungarian period, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and next the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Olympic Games, the war and the Dayton Peace Agreement including its aftermath shall be discussed in turn. Some of the most significant events that have shaped the history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century have directly marked the city of Sarajevo and they tackle some of the most intricate issues that dominate European history as a whole such as national belonging, political ideologies, and religious beliefs. Several milestones can be traced in this regard: the beginning of the first World War, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the second World War, Tito's political vision and the prosperous era of socialist Yugoslavia, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and violent ethnic war, the period of peace building and post-conflict reconstruction which is still ongoing. The aim of the study is to analyse the events and patterns which might have contributed to changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina's capital city. The main argument that the analysis tries to put forward is that the post-conflict Sarajevo's governance structure has maintained and institutionalised the ethnic divisions and political differences in the country and city's reality.*

**Key words:** *Bosnia and Herzegovina, border city, identity, multi-ethnicity, Sarajevo*

## **Introduction**

The Balkans are predominantly described as a crossroads of cultures and peoples. Their location in South East Europe between the large and powerful countries of the Western Europe, the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire, and Russia brought many threats, as well as many opportunities to the region. As a consequence, major cultural boundaries pass through the Balkans, marking a fragmented territory which had repeatedly been in search of its identity. The city of Sarajevo is, in many ways, the core of the Balkans, a representative case for the troubled history of the so-called “powder keg” of Europe. Among the inhabitants of Sarajevo the majority are native Muslims, known today as Bosniaks. But there are also Serbs who practice the Eastern Orthodox branch of Christianity and there is also a sizeable population of Croatian Catholics, a significant minority of Jews, as well as small numbers of other minorities. This mosaic of cultures has made Sarajevo a fascinating city, as there have been long periods in which they coexisted peacefully, but this seemed rather an exception to the general rule of conflicts in the Balkans. However, the century-long history of changing rulers and forms of belonging to different empires/political structures also explains the country's numerous wars and endless civil unrest that have left visible scars on the city of Sarajevo. The most recent event that destroyed the city's heritage of peaceful cohabitation

---

<sup>1</sup> Postdoctoral researcher at the Department of International Relations and European Integration at the National School for Political Studies and Administration (Bucharest, Romania).

took place during the Bosnian war between 1992 and 1995 – also known as the Siege of Sarajevo – which resulted in many deaths, large scale destruction, and dramatic population shifts. As soon as the war ended with the Dayton Agreement of November 1995, the slow healing process for the entire ex-Yugoslav region started. But 20 years after, Sarajevo is still a city divided by invisible borders, in search of its lost multi-ethnic identity.

This was the starting point of the analysis – the commonly accepted observation that the city of Sarajevo has changed immensely over the past two centuries. The challenge would be to determine whether this change was internally or externally driven, comprising a reflection of the new course of European history. I decided to devote the following analysis to the history of Sarajevo due to its valuable political significance, that places the city at the intersection of a multicultural past, a persistent ethno-nationalist rhetoric and a European identity all at the same time. Moreover, the year 2015 is in itself charged with great historical significance for the city itself and for Bosnia as a whole. On July, 11<sup>th</sup>, 2015 the international community commemorated 20 years since the Srebrenica genocide, the biggest atrocity to happen in Europe since the World War II, but also 20 years since the end to the Bosnian War with the Dayton Peace Agreement. At the political level, this year holds another historic importance as it brought a ground-breaking shift in BiH's road to the European Union membership, and its future stability. On the 1<sup>st</sup> of June 2015, after 7 years of deadlock, stagnation and even deterioration of Bosnia's political situation, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU entered into force and new hopes are on the rise for the country's democratisation and stabilisation.

Based on my field work research and also on my personal experience in Sarajevo<sup>2</sup>, I argued that the dominating element in the analysis of contemporary Sarajevo is still the memorialisation of war, with its diffuse sets of causes and consequences that are hard to track if one looks only in the period when the violence erupted. The analysis aims therefore at assessing the failed attempts for restoring the multi-ethnic tapestry of Sarajevo, being at the same time an invitation to reflect on the city's challenges and opportunities in the aftermath of Yugoslav socialism and the ethnic war that followed.

The article is structured as follows: The first section describes the main stages of the city's history, focusing on identifying several important milestones that profoundly redefined the city's landscape and political importance such as the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand (1914) and the World War I that followed, the inter-war period and the belonging to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the World War II, followed by Tito's regime and the glorious times of Yugoslavia (which started in 1946) and in the end Yugoslavia's disintegration and the ethnic war (1992-1995). The second section focuses on the current situation of the City and it analyses the political importance of Sarajevo in the last century and aims at outlining the characteristics of the main approaches to the analysis of Sarajevo as a sort of "Balkan melting pot". This section also presents the analytic focus chosen for the study, concentrating on the way its political identity, its ethno-national and confessional composition, foundations and dynamics have changed throughout the centuries. The last section aims at drawing a series of conclusions focusing on the heritage of the past in the present identity of the city's population, its impact on the everyday life and culture and Sarajevo's special status of borderland between the Western Balkans and the EU.

---

<sup>2</sup> For the PhD thesis, published as Miruna Troncota, *Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Critical Case Study of Europeanization* (Bucharest: Tritonic Publishing House, 2014).



### *The main stages in Sarajevo's modern history*

Sarajevo is the largest city and the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a small-sized European country nestled within the greater Sarajevo valley of Bosnia, situated in the heart of South-eastern Europe, along the Miljacka River and surrounded by the Dinaric Alps. During the last centuries, Sarajevo was both blessed and cursed by history, ranging from the peaceful inclusion to the violent exclusion of its own inhabitants, and from prosperous times of development to times of destruction and death. Six main stages have been identified in the modern history of Sarajevo that will structure the analysis – from the Ottoman ruling to the Austria-Hungarian ruling which ended with the Assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand (1914), from the World War I to Tito's rule (1946) and from Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Civil War (1992) to the contemporary post-conflict reconstruction and regained vitality of the city (more in **Table 1**).

The present day site of Sarajevo has a long and rich history dating back to the Stone Age. One of the first historical relics found in the Sarajevo valley dates back to the Neolithic, when the region was the centre of the so called "Butmir culture", a Neolithic society named after the findings in the location called Butmir, nearby Sarajevo<sup>3</sup>. It is also known that after that period, the Illyrians, which were the indigenous tribes that lived on the Western part of the Balkan peninsula, had several settlements in the Sarajevo valley. They have been defeated by the Roman emperor Tiberius in 9 a.d. And this period was followed by the Roman rule in the region when Sarajevo became part of the province of Dalmatia<sup>4</sup>. Over the years numerous Roman artefacts had been found in the heart of Sarajevo that testify about the importance of the region as a connector between North and South. The biggest known settlement in the region was identified on top of Ilidža, one of today's suburbs of Sarajevo. After the Romans, the Goths settled in the area and after them in the 7<sup>th</sup> century the Slavs finally conquered the area. The Slavic citadel settled in the Sarajevo valley was named Vrh-Bosna and its history is traced back from 1263 until it was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in 1429. During the Middle Ages the Bosnian Kingdom was one of the most powerful ones in the region<sup>5</sup>. As such, for the next four centuries, Bosnia as a province and Sarajevo as its capital city remained under the Ottoman rule and this period has left a significant footprint on the city and the culture of its inhabitants. The present analysis will start its focus on the city's history with the Ottoman period.

### *The Ottoman ruling*

Historians argue that Sarajevo as we know it today was founded by the Ottoman Empire in the late 1450s upon conquering the region. But the year 1461 is most frequently used as the city's founding date<sup>6</sup>. The first Ottoman governor of Bosnia, Isa-Beg Išaković, transformed the cluster of villages from the Sarajevo valley into a city and state capital by building a number of key objectives, including a mosque, a closed marketplace, a public bath, a hostel, and the governor's castle, which is considered to have given the city its present name<sup>7</sup>. His successor, Gazi Husrev-beg, contributed even more to the city's

<sup>3</sup> Michael Budja, "The Butmir Neolithic Culture," Sarajevo School of Science and Technology, 2003, accessed February 04, 2015, <http://dmc.ssst.edu.ba/ButmirNeolithicCulture/english/obre.html>.

<sup>4</sup> Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 12.

<sup>5</sup> More in Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine Jr, *Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed* (London: C Hurst & Co, 1997), 13-35.

<sup>6</sup> Geoffrey Woodward, "The Great Impact of the Turks in the 16<sup>th</sup> Century," March 2001, accessed March 04, 2015, <http://www.historytoday.com/geoffrey-woodward/ottomans-europe>.

<sup>7</sup> According to historians, Sarajevo is the slavified word based on the noun *saray*, the Turkish word for *palace*.

development and expansion. He was responsible for the construction of the famous Gazi Husrev-beg's Mosque, the Tsar's Mosque, and numerous other mosques throughout the city. He also constructed what is now known as the Old Town (*Baščaršija*), the first Sarajevo library, the school of Sufi philosophy (*madrassa*), and clock tower (*Sahat Kula*), along with numerous other important cultural structures<sup>8</sup>. In this period, Sarajevo quickly grew into the largest and most important city in the whole region. In the next two centuries that followed, the Ottoman Empire made Sarajevo an important administrative centre. It also became known for its large marketplace and numerous mosques, which by the middle of the 16<sup>th</sup> century were over a hundred in number<sup>9</sup>. According to some historians, Sarajevo even became known as one of the biggest and most important Ottoman city in the Balkans, after Istanbul itself. In this period, the city became an important market on the East–West trading routes, mostly used by Ragusan merchants (from present day Dubrovnik, Croatia)<sup>10</sup>. During this period many Slavs in the region converted to Islam. More precisely, “Sarajevo’s demographic picture changed from being about 73 percent Christian in and 27 percent Muslim in 1485 to about 97 percent Muslim in 1530”<sup>11</sup>. An explanation for this phenomenon is that life under Ottoman regime was organised according to “the millet system” in which Muslims generally had more privileges than non-Muslims. This demographic and religious shift has shaped Bosnia in a different way than its neighbouring Balkan countries and became in the next century an increasingly more relevant factor for the changes that marked Sarajevo’s urban identity. The Ottomans built some of the most remarkable landmarks of Sarajevo, such as the famous Tsar’s Mosque (*Careva Džamija*), as well as Europe’s first public toilet with running water and a functional sewage system, in 1529<sup>12</sup>. There were numerous reforms and rebellions, such as the movement of Husein Bey Gradaščević (1831–32), which finally defined the extent of Bosnian autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. During the 1860s, the reforms undertaken brought Bosnia certain provincial autonomy<sup>13</sup>. By the time of the Crimean war against Russia in 1853, the Ottoman Empire had begun to lose power in the region, allowing Russia to gain influence in the Balkans, particularly within Serbia and Montenegro. Next, the year 1878 is the important milestone in the Sarajevo’s transformation, as the Ottoman Empire was defeated and succeeded by the Habsburg rule.

### *The Habsburg ruling*

As part of the Treaty of Berlin, Austria-Hungary’s occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina came in 1878, but the complete annexation followed in 1908. Consequently, BiH became an autonomous administrative unit during the Austro-Hungarian regime. According to several historians, it was in this period that a truly urban society and modernised architecture had emerged in Sarajevo<sup>14</sup>. The Austria-Hungarian period was one of great development for the city as the Western power brought its new acquisition up to the standards of the Victorian age. One of the major changes was that, for the first time in history, Sarajevo’s population started writing in Latin script. During the forty years of their rule, the Habsburg authorities industrialised and modernised BiH and its capital city in a way which suited their strategic interests in the region<sup>15</sup>.

<sup>8</sup> Woodward.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Donia and Fine Jr, 71–75.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Malcolm, 56.

<sup>14</sup> Robert J. Donia, *Sarajevo: A Biography* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 62.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 65.

It is considered that this period gave Sarajevo its specific European flavour in terms of architecture, as the main boulevards along the quay host some examples of Secession and Pseudo-Moorish styles<sup>16</sup>. A negative event also helped this aesthetic change in the city, as a fire burned down a large part of the central area and this has left more room for development and redesign. Those changes resulted in a unique blend of the remaining Ottoman city market and contemporary Western architecture. Beyond this progress, the political situation was tense, as the ethno-confessional groups progressively kept pushing for more autonomy and became more and more anti-Habsburg in their rhetoric. The nationalist movements and anti-Habsburg uprisings reached their peak on June 28, 1914 (which symbolically marked also the anniversary of the battle of “Kosovo Polje” in 1389), when the successor to the Austrian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was murdered in Sarajevo. The assassin was a Serb student, Gavrilo Princip, a member of *the Black Hand*, a radical Serbian group whose goal was to detach Bosnia from Austria and give it to Serbia. After the assassination, Sarajevo became deeply divided along ethno-national lines<sup>17</sup>. Austria declared war on Serbia as a result of the Archduke’s assassination, thus triggering the beginning of the World War I.

### *The Kingdom of Yugoslavia ruling*

In 1918, at the end of the World War I, as the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed and its constituencies dissolved into independent states, BiH became part of the newly established independent Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes which was “a constitutional monarchy uniting all the South Slavs under domination of the Serbian royal house”<sup>18</sup>. BiH was not recognised as a separate administrative unit within the new kingdom, so Sarajevo became the capital of the Drina Province (*Drinska Banovina*) and thus lost its importance as a major urban hub of the region. Except the today's building of the National Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, virtually no significant contributions to the city were made during this period in terms of architecture. According to the historians' accounts, the first major affirmation of a sort of “political Yugoslavism” started in 1929 when the Kingdom was renamed Kingdom of Yugoslavia in an attempt to do away with particularistic/nationalist allegiances. Moreover, to that purpose, “all organizations based on a national or religious affiliation were banned in order to promote a unitary ideology”<sup>19</sup>. Soon after, the World War II broke out, but fascism did not reach Sarajevo until 1941. During the war the Kingdom of Yugoslavia's army was overrun by superior German and Italian forces. In 1941 the Nazi Germany invaded Yugoslavia and Sarajevo was bombarded. Many Sarajevans joined the Partisans and the Communist Party in their efforts to free their city of the aggressors. It is important to mention that on one hand the WWII had a major impact on Sarajevo’s plural coexistence and diversity as many Jews, Serbs and Roma were either killed or displaced during the Croat *Ustasha* regime which was closely affiliated with German Nazis and Italian Fascists. On the other hand, the resistance of Sarajevans against the violent oppressors is a remarkable feature which is continuously present throughout Sarajevo’s history<sup>20</sup>. During the war there were two major oppositional movements, the *Chetniks* - a Serb rebellion movement against foreign occupation and - the *Partisan*

---

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ian Armour, “The Roots of Sarajevo,” *History Today* 38, 8 (August 1988), accessed March 04, 2015, <http://www.historytoday.com/ian-armour/roots-sarajevo-austria-hungary-and-serbia-1867-81>.

<sup>18</sup> Aleksandar Pavković, *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans* (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), 21.

<sup>19</sup> Pavkovic, 29.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

movement (National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia), a movement of Yugoslav patriots with no specific national affiliation, led by the Communist Party<sup>21</sup>. The Partisan resistance fighters, led by Josip Broz Tito, liberated Sarajevo on 6 April 1945 and the city became an important regional centre of the newly formed Yugoslavia.

### ***The socialist federal ruling of Tito's Yugoslavia***

The year 1946 is the other relevant milestone in the transformation of the city of Sarajevo, as it marked the launch of the second version of the Yugoslav state, operated under one overarching political culture and ideology of 'Yugoslavism', which was responsible to "stitch" together a country of multiple ethnic identities. As such, at the end of the Second World War, under the power of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was formed. The entity was renamed as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) by the 1964 constitution. In reality Josip Broz Tito's federal project lasted until his death in 1980, even if formally the regime remained in place until 1991 when the first armed conflicts for the dissolution of Yugoslavia started. This federal project comprised six republics: BiH, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia (including the regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina) and Slovenia. A sort of "duo-nationality" was being created and endorsed by the central authorities, in which each person would have a federal Yugoslav and an ethnic identity at the same time. Holding together this immense ethnic diversity was this ideology of 'Yugoslavism' expressed through the slogan of 'brotherhood and unity' (*bratstvo i jedinstvo*), invoked to rise above old hatreds between different nationalities and make them stronger by being together in a common project. Tito's Yugoslavia was even compared to a sort of Balkan version of what was at the time the European Community (since 1992 named as the European Union). But in its essence SFRJ was a unique political entity, based on a mix of various ethnic and religious groups which were all united in one state by a common ideology: communism and led by a strong Communist party.

BiH was the most ethnically mixed of the six republics of the Yugoslav federation, as neither of the biggest three groups had a majority. Sarajevo grew rapidly in this period, as it became an important regional industrial centre in socialist Yugoslavia. Modern communist-city blocks were built in the Western part of the old city, adding new features to Sarajevo's architectural landscape. The Republic Government invested heavily in Sarajevo, building many new residential blocks in Novi Grad Municipality and Novo Sarajevo Municipality, while simultaneously developing the city's industry and transforming Sarajevo into one of the modern capital cities. Sarajevo was tremendously transformed during the socialist era also in demographic terms. From a post-war population of 115,000, there are estimations that by the end of Yugoslavia (before the war), Sarajevo had 600,000 people<sup>22</sup>. The city was impacted by both Tito's anti-nationalist policies and the modernisation processes. Sarajevo developed as an important transportation junction and trade and industrial centre of Yugoslavia. Also, Sarajevo was the head quarters of Yugoslavia's principal production and scientific electrical engineering association, *Energoinvest*, which designed and built electric power-plants, electric transmission lines, and other electric power facilities in Yugoslavia and abroad. The Academy of Science and Art of BiH was located in Sarajevo, as well as the university (established in 1946), other higher schools, research institutes in meteorology and hygiene, and a library.

---

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Pavkovic, 39.

It is important to outline at this point also the fact that only in 1963 Muslims were recognised as a nationality, further to be confirmed in the 1974 Constitution<sup>23</sup>. Sarajevo's urban development peaked in early 1980's and at the time was chosen to be the host for the 14th Winter Olympic Games in 1984. The Games were an amazing success for Sarajevo which became with this occasion a great tourist destination. Actually many argue that the Winter Olympic Games of 1984 had put Sarajevo on the world map. No previous event in the former Yugoslavia had aroused so much professional and emotional engagement. These years were the country's best decades in a long time. But that was not the case of the whole federation, for which the 80's represented a prelude of the black period of war that started in the 90's.

In 1974 the Yugoslav federation adopted a new constitution in which the key point was decentralisation, as the Communist leaders were anticipating on the outburst of nationalism and the republics' demand for more autonomy. In the last decade of socialism, Yugoslavia was hit by major economic stagnation, institutional problems and loss of legitimacy. Because of these decentralisation measures, which were implemented after the adoption of the new constitution, new local elites were given the possibility to effectively gain power and spread their nationalist rhetoric. After Tito's death in 1980, nationalism began to spread in most parts of the federation, including BiH and Sarajevo. This tendency culminated with what was further called "the beginning of the end" - the victory of the three national parties representing the three biggest ethnic groups in Bosnia at the first multiparty elections in November 1990 (Muslims, Croats and Serbs). The SFRY's concrete end took place on 25 June 1991, when Slovenia and Croatia declared independence. By April 1992, Serbia and Montenegro were the only remaining entities in the Federation, as Macedonia and BiH also declared their independence. By Resolution 755 of the United Nations Security Council, on May 20, 1992, BiH was internationally recognised. But already on April 5, 1992, Slobodan Milosevic sent the Yugoslav National Army (YNA) along with Serb nationalist forces across the Drina River into Eastern BiH. It was the beginning of a three and half years long war. As such, the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia in Sarajevo one of its most visible battlegrounds.

### ***The siege of Sarajevo - The biggest atrocity in Europe after the WW 2***

An important milestone in the breakup of Yugoslavia and also in the contemporary history of Sarajevo begins with the declaration of independence of BiH from Yugoslavia in a referendum for independence on February 29, 1992. The city then became the capital of the new state, which was independent for the first time in its modern history (since 1461, when the Ottoman ruling started in the area). The ethnic violence escalated in a very short period of time, almost without any important triggering event. Several Serb participants of a wedding were shot just outside Sarajevo's old Serbian Orthodox Church on March 1<sup>24</sup>. These shootings were considered the first spark of the future atrocities in Sarajevo and the beginning of the war, as Serb military forces started to transmit aggressive messages in the media, considering this event a direct provocation. Sarajevans however demonstrated massively against these violent events in their city. On April 5, 1992 almost 10,000 demonstrators demanded for the government to step down and asked for an international protectorate<sup>25</sup>. One day later, on the celebration of Sarajevo's liberation of German and

---

<sup>23</sup> Guy M. Robinson et al., "Remaking Sarajevo: Bosnian Nationalism after the Dayton Accord," *Political Geography* 20 (2001): 962.

<sup>24</sup> Donia, 278.

<sup>25</sup> Neven Andjelic, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 67.

*Ustasha* rule during WWII and the day the European Community recognised BiH's independence, the war in Sarajevo began with Serb militias attacking civilians who were engaged in peaceful protests<sup>26</sup>. Serb snipers in the Holiday Inn hotel, right in the heart of Sarajevo, opened fire on the crowd killing six people and wounding several more. Suada Dilberović and an ethnic Croat woman Olga Sučić were in the first rows, protesting on the Vrbanja bridge at the time. They were considered the first victims of the Siege of Sarajevo<sup>27</sup>. The bridge on which Sučić and Dilberović were killed was renamed in their honour. As such, after the war in Croatia, ethnic tensions exploded in Bosnia starting what became known as the Bosnian War for independence, which resulted in large-scale destruction and dramatic population shifts during the Siege of Sarajevo.

The Serb forces and the Yugoslav People's Army besieged Sarajevo from 5 April 1992 to 29 February 1996. It was the longest siege of a capital city in modern history, and produced the worst atrocities in Europe since World War II. The impact on the city was devastating. Serbian weaponry had severely damaged almost every part of the city and a wide array of buildings - media centres, skyscrapers, buildings of the government, mosques, residential areas, concert halls, synagogues, libraries, residential areas. The impact on its inhabitants was also extremely harsh as the city was held without electricity, heating, water, and medical supplies for the whole period of almost 4 years. An average of 329 shell impacts occurred per day, with a high of 3,777 shell impacts on July 22, 1993 (a period which was considered as the climax of the siege)<sup>28</sup>. After the Spring of 1992 the Sarajevans of all three ethnicities, but mostly Muslims (which during the war started to be called as Bosniaks) remained helplessly blocked inside by the Siege. All roads leading in and out of Sarajevo were blocked, and the airport was shut down. Approximately 400,000 residents were trapped in the siege, and they were cut off from food, medicine, water, and supplies of electricity. During the siege, 11,541 people lost their lives, including over 1,500 children. An additional 56,000 people were wounded, including nearly 15,000 children.<sup>29</sup> In total, over three-and-a-half years of war, 100,000 people were killed, and half of Bosnia's population of 4.4 million — made up of a plurality of Muslims — fled their homes<sup>30</sup>. Residents came very close to complete starvation, and their only chance for survival weighed in the balance on the success of UN airlifts from the Sarajevo airport that was opened in late June of 1992 through what was later called “the tunnel of Hope”. The Bosnian government defence forces inside the besieged city were poorly equipped and unable to break the siege. Without resources and in an evident asymmetry, the Bosniak forces and Sarajevan civilians of all ethnicities heroically resisted inside the besieged city.

Aside from the economic and political structures that were destroyed, the besieger targeted numerous cultural sites. Thus, places such as the Gazi Husrev-beg's Mosque, Cathedral of Jesus' Heart, and the Jewish cemetery were damaged, while places like the old City Hall and the Olympic museum were completely destroyed. An event that defined the cultural objectives of the besiegers occurred during the night of August 25, 1992, the intentional shelling and utter destruction with incendiary shells of the Bosnian National and University Library, the central repository of Bosnian written culture, and a major cultural

---

<sup>26</sup> Donia, 282.

<sup>27</sup> Ivana Macek, *Sarajevo under Siege. Anthropology in Wartime* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 16.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 89.

<sup>29</sup> United Nations Multimedia, April 2014, accessed January 07, 2015, <http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2012/04/siege-of-sarajevo-remembered/>.

<sup>30</sup> Macek, 96.

centre of whole Balkan region. Among the losses were about 700 manuscripts and a unique collection of Bosnian serial publications, some from the middle of the 19th century Bosnian cultural revival. Another horrific event occurred on August 28, 1995, when the Markale Market, the central marketplace in Sarajevo was shelled. This event came to be known as the 'Markale massacre' where 68 people were killed and over 100 wounded. It is considered that this massacre triggered external intervention that in the end led to the end of the conflict, alongside with the fall of UN safe area's Srebrenica and Zepa in the Eastern part of the country. After these events in the summer of 1995 the international community decided to engage in a decisive effort to put an end to the atrocities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO air strikes began on August 30 and were directed against Bosnian Serb positions surrounding Sarajevo. Four months after the US brokered Dayton Accords which ended the war, the Bosnian government declared the siege officially over on February 29, 1996.

### *The post-conflict reconstruction era*

After the war the whole country BiH was reorganised according to the 'Inter-Entity Boundary Line' (IEBL) as established by the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). Sarajevo thus became the capital of the country BiH but also the capital of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) representing one of the two entities that form BiH, comprising a majority of Bosniaks and Croats. The DPA had an ambivalent impact on Sarajevo as it first has ended the war in BiH, but it also administratively divided the country and Sarajevo in two parts. One of the two parts of Sarajevo now has the official name of 'East Sarajevo' (*Istočno Sarajevo*). The IEBL separates the country in two and bisects the city's differences and as such many argue that the DPA only ended the war but did not resolve the ethnic conflict. The DPA not only partitioned the territory of the country, but the people in BiH and its capital city have also been divided into three ethnic groups: Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs that offered them access to power in a complex power sharing mechanism. In September 1997 the assembly of Sarajevo Canton adopted a new constitution for the city which ensured the multi-ethnic composition of the city<sup>31</sup>. The Sarajevo metropolitan area, including Sarajevo, East Sarajevo and surrounding municipalities, is for the moment home to 688,354 inhabitants<sup>32</sup>. The new constitution stated that the city of Sarajevo is comprised of four municipalities: Stari Grad, Centar, Novi Grad and Novo Sarajevo. Each of these municipalities is to send seven representatives to the city council and the seats were to be allocated by ethnic key, ensuring a balanced representation of Bosniacs and Croats as constituent peoples of FBiH as well as 'others'<sup>33</sup>. The executive branch (*Gradska Uprava*) consists of a mayor, with two deputies and a cabinet. The legislative branch consists of the City Council (*Gradsko Vijeće*). The council has 28 members. Councillors are elected by the municipality in numbers roughly proportional to their population. Sarajevo's Municipalities are further split into "local communities" (*Mjesne zajednice*). Local communities have a small role in city government and are intended as a way for ordinary citizens to get involved in city government. Sarajevo also became the political centre of BiH. It is home to the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and

---

<sup>31</sup> Andrea Teftedarija, *Who Killed Sarajevo Spirit? Structure, Agency, Nationalism and the Case of Sarajevo* (unpublished MA Thesis) (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, July 2007), 65, accessed March 09, 2015, <http://dare.uva.nl/cgi/arno/show.cgi?fid=54063>.

<sup>32</sup> World Population Review, July 2015, accessed February 23, 2015, <http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/bosnia-and-herzegovina-population/>.

<sup>33</sup> Donia, 341.

Herzegovina and the operational command of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In previous research we have shown the ambivalent role of the European Union in stabilising and helping the state-building process in Bosnia.<sup>34</sup>

**Table 1.** *The main stages of Sarajevo's history.*

The main stages	The period of time	The main characteristics
1. Sarajevo in the <b>Ottoman Empire</b>	<b>1461-1878</b>	-the city became known as one of the biggest and most important Ottoman city in the Balkans, after Istanbul itself. - it was an important market on the East–West trading routes -numerous mosques were built and Ottoman cultural sites, as many Slavs in the region converted to Islam
2. Sarajevo in <b>Austria-Hungary</b>	<b>1878–1918</b>	-massive modernisation and urbanisation in a more European style -shift to the Latin script - in 1914 the Austro-Hungarian archduke and his wife were assassinated during their visit to Sarajevo by Gavrilo Princip and this triggered the beginning of the World War I.
3. Sarajevo in the <b>Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes</b>	<b>1918-1945</b>	- lost its importance as a major urban hub of the region. - in 1929 renamed Kingdom of Yugoslavia - in 1941 the Nazi Germany invaded Yugoslavia and Sarajevo was bombarded.
4. Sarajevo in the <b>Socialist Federalist Republic of Yugoslavia</b>	<b>1946-1992</b>	- it became an important regional industrial centre in socialist Yugoslavia. -many modern communist-city blocks were built in the Western part of the old city - it hosted the 14th Winter Olympic Games in 1984, an event which brought many tourists to Sarajevo and international attention
5. Sarajevo during the Bosnian war ( <b>Siege</b> )	<b>1992-1996</b>	-in April 1992 the city was besieged by armed Serbian paramilitary -in more than 3 years of terror, thousands of Sarajevans were murdered, wounded or forced to flee their homes.
6. Sarajevo in the post-conflict reconstruction era	<b>1996-2015</b>	-massive humanitarian aid for reconstruction -lots of buildings remained with their scars from the bullet holes visible -international cultural events tries to put the city back on the tourist map of Europe (like Sarajevo Film Festival)

**Source:** *compiled by the author.*

In terms of its architecture, the reconstruction of Sarajevo started as soon as the war ended, in 1996. During the siege, nearly every building in the city was damaged, but mainly,

<sup>34</sup> Iordan Bărbulescu and Miruna Troncotă, “EU’s “Laboratory” in the Western Balkans. Experimenting Europeanization without Democratization. The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” *Revista Española de Ciencia Política* 31 (Marzo 2013): 63-99; Iordan Bărbulescu and Miruna Troncotă, “The Ambivalent Role of the EU in the Western Balkans - “Limited Europeanisation” between Formal Promises and Practical Constraints. The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina,” *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* 12, 1 (March 2012): 5-26.



as previously mentioned, the cultural monuments and religious sites. As such the next several years after the siege were a period of heavy reconstruction. By 2003 most of the city was rebuilt, with only a few remaining visible ruins in the city centre. Various new modern buildings and skyscrapers have been built, most significantly the Bosmal City Centre, the BBI Centre and the Avaz Twist Tower, which is the tallest skyscraper in the Balkans. A new highway was completed in the late 2000s between Sarajevo and the city of Kakanj. Due to growth in population, tourism and airport traffic the service sector in the city is developing fast and welcoming new investors from various businesses. The business enclave Sarajevo City Centre is one of the largest and most modern shopping and business centres in the region. It was completed in early 2014.

Since 2000, massive international missions were sent to Sarajevo with the aim to coordinate the country's social, economic and political recovery. Hosting numerous international and regional organisations today Sarajevo is still very much a meeting place for different cultures. Even though its population decreased massively after the war, the city preserved its vivid atmosphere with specific coffee shops (*kafanas*) and cultural delights. International cultural events tried to put the city back on the tourist map of Europe (like Sarajevo Film Festival, which celebrated in 2014 its 20<sup>th</sup> edition).


In order to sum up, each historic period and each external ruler left its mark on both people and buildings of Sarajevo. After the siege the city of Sarajevo has tried to recover, facing the devastating impact of the war. Lots of buildings remained with their scars from the bullet holes visible, making the siege a living memory for the younger generations of Sarajevans. But there are signs of hope that commemorating the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the end of the war will revive international attention towards the city and stimulate efforts to build a more inclusive society.

**Map 1.** *The map of Sarajevo and the main locations of the Siege.*



**Source:** Combat Studies Institute, "Sarajevo Survival Map," accessed February 16, 2015, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2002/MOUTKingpix.htm>.

**Map 2** – The city of Sarajevo and its main touristic attractions in 2013.



**Source:** “Sarajevo Map,” accessed March 07, 2015, <http://www.mapsofworld.com/bosnia/sarajevo.html>.

### *Sarajevo - the city divided by invisible borders*

*"Ovdje niko nije normalan" (t. Nobody here is normal").*

(a graffiti on a wall in Sarajevo, dating from 1995, in Ivana Macek, *Sarajevo under Siege. Anthropology in Wartime* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 34)

After this historical overview, the next part aims to analyse the way Sarajevo's political identity changed, along with its ethno-national and confessional composition, foundations and dynamics throughout the last century. Also, this section focuses on the current situation of Sarajevo from the perspective of promoting multi-ethnic tolerance, on reconciliation and rebuilding trust in what remained still a deeply divided society. It analyses the political importance of Sarajevo in the last century and aims at outlining the characteristics of the main approaches to the analysis of Sarajevo as a sort of “Balkan melting pot”.

Every city changes over time, but the fascination of scholars of various specialities for the intriguing identity shifts that took place in the particular case of Sarajevo continues to remain on the rise. A strong reason for a more profound reflection upon the city's scars and narratives along the centuries is the fact that Sarajevo has always represented a cross roads of civilisations and a city with multiple layers which invite to multiple interpretations. In Sarajevo one can find the former Ottoman centre meeting a Hapsburg built quarter and neighbouring socialist Yugoslavia's big city grandeur. The city provides a mix of old and new, a combination of elements that have been around for thousands of years, and others that have only been recently created. Moreover, part of its uniqueness and heritage of a tolerant past lays in the fact that Sarajevo is the only city in Europe where a Mosque, a

Catholic Church, an Orthodox Church, and a Synagogue are within 100 meters of each other. The main argument of the analysis to be further presented rests on the idea that in the last 20 years that have passed since the end of the siege, Sarajevo remained a city divided by invisible borders. By compiling a series of explanations in the literature and some personal thoughts, the article tries to identify what are the mechanisms that enforce these borders and how do they maintain this ambiguous status of being visible and invisible at the same time.

Any visitor of Sarajevo can easily observe this particular “spirit” of religious coexistence, especially when looking at its visible marks like mosques, Orthodox and Catholic churches and synagogues which are built in close proximity in Sarajevo’s city centre. What was exactly the impact of these violent changes on the century-long perceived cosmopolitan character of the city and is the Spirit of Sarajevo completely lost? These are open questions that still invite to in-depth reflection. In their attempt to answer these questions, many authors concluded that there is a very visible heritage of the past in the present identity of Sarajevo, which remained a city defined by cosmopolitanism, a rare East-West blend, marked by diversity, secularity in combination with respect for religious communities, a special brand of humour and sarcasm, pluralism and open-mindedness, a typical coffee culture, ‘at ease’-mentality, survival, tolerance etc.<sup>35</sup> In contrast, other authors advanced the thesis that Sarajevo has changed from a non-nationalist, multi-ethnic, tolerant city that developed this identity in almost five centuries of modern history to an almost ethnically homogeneous and nationalistic place as a result of the Bosnian war.<sup>36</sup> A blend of these two perspectives will be further presented in the analysis of the impact of the war on the Sarajevo's identity.

### ***The shift in ethno-national and confessional composition***

As already mentioned, Sarajevo is not only associated with the siege, but also with its traditional cultural and religious diversity, with adherents of Islam, Orthodoxy, Judaism and Catholicism coexisting there for centuries. Due to its long and rich history of religious and cultural variety, Sarajevo was sometimes called the “Jerusalem of Europe” or “Jerusalem of the Balkans”. In this sense, there are authors who criticize the overwhelming presence of Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and the significantly smaller numbers of Croats and Serbs inhabiting Sarajevo compared to the city’s pre-war ethnic make-up. Data show that an important consequence of the siege of Sarajevo was the fact that the demographic picture of the city has profoundly changed. In 1991 Sarajevo was a multi-ethnic city of 49 per cent Bosniaks, 30 per cent Serbs and 7 per cent Croats<sup>37</sup>. The war affected Sarajevo's demography, as it had produced an evident alteration in the ethnic composition of the city. In this sense, Kroeger argued that “Cosmopolitanism was one of the first casualties of the war.”<sup>38</sup> Statistical data show that by 1994, half of Sarajevo's 600,000 pre-war residents had left the city. Another 150,000 “displaced persons” had arrived, mostly Muslims from villages and small towns in

<sup>35</sup> See for example in Fran Markowitz, *Sarajevo: A Bosnian Kaleidoscope* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2010); Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, *Sarajevo Essays* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2003); Steve Sachs, “Sarajevo: A Crossroads in History,” 1994, accessed February 16, 2015, [http://www.stevesachs.com/papers/paper\\_sarajevo.html](http://www.stevesachs.com/papers/paper_sarajevo.html); Cornelia Sorabji, “Managing Memories in Post-War Sarajevo: Individuals, Bad Memories, and New Wars,” *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 12, 1 (2006): 1-18.

<sup>36</sup> Teftedarja, 56.

<sup>37</sup> World Heritage Encyclopedia, “Census in Bosnia and Heregovina,” 1991, accessed February 12, 2015, [http://community.worldheritage.org/articles/1991\\_population\\_census\\_in\\_Bosnia\\_and\\_Herzegovina](http://community.worldheritage.org/articles/1991_population_census_in_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina).

<sup>38</sup> Alexandra Kroeger, “Sarajevo’s Decade of War and Peace,” *BBC*, 9 April 2002, accessed March 07, 2015, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1918998.stm>.

eastern Bosnia. So the population of Sarajevo in 1994 was 450,000, two-thirds of whom were pre-war Sarajevans, and one third of whom were newcomers. Moreover, a lot of Serb Sarajevans left in 1996 as well after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in which Sarajevo was assigned to the Bosniac-Croat Federation<sup>39</sup>. As such, the perceived loss of the cosmopolitan character of the city is frequently assigned to the fact that “much of the urban, native population of Sarajevo has left the city and has been replaced by refugees from more rural parts of the country who have different and more traditional values.”<sup>40</sup> As a consequence, the ethnic composition of the city has changed, which has resulted in a shift from a multi-ethnic city to an almost exclusively Bosniac (Muslim) one. Some authors went even further with their argument, and advanced the hypothesis of a Muslim reconstruction of Sarajevo which hinders its multi-ethnicity<sup>41</sup>. As such they focused on the actions that are reinforcing the identity of Sarajevo as a “Muslim city.”

Milorad Dodik the Prime Minister of RS made many statements accusing Sarajevo for its “Islamisation” - ‘Sarajevo is Teheran; I will only support Bosnia if it plays against Turkey’<sup>42</sup>.

Beyond these political statements, there is a need to have a closer look on this matter. Muslims in Sarajevo and across Bosnia have many reasons for becoming much closer to Islam than they had been historically in the last centuries. After the First World War, the creation of Yugoslavia was largely dominated by the Serb influence while Croat politicians called for a more federally based state structure to even their power. In the struggle for political capacity and recognition, the exclusion of the Muslim population was yet again reasserted and made pointedly evident by the first name given to the new Yugoslavia: the ‘Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes’<sup>43</sup>. The result was a further weakening of the potential for Muslim Bosnians to become a constituent part of the nationalist project.

The 2013 national census – the first one carried out after the cessation of the conflict – reveals an ongoing attempt to make society legible by reading it through a lens of ethnic division. Although official authorities assure that an ‘open determination’ model has prevailed in the census<sup>44</sup>, the ethnicity, faith and language of BiH citizens have been restricted according to Bosniak, Croat, or Serb delineations. “In the capital city of Sarajevo the geographies of division are actively engrained into the already complex map of memory in the city”<sup>45</sup>. Ethnic cleavages are evident in Sarajevo as well Sarajevans, under communism largely secularised, nowadays keep re-emphasising their religions. Money is invested in building new mosques, churches and religious centres. One of the largest mosques in the Balkan region is built in one of the Sarajevo suburbs and was a gift of Saudi Arabia to Muslims in BiH<sup>46</sup>.

<sup>39</sup> Scott. A. Bollens, *Cities, Nationalism, and Democratization* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 171.

<sup>40</sup> Teftedarija, 40.

<sup>41</sup> Nenad Pejić, “The Suicide Of Multiethnic Sarajevo?,” *Radio Free Europe*, 25 April 2010, accessed March 02, 2015, [http://www.rferl.org/content/The\\_Suicide\\_Of\\_Multiethnic\\_Sarajevo/2023847.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/The_Suicide_Of_Multiethnic_Sarajevo/2023847.html).

<sup>42</sup> Nicholas Wood, “Fiery Campaign Imperils Bosnia's Progress,” *New York Times*, 27 August 2006, accessed February 23, 2015, [http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/27/world/europe/27bosnia.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/27/world/europe/27bosnia.html?_r=0).

<sup>43</sup> Robinson et al., 975.

<sup>44</sup> Valery Perry, “The 2013 Census in Bosnia and Herzegovina – A Basic Review,” *DPC Policy notes Series 3* (October 2013), accessed March 11, 2015, <http://democratizationpolicy.org/uimages/pdf/dpcpolicynotebihnewseries3bihcensus.pdf>.

<sup>45</sup> Kotzen and Garcia, 7.

<sup>46</sup> According to “King Fahd Mosque in Sarajevo - Bosnia and Herzegovina,” accessed March 07, 2015, <http://www.beautifulmosque.com/king-fahd-mosque-in-sarajevo-bosnia-and-herzegovina/>.

There are a series of factors that determined this situation. The vast majority of Serbs and Croats fled or were expelled in the early days of the siege or at the end of the war. The Serbs who left Sarajevo to live in Republika Srpska mostly did so in 1996 when the core of the city was assigned to FBiH. Teftedarija argues that large numbers of refugees from all parts of BiH fled to Sarajevo and moved into empty apartments of Serbs who have left the city<sup>47</sup>. Thus the abandonment of the city by Serbs and Croats and the large influx of deported Bosniaks did indeed change the ethnic makeup of the city. Nevertheless, we need to underline the fact that the question of multi-ethnicity can be posed to any town in the Serb-administered part of Bosnia (the “Serb Republic”) whose Bosniak population has been decimated through ethnic cleansing. Banja Luka, Zvornik, Visegrad, Foca and Trebinje are just a few towns that had significant if not predominant Bosniak populations before the war, yet today they are ethnically homogeneous Serb towns.

### ***IEBL - Sarajevo's invisible border***

The city of Sarajevo most prominently sketches the fragmented geography of Bosnia's divisive reality. As already mentioned, the DPA marked the end of military violence but it also divided BiH into two constituencies, separated by the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL). Sarajevo's territory sits on both constituencies and is being divided by the IEBL. As a consequence, the Eastern part of Sarajevo is in the RS, whereas the other part is in FBiH. The main argument to be developed further on is that Sarajevo governance structure has maintained and institutionalised the ethnic divisions and political differences in the city's reality. Anthropologist Stef Jansen's ethnographic work on the IEBL in the neighbourhood of Dobrinja in Sarajevo illustrates these particular effects of memories held by different ethnic identities at the geographic fractures produced by the DPA. He mainly shows that the IEBL provided for the last two decades the main socio-spatial configuration of Sarajevo and it was determined by its governance structures and policies. The city became “a commemorative landscape composed of borders that provide spatial and temporal co-ordinates for remembering”<sup>48</sup>. In other terms Sarajevo is divided by “invisible borders”, as Jansen asserts, there are “no fences, barriers, ‘welcome’ signs or uniformed officers, yet [there is] a deeply contested polity border, invested with considerable sovereignty claims, governmental logistics and affect”<sup>49</sup>. The Dobrinja neighbourhood is a purposefully produced Serb canton, a place where the process of “persistent segregation” of Sarajevo takes place<sup>50</sup>.

The rigidity of ethnic cleavages has been institutionalised by the Dayton political system of power sharing and ethnic representation public service is an example. One can for example only become a member of the Presidency if one declares to be a Bosniac, Croat or Serb. This causes big problems for many citizens who are non-BC-S citizens, from a mixed marriage, or ones who simply do not feel affiliated with each of the three categories and who refuse to be labelled as ‘Others’ in their own country<sup>51</sup>. The same changes can be observed

---

<sup>47</sup> Teftedarija, 98.

<sup>48</sup> Kotzen and Garcia, 9.

<sup>49</sup> Stef Jansen, “People and Things in the Ethnography of Borders: Materialising the Division of Sarajevo,” *Social Anthropology* 21, 1 (2013): 25.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>51</sup> In December 2009 the Grand Chamber of the ECHR issued a decision in the case of Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina. The judgement stipulated that the 2001 Election Act provisions in BiH Constitution was found to have been violating the ECHR. In other words, it functioned an imperative of ensuring equality and the full enjoyment of human rights in political and public life. In what was defined as “ground-breaking case” for international law practitioners,

also in the western part of Mostar (which is almost exclusively Croat) and in Banja Luka, the capital of the Serb parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina which has predominantly Serb inhabitants. Post war cities are confronted with a difficult choice for their reconstruction and in coming to terms with their past – the choice between hybrid identities or ethno-nationalist identities. Anthropologists have lately focused on people's experiences of the war-torn Sarajevo and how identity was dissolved and reconstructed in various domains of Sarajevoan life: material, psychological, social, ideological, and moral, and on the forces that were disrupting their lives and points to the contradictions that occurred in this process. In this context, special attention was given to the mobilisation of religion by ethno-nationalistic ideology and its increased importance in everyday life in Sarajevo.

Recent analyses show that Sarajevo is an illustrative case that shows how nationalism influences urban landscapes. Gruia Bădescu's research focuses on how architects and planners have addressed issues of coming to terms with the past in urban reconstruction in three contexts, differentiated by the perceived nature of war and political responsibility. All various forms of divisions and transformations in post-war Sarajevo raise the issue of the moral philosophy of 'coming to terms with the past, based on the idea that re-shaping places are determined by re-shaping memory: post-war reconstruction in Sarajevo. The case of Sarajevo's reconstruction illustrates the case of a sort of "unfinished war" with the main countries still struggling for transitional justice. The former Bosnian Serb army commander, Ratko Mladić was taken to Hague and prosecuted in 2011, and for the moment he is charged with terrorising the people of Sarajevo with a shelling and sniping campaign. He is also charged with genocide, persecution of non-Serbs and with taking UN peacekeepers hostage. The trial has brought intriguing results, being marked by denial and negation of war crimes<sup>52</sup>. Radovan Karadžić, the leader of Republika Srpska, is also on trial in a separate case for the same crimes. An observation to make in this context is that Sarajevo's reconstruction is obstructed by its lack of reconciliation, as the blame for the war is placed externally and reconstruction reasserts the idea of an exclusivist 'nation'. His work examines how different perceptions of conflict and responsibility influence architectural design and planning and can contribute to the understanding of urban post-war reconstruction. From this perspective, Bosnia's experience, compressed only in the evolution of its capital city Sarajevo suggests that ethno-federalism freezes existing ethnic divisions and promotes corruption, which stymies economic growth. Even if there existed no feasible alternative to Dayton in 1995, the system should have been designed to incentivize reform by including lower thresholds for decision-making and by linking aid to reform. Today the Dayton system has become engrained and Bosnia has become a cautionary tale demonstrating the pitfalls of overambitious, externally driven nation-building<sup>53</sup>. The city's eclectic lifestyle is reflected in the mixture of oriental and modern Western architecture alongside more local efforts of modern architecture, such as luxury hotels and shopping malls resembling those in the Western world. The city is rapidly improving its tourist ratings and building new attractions for the outside world. Although

---

Jakob Finci, who is Jewish, and Dervo Sejdić, of Roma ethnicity, successfully argued that Bosnia's constitution (DPA) is discriminatory in preventing them from running for the presidency or the upper house of the parliament.

<sup>52</sup> The most recent testimony in the trial is a negation of the siege of Sarajevo at all. "Witness Claims Sarajevo Was Divided not under Siege," *Balkan Insight*, 17 July 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/witness-claims-sarajevo-was-divided-not-under-siege>.

<sup>53</sup> Michael F. Harsch and Tyler Y. Headley, "Life after Genocide. Comparing Bosnia and Rwanda," *Foreign Affairs*, 2 July 2015, accessed July 02, 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/rwanda/2015-07-02/life-after-genocide?cid=soc-fb-rdr>.

Sarajevo is now considered one of the fastest developing cities in the region, there is another side to the story. These grandiose modern buildings have been built on the grounds of war by war profiteers and nationalist politicians, often at the expense of regular citizens. Gruia Bădescu has studied in particular the process of '*coming to terms with this past*' in urban reconstruction. From this perspective, Sarajevo is like a puzzle formed by very distinct parts, within a juxtaposition of sacred objects, mosques, synagogues, Orthodox and Catholic churches. Furthermore, the city defies stereotypical characterisations of either a haven of multiculturalism or a Balkanising setting of perpetual antagonisms, of rural-urban clean cut cleavages<sup>54</sup>. In this context Bădescu also underlines the fact that Sarajevo soon became a heaven for “ruin fetishists” and draws attention to the danger of trivialisation of the ruins. Sarajevo is characterised by many buildings which have not been restored yet, marked by cavities caused by mortar strikes everywhere in the city. Moreover, huge cemeteries throughout the city are a constant reminder of the war casualties<sup>55</sup>.

Bronwyn Kotzen and Sofia Garcia focus on the process of memory management in post-conflict Sarajevo and they show that Sarajevo persists as a divided body along geographic and administrative ‘lines of memory’. Moreover, they stress that recognising a multiplicity of identities is of critical concern in the process of reconciliation between historically conflicting groups<sup>56</sup>. This reminds us that Sarajevo's own urban, cultural and geopolitical formation draws from fragmented histories: from the Ottoman core and Habsburg centre to socialist and post-socialist extensions. Their core argument suggests that the way in which the territories of both the country of BiH and city of Sarajevo are currently governed –since the cessation of the war in 1995 - memorialises and perpetuates the very divisions that initially catalysed the nation to war in the first place<sup>57</sup>.

This section aimed at showing that Sarajevo's ethnic composition changed during the course of the war; however, more attention should to be given to the causes and not merely to the end results of the new ethnic composition. In conclusion, Sarajevo, once praised for its peaceful coexistence of various religions and peoples, has been affected by the siege at many levels in terms of its urban constructions, its ethnic and confessional compositional and its multi-faceted identity.

### ***Conclusions: how to fix a “cracked” melting pot?***

This last section aims at drawing a series of conclusions focusing on the heritage of the past in the present identity of the city's population, its impact on the everyday life and culture and Sarajevo's special status of borderland between the Western Balkans and the EU. The overall aim of the analysis was to reveal the shift in Sarajevo's identity from a Multicultural Past, an Ethnic War and a European Future.

---

<sup>54</sup> Gruia Bădescu, “City Makers, Urban Reconstruction and Coming to Terms with the Past in Sarajevo,” in *Reconstructing Sarajevo Report*, ed. Bronwyn Kotzen and Sofia Garcia (City Studio, London School of Economics & Political Science, Department of Sociology, July 2014), 15-21, accessed March 21, 2015, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/LSECities/citiesProgramme/pdf/Reconstructing-Sarajevo.pdf>.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Bronwyn Kotzen and Sofia Garcia, “Politics of Memory and Division in Post-Conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sarajevo,” in *Reconstructing Sarajevo Report*, ed. Bronwyn Kotzen and Sofia Garcia (City Studio, London School of Economics & Political Science, Department of Sociology, July 2014), accessed March 21, 2015, <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsee/2014/11/26/lse-cities-reconstructing-sarajevo-report/>.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

The article relied on the idea that any reconstruction needs to engage with the past. At its conception by the Ottoman Empire in the 15th century, Sarajevo was the biggest and the most developed city in the region. However, soon enough, the city's precarious position between the East and the West took its toll in the form of numerous wars, culminating in the Bosnian War for Independence. The historic overview showed that Sarajevo has long been a rich melting pot of Islamic, Orthodox, Catholic, and Jewish culture. This multicultural essence existed in what was always a province of some larger polity, whether Ottoman, Hapsburg, or Belgrade-centred Yugoslav. The first section showed that three historic events placed Sarajevo in the history books, marking the beginning and the end of a century of European horrors: the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and the start of World War I, the winter Olympic games of 1984 (the only positive event in the recent history of the city), and the shelling of the city in the ethnic conflict of the Yugoslav war. This devastating war gave Sarajevo the unwanted record for the longest siege in the history of modern warfare. Ethnic violence had a deep impact on the city and the everyday lives of the Sarajevans. But the war transformed coexistence into division as a result of a form of nationalism which was never part of Sarajevo's heritage. The city offers to foreigners a post-traumatic landscape in its attempt of recovering its lost multicultural identity. Based on these facts and personal perceptions, the main aim of this article was to analyse the historic evolution of the city of Sarajevo as a border city between East and West and a melting pot of civilisations.

Next, the analysis showed that the war left a strong imprint on the city's identity. The territorial borders created by the Dayton Peace Accords have also created a series of symbolic/ invisible borders that bisect Sarajevo, making it hostage to its conflicted past. The article argued that in political and symbolic terms, Sarajevo is virtually a partitioned city: the IEBL, dividing the Muslim-Croat Federation from the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska, runs through the Sarajevo suburbs. Above all that, bullet holes and ruins became part of the city's identity. Nevertheless the recent development on the path of EU integration made Sarajevo a city patterned not only by disjunctures and divisions, but as well as the possibilities of recovery and opening new forms of cooperation and solidarity.

The present article focused on the mechanisms which have caused the shift in Sarajevo's identity. The article tried to look back at Sarajevo asking what has become of *Sarajevanness* today. 20 years after the siege, Sarajevo is still a city divided by invisible borders, in search of its lost multi-ethnic identity. The article has shown that Sarajevo is an illustrative case for how political borders have been symbolically reconstructed on ethnic lines in the Balkans for the last five centuries. This multiple layering of spaces and people makes Sarajevo a fascinating city to study the challenges posed by war and post-war reconstruction. As such, the article shows that Sarajevo is more than a border city. It is a symbol which bears testament in its urban structure of a wide array of shifting socio-political spaces, to be found also in the three major scripts to be found in the public space of Sarajevo: Latin, Cyrillic, and Arabic. The challenge at hand remains how best to stitch a post-conflict society together, to weave its fragmented collection of urban territories into a singular unified state and city while recognising its rich social heterogeneity. The analysis also tried to show that it is not only Sarajevo's architecture and the city's history which amazes outsiders, but also its struggle to overcome the devastation of war and build bridges toward the future. The challenging part would be for the city to build a European future respecting its multi-cultural past. In the end the conclusions are mixed - if Sarajevo remains as a symbol of a "cracked" melting pot, than Sarajevans themselves need to find ways in which to find their equilibrium.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Andjelic, Neven. *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy*. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003.
- Armour, Ian. "The Roots of Sarajevo." *History Today* 38, 8 (August 1988). Accessed March 04, 2015. <http://www.historytoday.com/ian-armour/roots-sarajevo-austria-hungary-and-serbia-1867-81>.
- Bădescu, Gruia. "City Makers, Urban Reconstruction and Coming to Terms with the Past in Sarajevo." In *Reconstructing Sarajevo Report*, edited by Bronwyn Kotzen and Sofia Garcia, 15-21. London: City Studio, London School of Economics & Political Science, Department of Sociology, July 2014). Accessed March 21, 2015. <http://www.lse.ac.uk/LSECities/citiesProgramme/pdf/Reconstructing-Sarajevo.pdf>.
- Bărbulescu, Iordan, and Miruna Troncotă. "EU's "Laboratory" in the Western Balkans. Experimenting Europeanization without Democratization. The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Revista Española de Ciencia Política* 31 (Marzo 2013): 63-99.
- Bărbulescu, Iordan, and Miruna Troncotă. "The Ambivalent Role of the EU in the Western Balkans - "Limited Europeanisation" between Formal Promises and Practical Constraints. The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina." *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* 12, 1 (March 2012): 5-26.
- Bollens, Scott A. *Cities, Nationalism, and Democratization*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2007.
- Budja, Michael. "The Butmir Neolithic Culture." Sarajevo School of Science and Technology, 2003. Accessed February 04, 2015. <http://dmc.ssst.edu.ba/ButmirNeolithicCulture/english/obre.html>.
- Donia, Robert J. *Sarajevo: A Biography*. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2006.
- Donia, Robert J., and John V.A. Fine Jr. *Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed*. London: Hurst & Co, 1997.
- Harsch, Michael F., and Tyler Y. Headley. "Life after Genocide. Comparing Bosnia and Rwanda." *Foreign Affairs*, 2 July 2015. Accessed July 02, 2015. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/rwanda/2015-07-02/life-after-genocide?cid=soc-fb-rdr>.
- Jansen, Stef. "People and Things in the Ethnography of Borders: Materialising the Division of Sarajevo." *Social Anthropology* 21, 1 (2013): 23-37.
- Karcic, Harun. "Is Sarajevo a Multiethnic City?." *Today's Szaman*, 2010. Accessed February, 16, 2015. [http://www.todayszaman.com/op-ed\\_is-sarajevo-a-multiethnic-citybyharun-karcic-\\_209707.html](http://www.todayszaman.com/op-ed_is-sarajevo-a-multiethnic-citybyharun-karcic-_209707.html).
- "King Fahd Mosque in Sarajevo - Bosnia and Herzegovina." Accessed March 07, 2015. <http://www.beautifulmosque.com/king-fahd-mosque-in-sarajevo-bosnia-and-herzegovina/>.
- Kotzen, Bronwyn, and Sofia Garcia. "Politics of Memory and Division in Post-Conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sarajevo. In *Reconstructing Sarajevo Report*, edited by Bronwyn Kotzen and Sofia Garcia, 1-15. London: City Studio, London School of Economics & Political Science, Department of Sociology, July 2014). Accessed March 21, 2015. <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsee/2014/11/26/lse-cities-reconstructing-sarajevo-report/>.
- Kroeger, Alexandra. "Sarajevo's Decade of War and Peace." *BBC*, 9 April 2002. Accessed March 07, 2015. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1918998.stm>.
- Kuper, Simon. "Sarajevo: The Crossroads of History." *Financial Times*, 21<sup>st</sup> of March 2014. Accessed March 28, 2015. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/293938b2-afcd-11e3-9cd1-00144feab7de.html>.

- Macek, Ivana. *Sarajevo under Siege. Anthropology in Wartime*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.
- Macek, Ivana. "Predicament of War: Sarajevo Experiences and Ethics of War." In *Anthropology of Violence and Conflict*, edited by Bettina E. Schmidt, and Ingo Schröder, 197-225. London: Routledge, 2001.
- Mahmutćehajić, Rusmir. *Sarajevo Essays*. New York: State University of New York Press, 2003.
- Malcolm, Noel. *Bosnia: A Short History*. New York: New York University Press, 1996.
- Markowitz, Fran. *Sarajevo: A Bosnian Kaleidoscope*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2010.
- O'Shea, Brendan. *The Modern Yugoslav Conflict 1991-1995: Perception, Deception and Dishonesty*. London: Frank Cass, 2005.
- Pavković, Aleksandar. *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans*. London: Macmillan Press, 2000.
- Pejić, Nenad. "The Suicide of Multiethnic Sarajevo?." *Radio Free Europe*, April 25, 2010. Accessed March 02, 2015. [http://www.rferl.org/content/The\\_Suicide\\_Of\\_Multiethnic\\_Sarajevo/2023847.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/The_Suicide_Of_Multiethnic_Sarajevo/2023847.html).
- Perry, Valery. "The 2013 Census in Bosnia and Herzegovina – A Basic Review." *DPC Policy notes Series 3* (October 2013). Accessed March 11, 2015. <http://democratizationpolicy.org/uimages/pdf/dpcpolicynotebihnewseries3bihcensus.pdf>.
- Robinson, Guy, Sten Engelstoft, and Alma Probić. "Remaking Sarajevo: Bosnian Nationalism after the Dayton Accord." *Political Geography* 20 (2001): 957-980.
- Sachs, Steve E. "Sarajevo: A Crossroads in History." 1994. Accessed February 16, 2015. [http://www.stevesachs.com/papers/paper\\_sarajevo.html](http://www.stevesachs.com/papers/paper_sarajevo.html).
- Sorabji, Cornelia. "Managing Memories in Post-War Sarajevo: Individuals, Bad Memories, and New Wars." *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 12, 1 (2006): 1-18.
- Troncotă, Miruna. *Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Critical Case Study of Europeanization*. Bucharest: Tritonic Publishing House, 2014.
- Teftedarja, Andrea. *Who Killed Sarajevo Spirit? Structure, Agency, Nationalism and the Case of Sarajevo*. Unpublished MA Thesis. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, July 2007. Accessed March 09, 2015. <http://dare.uva.nl/cgi/arno/show.cgi?fid=54063>.
- United Nations Multimedia, April 2014. Accessed January 07, 2015. <http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2012/04/siege-of-sarajevo-remembered/>.
- "Witness Claims Sarajevo Was Divided not under Siege." *Balkan Insight*, 17 July 2015. Accessed July 17, 2015. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/witness-claims-sarajevo-was-divided-not-under-siege>.
- World Population Review, July 2015. Accessed February 23, 2015. <http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/bosnia-and-herzegovina-population/>.
- World Heritage Encyclopedia. "Census in Bosnia and Herzegovina." 1991. Accessed February 12, 2015. [http://community.worldheritage.org/articles/1991\\_population\\_census\\_in\\_Bosnia\\_and\\_Herzegovina](http://community.worldheritage.org/articles/1991_population_census_in_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina).
- Woodward, Geoffrey. "The Great Impact of the Turks in the 16<sup>th</sup> Century." March 2001. Accessed March 04, 2015. <http://www.historytoday.com/geoffrey-woodward/ottomans-europe>.
- Wood, Nicholas. "Fiery Campaign Imperils Bosnia's Progress." *New York Times*, 27 August 2006. Accessed February 23, 2015. [http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/27/world/europe/27bosnia.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/27/world/europe/27bosnia.html?_r=0).

# Chernivtsi: A City with Mysterious Flavour of Tolerance

Anatoliy KRUGLASHOV<sup>1</sup>

**Abstract.** *The article presents the analytical outline of Chernivtsi, the city with a reach cultural history. The past of the city is traced back as far as the written sources began to mention the settlement in the sources of Moldavian Principality. Austrian, Romanian, Soviet and Ukrainian periods of city evolutions are considered and compared. The main focus has been made on the interethnic communication of key local ethnic groups, their relations and coexistence. The contribution of urban population into formation of prominent Bukovynian tolerance also has been regarded by the author. Current challenges of the local community development are summed up and prospect for its further evolution suggested in Conclusions. It's stressed the importance influence of the borderland position of the city on the whole history and present time of it.*

**Key words:** *Chernivtsi, ethnic communities, tolerance, cross-cultural dialogue, border city*

## ***Introduction***

Ukraine is not so lucky to have a plenty of cities and towns, where historical heritage and traditions survived up to day. Two World Wars and radical political experiments of Soviet regime left behind too many ruins and deep sorrows. But one of the few cities who's core architectural and to extent cultural identity survived throughout those turbulent time is Chernivtsi. It would not be a big mistake or greater exaggeration to suggest that this city attracts attention and curiosity which does not correspond with the real scale of it.

Sure, the fate of the city could not be delineated off the regional history of Bukovyna, where Chernivtsi is the true capital and focal point. It makes a special impact on city evolution since Bukovyna got the status of Duchy in Austrian Empire. That period Chernivtsi is no doubt got the momentum in its history, and reached the highest and richest point of its progressive trajectory both from material and cultural points of view on the local history.

There are some aspects of the city which comprises its uniqueness. First of all, it's a border city now situated not far away from the Ukrainian frontier with Romania. And being on the border is a characteristic feature of the city since its very beginning. Because of that, the city as well as the region in general changed their state belonging several times. Secondly, being borderland centre the city went through the period of obscurity and prosperity, sometimes changing each other rapidly and unpredictably. Thirdly, the most valuable attribute of the city is its poly-ethnic nature, where Jews lived alongside with Ukrainians, Romanians, Poles, Germans, Armenians, and later Russians for a long time. And these communities succeed with creating the very sense of the city, naming it as Chernivtsi, Cernăuți, Czernowitz, Czerniowci etc. Despite of some differences with pronunciation the names mentioned above talks about the same town and later – city. And, finally, despite of all changes and maybe because of them the city survived and seems to be

---

<sup>1</sup> Dr. of Political Science, Prof., Head, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Director, Research Institute of European Integration and Public Administration, Chernivtsi Jury Fedkovych National University, Ukraine. E-mail: akruglas@gmail.com.

more stable and vivid than States and Emperies who hold them in their borders. A key factor making this urban society able to live together is prevailing ethnic and cultural tolerance. Phenomenon of Bukovynian tolerance which is pretty well represented in academic literature and in belletristic sometimes overprized and mystified. But city's burgers did avoid major interethnic and confessional conflicts in the ages, where they happened to be typical for many other areas of Europe. Maybe, this local and regional culture of tolerance is a best contribution made by generations of Chernivtsi community dwellers in their collective history.

If to regard this local model of multiculturalism as the most peculiar and valuable Chernivtsi feature, one has to add that this phenomenon does not remain the same as it existed in XIX – the beginning of XX centuries. Chernivtsi had to face with radical political and socio-economical changes. Political regimes reigning upon the territory there had not always been positive towards local peculiarities and sometimes regarded them as the challenge or a threat. Moreover, dynamic process of migration has been influencing the cultural and social landscape of the city and region dramatically, shifting the composition of leading ethnic groups and reshuffling the very foundations of the local urban life. All of these factors made city different and required setting up new traditions and patterns instead of one's predestined to extinction. Thus, the overall experience of this city is worthy some more research aimed at the cultural heritage of the previous epochs and reflection on some new trends of contemporaneous process.

### *Golden Age: an appeal of the Lost Paradise*

The “prehistory” of Chernivtsi looks lost in a realm of archaeology. There are a lot of tracks of recurrent settlements on both banks of the river Prut since the Stone ages. Some regular settlement which is most probably related to Chernivtsi prehistory is fortress Chern, destroyed by Tatars in the era of Khan Batu invasion. Archaeologists gather a lot of artefacts from the excavations of that fortress remnant and some historians are eager to regard the latter as a direct precursor of what is now Chernivtsi. Even the name of the city is explained as derived from some escapees of destroyed and burnt down fortress of Chern. Interesting to note, that that territory now is close to Chornivka village and situated on the margin of today's municipality borders.

Ukrainian authors are sure that these lands belonged to Kyivan Rus and its successors, mainly Galician Principality, being a kind of military camp against nomads and other rivalries with Old Rus principality. But the real fate of the Chernivtsi predecessor remains unclear. Middle ages brought down to this piece of land and their inhabitants a great period of permanent instability, recurrent military clashes and as a consequence ruining settlements around. Tatars Hordes, Great Duchy of Lithuania, Poland and Hungary, Moldova and Ottomans Empire – these are incomplete list of states pretended to control the territory later named Bukovyna. There are some tracks of recurrent activity in settlements on the territory of nowadays Chernivtsi, as far as they lay on the important route from Lviv to Iasi and beyond. Any attempt to restore a trustworthy picture of those ages is highly speculative because lack of provable knowledge of them regarding the small town or constellations of villages is a kind of hypothesis. What is a fact it's a first written mention about Chernivtsi in the time of Alexander Bun – the Prince of Moldavian Principality. So, since 1409 started a period of written history of Chernivtsi, at that time rather modest suburb of Tsetsyn (Chechun and some other variations of spelling) fortress<sup>2</sup>.

---

<sup>2</sup> Serhiy Pivovarov, “Arkheolohichni dannii pro mynule Chertnivtsiv ta ikh okolyts” [Archeological data concerning the past of Chernivtsi and its outskirts], in *Chernivtsi: istoriia ta*

While the official birthday of the city is related with the period of Moldavian Principality, there is no doubt about much deeper historical roots of the small town mentioned in the early documents. This period is marked with non-stop invasions, when epidemic diseases and waves of the brutal violence plundered the town and region from any corner. With the currents of time and historical evolutions, having more and more importance as the border defence and customs duty point Chernivtsi grew up and gradually acquired some basic peculiar characteristics.

Firstly, the town got some benefits of situating on the lively trade route, being both an important point of the frontier line and custom duties post. Secondly, along with many servicemen of Moldavian Principality here lived also merchants and craftsmen. And, last but is not the least, the ethnic and confessional composition of locals had been complicated and of mixed nature. Still, Chernivtsi rather looked like a big village, then a European town when epoch of Moldavian Principality and Turkish domination came to the end there.

Since 1775 till the Great War Bukovyna and its capital city had been incorporated into Austrian Empire (Austro-Hungary). This period is usually considered as the Golden Age in the history of city and province. If to overview town and later a city's records of that time, compare them with previous and following periods it might be confirmed as a true opinion. What should be recognised as the major pros of Austrian domination upon the province and its capital? Firstly, incomparable political stability and peace conditions brought about with the might of the Imperial State. Secondly, its evolution from the Absolutism to Constitutional and Dual Monarchy has rewarded Bukovynians and inhabitants of the capital city with more rights and opportunities, if to compare them with their closest neighbours from Russian Empire and Romanian principalities and later of Romanian Kingdom. Reforms and changes, while sometime incomplete and obstructed however paved a way to Europeanisation of the local economy, social and cultural life. Finally, being vitally motivated with security and loyalty of the newly acquired province Wien has been carefully supported local and regional peaceful coexistence of ethnic groups and culture of their interethnic tolerance. Subsequently, locals benefited of that policy too.

Sure, these changes came into forth not for a night, and they become to be considerable only when the territory of Bukovyna had been granted with the status of Duchy, with own Diet and a system of local self-government since 1850 on. And, if the history of Austrian period is imprinted on the 'golden coin', the every coin has two faces. Bukovyna and its capital city had to row with the central government for any considerable improvement. Whether it concerns its political autonomy (namely off the Polish elite run Galicia) or the consent on building up the railway, either the opening of the local University. Some of those initiatives faced with less favourable political will of the Emperor and his Government, some had been postponed for decades or so, the rest never came into existence. The region and city remain the true periphery of the Empire, including the level of well-being and tempo of industrialisation. Finally, the quest for the better health care and education in the mother tongue there had a long history of defeats of locals' appeals and their repeated failures with-a-with Wien bureaucracy. These and some more other hardships and certain superficial neglect of local and regional demands by the central authority should be taken into account when one tries to propose a well-balanced evaluation of the Imperial policy towards the Land and city and sum up the heritage of that period more or less objectively.

But sooner or later, faster or slower the city and its infrastructure evolved from the poor town towards a kind of typical Central European city of those days in the second half of XIX – the beginning of XX centuries<sup>3</sup>. The central part of the city, its downtown advanced the most from the development of building industry, gradual modernisation of transportation, communications and other modern fruits of technological progress. Despite related backwardness of Bukovyna in the Imperial hierarchy of provinces, Chernivtsi got certain popularity and positive perception in a public opinion of Austro-Hungary.

Though peripheral the city gets more beautiful architectural spots, impressive and gorgeous administrative buildings, theatres and other cultural institutes, and cheerfully accepted the modern urban style of life. While the centre authority sometimes hindered industrialisation of the city and province but comparing with the agrarian and patriarchal province of Bukovyna, the city contrasted the latter with a charming appeal of the regional capital. And it performs a capital city role in all aspects of the regional development<sup>4</sup>.

As well as Bukovyna itself, the central city has got a real poly-ethnic character. Nonetheless, the city has some distinct peculiarity, opposing the ethnic composition of the surrounding Land. As for the province the largest ethnic groups in accordance with Austrian senses were Ukrainians and Romanians, followed with Germans, Jews, Poles and the rest of minorities. The critical importance as for the provincial interethnic stability has a fact that there weren't the real ethnic majority in Bukovyna, just bigger and smaller ethnic communities. It happened to be a key precondition for constructing a special ethnic equilibrium in the province rather a ground for trying to monopolize the one by any community (sure, one should not ignore several attempt of claiming Bukovyna a one nation's property, this unilateral "national" perspective, mainly Romanian of that time would not been supported by the leadership of local Romanians unanimously as unrealistic approach). Contrary to the regional ethnic composition, the city of Chernivtsi remained vastly populated with Jews, only then followed with autochthonous Ukrainians (till the begging of XX centuries regarded as Ruthenian's by Austrian authorities) and Romanians, then Germans, Poles etc.

So, while in countryside Ukrainians and Romanians statistically dominated, in the urban landscape they have to agree with the role of minorities. This status correlated with their financial resources, political influence and cultural representation. The opposition of the city towards a province seems to be unusual as for the Eastern European case. While more typical dichotomy of that period for the vast region could be portrayed with model of two regionally confronting cultures: the privilege and ruling Nation in the capital city as the representative of the upper Culture of certain minority, encompassed with rustic, deprived majority of another tongue in the province around (Lviv/Lwow/Lemberg nearby is the closest and no way exceptional case). Indeed, evolving system of the local and regional interethnic and inter-confessional balance has far more complicated and specific outlook and foundations.

Key role as for the shaping the urban culture of Chernivtsi has been played with local Jews. They were not united as far as the Jewish itself community has been divided into traditionalist and modernist. The latter ones tried their best in order to get acceptance into a dominant Austrian-German culture, broking down ties with kahal and previous self-isolation

<sup>3</sup> Gabriel fon Spleni, *Opys Bukovyny* [Description of Bukovyna] (Chernivtsi: Ruta, 1995), 21.

<sup>4</sup> Ihor Zhaloba, *Infrastructurna polityka avstriiskoho uriadu na pivnichnomu skhodi monarchii v ostanniy chverti XVIII – 60-kh rokakh XIX st.* (na prykladi shliakhiv spolucheniia) [Austrian Government infrastructural policy on the Northern East of the Monarchy (a case study of the transportation communication)] (Chernivtsi: Knyhy – XXI, 2004).

of Jews. They try to acquire those days' European culture, education, prestigious jobs, social status etc., for sure in Austrian Imperial context. Being "integrated" even by senses' rules in the group of German tongue, they vehemently supported German culture and policy of Wien, sometime trying to be more 'Germans' than Germans themselves. Still, many of local Jews seemed to hold a kind of dual identity. Due to the origin they have been oriented towards Judaism and defensive form of ethno-national collective survival. However, social values and aspirations at prosperity prompted them vigorously back up Austro-Hungary and the policy of Wien<sup>5</sup>. Austrian government had some good reason of practicing selective support of these trends, and as far as Bukovyna and its capital city are concerned the Jewish enthusiasm for German culture and education made useful service for the State sake, compensating some weakness of the local German community and make the latter, only together with Jews a dominant group in the city and the core element of the regional socio-political process<sup>6</sup>. No wonder that Jewish and Austrian Germans leaders were eager of acting together and sharing some joint attitudes towards local and regional politics' issues quite often<sup>7</sup>. This *modus Vivendi* of the local Jewish community, being a mixture of both pragmatic and opportunistic motives had behind the scene some external influences too. Tolerance of Habsburg Monarchy in fact contrasted with the real situation with Jews in Russian Empire and Romania. Comparing the privileges and opportunities granted by Emperor in the Dual Monarchy, Jews had a good reason to be thankful towards Wien and imperial authority. And they paid them back with true loyalty and political support.

So, Jewish community and Imperial authority relations look like symbiotic ones. Bukovynian Jews did contribute into the local and regional political and social stability, regarding the existing interethnic model as a guarantee of their personal and collective safety and prosperity. In their turn, local and regional authorities have a lot of reasons to rely on the support and loyalty of this community. Above all, the latter has possessed no irredentist sentiments and therefore would have not threatening Imperial territorial integrity and security system. These pragmatic sentiments of Jews towards Austro-Hungary have been rewarded by the officials of Wien till the outburst of the Great War. After the collapse of Empire many of Jews laid down emotional foundations for pro-Austrian nostalgia. Jews had no other option as to face with less favourable and often more brutal policy of newborn states in the Central and Eastern Europe of the interwar period.

After Austrian Germans and Jews, the city public space and everyday life is being coloured with the presence and activity of Polish and Armenian communities. Poles contributed considerably into administrative, educational and cultural spheres of urban life. Moreover, despite the fact that Poles had not exceeded 4, 5 % of Bukovyna inhabitants, they constituted second after Jews ethnic community in the regional capital city. For instance, the Mayor of Chernivtsi with a high repute and longest period of service Anton Kochanowski is

---

<sup>5</sup> Eleonora Lappin, "Chernivets'ka movna konferentsiia (1908 r.) ta superechka pro evreis'ky natsional'nu movu" [Chernivtsi Linguistic Conference (1908) and the debates on Jewish National Language], in *Mini-cosmos Bukovyny. Kul'turni zdobutky rehionu* [Mini-cosmos of Bukovyna. Cultural records of the region], ed. Serhiy Osachuk (Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2006), 99.

<sup>6</sup> Serhiy Osachuk, *Nimtsi Bukovyny. Istoriia tovarys'koho rukhu (druha polovyna XIX – pochatok XX st.)* [Germans of Bukovyna. The History of the comradeship movement] (Chernivtsi: Zoloti lytavry, 2002).

<sup>7</sup> Andrei Corbea-Hoisie, *Czernowitzer Gezchichten. Über eine städtische Kultur in Mittel (Ost)-Europa* [Chernivtsi stories. About one urban culture in the Central (East) Europe] (Wien-Koln-Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 2003), 29-43.

one of the best representative of local Poles in the local history<sup>8</sup>. A tiny ethnic group of local Armenians were active in the local economic and trade, belonging to the urban business elite of those days.

Hereby it would be timely to pay attention to the situation with Ukrainian and Romanian population of Chernivtsi. Vast majority of them occupied mainly suborns of the city and get involved into the agricultural sector of local economy, cattle breeding and crafts. They were important occupations while with low income and lacking social prestige. Despite the remaining important role of the agriculture for many of Chernivtsi inhabitants, modernisation process in the Empire and Duchy of Bukovyna became influencing the economy and society of the city, changing the status and impact of both communities. Limited resources of the local and regional market made the competition there tough and urged ethnic communities got consolidated with regard to the access of Public Administration and Civic services' available positions. Urbanisation and industrialisation process, where Bukovyna has been lagging behind the average level in Austro-Hungary attracted more former peasants to the provincial capital, and the number of Romanians and Ukrainians grew up in the period concerned. Not automatically but these trends had an impact on politicising both ethnic communities; increasing their social and political demands and making them involved both in local and regional policy as active actors. Step by step it laid down some crucial preconditions for the national consolidation of both communities locally and regionally<sup>9</sup>.

Unlikely the rest of Austro-Hungarian provinces, national consolidation process in Chernivtsi and Bukovyna had avoided confrontation scenario as it happened for instance in neighbouring Galicia. The local Poles and Ukrainians wade through estrangement and hostility, finally resumed with Ukrainian-Polish War at 1918 – 1919 years. Fortunately for locals, this script does not apply to Bukovyna. Trying to explain this difference, the majority of researches state that the key reason of the principal interethnic conflict absence is a fact of no dominant ethno-national group in the region. True, the poly-ethnic mosaic had to be rather typical and no way the exclusive trait of many of Eastern European regions so far. Ukrainians statistically prevailed in Bukovyna but Romanians followed them closely. And both ethnic groups do not reach a majority in the province, while remained minority in the capital city. Under the condition of gradual spreading of the liberal values and constitutionalism in Dual Monarchy no ethnic group has possessed the legitimate right of claiming themselves the major stakeholder of the respected region and city. Sure, that obvious fact has been overcompensated in other ways, e.g. with the usage of symbolic policy of acclaiming exclusive “historical rights” on the Land, mainly from Romanian elite side sometimes followed up with some Ukrainians later as a counteraction. But this attempt of getting a kind of symbolic superiority faced with opposite claims of some other groups. And, all of these pretence and demands have been exploited instrumentally and resumed balanced in the regional and local net of compromises and political intrigues. Thus, all the parties concerned had to come to rational general conclusions that nobody could be hegemonic in the city and region. They admitted peaceful and tolerant interethnic and inter-confessional relations are equally profitable for all despite the quantity of the group and its

---

<sup>8</sup> Andriy Horuk, *Natsional'no-kul'turnyi rukh poliakov na Bukovyni (druha polovyna XIX – 1914 r.)* [National-cultural movement of Poles in Bukovyna (the second half of XIX – 1914)] (Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2005), 48-52.

<sup>9</sup> Oleksandr Dobrzhansky, *Natsional'nyi rukh ukrainsiv Bukovyny druhoii polovyny XIX – pochatku XX st.* [National movement of Ukrainians in the second half of XIX – the beginning of XX century] (Chernivtsi: Zoloti litavry, 1999), 112-113.



historical enrooting into Bukovyna soil. And this model while sometimes got tested on sustainability, survives till the very end of Habsburgs' rule.

Another reason for keeping up the ethnic and religious tolerance as a part of the local/regional political and everyday culture is the dynamically balanced system of economical and social roles (contributions) made by key ethnic groups. It has been elaborated in evolutional manner and maintained with smooth adjustments in Chernivtsi for a long period of time<sup>10</sup>. So, those favourable combination of positive objective reasons and subjective good will, summed up with rational interests of the local elite had created a true engine of tolerance and mutual complementary recognition, led to softening existing conflicted aspirations and demands of deferent communities in the city.

The importance of the institutional framework of local politics should not be neglected too. While far away of the perfection, with so many shortages and inconsistencies the legal system of regional and local self-government does provide important foundations for a local advancement<sup>11</sup>. The overall evolution of electoral system while insufficient from the point of view of pure democratic standards of suffrage universal, but approaching a bit more progress, relatively open access of local and regional elite to some powerful institutes, and the recognition of certain dialogue with different social groups and ethnic communities, finally, the absence of the dominant ethnic community, all of these pushed local leaders to elaborate peculiar model of the local public policy. On the one hand, it had been grounded onto Austro-Hungarian patriotism and loyalty to the Emperor, but on the other relayed on the regional identity, political moderation and avoidance of radicalism. A strong attachment to the regional super-ethnic Bukovynian identity, which has been nourished with some generation of local politicians, intellectuals and civic activists forged their responsible attitude to manifestation of diverse interests and concerns, predisposition of looking for a compromise and making coalitions, aimed at cooperative approach towards the hot issues of local, regional and imperial politics<sup>12</sup>. It serves to better understanding of other ethnic communities, cultivation of some mutual respect, for instance by means of learning leading regional languages and using them into everyday urban communication. The polyphony of Chernivtsi streets and squares portrayed the best the local specificity and had not been a privilege of the upper class only, spreading even to the low social strata too. This communication comfort contributes into local and regional culture of tolerance and in general got supported with central and regional authorities. They benefited of them also, regarding the Bukovynian tolerance as an important leverage of sustaining the regional stability and effective policy. With the growing tensions all over Europe and getting more endangered relations with Russian Empire remaining loyalty and support of the region and its capital city means a lot for the official Wien sake<sup>13</sup>. Less dangerous but still challenging

<sup>10</sup> *Nimets'kyi vchenyi Yohan Kol' pro Bukovynu ta Halychynu v seredyni XIX st.* – Chernivtsi [German Scholar Johan Kohl on Bukovyna and Galicia in the second half of XIX century] (Chernivtsi: Zoloti litavry, 2007), 31.

<sup>11</sup> Mykhailo Nykyforiak, *Derzhavny lad i pravo na Bukovyni v 1774 - 1918 rr.* [The State order and Law on Bukovyna in 1774-1918 years] (Chernivtsi: Ruta, 2000).

<sup>12</sup> Oleksandr Dobrzhansky, "Ukraino-pol's'ki stosunky na Bukovyni u 80-90-kh XIX stolittia" [Ukrainian – Polish Relations in Bukovyna in 80-90<sup>th</sup> of XIX century], in *Bukowina. Blaski i cienie «Europe w miniaturze»* [Bukovyna. Lights and shadows of "Europe in the miniature"] (Warszawa: Wyd. Energeia, 1995), 113-120.

<sup>13</sup> Ihor Burkut, "Rozpad Avstro-Uhorshchyny i formuvannia novykh nezaleshnykh derzhav Tsentral'noi ta Skhdnnoi Evropy" [The Breakdown of Austro-Hungary and the formation of new States of Central and Eastern Europe], in *Narodne viche Bukovyny, 1918 – 1993* [Peoples' Forum of Bukovyna] (Chernivtsi: Prut, 1994): 29-33.

seemed to be some geopolitical dreams of Bucharest, where co-national Romanian populace in Bukovyna has been regarded as the important resource of Romania's foreign policy strategic goals.

Together with the abovementioned factors the overall tolerant atmosphere in Chernivtsi is being supported with the intertwined confessional identities and loyalties of locals which went beyond ethnic cleavages and sometimes overlapped them to an extend<sup>14</sup>. Overwhelming majority of Romanians and Ukrainians, for instance, belonged to the same Orthodox Church with the Metropolitan Residence in Chernivtsi (now the former Residence of Metropolitan is Chernivtsi Jury Fedkovych National University property and is in the UNESCO list of Cultural Heritage). They have been competing with each other for the role and influence in the confession and as usually Romanians obtained more important positions there till the end of Habsburg rule. However this competition does not break through limits of tolerance and non-aggressive public conduct. Jews and Germans went together in so many political and cultural issues while remained far away religiously. Germans (divided between Catholics and Lutherans) and Poles, as well as Armenians identified themselves with different denominations, as did some other ethnic groups (Russian old believers etc.). So far as boundaries of ethnic and confessional identities does not coincide neither locally, nor regionally it opened up more public space for the culture of on-going dialogue and disgust to any pretence on the kind of hegemonic exclusiveness. And consequently, it does contribute to the more rational articulation then irrational motivation of key interests laid down into the basic of local politics by leaders of the urban communities. By and large the local inhabitants had to be regarded as borrowers of multifaceted and heterogeneous self-conciseness, where ethnic identity seemed to be wreathed with confessional belonging, and social stratification does not comply with political preferences, directing locals to pluralistic, multilayer and diffusive identification and loyalty.

In this context it's worthy to note, that the issue of the impact and contribution made with leading ethnic communities in the city development is debatable. Historiography remains partly biased and dependable on the point of view of the authors, coloured with ethno-national preference as the vintage point of interpreting the local and regional past. And borders of ethno-nationally determined narratives remain the barrier on the way towards all-comprehensive vision on local history till now. Because of that the question on the most valuable contribution made in the Bukovynian phenomenon of interethnic tolerance remains open for further research and discussion. Still, it's clear that this phenomenon should not be monopolised by any community or ascribed to the impact of Austrian authorities only. It's rather a fortunate combination of the state-sponsored regional and local policy and the coincidence of some profound interests and limits of power of leading ethnic and confessional groups, both in the capital city and whole Bukovyna. One more issue deserving further consideration is about the ratio of urban and rustic population influence on the process of Bukovynian tolerance formation. Sure, villagers took a part into founding and supporting regional culture of tolerance to others and without their attitude this phenomenon did not come into very existence or ceased to exist forever. Nevertheless, the reflection on the tolerance as the value and desirable social model, attempts to make it a kind of everyday code of proper and approvable social behaviour, all of these would be correct to attribute with the outcome of Chernivtsi inhabitants long-lasting endeavour. And the primary role has to be recognised for the local elite, e.g. political, business and intellectuals.

---

<sup>14</sup> Hanna Skoreiko, "Polikonfesiinist' iak skladova tolerantnosti bukovyns'koho suspil'stva" [Poly-confessional character as a part of Bukovynian Society tolerance], in *Bukowina. Tradycje i wspolczesnosc* [Bukovyna. Tradition and Present time] (Pila-Czerniowce-Suczawa, 2006), 146.

The latter, namely professors of Chernivtsi University, gymnasiums' and schools' teachers, leaders of the local civic society not only replicate this positive practice but transferred and enriched them for the sake of some generations to come.

So, it will not be a false assumption that ethnic and religious tolerance as the prevailing model of social conduct and valued pattern of the everyday behaviour is being opted up by locals as their vital communication strategy, chosen from some available alternatives of the time being. And it was done as the best choice as this strategy complemented to the city and region evolution, preventing major conflict and uniting them in a front of some internal and external challenges. That is why alongside with some economical, industrial and educational progress related to Austrian period of Chernivtsi history, the cultural and ethnopolitical legacy of Habsburgs' epoch might be duly considered as the most formidable and important in the process of constructing city's identity and its heritage. Ideal type of Chernivtsi and its locals does correspond first and foremost with this Golden age of the local past, which had been doomed to be soon converted into a lost paradise. The more distant this epoch is from the present time, the more myths and legends are covered this period to make it shine brighter and mysteriously.

*From the balanced plurality to an imposed uniformity: devolution of the local tolerance*

After the collapse of Austro-Hungary Bukovyna did not succeed with the idea of its partitioning into Ukrainian and Romanian parts but has been ruled by Romanian Kingdom solely. The overall period after WWI appeared to be unfavourable for the local and regional model of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations. First deformation and tests on the validity of that model comes at Romanian period of the local history (1918-1940, 1941-1944 pp.), where took place a radical change of the regional status, under the aegis of Bucharest. New sovereign of the region seemed to be far distant of the Habsburgs Empire policy and politics patterns. Its size, social and economic potential, cultural traditions and standard of living, all of them get lost in eyes of new subjects. Due to Romanian administrative reforms Bukovyna did not secure its previous autonomy, territorial integrity and even the official name being replaced with a new one of Suceava province. Since 1923 the region did not exercised any remnants of the previous autonomy and legal liberties attributed with them. Local inhabitants had to accommodate themselves to the pretty unstable political system of Romania and its devolution from the moderate liberalism of 20<sup>th</sup> to radical nationalism and authoritarian regime in the end of 30<sup>th</sup>. Less of all these changes make happy the ethnic minorities who belongs to all the ethnic groups of the region and city but Romanians. New rulers did not fell themselves sure on the new acquired territories. As far as there Romanians do not constitute majority, this lands were not ethnically homogeneous and the populace fond of the Greater Romanian ideals. Former ideals of the tolerance and inter-ethnic balance got lost under the pressing demands of the national security. The principal answer to threatening diversity has been invented in a framework of the Romanisation policy. Bukovyna and its principal city got captured into a zone of ascending geopolitical turbulence and uncertainty<sup>15</sup>.

Despite these turbulent circumstances the city gradually advanced with regard to the infrastructure, local economy and architecture. Sure, this statement should be balanced with

---

<sup>15</sup> Vladimir Fisanov, "Problema bezopasnosti v usloviakh podvizhnykh geopoliticheskikh toчек: sluchai s Bukovinoi" [Security issue under conditions of the moveable geopolitical points: a case with Bukovyna], in *Re Commendationem: Zbirka vybranykh statei* [Recommended: the Collection of selected articles], ed. Volodymyr Fisanov (Chernivtsi: Zoloti litavry, 2006), 70-71.

realistic approach towards Romania of this period. Still, some improvement of the local transportation, industry and social services has to be recognised too, together with the process of recovering after WWI ruins and damages<sup>16</sup>. When the liberal trends of Romanian politics failed in the end of 1920<sup>th</sup>, the main accent in the regional and all-national ethno-politics had been made on forceful implementation of the dominant nation rights and exclusive status. With some minor fluctuations and bureaucratic inconsistency the Romanisation policy led to the violation of traditional balance of interests, the whole structure of the local inter-ethnic relations, and exhaustion of the tolerance resources and cooperation of ethnic communities. All but Romanians from locals had to face with certain discrimination, depending on the fluent domestic or international conjuncture. It's hardly easy to rank and systematised the discrimination they faced with and it need much more research of documents and memoirs. For example, spreading faster over Romania anti-Semitic attitude strongly affected the situation of Bukovynian and local Jews<sup>17</sup>. Romanian-Ukrainian relations in the city and region also entered into turbulent phase. The previous approximate equality of both communities had been replaced with the growing tension and conflict, never seen earlier in Chernivtsi and around. The authority treated Ukrainians with suspicion and certain arrogance, and suppressed any resistance towards denationalising, Romanisation policy of Bucharest and its local agents<sup>18</sup>. Sure one could discover the opposite samples too. For instance, the close alliance of Romania with Poland made the situation with local Poles improving relatively. And with A. Hitler and Nazis coming to power in Berlin and later Bucharest reorientation towards military alliance with the Third Reich the official attitude towards local Germans got much warmer and respectful stance<sup>19</sup>. But the order of Hitler for all Germans from Bukovyna to leave the region out and go to the Fatherland made German community extinct from the land they settled down long before. Until November of 1940, when Chernivtsi has been surrender by Romania to USSR under the ultimatum of Kremlin this process of Germans evacuation ended up completely<sup>20</sup>.

As the consequence of WWI it should be noted, that it brought about the massive immigration and exodus from Chernivtsi caused by military actions, mass brutality and

<sup>16</sup> Oleksandr Dobrzahans'ky and Yury Makar, "Etnichni hrupy Bukovyny pid chas triokh rossiiskykh okupatsii kraiu (1914-1917)" [Ethnic groups of Bukovyna under three Russian occupations of the region (1914-1917)], in *Istoryko-politychni problemy suchasnoho svitu: Zbirnyk naukovykh statei*, t. 29-30 [Historical-political issues of the contemporary world: collection of articles] (Chernivtsi: Chernivets'ky natsional'nyi universytet, 2015), 122-125.

<sup>17</sup> Eduard Turczynski, "Sztuka konsensusu, czyli o kulutrze politycznej Bukowiny" [Masterpiece of the consensus or on the political culture of Bukovyna], in *Bukowina po stronie dialogu* [Bukovyna on the side of dialogue] (Sejny: Pogranicze, 1999), 23.

<sup>18</sup> Ihor Burkut, "Bukovyna u planakh Velykoi Rumunii" [Bukovyna in the plans of Greater Romania], in *Politychni protsesy: istoriia, mify, real'nist' (pohliad z rehionu)* [Political processes: history, myths, reality: the outlook from the region] (Chernivtsi: Prut, 2005), 32-33.

<sup>19</sup> Serhiy Osachuk, "Sotsial'na dynamika i politychni orientstasii nimtsiv Bukovyny 1918-1940pp" [Social dynamics and political orientations of Bukovynian Germans in 1918-1940 years], in *Bukovyna 1918-1940 rr.: zovnishni vplyvy ta vnutrishnii rozvytok* [Bukovyna 1918-1940: external influence and domestic evolution], ed. Serhiy Osachuk (Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2005), 114-117.

<sup>20</sup> Vasyl Kholodnytsky, "Do pytannia pro pereselennia ta deportatsii zhyteliv Pivnichnoi Bukovyny u 1940-1941 rr." [On the issue of resettlement and deportation of Germans from Northern Bukovyna in 1940-1941], in *28 chervnia 1940 roku: pohliad cherez 60 rokiv* [28 June 1940: an outlook through 60 years] (Chernivtsi: Prut, 2000), 12-14.

persecutions and general insecurity for civilians<sup>21</sup>. Russian and Austrian Authority and soldiers left behind themselves a lot of cruelty and sufferings of locals. From this time on the emigration factor, worsened with practices of ethnic cleansing had reformatting ethno-national composition of the local population, and as the collateral damage the very culture and patterns of their interethnic interaction. Interwar period might be evaluated as a movement from bad to worse with regard to the ethnopolicy of Romanian Kingdom. So, relations of key ethnic communities in the city became more tense and distrustful, granting them with new conflicts not only on the streets, but even though unexpectedly in so elite social space as Chernivtsi University (also converted from German to totally Romanian University). The representative of non-Romanians had to witness some problems with entering the University and learning there, that had provoked aggressive clashes of some students' organisations there (based on ethnicity first of all) from some fights up to bloody duals of their members.

Worst of all seemed to be period of Romania Kingdom second coming to Bukovyna in the period of Ion Antonescu dictatorship. Having in mind to get revenge for the humiliating "evacuation" from the Bessarabia and Northern Bukovyna (28.06. 1940), Romanian authorities and some radical right organisations launched the policy of ethnic cleansing towards Jewish population, which emptied up Chernivtsi off this important part of its inhabitants. Overall, the ethno-national policy of Bucharest has been filled with chauvinistic and aggressive stance regarding ethnic minorities and political opponents character, for now far away of a tolerance and whatever respectful attitudes to others<sup>22</sup>. Those negative tendencies were not always greeted with locals and of Romanian stock too. They had tried to withstand political deterioration of local cultural climate, preventing the old Chernivtsi and its tolerance as well as some other attributes of them of final collapse.

It seems that best of all these attempts succeeded in émigrés circles and in talking of the older generation remaining in the city, who witnessed that the new time came with the feeling of the losing and missing of their native city colour and flavour. Really, the wholesome picture of the interwar period of Chernivtsi is not black and white. There had to be recognised not only abruption, but also a certain continuity of the local evolution. With all the negative trends Romanian Kingdom had been a part of the European civilisation of those days, while a peripheral one, lagging behind mainstream but in principal aspects compatible and belonging to than time Europe. Moreover the ties of city with Europe and other European states left active and vivid as far as the interwar period is concerned. Romanian period of Chernivtsi history requires much more research and most of all comparative studies. Regarding the approaches of urban studies the city history and this peculiar period remains less researched and need to be revisited anew.

While Romanian time but Antonescu period might be regarded as a complex mixture of deferent trends in the local history, a combination of discontinuity and continuation with regard to the European flavour of Chernivtsi evolution, the Soviet period is rather marked as a clearly disruptive with all of previous times.

---

<sup>21</sup> Viktor Demchenko, "Vplyv Pershoii Svitovoi viiny na demohrafichnu sytuatsiiu ta produktyvni syly Pivnichnoi Bukovyny" [The WWI influence on the demographic situation and productive forces of Northern Bukovyna], in *Bukovyna – mій рідний край. Матеріали історико-краєзнавчої конференції молодих дослідників, студентів та науковців* [Bukovyna – my native land. Proceedings of the historical and regional studies of young researches, students and scholars] (Chernivtsi: Prut, 1996), 10.

<sup>22</sup> *Bukovyna v konteksti evropeiskyykh mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn (z davnykh chasiv do seredyni XX st.)* [The WWI influence on the demographic situation and productive forces of Northern Bukovyna] (Chernivtsi: Ruta, 2005), 650-651.

Superficially, the soviet period in the history of Chernivtsi mean a speedy growth of the city scale, its territory, economy and populace. City embraced the neighbouring Sadgora town, which became to be one of the city districts. A lot of new factories and plants made Chernivtsi landscape look industrial as never before. New institutes of education had been opened, and first of all, Medical Institute (1944) which have contributed a lot into the betterment of the health care system in the city and region. Gradually and steadily grew up the level of education of city inhabitants and their well being started to get improved, especially since 1970<sup>th</sup>. This list of soviet records might be added with some more facts and stats. Still, the other side of the coin should be regarded adequately also.

Concerning the interethnic relations in city, soviet period has not granted locals with all the benefits, officially declared by new authorities despite the so-called internationalism and all-comprehensive equality promised. Briefly, the picture of the period might be characterised as follows. Firstly, namely this time Ukrainians got the growing majority both in the city and region (Chernivtsi oblast since 1940). Even though, their real status and influence does not mean any kind of privileges (like for Germans in Austrian time or Romanians in the Interwar period). This status in fact has been granted to Russians or Russified representatives of other ethnic groups<sup>23</sup>. Secondly, contrary to their minor share in the demographic structure of the city population (in the best for them time around 5 % of locals), Russians as usually got the most prestigious and powerful posts in the system of local and regional administration<sup>24</sup>. When invasive industrialisation came into existence they had been disproportionally represented amid the general management of state-run factories and plants. As all of western lands of the post-war USSR Northern Bukovyna had to adapt itself towards centrally planned migration of Russians, and Ukrainians from the East of Ukraine as well as representatives of some other Union Republics. It remind a specific while carefully planned and performed type of colonisation, when locals of traditional ethnic communities for both city and region had to move into Russia and Kazakhstan (the campaign of cultivating verging lands, Siberian resources exploit and many other “Socialist Constructions of the Century”), while the most devoted supporters of Soviet regime replaced them at home. And, surprisingly, the last specificity of the period is the lack of ethnic domination upon the city everyday culture. Ukrainians would not have been able to realize their demographic domination by political or cultural means, should they wanted to do so. Russians were lacking strength, and therefore all the ethnic groups remained equalised with the lack of any institutional instruments and political channels of aggregating and articulating of their concerns and interests. It might be compared with Austrian mosaic of cultures, but now all of them limited and narrowed with a Soviet model of ethnicity. That was formal equality of rights but without real access to them.

Thus, all of the ethnic groups lapsed to possess a real self-organisation and adequate representation, being de-facto minorities’ vis-à-vis Soviet version of Russian domination all over USSR. The latter explicitly being represented in the discriminative steps of new authorities, including severe repression and forceful resettlement of intellectual and social

<sup>23</sup> Tetiana Dolynian’ska, “Orhany vlady v period vidbudovy ta khrushchovs’koi vidlyhy” [Institutes of Power in the Reconstruction and Khrushchov’s Thaw periods], in *Istoriia rozvytku orhaniv vlady na terrytorii` Chernivets’koi oblasti. Za zah. redaktsieiu Oleksandra Dobrzhan’koho, Anatolia Kruglashova, Mykoly Yarmystoho* [History of power bodies development on the territory of Chernivtsi region], ed. Oleksandr Dobrzhansky et al. (Chernivtsi: Bukrek, 2014), 596-597.

<sup>24</sup> Vasyl Kholodnyts’ky, “Misto v radianskyi period” [The City in the Soviet period], in *Chernivtsi: istoriia ta suchasnist’* [Chernivtsi: the history and present time], ed. Vasyl Botushansky (Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2009), 263.

elite of the city, especially in the first years of so-called Sovietisation. It also appeared into systematic and all penetrative propaganda and agitation in favour of the new, namely Soviet style of nation brotherhood. And, after the proclamation of the Communist Party that the national question is resolved in USSR, the inter-ethnic issues had been mentioned primarily in the context of overcoming the heritage of the blamed past, the permanent necessity to fight against the global imperialism's plotting and the vicious activity of alien agents.

Once again the ethno-demographic structure of the city was undergoing further changes and certain distortion. Most impressive are metamorphosis of the local Jewish community, which did not recovered to the same share as in Austrian or Romanian period respectively. Still, they composed around 1/5 of the locals and remained influential part of the city life, economy and management including. Considering the trauma of Holocaust, noteworthy is that many of pre-war Jewish locals did not come back home and their apartments had been occupied with Soviet Jews and other newcomers, who came from other regions of USSR. It means the brake with the previous tradition both for the respected community and city in general. Being unacquainted with the local and regional customs the new settlers have no choice as to accept an existing order and support Soviet-Russian symbolic and cultural domination. Certainly, it reminds somehow a "balance" of the ethnic communities under Austrian Imperial rule, but rather in a caricature shape and accessed from the opposite starting point. All of ethnic communities but Russians had to cooperate with authorities in the framework of mutual agreement to be gradually denationalised and prompted to merge into the fantastic ideological construction, officially named as "the single Soviet people".

In the contrast with the previous historic periods, all the ethnic communities and social strata had been stripped off the right to constitute their legal organisations outside very narrow, totalitarian soviet mass-organisations, restlessly controlled with the Communist party and KGB. They no way would have been able to serve self-organisation tools but only repeatedly encompass soviet citizens into a hierarchy of the political institutionalisation network, from a kindergarten till the end of life.

NGO's and other structures of civic society in the city founded in Austro-Hungary and survived through Romanian Kingdom (till the dictatorship period), Soviet regime totally annihilated, as well as all of ethno-cultural societies. Though Chernivtsi secured basic traits and character of multi-ethnic community, the manifestations of ethnicity had to be placed into Procrustean bed of folklore and ethnography, in order to illustrate Communist party all-comprehensive care about all the nationalities in USSR and their happiness of living in the "most progressive country". Outside of the cultivated image of the USSR as paradise of inter-ethnic harmony and brotherly cooperation, the inter-ethnic communication sometimes appeared on the surface, breaking through of the everyday life total control the by intolerant behaviour, negative stances towards some minorities (Jews and Moldavians mainly), and with some other cases of disrespect and disgust to others.

The key concern of authorities seemed to be fighting against any manifestations of national identity should they be deviating off their official version. The principal target of suppression had been the same – nationalism, which meant whatever deference with the officially approved kind of ethnicity. The official cliché of the ethnicity (nationality) is being grounder on the magic formula, that any soviet national culture is a socialist in content and the national one only in form. Therefore, making an accent on ethnicity could be dangerous for someone. So far, time-by-time KGB orchestrated some kind of a public show aimed at revealing the nests of "the bourgeois nationalists" and their unanimous condemnation by the soviet citizens of all ethnic stocks. Mainly, it concerns Ukrainian, Jewish and to a lesser extent Romanian intelligentsia and students. Since 1970<sup>th</sup>, when massive immigration of

Jews begun, the Soviet authority all over the country started to exploit anti-Semitism, covered with propaganda of preventing the spread of the global Zionism. Mass media, soviet organisations of every type, had to stand fast against this new invented threat. As a result anti-Semitism and some other symptoms of xenophobia had been growing up, viciously affecting every day relations of the ordinary locals in Chernivtsi. Finally, it led to the new unofficial but actual system of interethnic hierarchy, with the top of them 'crowned' by Russians and Russian-speaking part of the community, lower Ukrainians, Jews, Moldavians, Romanians and finally other minorities. Really, the open hostility amid ethnic community had been expelled and forbidden while hidden jealousy and prejudice waited for a suitable time to swim up to the surface of the public life.

In general, the Soviet period of local history left behind a contradictory legacy. On the one hand, the city grew up and reached its height both of the territory and population. The economy of the city got industrialised with the strong share of the military-industrial complex electronic plants. Urbanisation in the region reached the momentum, and the region of Chernivtsi has been transformed from the agrarian one into the industrial-agrarian, with the domination of urban populace. There had been made several steps forward in educations, science and health care for the period under consideration. Surely, with no major breakthrough but the wealth of ordinary people had been improving, still tending to be a kind of equality of the pretty modest standards and on-going race for the everyday food and staff. A lot of new buildings rose up in the new districts of the city, and they remained architecturally unattractive and missing any aesthetics value. It's hardly possible to recall a principal local outstanding architectural record of the Soviet period. Plus, the reality of Soviet life made locals more and more sympathetic to the West and forged them to reconstruct the growing idealisation of the past, centred on the imagined best life in Austro-Hungary.

### ***Chernivtsi in Ukraine: a gate to Europe or the deadlock of provinciality?***

The impact of the Soviet period's heritage affected social and cultural life of the city in the last years of Perestroika and first years of Ukrainian Independence. When state pressure had been lifting up and limits on the freedom of speech gradually implemented it granted the locals with some problems also. Earlier suppressed and forbidden public expressions of negative felling and attitude towards the others, got a good chance to be articulated in a destructive manner of some suspicion and distrust, negative stereotype and prejudice.

Keeping in mind a negative experience of the previous dramatic epochs, Jews from Chernivtsi as well as from the rest of former USSR prefer to flee off the city and country en masse. The rest of ethnic communities had been less predisposed to the massive emigration.

The new period while started with some raising hopes and expectations soon brought about more and more dramatic challenges. The growth of economical and social problems, unemployment, closure of the previously big factories and plants, and new demands of rapidly changing system of values make the background of interethnic relations complicated and tense. In the same period one could find some very positive trends too. First of all, ethnic and religious communities in the city as all around the new State enjoyed the possibility of freedom and tried to restore their traditional for the society societal placing and cultural role. Doing that, they had been primarily oriented to the past samples of institutional building, partly of Romanian period and to a bigger extend of Austrian times. They started public campaign for the restoration of their rights on Peoples' Houses (Jewish, Ukrainian, Romanian, German and Polish), reopened or founded anew socio-cultural societies, educational and other institutes of the civic society. They have been contributing into the process of ethno-national revival of the leading communities and made social



spectrum of the city life more colourful and vivid. But the negative economic and social factors undermined the socio-cultural and political stability in the city, which is attributed with some previous decades or so.

The most sharp and radical transformation underwent Jewish community of Chernivtsi, the total ratio of them had diminished down 0, 4% of all locals, due to the last census of 2001<sup>25</sup>. Thus, from the most populous and certainly influential ethnic group this community now is approaching the minimum level of both number and strength. While it possessed a great importance as for the history and whole culture of Chernivtsi, the emigration of Jews left behind many social and economical lacunas, which are not filling in with other ethnic communities' adequate activity. It concerns commerce, education, health care and some other city's spheres. Less radical changes touched upon local Russians<sup>26</sup>. Some of them moved out of Chernivtsi and Ukraine, but many preferred to stay there. Noteworthy, that some of locals who had dual ethnic identity (one of the parent Russian another Ukrainian, for instance) became favourable to change the identity from Russian to Ukrainian one.

Last decades expose a picture of considerable changes in Romanian and Moldavian communities in the city and region of Chernivtsi. Remaining more or stable statistically in general sum, they evolved in shifting the popularity of Moldavian identity in favour of Romanian<sup>27</sup>. If in the Soviet period authorities unofficially had granted and proliferated some support to Moldavian identity, especially in the earlier years of the new regime rooting into new ground, it changed with Ukrainian Independence. Ukraine has not elaborated a clear identity policy and moreover did not make any attempt to take into account the regional specificity of identification process under new circumstances. In the same period Romania, after Revolution of 1989 had been looking for a new prospect of the development. And while the distinctive European and Euro-Atlantic choice had not been made with Romanian elite and society, they experienced a period of uncertainty and frustration. Post-totalitarian period brought about some nationalistic and revanchists trends into Romanian politics, coloured with the ideal of Greater Romania restoration. It clouded Ukrainian-Romanian relations, both on the interstate level and between neighbouring societies, having poised as a kind of collateral damage interethnic climate in Chernivtsi. Manifestation of pro-Romanian irredentism did not reach dangerous level of conflict not in the province, nor in the city but seeded around suspicious and distrust. Sure, there was a chance of open conflict in the region and a city, and fortunately this scenario had been avoided then. After series of Treaties amidst Ukraine and Romania on interstate border and cooperation had been signed up and ratified, the general situation with interethnic relations in Chernivtsi are steadily been improved and freed off the threaten negativity.

The newest ethno-demographic process in the city could not be accurately researched because the lack of some provable data after last Ukrainian census of 2001. Now they seem to be out-dated in order to make provable analysis and right conclusions. The

<sup>25</sup> *Natsional'nyi sklad naselennia Chernivts'koi oblasti ta ioho movni oznaky (za danymy Vseukrains'koho perepysu naselennia 2001 roku)* [Ethnonational composition of Chernivtsi oblast population and its linguistic attributes], vol. I (Chernivtsi, 2003).

<sup>26</sup> Tamara Yury, "V oblasti stalo bil'she selian i menshe rosian" [The region gets more peasants and less burgers] *Doba*, 14 sichnia [January] 2003, 1, 3.

<sup>27</sup> *Otchet o missii. Severniiia (Ukrainskaia) Bukovina. Pridnestrovskaia Moldavskaia respublika. Gagauzii (Gagauz-Ery). Moldova* [Report on the Mission. Northern (Ukrainian Bukovyna, Transdnistria Moldavian Republic, Gagauzia)] (Minsk: Rabochaia grupa NPO SNG po predotvrashcheniiu i urehulirovaniu konfliktov [Working group NPO SNG in preventing and regulate the conflicts], 2004), 17-23.

problem occurred when V. Janukovych had postponed twice the next census since 2012, and it might be supposed that he did it with vicious calculations of preparing the next stages of Crimea annexation and forgery of “Novorossia”, based on Kremlin false assumption of “protecting compatriots abroad”. As far as local situation is concerned some trend need more scrutiny and comparative approach. It concerns changes of Moldavian identity also. Romanians are sure that no Moldavian nation and identity exists at all. Nonetheless, many of Moldavian citizens in Republic in Moldova as well as citizens of Ukraine remained loyal right to that kind of identity. Romanian media, education institutes and politicians invested a lot of energy to prove the obscurity of that type of identity in both neighbouring states. Moreover, Romanian post-socialist transformation gained much more results in comparison with Ukraine’s and Republic of Moldova’s records. So, as for now, Romania has some more appealing social and economic characteristics for Eastern neighbourhood. All of those have contributed into process of making the Romanian identity more prestigious and attractive for the Moldavians in Ukraine and Republic of Moldova. This process looks unfinished but leads towards distinctive flow from Moldavian to Romanian community in Chernivtsi, why their specific weight remains stable locally.

Time by time, Chernivtsi became to be a target for the radical forces, trying to undermine local and regional ethno-political stability, and aiming at harvesting some kind of popularity in the period of electoral campaigns<sup>28</sup>. Ethnic factor has been exploited as a sort of electoral technologies prior to the Orange Revolution of 2014, where unknown authors had extensively decorated public places with provocative graffiti’s seeding xenophobia and mutual distrust between leading ethnic communities of the city. The provocation did not succeed to spark a fire in the city but no reaction from the then-time authorities demonstrated that this technology has been invented with a certain political support of Kuchma regime. New wave of provoking once again some interethnic tensions, now playing a card with Romanian community and ascribed to them ‘willingness’ of separating from Ukraine. Fortunately, the origin of those attacks is attributed with activity of pro-Russian, not pro-Romanian local agents of influence.

Post-soviet period also marked with social changes in the city. First of all, the rapid industrialisation of the region came to the end right with the economic crisis of 90<sup>th</sup> being replaced with the reversal tendencies of de-urbanisation. But the closure of the most important plants and factories does not mean the movement of locals from Chernivtsi to surrounding villages. Quite opposite, villagers continuously left their homes looking for better life in regional centre or far away of their native places. Secondly, arriving at Chernivtsi they became to me culturally marginalised, leaving behind their familiar culture, they need years or decades to get accommodated with new urban life. It’s brought about somehow a kind of cultural shock both for new comers themselves and locals who have to deal with these waves of incoming immigrants who are not acquitted and do not respect too much the norms and habits of their new place of residence. Together with ex-villagers from the region the city has to face with immigrants from some part of Ukraine and former USSR republics, like Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan etc. All of the new flow of immigration and emigration add some new colours to city’s life. It brings also new troubles, which are not properly set down by the local authorities and community in general.

As far as every historic epoch contributed into cultural landscape of Chernivtsi, the newest phase of city evolution is attributed with bid scale of constructing new private

---

<sup>28</sup> Ihor Burkut et al., *Suchasna Bukovyna: 1991-2005 roky v pidsumkakh sotsial'no-ekonomichnoho ta politychnoho rozvytku kraiu* [Contemporary Bukovyna: 1991 – 2005 in the outline of socio-economic and political development of the region] (Chernivtsi: Knyhy – XXI, 2006), 126.

houses, the luxury hardly available in the Soviet period. In the same time a great number of those new houses do not mean any architectural added value to the attractiveness of the city. Many of them are rather stamped with lack of taste and remind about the villages' local preference where the owner came from. Alongside with new constructions many of historical building and their decorations went lost because the epidemic renovations which did not care about the valuable details of facades, ornaments, original gates and doors etc. So, a strange mixture of urban and rustic traditions, European fashion and local incentives are commemorated now in the architecture of last two decades.

### ***In conclusions***

Chernivtsi has been travelling throughout centuries, sharing similar destiny with other Central-East European towns and cities. As many of them the city grew up and failed down, had been burnt and captured, changed involuntarily his states' belonging several times only in XX centuries, not to mention previous epochs. It reached the most importance as the capital of Duchy of Bukovyna in Austrian Empire and gradually lost its importance in Romanian Kingdom. In Soviet time and after Ukrainian Independence Chernivtsi remained the central city of the same name region.

Now the city remained enriched with different styles of architecture and monuments, symbols of best and worst times in its history. What makes the city and surrounding region unusual is a certain flavour of mist and legendary community, where Jewish and German, Ukrainian and Romanian, Polish and Armenian, Russian and other cultures intertwined and enriched each other. So, the most precious characteristic of the city was and is it's multicultural and multi-confessional atmosphere, grounded on long-standing tradition of tolerance and mutual recognition.

As far as the Moldavian and Austrian period are concerned it seems that this local ethno-national stability and complementarily interrelations of leading ethnic community and denominations had a lot of factors influenced them, while being grounded on the absence of dominant and hegemonic ethnic community both in the region and its capital city. Thus, the necessity to accommodate every day social and political process towards diverse and heterogeneous society made a medium line of the city evolution aimed at the cultivation of tolerance and cooperative approaches prevailing upon confrontation and conflicts. This well-balanced system became to crumble down when Chernivtsi and Bukovyna had appeared under Romanian crown since 1918. First time the mono-ethnic culture and growing pressure of politics of Romanisation replaced the previous local trends and values of tolerance locally and regionally. In the same period city had progressed with building urban community and continuing to be in the context of European civilisation, with all pros and cons it did comprise at that days. The sorrows of WWII and tragedy of Holocaust under Antonescu dictatorship finalised the destruction of what still remained of the traditional local culture of ethnic tolerance.

Soviet period started from severe reprisals and radical social experiments of the new authorities aimed at Stalinist version of socialism construction. It left behind the heritage of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation and a lot of social and cultural problems. Chernivtsi had been growing up as well as the potential of the city in local economic, education and culture but under pressure of total Communist party control and with all the contradictions between official promises and real records of the so-called soviet style of life. Interethnic tensions remained actual issue but artificially covered with propaganda and KGB manipulations.

New tendencies are attributed with period of Ukrainian Independence. The ethnic composition of the city tended to simplification and the vast majority of its locals are of

Ukrainian stock. Because of previous waves of migration city lost some historic communities (Germans, Jews, and Poles) and has to adapt some newcomers from the post-soviet space mainly<sup>29</sup>.

All the history through Chernivtsi has been placed new near shifting state borders, facing with military threats and geopolitical games. It's a "typical" borderland city. Provincial colour of the city remained both appealing and disappointing, depending on the point of view.

Thou the phenomenon of balanced multiculturalism is getting to be rather a historic fact, than a reality of nowadays, it are worthy to cultivate the memory and value of traditional tolerance for new generations of locals. Unfortunately, if Chernivtsi burgers had been spoken freely on 4 – 5 languages a century ago for now it's hardly possible to meet such a linguistic fluency. Thus, multi-polar system of ethno-cultural relations has been gradually replaced with bipolar model of majority-minorities relations, for now Ukrainians and others, mostly, Romanians and Moldavians. This tending to be dichotomist model is much simpler and in the same time less stable as for the sake of the city further prospect. And it remains an open question as whether the city and its authority is really well-prepared to permanently invest energy, good will and other resources to keep Bukovynian tolerance alive, accepted and reinforced with new generations of locals. Either it's doomed to be a part of the past, however glorified and mystified in literature and collective memories.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bukovyna v konteksti evropeyskykh mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn (z davnih chasiv do seredyny XX st.)* [The WWI influence on the demographic situation and productive forces of Northern Bukovyna]. Chernivtsi: Ruta, 2005.
- Burkut, Ihor. "Bukovyna u planakh Velykoi Rumunii" [Bukovyna in the plans of Greater Romania]. In *Politychni protsesy: istoriia, mify, real'nist' (pohliad z rehionu)* [Political processes: history, myths, reality: the outlook from the region], 32-33. Chernivtsi: Prut, 2005.
- Burkut, Ihor. "Rozpad Avstro-Uhorshchyny i formuvannia novykh derzhav Tsentral'noi ta Skhidnoi Evropy" [The Breakdown of Austro-Hungary and the formation of new States of Central and Eastern Europe]. In *Narodne viche Bukovyny. 1918-1993* [Peoples' Forum of Bukovyna], 27-40. Chernivtsi: Prut, 1994.
- Burkut, Ihor, Serhiy Geras'ko, and Mykhailo Romaniv. *Suchasna Bukovyna: 1991-2005 roky v pidsumkah sotsiaal'no-ekonomichnoho ta politychnoho rozvytku kraiu* [Contemporary Bukovyna: 1991-2005 in the outline of socio-economic and political development of the region]. Chernivtsi: Knyhy – XXI, 2006.
- Corbea-Hoisie, Andrei. *Czernowitzer Gezchichten. Über eine städtische Kultur in Mittel(Ost)-Europa* [Chernivtsi stories. About one urban culture in Central (East) Europe]. Wien. Koln. Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 2003.
- Demchenko, Viktor. "Vplyv Pershoii svotovoi viiny na demografichnu sytuatsiu ta produktyvni syly Pivnichnoi Bukovyny" [The WWI influence on the demographic situation and productive forces of Northern Bukovyna]. In *Bukovyna – mii ridnyi krai. Materialy istoriko-kraeznavchoii konferentsii molodykh doslidnykiv, studentiv ta*

<sup>29</sup> "Migratsiini protsesy na Bukovyni" [Migration process in Bukovyna], *Kraiova osvita* [Regional education], 16 kvitnia [April] 2004, 2.

- naukovtsiv* [Bukovyna – my native land. Proceedings of the historical and regional studies of young researches, students and scholars], 9-12. Chernivtsi: Prut, 1996.
- Dobrazhansky, Oleksandr. *Natsional'nyi rukh ukrainsiv Bukovyny druhoii polovyny XIX – pochatku XX st.* [National movement of Ukrainians in the second half of XIX – the beginning of XX century]. Chernivtsi: Zoloti litavry, 1999.
- Dobrzahansky, Oleksandr. “Ukrains'ko-pol's'ki stosunki na Bukovyni u 80-90-kh rokakh XIX stolittia” [Ukrainian – Polish Relations in Bukovyna in 80-90<sup>th</sup> of XIX century]. In *Bukowina. Blaski i cienie «Europe w miniaturze»* [Lights and shadows of Europe in the miniature], 113-120. Warszawa: Wyd. Energeia, 1995.
- Dobrzahansky, Oleksandr, and Yury Makar. “Etnichni hrupy Bukovyny pid chas triokh rosiiskykh okupatsiiy kraiu (1914-1917)” [Ethnic groups of Bukovyna under three Russian occupations of the region (1914-1917)]. In vol. 29-30 of *Istoryko-politychni problemy suchasnoho svitu: Zbirnyk naukovykh statei* [Historical-political issues of the contemporary world: collection of articles], 122-125. Chernivtsi: Chernivets'kyi natsional'nyi universytet, 2015.
- Dolynianans'ka, Tetiana. “Orhany vlady u period vidbudovy ta khrushchovskoi vidlyhy” [Institutes of Power in the Reconstruction and Khrushchov's Thaw periods]. In *Istoriia rozvytku orhaniv vlady na terrytorii Chernivets'koi oblasti, Za zah. redaktsieiu Oleksandra Dobrzahans'koho, Anatoliia Kruglashova, and Mykoly Yarmystoho*, 594-631. Chernivtsi: Bukrek, 2014.
- Fisanov, Vladimir. “Problema bezopasnosti v usloviakh podvizhnykh geopoliticheskikh tochek: sluchai s Bukovinoi.” [Security issue under conditions of the moveable geopolitical points: a case with Bukovyna]. In *Re Commendationem: Zbirka vybranykh statei* [Recommended: Collection of selected articles], edited by Volodymyr Fisanov, 69-75. Chernivtsi: Zoloti litavry, 2006.
- Horuk, Andriy. *Natsional'no-kul'turny rukh poliakiv na Bukovyni (druha polovyna XIX – 1914 r.).* [National-cultural movement of Poles in Bukovyna (the second half of XIX – 1914)]. Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2005.
- Kholodnytsky, Vasyl. “Do pytannia pro pereselennia ta deportatsii zhyteliv Pivnichnoi Bukovyny v 1940-1941 rr.).” [On the issue of resettlement and deportation of Germans from Northern Bukovyna in 1940-1941]. In *28 chervnia 1940 roku: pohliad cherez 60 rokiv* [28 June 1949: the outlook through 60 years], 12-16. Chernivtsi: Prut, 2000.
- Kholodnyts'ky, Vasyl. “Misto vadians'ki chasy” [The City in the Soviet period]. In *Chernivtsi: istoriia ta suchasnist'* [Chernivtsi: the history and present time], ed. Vasyl Botushansky, 241-280. Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2009.
- Lappin, Eleonora. “Chernivts'ka movna konferentsiia (1908 p.) ta superechka pro evreis'ku natsional'nu movu” [Chernivtsi Linguistic Conference (1908) and the debates on Jewish National Language]. In *Mini-cosmos Bukovyny. Kul'turni zdobutky rehionu* [Mini-cosmos of Bukovyna. Cultural records of the region], 99-109. Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2006.
- “Migratsiini protsesy na Bukovyni” [Migration process in Bukovyna]. *Kraiova osvita* [Regional education], 16 kvitnia [April] 2004, 2.
- Natsional'nyi sklad naseleennia Chernivets'koi oblasti ta ioho movni oznaky (za danymy Vseukrains'koho perepysu naseleennia 2001 roku)* [Ethnonational composition of Chernivtsi oblast population and its linguistic attributes], vol. I. Chernivtsi, 2003.
- Nimet's'kyi vchenyi Yohan Kol' pro Bukovynu ta Halychynu v seredyni XIX st.* [German Scholar Johan Kohl on Bukovyna and Galicia in the second half of XIX century]. Chernivtsi: Zoloti litavry, 2007.

- Nykyforiak, Mykhailo. *Derzhavnyi lad i pravo na Bukovyni v 1774-1918 rr.* [The State order and Law on Bukovyna in 1774-1918 years]. Chernivtsi: Ruta, 2000.
- Osachuk, Serhiy. *Nimtsi Bukovyny. Istoriia tovarys'koho rukhu (druha polovyna XIX – pochatok XX st.)* [Germans of Bukovyna. The History of the comradeship movement]. Chernivtsi: Zoloti litavry, 2002.
- Osachuk, Serhiy. “Sotsial’na dynamika i politychni orientatsii nimtsiv Bukovyny 1918-1940 rr.” [Social dynamics and political orientations of Bukovynian Germans in 1918-1940 years]. In *Bukovyna 1918-1940 rr.: zovnishni vplyvy ta vnytrishnii rozvytok* [Bukovyna 1918-1949. External influences and domestic evolution]. Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2005.
- Otchet o missii. Severnaia (Ukrainskaia) Bukovina. Pridnestrovskaia Moldavskaia respublika. Gagauziia (Gagauz-Ery). Moldova* [Report on the mission. Northern (Ukrainian Bukovyna, Transdnistria Moldavian Republic, Gagausia)]. Minsk: Rabochaia gruppa NPO SNG po predotvrashcheniiu i urehulirovaniu konfliktov [Working group NPO SNG in preventing and regulate the conflicts], 2004.
- Pivovarov, Serhiy. “Arkheolohichni danni pro mynule Chertnivtsiv ta ikh okolyts” [Archeological data concerning the past of Chernivtsi and its outskirts]. In *Chernivtsi: istoriia ta suchasnist’*. Yuvileine vydaniia do 600-richchia pys'movoi zhadky pro misto [Chernivtsi: the history and present time. Jubilee edition devoted to 600-year of written mentioning about the city]. Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2009.
- Skoreiko, Hanna. “Polikonfesiinist’ iak skladova tolerantnosti bukovynskoho suspil'stva” [Poly-confessional character as a part of Bukovynian Society tolerance]. In *Bukowina. Tradycje i wspolczesnosc* [Bukovyna. Tradition and Present time], 135-147. Pila-Czerniowce-Suczawa, 2006.
- Spleni, Gabriel’ fon. *Opys Bukovyny* [Description of Bukovyna]. Chernivtsi: Ruta, 1995.
- Staryk, Volodymyr. *Mizh natsionalizmom i tolerantnistiu* [Between Nationalism and Tolerance]. Chernivtsi: Prut, 2009.
- Turczynski, Emanuel. “Sztuka konsensusu, czyli o kulutrze politycznej Bukowiny” [Masterpiece of the consensus or on the political culture of Bukovyna]. In *Bukowina po stronie dialogu* [Bukovyna on the side of dialogue], 21-26. Sejny: Pogranicze, 1999.
- Yury, Tamara. “V oblasti stalo bil'she selian i menshe rosian” [The region gets more peasants and less burgers]. *Doba*, 14 sichnia [January] 2003, 2.
- Zhaloba, Ihor. *Infrastrukturalna polityka avstriiskoho uriadu na pivnichnomu skhodi monarkhii v istanniy chverti XVIII – 60-kh rokakh XIX st. (na prykladi shliakhiv spoluchenniia)* [Austrian Government infrastructural policy on the Northern East of the Monarchy (a case study of the transportation communication)]. Chernivtsi: Knyhy – XXI, 2004.

# The Borderland City of Turkey: Izmir from Past to the Present

*Sedef EYLEMER<sup>1</sup>*  
*Dilek MEMİŞOĞLU<sup>2</sup>*

**Abstract.** *Izmir is a large metropolis in Turkey at the side of a gulf on the Aegean Sea in the westernmost part of Anatolian Peninsula. As the third most populous city of the country after Istanbul and Ankara, Izmir has a population over 4 million on an area of 12,012 km<sup>2</sup> extending along the Gulf of Izmir to the inland across Gediz River's delta in the north, alongside a plain in the east and a somewhat craggy area in the south. It is the second leading port after Istanbul with its large and sheltered harbour. The ancient city which was known and also mentioned in English as Smyrna has officially taken the name of Izmir in 1930. Being described as "princess" by the 19th century French poet Victor Hugo, the city have witnessed 8,500 years of human history including 3,500 years of urban history as one of the oldest port cities of the Mediterranean. Izmir had long served as a point of interaction between the East and West and constituted a borderland between civilisations, between ethnicities, and between religions in its process of evolution from Smyrna to Izmir. The current urban identity of Izmir and its population has been deeply influenced by its historical heritage and multicultural past. Although the city has experienced vital changes in the course of time it still bears the borderland city flavour as a contribution of this heritage.*

**Keywords:** *Izmir, Smyrna, Turkey, borderland city, international port, historical and cultural heritage*

## ***Introduction***

Izmir which is the third largest city of Turkey has witnessed a long and rich history of 8,500 years as one of the oldest port cities of the Mediterranean. As the door of Asia Minor opening to Mediterranean through the Aegean Sea, the city which is said to be founded by the legendary female warrior Amazons has been one of the significant centres of its region since the ancient time. Besides the advantages emanating from its location and Aegean style Mediterranean climate, the city's wide hinterland serving as a point of intersection between diverse cultures, languages and religions also contributed to its economic, social and cultural development. Many cultures and civilisations flourished over the centuries within a colourful social mosaic in this deep-rooted city. The city was ruled or influenced by various civilisations such as Hittites, Ionians, the ancient Greeks, the Lydians, the Persians, the Macedonians, the Romans, the Byzantines, the Arabs, and the Seljuk Turcomans until it became part of the Ottoman Empire in the 15<sup>th</sup> century. During the Ottoman era, it became a place of interaction between the Muslim, Christian European and Jewish cultures strengthening its multi-religious and multi-cultural fabric.

---

<sup>1</sup> Assist. Prof. Dr., Dept.of International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Izmir Katip Celebi University, Turkey.

<sup>2</sup> Assist. Prof. Dr., Dept. of Political Science and Public Administration, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Izmir Katip Celebi University, Turkey.

Hence, this harbour city long constituted a “borderland between ethnicities, between civilisations and between periods” in its process of evolution from Smyrna to Izmir.<sup>3</sup>

Although Izmir was ruled by various civilisations throughout the history, its importance increased particularly during the Ottoman rule between the 15<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Whereas the economy of the city was dominantly based upon agriculture until the 16<sup>th</sup> century, it turned into a fundamental market and a trade centre by the second half of the century. Hence, the city became a vital harbour city along with the alterations in the Mediterranean trade system between the 16<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. The changes in the economic system in this period contributed to the formation of a cosmopolitan society composed of the Muslim Turks, Jews, Armenians, Greeks and Levantines. The city became a major external trade port in the Ottoman Empire in 19<sup>th</sup> century owing to its social, economic and urban development. Besides its enhancing economy and commerce, the cultural richness stemming from the historic and natural environment as well as the ethnic and religious diversity played role in the flourishing of Izmir during the Ottoman era. The city has become part of the Republic of Turkey since 1923. Despite the vital changes experienced in the city following the establishment of the Republic, the imprints of heritage of the past can be traced in the present identity and culture of Izmir which still has a special borderland flavour. In addition to the impact of historical legacy and multicultural past, also the position of Izmir as an international port city continues to be an important aspect of the city’s identity. Within this context, this study aims to elaborate on the historical and cultural past of Izmir as well as its evolution as an international port city which are indispensable aspects of its persisting identity as a borderland city.

### ***Location and the roots of the name of Izmir***

With its 8,500 years of history, Izmir has an international as well as a territorial and regional importance. Located at the intersecting point of civilisations, Izmir contributed to the development of several civilisations in the world. As the door of Asia Minor opening to Mediterranean through the Aegean Sea, the city hosts Temple of Artemis which is one of the Seven Wonders of the World as well as Ephesus and Pergamum which were the metropolitan areas of the ancient era. While Pergamum was the capital of the Kingdom of Pergamon during the Hellenistic era, the Ephesus constituted one of the major cities of Asia Minor among the twelve cities of Ionian League during the Classical Greek period. Contributing vastly to the development of the ideational legacy of the ancient era, Izmir is the area where the parchment paper was first produced and the Ephesus Celsus Library which was one of the biggest libraries of the era was established. It is said to be the birthplace of Homer who is the writer of Iliad and Odessa, the two most important epics of the ancient era, as well as of Heraclitus who is accepted as the founder of the dialectical philosophy. Izmir is home to the three of the seven churches (Ephesus, Smyrna and Pergamos) mentioned in the Bible (seven Churches of Revelation) as well as the Church of the Virgin Mary. Furthermore, Izmir had been a crucial city-playing role in the spread of Islam to Europe through Aegean and Balkans and also one of the major areas where the Jews migrating from Europe to Anatolia were inhabited in the Middle Ages. Besides, it served as an important centre in the modernisation process from the Ottoman era to the establishment of modern Turkey.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Edhem Eldem et al., *The Ottoman City Between East and West Aleppo, Izmir and Istanbul* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 14.

<sup>4</sup> Izmir Development Agency, *Izmir Current Situation Analysis* (İzmir: Arkadaş Matbaası, 2009), 4, accessed June 25, 2015, [http://www.izka.org.tr/files/Mevcut\\_Durum\\_Analizi.pdf](http://www.izka.org.tr/files/Mevcut_Durum_Analizi.pdf).



The currently used city name Izmir is transformed from the ancient name of Smyrna. It is claimed that Smira, Lesmira, Zmirra, Ismira, Samorna or Smurna were also used as the earlier versions of the name. The choice of the word Smyrna is assumed to be related to the existence of a sacred place near the settlement area. In the ancient ages the widespread belief in supernatural powers inclined people to establish their city near places representing such powers. In this manner, it is argued that the sacred place in the case of Smyrna was Halkapinar Spring (Circular Spring) and the lagoon formed by that spring. The European travellers visiting Izmir in the 19<sup>th</sup> century often called this spring as Diana Baths. Thus, the word of Smyrna which most probably has a Hittite origin is asserted to be connoting to the Mother Goddess Spring / Lagoon or at least related to the meaning of Mother Goddess / Holy Goddess. The word was written as Smurne in the ancient Ionian dialect and as Smyrna in the Attic Greek.<sup>5</sup> The name of Smyrna was retained for long years in the history until it started to be pronounced as Izmir following the conquest of the city by the Turks. Initially it was pronounced as “Ismir” and eventually turned into “Izmir”. In this sense, while the name of Smyrna embraces the marks of the history of the city, the transformation of the name of the city into Izmir symbolizes the transition from one cultural structure to another one.<sup>6</sup>

One can encounter different stories about the initial foundation of the ancient city of Smyrna based upon the fables of ancient writers. Whereas Smyrna which is one of the oldest settlements of the Mediterranean basin is argued to be established by Tantalos, the mythic king of Phrygia according to one story, it was described as an area where initially Lelegians, an aboriginal Aegean-Anatolian tribe, were settled down. According to a more common argument, the city's name was originated from an Amazon women warrior during the Hittite rule of Anatolia. Another speculation about the meaning of Smyrna relates the word to the place name Ti-smurna as referred to in the Kultepe inscriptions. As a different pronunciation, the name of the city was written as Zmyrna on monuments and coins of the Hellenistic and Roman eras.<sup>7</sup>

The city of Izmir was founded at the end point of a self-titled Gulf. Throughout its evolution process from the ancient ages to the current era, it has become the most important settlement of the Aegean Region. The city was initially located along with a small and sheltered harbour in the eastern margin of the Gulf of Izmir but it was later abandoned due to overpopulation, thereafter it expanded to an alluvial plain located between Halkapinar Spring and Meles stream at Pagos Hill (Kadifekale) foot. The population of the new city area increased rapidly due to the existence of abundant spring water and fertile agricultural fields. The construction of a castle on the Pagos Hill during the time of Alexander the Great in the 4<sup>th</sup> Century BC facilitated the defence of the city while the inner harbour gained significance in parallel to the development of commercial life. Hence, a new residence area emerged near the Pagos Hill. This residence area has maintained its importance for ages. Thus, although many settlement areas around Izmir such as (Erytrai, Kolophon, Ephesos, Priene, Miletos) were abandoned over time, Izmir

---

<sup>5</sup> Attic Greek is the main Greek dialect spoken in the ancient Attica.

<sup>6</sup> T.C. İzmir Valiliği Resmi Kent Rehberi [Izmir Governorship Official City Guide], “Smyrna/İzmir İsminin Anlamı” [History/ Izmir/ Smyrna/ Meaning of the name of Izmir], accessed July 11, 2015, [http://izmirfx.mekan360.com/iys\\_tarihce,sehirID=35,icerik=135,sayfa=1-tarihce-smyrna-izmir-isminin-anlami.html?#detay](http://izmirfx.mekan360.com/iys_tarihce,sehirID=35,icerik=135,sayfa=1-tarihce-smyrna-izmir-isminin-anlami.html?#detay).

<sup>7</sup> Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism, “Smyrna in Ancient Times,” accessed June 25, 2015, <http://www.kultur.gov.tr/EN,34491/smyrna-in-ancient-times.html>.

has retained its vitality and dynamism in different periods.<sup>8</sup> Izmir currently consists of 30 districts under the authority of Izmir Metropolitan Municipality. The districts, namely Balcova, Bayrakli, Bornova, Buca, Cigli, Gaziemir, Guzelbahce, Karabaglar, Karsiyaka, Konak and Narlidere are located in the centre of Izmir.

**Illustration 1:** *Provincial Borders of Current Izmir.*



**Source:** “İzmir Kent Rehberi” [Izmir City Guide], accessed August 15, 2015, [http://www.izmirde.biz/FileUpload/ds31586/File/izmir\\_haritasi\\_5.png](http://www.izmirde.biz/FileUpload/ds31586/File/izmir_haritasi_5.png).

### ***Ancient Age and old Smyrna***

Despite the uncertainty about the exact date of the establishment of the city, the excavations shed light on the long history of the city. The findings of the excavations carried out from 1948 to 1951 had indicated initially that Smyrna was originally established as an Aeolian city on a hill called Tepekule located behind the modern suburb of Bayrakli by 3000 BC in time of the first city of Troy.<sup>9</sup> Besides the finding at this level, it was illustrated that the other two levels belonged to the Hittite and Troy VI age (2000-1200 BC) and to the Greek era (X-IV century BC).<sup>10</sup> However, whereas these previous excavations pointed out a history of 5000 years, the discovery of Yesilova Mound located in the plain of Bornova in 2003 revealed that the settlements in the city dated back to more than 8,500 years. The excavations performed in the Mound by a team of archaeologists from Izmir's Ege University in collaboration with Izmir Archaeological Museum between 2005 and 2008 found out three levels, the two of which were prehistoric. Whereas the first level concerns the late Roman-early Byzantine era, the second level refers to the

<sup>8</sup> Ahmet Necdet Sözer, “İzmir: Ege'nin Metropolü” [Izmir: The metropolis of Aegean], *Ege Üniversitesi Coğrafya Dergisi* [Aegean Geographical Journal] (1988): 1-2.

<sup>9</sup> Trudy Ring, Robert M. Salkin, and Sharon La, *International Dictionary of Historic Places*, Volume 3, *Southern Europe* (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1996), 348.

<sup>10</sup> Sözer, 5.

Chalcolithic period and the second level to the Neolithic period.<sup>11</sup> Hence, it is estimated that the indigenous people settled in the area approximately from 7th millennium BC to 4th millennium BC. The discovery of various graves from 3000 BC in the site illustrates that the place was started to be used as a cemetery after a while as the shoreline retreated.<sup>12</sup> Thus, after 7<sup>th</sup> century BC, Smyrna obtained an identity of city-state.

As a location in charge of the whole Gulf of Izmir, the settlement which later became the core of “Old Smyrna” (the current quarter of Bayraklı) was founded around 3000 BC on a hill (Tepekule) on the slopes of the Mountain of Yamanlar and flourished over time. Located between Aeolis and Ionia, it was colonised by the ancient Greeks in the middle of tenth century BC. The city turned into one of the most developed cultures in early Anatolian history comparable with Troy. Whereas around 1,000 people lived within the city-walls, the rest were inhabited in close villages where fields, olive trees and vineyards were situated. The main means of living were agriculture and fishing. It came under the influence of the Central Anatolian Hittite Empire by 1500 BC.<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless, it remained as an Aeolian city till the conquest of the Ionians. According to the Greek historian Herodotus, the city was seized by the refugees from Kolophon which was one of the twelve Ionian states (Miletos, Myous, Priene, Ephesos, Kolophon, Lebedos, Teos, Erythrai, Klazomenai, Phokaia, Samos and Khios) around 700 BC.<sup>14</sup> The Ionian states formed a powerful commercial network via their overseas colonies within their established federation. Thus, they presumably wanted to take advantage of Smyrna’s favourable location in their trading activities spreading these activities to the Gulf of Izmir. In fact, the invasion of the city by the Ionians resulted in a rapid transformation in the history of the city as it prospered and developed in a short period of time. It became one of the leading cultural and commercial urban centres in the Mediterranean by the 650–545 BC. The Temple of Athena which was the most crucial sanctuary of Old Smyrna dates back to this era (640–580 BC).<sup>15</sup>

### *Izmir under Lydian and Persian Rules*

As Smyrna prospered in the seventh century BC, it had to face the attacks of the Lydians who aimed to control the Western Anatolian trade and harbours. The Lydians became much more interested in this port city near their capital. They ultimately conquered and destroyed parts of the city around 610-600 BC coercing the citizens to leave Smyrna. During this era, the citizens had to move to villages.<sup>16</sup> Due to the transformation into a village system and the decline in its power, the importance of Smyrna as a city-state abolished for the next 300 years. The Lydian rule over Smyrna continued until the Lydians were defeated by the Persians in 546 BC.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Zafer Derin, “Yeşilova Höyüğü Kazıları ve İzmir’in Tarih Öncesi Dönemi” [Yeşilova mound excavations and the prehistoric period of Izmir], in *Körfez’de Zaman İzmir Araştırmaları Kongresi Bildiriler* [Proceedings of the Congress of Izmir Researches], ed. Eren Çiçek, Mustafa Mutluer and Cüneyt Kanat (Bornova: Bormat Matbaacılık, 2010), 11, accessed June 25, 2015, <http://www.yesilova.ege.edu.tr/arsiv/korfez.pdf>.

<sup>12</sup> World eBook Library, “İzmir,” accessed July 11, 2015, <http://www.worldbooklibrary.org/article/WHEBN0000580279/%C4%B0zmir>.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ring, Salkin and La, 348.

<sup>15</sup> World eBook Library, “İzmir.”

<sup>16</sup> Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism, “Smyrna in Ancient Times.”

<sup>17</sup> Sabri Yetkin and Fikret Yılmaz, “İzmir’in Tarihi” [The history of Izmir], accessed June 28, 2015, <https://www.izmir.bel.tr/Izmir%E2%80%99inTarihi/225/196/tr>.

The Persian conquest gave end to the history of Old Smyrna. Following the invasion of the capital of Lydia by the Persian Emperor Cyrus, the coastal cities of the Aegean were also attacked leading to the destruction of Old Smyrna in 545 BC. As it was not possible to restore the urban settlement around Bayrakli, the settlements could only continue within an unorganised village system. Hence, the first phase in the evolution process of Izmir came to an end. In the following phase, the city would move to the slopes of Pagos as a developed and larger city. Nevertheless, one of the most important heritages of the city from the ancient time is the Old Smyrna. The excavations have still continued to uncover the marks of history in this old city which was later discovered to have grid-planned organisation of streets cutting each other vertically.<sup>18</sup>

### ***Alexander the Great and the re-establishment of Izmir***

The city was re-established in Pagos Hill (Kadifekale) at a new location beyond Meles River with the order of the Macedonian Alexander the Great around 340 BC. After defeating the Persians in 333 BC, Alexander the Great advanced towards the Ephesus. According to the legend, when Alexander the Great went to hunting at the woods of Pagos Hill, he fell asleep and was required sacredly in his dream to establish a new city in Pagos and to bring the citizens of Old Smyrna to this place. In fact, the new location of the city was very suitable for military and commercial reasons.<sup>19</sup> Being situated 186 meters above sea level, the Pagos castle was constructed on a very advantageous location in terms of defence. This castle was later used in the periods of Roman Empire, Byzantine Empire, Beyliks and the Ottoman Empire. The fate of the city which was founded from the Pagos Hill down towards the sea and harbour was again closely related to dynamism of the harbour and maritime trade.<sup>20</sup> Whereas old Smyrna could accommodate only a few thousand people as a small hill, much more people could be settled down in Pagos causing an increase in the city's population.<sup>21</sup>

Following the conquest of the Alexander the Great, Smyrna benefited more favourable conditions to achieve peace and prosperity. After the death of the Alexander the Great, the establishment of the city was finalised Lysimakhos. That was why the city was named after Lysimakhos' daughter "Eurydikeia" for a while. Yet, this name was discarded in a short period of time. Regarding Alexander the Great as the founder of the city, his image started to be used on the coins. The newly founded city which joined the Ionian Confederation as the 13<sup>th</sup> member on the basis of the recommendation of Ephesus obtained the recognition of Hellenistic Monarchs and the other sovereign city-states. It succeeded in maintaining its status of "independent city-state" by this way. Being aware that they needed the support of powerful states for ensuring their survival, the Smyrnians established cooperation with the Syrians. Later on, the city fell under the rule of Pergamons which strengthened its power in Western Anatolia. In this era, although the city's relations with other cities were subject to Pergamon's approval, it retained its

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Izmir Development Agency, "Izmir The Frontier City of Turkey," 10, accessed June 25, 2015, [http://izka.org.tr/files/oncubrosurler/Eng\\_web.pdf](http://izka.org.tr/files/oncubrosurler/Eng_web.pdf).

<sup>20</sup> T.C. İzmir Valiliği Resmi Kent Rehberi [Izmir Governorship Official City Guide], "Tarihçe/ İzmir/ İzmir'in Yeniden Kurulması" [History/ Izmir/ Reconstruction of Izmir], accessed July 11, 2015, [http://izmirfx.mekan360.com/iys\\_tarihce,sehirID=35,icerik=138,sayfa=1-tarihce-izmir-in-yeniden-kurulmasi.html?#detay](http://izmirfx.mekan360.com/iys_tarihce,sehirID=35,icerik=138,sayfa=1-tarihce-izmir-in-yeniden-kurulmasi.html?#detay).

<sup>21</sup> World eBook Library, "Izmir."

authorities regarding the formation of an army and printing money.<sup>22</sup> Upon the demise of the Pergamon king Attalus III, the city had become part of the Roman Empire together with other Ionian city-states in 133 BC. While the importance of Izmir ascended, the city solidified its position as a commercial centre under the rule of Roman Empire.<sup>23</sup>

### ***Izmir under the Roman and Byzantine Rules***

The Romans already started to expand their influence on Western Anatolia through their strengthening cooperation with the Pergamon Empire by the 3rd century B.C. In 195 BC the Smyrnians constructed a temple dedicated to the Rome in order to reveal their friendship to the Romans. They supported the Romans together with Pergamon Kingdom in the Magnesians War between the Romans and Syrians in 190 BC.<sup>24</sup> The city became part of the Roman Empire when the Pergamon king Attalus III willed his kingdom to the Romans before dying heirless in 133 BC. As a civil diocese and a Roman province of Asia of 100,000 people, the city enhanced its position in this new era of prosperity. Many outstanding structures were constructed by the Romans in the city which became known for its beauty, library, rhetorical tradition and school of medicine where Galen of Pergamon, one of the most important surgeons in the Roman Empire, studied. Smyrna competed with Ephesus and Pergamon to become “the first city of Asia”. Alongside the weakening of Ephesus, Smyrna which hosted one of the Seven Churches built in the evolution process of Christianity in Anatolia and referred to in the biblical Book of Revelation by St. John the Apostle, became the place of a significant bishopric. Yet, as the Christians resisted the imperial rule of the Roman Empire, the churches were persecuted by the Romans.<sup>25</sup>

The city was destroyed overwhelmingly by the catastrophic earthquake in 178 AD. The city could only be rebuilt by the support of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius of the Roman Empire. The state Agora which was presumably built in the era of Alexander and stands as one of the few surviving pre-Ottoman monuments was restored after the earthquake. Indeed, plenty of architectural works were constructed in this pre-Turkish era but unfortunately few of them could reach to date.<sup>26</sup> The vital works of the era that could not survive so far includes the theatre, stadium, and the commercial agora whereas the state Agora, Kadifekale castle and aqueducts were retained.<sup>27</sup>

Following the split of the Roman Empire into two entities in 395 AD, Anatolia and thus Izmir became the territory of the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire. The collapse of Western Roman Empire in 476 AD contributed to the reinforcement of the Byzantine rule in the region. Izmir continued to be one of the crucial ports of the Empire until the upsurge of Istanbul (Constantinople). Once Istanbul turned into a political and economic centre as the capital city of the Empire, the trade between Anatolia and the West reduced and thus vitality of Izmir weakened leading to a decline in its size during the Late Antiquity and Early Middle Age. Thus, the city could not reach again the levels of prosperity that it once achieved during the Roman era. Nevertheless, the declaration of the city as a metropolitan and the appointment of an archbishop at the Council of Chalcedon

<sup>22</sup> Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism, “Smyrna in Ancient Times.”

<sup>23</sup> Republic of Turkey Izmir Governorship, “History of Izmir,” accessed June 25, 2015, <http://www.izmir.gov.tr/tarih-e>.

<sup>24</sup> Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism, “Smyrna in Ancient Times.”

<sup>25</sup> Ring, Salkin, and La, 350.

<sup>26</sup> World eBook Library, “İzmir.”

<sup>27</sup> T.C. İzmir Valiliği Resmi Kent Rehberi, “İzmir’in Yeniden Kurulması.”

(current Kadikoy) in 451 AD confirmed Izmir's religious importance. But still, it would be fair to state that the traces left by the Byzantines on Izmir were not comparable to the ones left on Istanbul.<sup>28</sup> The areas and temples used in the Roman and pre-Roman periods were destroyed as they were seen contrary to the Christian faith of the Byzantines. Furthermore, the external attacks had an adverse impact on the development of the city from the beginning of 7th century. The attacks of Sassanids in 608 were followed by the continual attacks of Arabs after 637. In 665 Izmir was seized for a while by Arabs as a result of the Emevi attack on the Byzantine Empire. Izmir started to revive as a city from the 9<sup>th</sup> century onwards. In this period Izmir started to be used as a base of Byzantine navy, hence promoting the construction of navy yard and vessels. This development which was accompanied by a commercial revival contributed to the military significance of the city. Yet the earthquake in 1025 caused destruction in Izmir. Izmir entered a new phase of transformation in its evolution process as the Byzantine rule became questionable due to the hand-over of the city between the Empire and Turks for a few times.<sup>29</sup>

### ***Byzantine Rule and the beginning of Turkish era in Izmir***

The victory of the Seljuk Turks against the Byzantine Empire in 1071 was a turning point in the Anatolian history. Izmir was first captured by the Seljuks in 1076. The Turkish commander Caka Bey (Chaka-known as Tzachas among the Byzantines) located himself in Izmir by 1081 giving end to the presence of Byzantines and used Izmir as a base for its assaults against the Aegean islands.<sup>30</sup> Contributing to the establishment of the navy, Caka Bey developed a sort of naval state by seizing the neighbouring villages including Clazomenae (Urla) and Phocaea (Foca). Yet, following his death in 1098 the city returned to the Byzantine rule until 1317.<sup>31</sup> The interim Nicaea (current Iznik) Empire (1204-1261) was founded by the Byzantines following the invasion of Istanbul by the Latin Crusaders in the Fourth Crusade in 1204. The Iznik Empire could restore its authority in Izmir and its citadel in a short while notwithstanding the enormous concessions given to the Genoese regarding the use of the prosperous port.

The city regained its importance during the era of Nicaea Empire. After the transferral of administrative headquarter of the Empire to Izmir in the period of Byzantine Emperor John III. Ducas Vatatzes (1222-1254), the city had again become the naval base of Byzantines through which they could intervene in the developments in Europe. The restoration of the Pagos castle (Kadifekale) and construction of a new castle by the side of the port<sup>32</sup> led to the separation of the city into two parts. In this period a Genoese neighbourhood was formed in the city in line with their rising commercial activities. The return of Istanbul from the Latins to the Byzantines and its restoration as the capital city in 1261 resulted in a decreasing interest in Anatolia and Izmir causing the collapse of the border defence and thus paving the way for the raids of the Turcoman tribes.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Onur İnal, "Levantine Heritage in Izmir" (MA thesis, Koç University, 2006), 9-10.

<sup>29</sup> T.C. İzmir Valiliği Resmi Kent Rehberi, "İzmir'in Yeniden Kurulması."

<sup>30</sup> C. Edmund Bosworth, *Historic Cities of Islamic World* (Leiden: IDC Publishers, 2007), 218.

<sup>31</sup> İnal, 11; Bosworth, 218. According to some other sources the return of Izmir to Byzantines took place in 1096.

<sup>32</sup> The lower port castle of Neon Kastron was called St. Peter by the Genoese and "Ok Kalesi" by the Turks.

<sup>33</sup> Yusuf Ayönü, "İzmir'de Türk Hâkimiyetinin Başlaması" [The beginning of Turkish domination in Izmir], *Türk Dünyası İncelemeleri Dergisi* [Journal of Turkish World Studies] 9, 1 (2009): 5.

After almost two centuries, Izmir was recaptured by the Turks as the city was conquered by the chief (Bey) and founder of the Turcoman principality of Aydin (beylic of Aydinoghulları), Mehmed Bey, in 1317. Umur Bey, the son of Mehmed Bey, had become the governor of Aydin principality of Izmir and used the city as a naval base building a shipyard. Although the lower port castle was invaded in 1344 by the Latin crusaders who passed it to the Knights of Rhodes, the principality of Aydin could be able to keep the upper castle called Kadifekale. Thus, the city was split into two parts as “Turkish Izmir” and “Christian Izmir” for almost sixty years. Conquering Izmir in 1402 the Mongol Khan Timur (Tamerlane) expelled the Knights from the city destroying the lower castle. Consequently, Izmir was taken over again by the principality of Aydin up to 1415 when it was captured by the Ottoman Empire during the period of Ottoman Sultan Mehmed I Celebi.<sup>34</sup>

### ***From the Ottoman Rule to the Izmir of Turkish Republic***

The Western Anatolia and Izmir had become under the certain control of the Ottoman Empire which terminated the principality of Aydin in 1426 culminating the administrative uncertainty of Izmir. Thereafter, the Ottoman Empire had continuously ruled the city for almost five centuries. The Ottomans created the conditions under which stability and prosperity could be achieved in the city whose harbour and hinterland was terribly destroyed back then. Yet they initially needed to strengthen their dominance over the Aegean Sea as they confronted with the commercial and military rivalry and repeated attacks of the Venetians to capture Izmir. The Venetian attack in 1472 led to the reconstruction of the formerly destroyed lower port castle and thus returned the city to its previous facade. The city became integrated again between the upper Pagos castle and the lower port castle. The settlements intensified around the Pagos Hill whereas the commercial site was situated around the harbour at that time.<sup>35</sup>

In the course of the sixteenth century the increase in the population of the city forced the Turks to expand their residential area from the hill to the harbour and thus to form a continuous suburban area between the upper castle and the lower castle.<sup>36</sup> In fact, besides the natural increase, the rising population was also caused by the newcomers including the Turkish Muslims from other parts of western Asia Minor, Armenians from Bursa, Aleppo, and even Safavid Isfahan; Greeks from the Aegean islands and Morea; Jews from Spain, Portugal, Italy and some other Ottoman towns; and European merchants coming from Holland, England, France and Venice. The European merchants generally employed Ottoman Armenian, Greek, Jewish brokers who could speak western languages and Turkish whereas the role of the Turks was much more limited in the international trade. The Western merchants' preference for Izmir as a transit harbour in their commercial activities resulted in the establishment of several consulates in the city. While Izmir was a settlement of 2,000 people by the end of the sixteenth century, it turned out to be one of the most important port cities in the Eastern Mediterranean and a vital commercial centre of approximately 35,000-40,000 residents by 1640. In this period, the city was the supplier of products such as food, wool, leather and silk not just for Istanbul

---

<sup>34</sup> Bosworth, 218.

<sup>35</sup> Yetkin and Yılmaz.

<sup>36</sup> T.C. İzmir Valiliği [Izmir Governorship], “İlimizin Tarihçesi” [History of our city], accessed June 28, 2015, <http://www.izmir.gov.tr/tarih-e>.

but also for the European merchants.<sup>37</sup> Thus along with the growing population, the economic composition of the city was also changing. The city was being alienated from its rural and agricultural structure and transformed into a market as the newcomers were engaged in trade rather than agricultural activities.

Despite being already the biggest city of the region in the seventeenth century, İzmir remained as the subdivision of Aydın province<sup>38</sup> until the permanent movement of the capital of province from Aydın to İzmir in 1850.<sup>39</sup> The city was noticeably devastated by the earthquakes in 1688 and 1778. 10,000 to 15,000 inhabitants died in the 1688 earthquake and the accompanying fire. The city could be reconstructed within two years by the Ottoman Empire which was also supported by the foreign merchants, the Ottoman middlemen and Muslim notables in the region. The enhancement of İzmir continued notwithstanding the military and economic problems experienced by the Ottoman Empire from the late seventeenth century to the nineteenth century. İzmir had become a location where the Ottoman Empire was penetrated into the world economy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Ottoman Armenians, Greeks and Jews played a critical role in this penetration by taking the place of the local notables. The British prevalence in the Ottoman Mediterranean as well as the reforms carried out by the declining Ottoman Empire for the modernisation of the military, economy, government as well as other fields of state and society contributed to the urban growth of İzmir and generated an even more cosmopolitan city. Besides the mounting European trade, the Ottoman reforms benefited particularly the non-Muslim population by enlarging their rights in the Empire.<sup>40</sup> İzmir became one of the cities profiting most from the growing commercial relations driven by the Industrial Revolution throughout the nineteenth century. Attraction of the capital owners to the city was not only leading to the formation of new business areas but also to an increase in the population.<sup>41</sup> The estimated population of the city by the end of the seventeenth century was approximately 90,000 which included around 60,000 Turks, 15,000 Greeks, 8,000 Armenians and 6,000 to 7,000 Jews in addition to the substantial amount of European, essentially the French, the British, the Dutch and Italian, merchants.<sup>42</sup> The city's population increased to 200,000 by the 1890s and to 300,000 after the World War I.<sup>43</sup>

The non-Muslim Ottomans and the foreigners in the city played a dual role by enabling the trading of the local products and also marketing the European products in Western Anatolia. Therefore, in the course of this century which is called by a famous Turkish historian as “the longest century of the (Ottoman) Empire”,<sup>44</sup> İzmir experienced a

<sup>37</sup> Gabor Agoston and Bruce Masters, *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Facts On File Infobase Publishing, 2009), 291-292.

<sup>38</sup> The province of Aydın was an administrative unit including the current cities of İzmir, Manisa, Mugla, Denizli, Aydın in Turkey.

<sup>39</sup> Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism, “İzmir Merkezde Görülmesi Gereken Yerler-Hükümet Konağı” [The places to be seen at the centre of İzmir - Government Office], accessed June 25, 2015, <http://www.kultur.gov.tr/TR,72639/hukumet-konagi.html>. İzmir became the capital of the province of Aydın for the first time in 1841-42 albeit temporarily.

<sup>40</sup> Agoston and Masters, *Ottoman Empire*, 292.

<sup>41</sup> H. Taner Kerimoğlu, “19. Yüzyılda Reformlar ve İzmir” [Reforms and İzmir in the 19th century], in *İzmir Kent Ansiklopedisi, Tarih Cildi, I. Cilt* [İzmir city encyclopaedia history, Volume I], ed. Kemal Arı and Fevzi Cakmak (İzmir: İmaj Basım, 2013), 82.

<sup>42</sup> World eBook Library, “İzmir.”

<sup>43</sup> Agoston and Masters, 292.

<sup>44</sup> İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* [The longest century of the Empire] (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2014).



significant transformation as a result of the increasing population, developing economy and social life and gained a facade of a modern Western city. It was also like a display window for the Western powers in the eyes of the Ottoman authorities. The expansion of the population and thus residential areas also required the improvement of the urban services. Hence, the initial formation of the municipal organisation in 1867 to deal with the problems of the city was followed by the establishment of Izmir Municipality in 1868.<sup>45</sup>

Izmir once more experienced instability, destruction and then rebirth due to the World War I and developments in the successive years. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire as a result of the World War I was followed by the Greek occupation of Izmir and the Aegean region with the support of the British, French and Italian troops on May 15, 1919. The city was recaptured by the Turkish forces led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, on September 9, 1922. Unfortunately, important amount of the city was destroyed by the fire which started on September 13, 1922 while the Greek forces were retreating. The fire which could only be extinguished on 18 September burnt 20-25 thousand buildings and destroyed a residential area of 2 million 6 hundred square metres. Almost two thirds of the city excluding the Turkish quarter was burnt in this fire.<sup>46</sup>

The Treaty of Lausanne which was concluded on July 24, 1923 established the borders of modern Turkey where Izmir was located as the third largest city. This Treaty also involved a stipulation that was crucial for the fate of the city: the substantial population exchange between Turkey and Greece. This required the exchange of the huge Greek population of the city with the ethnic Turks who had long been inhabited in Greece and Greek islands in a way strengthening the current Turkish character of the city. The commencement of a new era for Anatolia as well as Izmir was confirmed by the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey on October 29, 1923. Meanwhile, revealing the significance attached to the resolution of the economic problems of the country and the establishment of a national economy, the first Economic Congress was convened in Izmir in February 1923 with the participation of 1100 delegates of farmers, traders, workers and industrialists. The Congress provided a platform for the discussion of the future economic policies of the new country. Despite the call for the protection of local industry, foreign investment was not opposed on the condition that preferential treatment was not provided to foreigners.<sup>47</sup>

Izmir was influenced by the western planning approaches in the new Turkish Republic. The modern city was planned by French planner Henri Prost and Rene and Raymond Danger in 1925. The plan which was endorsed by the Izmir Municipality in the same year was modified in 1933.<sup>48</sup> In order to revive trade, the goal of attracting foreign investment to the city came to the forefront. The first effort to introduce and market the local products was the fair opened during the Izmir Economic Congress. Izmir Fair which is one of the oldest and most extensive trade organisations in Turkey was formally started in 1927. This fair which has been associated with the city in the course of time has officially taken the name of "Izmir International Fair" in 1937. Since those days, the city has grown rapidly. As the city was oriented towards industrialisation after the 1950s it started to attract massive domestic migration, particularly rural-urban one. This

---

<sup>45</sup> Kerimoğlu, 83-84.

<sup>46</sup> Yetkin and Yılmaz.

<sup>47</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (New York: Tauris & Co Ltd, Revised Edition, 2004), 195.

<sup>48</sup> Isin Can, "Urban Design and the Planning System in Izmir," *Journal of Landscape Studies* 3 (2010): 183.

development has essentially affected the demographic structure as well as the urban settlement in the city.

**Illustration 2:** *Historic Clock Tower at Konak Square in the City Centre of Izmir.*<sup>49</sup>



**Source:** “Photos of Izmir,” Izmir Metropolitan Municipality Website, accessed July 11, 2015, <https://www.izmir.bel.tr/IzmirFotograflari/303/tr>.

### *Izmir as an International Port City*

During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Izmir carried on its commercial relations particularly within near abroad as a small city positioned at the western end of the caravan trade. For most of the sixteenth century, the overwhelmingly agrarian internal trade of the city was focused on the steady transfer of local products to the capital city Istanbul. The lack of international trade was a crucial factor preventing the economic development of the city.<sup>50</sup> At this point understanding how Izmir was developed into a trade centre and which actors were influential in this accelerated development process are crucial in order to comprehend the historical identity of Izmir as a borderland city. Several factors played role in the modification of the commercial relations of Izmir as the Ottoman Empire had gained a leadership position in the Aegean and Mediterranean maritime trade. The Ottomans obtained the status of a “sea power” against the Venetians in the Mediterranean following the naval Battle of Preveza in 1538.<sup>51</sup> Furthermore, the seizure of locations such as Egypt, Syria, Rhodes, Cyprus, and Chios by the Ottomans were critical in securing the sea routes in the sixteenth century. The initial rivalry of Izmir with the other Eastern Mediterranean coastal cities was followed by the upsurge of the city after the decline of the other trade centres. The seizure of Chios by the Ottomans caused the

<sup>49</sup> The historic clock tower was designed by by the Levantine French architect Raymond Charles Père, and built in 1901 to commemorate the twenty fifth anniversary of Abdülhamid II's accession to the throne.

<sup>50</sup> Agoston and Masters, 291.

<sup>51</sup> Halil İnalcık, “Osmanlı Deniz Egemenliği” [Ottoman sea domination], in *Türk Denizcilik Tarihi* [Turkish maritime history], ed. Bülent Arı (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Denizcilik Müsteşarlığı, 2002 ), 59.

shift of the trade of precious goods from Chios to Izmir. Furthermore, the movement of Armenian silk merchants to the city was ensured by the decline of Aleppo owing to the insecurity of this route because of the Ottoman-Safavid confrontation.<sup>52</sup>

The notable rise of Izmir started at the end of the sixteenth century. Cotton and other goods which were grown in Western Anatolia rendered Izmir attractive for French, English, Dutch and Venetian traders. The commercial privileges (capitulations) granted by the Ottoman Empire to the several European states in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries increased the attractiveness of Izmir like the other Ottoman port cities for the European merchants. In this period the Empire approached to the issue of capitulations pragmatically as a way of developing commercial relations as well as alliances with the European powers against its rivals such as the Tsardom of Russia and Habsburg Empire.<sup>53</sup> Yet, in the following century the capitulations converted into a serious stumbling block for the Ottoman Empire and played an important role in its decline.

The global transformations such as the geographical discoveries which led the European states to extend their commercial activities worldwide also had an impact on the development of Izmir. The British efforts to spread their influence into the Near East while competing with the French and Venetians for predominance in Eastern Mediterranean trade also played a vital role in the rise of Izmir as a commercial centre. Following the British and French merchants, the Dutch also came to the city by the early seventeenth century and they all began to reshape the Western Anatolian trade contributing to the significance of Izmir as one of the most important cities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Hence, foreign consulates started to move from Chios to Izmir providing commercial services to their nationals. Each consulate had its own quay where the ships of their country could anchor. Besides, the long period of campaign for the Cretan conquest (1648-1669) influenced the situation of Izmir significantly in the Empire. In this process Izmir functioned as a shipping port which was used to supply troops for the conquest.<sup>54</sup>

In the early seventeenth century the Jewish community in Izmir was playing a vital role in international trade as the most considerable Ottoman rival to the foreigners. However, though not absolutely withdrawing from the commercial sector, the dominance of the Jews over trade started to shrink in the coming years as Greeks, Armenians, and even Venetians began to serve as factors, brokers, even consuls for the French, English, and Dutch. These groups eventually took the place of the Jews as middlemen between the foreigners and producers in Western Anatolia. Thus, the structure of the Western Anatolian commercial networks altered towards the end of the seventeenth century. Up to the 1670s several groups and individuals as well as the foreigners spread out randomly across the Western Anatolia to conduct commercial activities. In this regard, the Dutch, Venetian and English merchants had to use the letters patent issued by Istanbul to move around the region. Yet from the late seventeenth century onwards, the foreigners started to focus ever more on their commercial activities in Izmir and employ Armenian, Jewish, and Muslim agents for their activities in the provinces.<sup>55</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup> İnal, 21.

<sup>53</sup> Halil İnalçık, "Osmanlı'nın Avrupa ile Barışıklığı: Kapitülasyonlar ve Ticaret" [Reconciliation of Ottoman with Europe: capitulations and trade], *Doğu Batı Dergisi* [Journal of East West] 24 (August-September-October 2003): 61.

<sup>54</sup> World eBook Library, "İzmir.," Daniel Goffman, *İzmir ve Levanten Dünya 1550-1650* [Izmir and the Levantine world, 1550-1650] (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları 21, 2000), 60-63.

<sup>55</sup> Devrim Dumludağ and Bülent Durgun, "An Economy in Transition: İzmir (1918-1938)," *Middle Eastern Studies* 47, 6 (2011): 924.

The disturbing earthquake in July 1688 led to a rapid decrease in trade of Izmir for a while. Nevertheless, the proposal of some European traders to constitute an alternative trade centre on the Aegean was not accepted by the Ottoman government. Despite the destruction created by the earthquake, Izmir was still seen by the majority of European merchants as the most secure hub in their commercial network. In the following years, the French had gained dominance in the commerce of Izmir comprising the biggest European trade community in Izmir by the eighteenth century. In this era when the port of Izmir was used as a transport centre for the French goods to and from the Near East, the economic and cultural life of the city was influenced deeply by the French. After experiencing a period of stagnation during the Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815) and the Greek War of Independence (1821-28), Izmir revived again as a trade port in the 1830s.<sup>56</sup> The port of Izmir was the transition point for 24 percent of all imports to the Ottoman Empire from the West and 57 percent of all exports in the 1840s while the same trade figures appeared as 19 percent and 55 percent respectively in 1900.<sup>57</sup>

The city passed through a crucial transformation process in the nineteenth century as the demanded products and the means of trade altered. Due to the increasing demand of the European cities for the agricultural products in the wake of the Industrial Revolution, the trade of these products, especially pulses and cereals, substituted the trade of precious goods. This shift in the trade structure also affected the infrastructure of the city reshaping the capital resources and the network of entrepreneurs and intermediaries. Within this period the Armenians and the Greeks became the primary actors as intermediaries in trade and started to play a key role between the European merchants and the Muslim producers.<sup>58</sup> These local Ottoman intermediaries did not only connect the inner production places with the port but also mediated the transfer of credit from the coast into Anatolia.<sup>59</sup> In the nineteenth century the major export products included raisins, cotton, dried fruit, figs, madder, opium, cereals, sponges, olive oil, tobacco while the imports from the West were mainly comprised of manufactured and textile products.<sup>60</sup>

By the first half of the nineteenth century as the impact of the British expansionary policies on the Ottoman Empire prevailed, the British merchants started to dominate in the Western Anatolian trade. This dominance was achieved particularly following the 1838 Balta Limani Treaty which is often evaluated as a significant breaking point for the foreign trade and foreign relations of the Ottoman Empire. Differently from the previous unilateral concessions given by the Empire to the foreigners in terms of rights to trade and reside within the Empire, this Treaty was designed as a bilateral agreement which increased the privileges of the foreigners to a crucial extent. In fact the Treaty was concluded in a difficult period of time for the Empire when it was striving to contain the revolt by the governor of Egypt. Ensuring protection for the activities of British merchants, this British-Ottoman commercial treaty decreased the authority of the Ottoman government to enforce unilateral trade tariffs and laid down the abolition of monopolies of any nature and other methods of control that could restrain the trade.<sup>61</sup> Consequently the number and influence of the British merchants increased in Izmir. Thus, the Commercial

---

<sup>56</sup> İnal, 23.

<sup>57</sup> Elena Frangakis-Syrett, "The Making of an Ottoman Port the Quay of Izmir in the Nineteenth Century," *The Journal of Transport History* 22, 1 (2001): 24.

<sup>58</sup> İnal, 23.

<sup>59</sup> Dumludağ and Durgun, 925.

<sup>60</sup> Frangakis-Syrett, 24.

<sup>61</sup> Resat Kasaba, "Treaties and Friendships: British Imperialism, the Ottoman Empire, and China in the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of World History* 4, 2 (1993): 216-218.

Bank of Izmir which was the first bank in the Ottoman Empire was established by the British merchants in 1843 and the British Chamber of Commerce was set up in 1888.<sup>62</sup>

**Illustration 3:** *Izmir Port in the Nineteenth Century.*



**Source:** “Photos of Old Izmir,” Izmir Metropolitan Municipality Website, accessed July 11, 2015, <https://www.izmir.bel.tr/IzmirFotografлари/303/tr>.

Izmir developed into a larger city and one of the most well-known and famous cultural and trade centres in the world through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The nineteenth century was also important for Izmir as an experience of physical change. This change could be achieved through the financing of particularly foreign investors who enjoyed the concessions of railroad, streetcar, natural gas, tobacco, and other monopolies given by the Ottoman Empire to the American, British, French, and German companies. Besides, Izmir turned into a publication midpoint whereby books, magazines, and newspapers were published.<sup>63</sup> In this context the first newspaper (La Spectateur Oriental) of Izmir published in 1821 by the Levantine groups. Afterwards the Greek newspaper, O Filos ton Neon, was published in 1831, the Armenian newspaper, Archalouys Araradian (Dawn of the Ararat), was published in 1840, the Jewish newspaper, La Bueno Esperansa (Good Hope) was published in 1842, and the Bulgarian newspaper, Ljubosleviye (Love for the World), was brought out in 1842. On the other hand the Turkish newspaper, Aydin, was published comparatively late in 1869.<sup>64</sup>

The development of transportation facilities also played a key role in Izmir’s evolution process, particularly for its increasing and expanding trade. This enabled not only the access of products and merchants to the seaport of Izmir, but also the connection of the commercial foundations in Western Anatolia to their partners in Europe. Therefore the first railway line in Anatolia was constructed from Izmir to Aydin within a period of ten years between 1856 and 1866. Construction of the railway did not only change the

<sup>62</sup> İnal, 24.

<sup>63</sup> Dumludağ and Durgun, 924.

<sup>64</sup> İnal, 26.

economy and society in Izmir and its hinterland but also provided the city a precursor role in the construction of other railways in the Ottoman Empire. The other important development regarding transportation was the construction of the quay. The quay played a key role in the economic, cultural and also social life of Izmir and it became an esplanade. Cafes, theatres, cinemas, clubs, hotels, and consular bureaus were established throughout the coast in an area called Kordon which became a haunt especially for the Levantines. Apart from the progress in transportation facilities the reorganisation of the rights of foreigners to attain properties in 1869 also attracted the Levantines to the city and increased their settlement in the city in the nineteenth century.<sup>65</sup> Such developments crucially influenced the demographic structure, culture and the Ottoman character of the city. Thus, Izmir eventually became the centre of the Aydin province which constituted an administrative area embracing a huge fraction of the current Aegean region in 1867.<sup>66</sup>

Beyond their interaction with their home city and the economy of the region, the ports also play a crucial role in shaping the social, cultural and spatial features of city.<sup>67</sup> In this regard, Izmir (Alsancak) port has continued to constitute a vital aspect of the city's historical identity as a borderland city enabling the connection between the west and the east. The identity of Izmir as an international port city persists in modern Turkey as well. Although the development process of Izmir port was interrupted from 1920s up to the 1960s due to the initial focus of the new Republican regime on the establishment of official institutions, its interaction with the city has continued to influence the general characteristics of Izmir. The port has taken its current location with the establishment of the Alsancak quay in 1954. The port was transferred to the Turkish State Railways in 1957 and started to operate in 1959. Hereafter, along with the revival of the port which has a serious contribution to the national economy, Izmir has retaken its place in international trade.<sup>68</sup> When it is evaluated in combination with its highway and railway connections, the hinterland of Izmir port which predominantly provides service to tramp vessels and cruises involved the southern part of the Marmara Region, the entire Aegean Region, the western part of Inner Anatolia, and western and north-western parts of the Mediterranean. According to 2012 external trade data, 34 percent of the imports and 40 percent of exports of the city and the Aegean region were conducted via Izmir port.<sup>69</sup>

When the place of Izmir in the regional and national economy is assessed in general, it can be stated that Izmir is the pivotal city of the Aegean region creating 48% of the region's gross domestic product. Izmir's economy is dominantly based upon industrial, commercial, transportation, communication and agricultural activities. It is also a prominent foreign trade city of Turkey with its 2 free zones, 13 industrial zones, and 4 technology development zones. Maritime transportation opportunities have a significant

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 25-27.

<sup>66</sup> World eBook Library, "İzmir."

<sup>67</sup> Hitay Baran and Çınar Atay, "İzmir Alsancak Limanı'nın Etki Alanı ve İzmir Kentinin Ekonomik Yapısı ile Bağı" [The influence area of Izmir Alsancak port and its connection with the economic structure of Izmir city], *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Denizcilik Fakültesi Dergisi* [Dokuz Eylül University Journal of Maritime Faculty] 2, 2 (2010): 67.

<sup>68</sup> Ümit Çiçek, "İzmir Limanı'nın Tarihsel Gelişimi" [Historical development of the port of Izmir], *İzmir Ticaret Odası Ar & Ge Bülteni* [Bulletin of Izmir Chamber of Commerce], (2006), accessed June 28, 2015, [http://www.izto.org.tr/portals/0/iztogenel/dokumanlar/izmir\\_limaninin\\_tarihsel\\_gelisimi\\_u\\_cicek\\_26.04.2012%2022-21-21.pdf](http://www.izto.org.tr/portals/0/iztogenel/dokumanlar/izmir_limaninin_tarihsel_gelisimi_u_cicek_26.04.2012%2022-21-21.pdf).

<sup>69</sup> Turan Yalçın, "İzmir Limanı" [The port of Izmir], T.C. Devlet Demiryolu İşletmesi Genel Müdürlüğü" [General Directorate of Turkish State Railways], accessed June 28, 2015, [http://www.deu.edu.tr/UploadedFiles/Birimler/21148/TCDD\\_Turan%20YAL%C3%87IN.pdf](http://www.deu.edu.tr/UploadedFiles/Birimler/21148/TCDD_Turan%20YAL%C3%87IN.pdf).

share in the country's international trade.<sup>70</sup> It ranks as the 5th city in total imports, and 4th in the exports. In 2013 the imports of Izmir amounted to 10 653 188 dollars while its exports was of 9 311 212 dollars comprising almost half of the exports of the Aegean region. Food products, construction products, textile products, wood products and furniture, chemical products and agricultural products have a vital place in Izmir's trade. Izmir has a developed capital market via its national and international banking network and stock market. Thanks to its strategic location, logistics infrastructure, qualified human resources, multi-sectorial economic structure and investment zones with special incentives Izmir is a city attractive for foreign investments. Cumulative amount of foreign direct investments (FDI) rose to 1,944 in 2013 from 534 in 2004. German companies take the first rank in terms of foreign investments accounting for 25% of the foreign firms and are followed by companies of Netherlands (8%), Iran (7%), Italy (7%), United Kingdom (6%), France (6%), United States (5%), Greece (3%), Russia (2%), Switzerland (2%), Austria (2%), Azerbaijan (2%), Belgium (2%) and Israel (2%).<sup>71</sup>

Furthermore, owing to its historical, cultural and natural assets as well as Aegean type Mediterranean climate, Izmir is one of the vital tourism centres in Turkey. The city's special borderland flavour combining its western culture and outward-oriented structure with the Anatolian culture contributes to its touristic attraction. Besides thermal tourism, eco-tourism, sun tourism and convention and fair tourism, culture tourism and faith tourism also form a significant aspect of touristic activities in this sense. Of the 1 943 253 tourist arrivals in the city in 2013, 1 407 240 were foreign tourists. Tourism income was over 1, 5 million dollars in the same year.<sup>72</sup>

### ***Izmir's multicultural past and its impact on the present structure of Izmir***

Eighteenth century was a period of time when Izmir passed through a noticeable transformation process. The different social groups and communities who came to Izmir in order to participate in the commercial activities had been effective in this process contributing particularly to the remodelling of social and economic life. Thus, Izmir gained a multicultural and cosmopolitan structure with the participation of different ethnic and religious groups in the urban life. These groups were separated from each other in their residential areas as they were located in different regions of the city. For instance, while Turkish population was inhabited on the foothills of Kadifekale, the Jews settled in Karatas, the Franks in Alsancak, British in Karantina and Goztepe districts. In this sense, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are perceived as a period of transition for Izmir in terms of the structural configuration and settlement of the population based on ethnic and religious identity.<sup>73</sup>

During the eighteenth and particularly nineteenth centuries the ethnic and religious composition of Izmir was especially remarkable due to the diversity of settled Ottoman communities as well as Levantines. In this period Izmir, as the second biggest city of the Ottoman Empire, had mainly two settled communities; one of them was Muslims (Turks) and the other one was non-Muslim, including the Orthodox, and Catholic

<sup>70</sup> Izmir Development Agency, "Why Izmir: Economy?," accessed June 25, 2015, <http://www.investinizmir.com/en/html/1089/Economy>.

<sup>71</sup> Izmir Development Agency, "Foreign Direct Investments," accessed June 25, 2015, <http://www.investinizmir.com/en/html/1129/FDI+in+Izmir>.

<sup>72</sup> Izmir Development Agency, "Economic Facts and Figures-Izmir," 2014, accessed June 25, 2015, <http://www.investinizmir.com/upload/Sayfa/1128/files/facts.pdf>.

<sup>73</sup> Ercan Tatlıdıl, "Kent ve Kentli Kimliği; İzmir Örneği" [Identity of cities and citizens; the case of Izmir], *Ege Akademik Bakış* [Ege Academic Review] 9 1 (2009): 330-331.



Greeks, Gregorian and Catholic Armenians, as well as a few thousand Jews. The large non-Muslim population in Izmir during this era influenced the perspectives of Muslims and the Ottoman authorities on Izmir leading to the labelling of the city as “Infidel Izmir”.<sup>74</sup> On the other hand, there were also Levantines, namely captains, merchants, seasonal travellers, and artisans from Europe who decided to settle in the city following their visits. The Levantines were mostly from the European countries such as Britain, Holland, France, Italy, and Greece.

**Illustration 4:** *Famous Esplanade (Kordon) of Izmir in the Nineteenth Century*



**Source:** “Photos of Old Izmir,” Izmir Metropolitan Municipality Website, accessed July 11, 2015, <https://www.izmir.bel.tr/IzmirFotografлари/303/tr>.

Although one can come across different data in diverse sources regarding the distribution of population between different religious and ethnic groups in Izmir in those times, it is a fact that the total population of the non-Muslims and foreigners in the city composed more than half of the total population up to the First World War. As well as Muslims, the Rums<sup>75</sup> (the local Greeks of Izmir and Anatolia), Armenians, Jews and Levantines maintained their presence in the city until the era of Turkish Republic.<sup>76</sup> The Ottoman General Census of 1881/82-1893 in which the women as well as men were counted for the first time illustrated a total population of 496,6 thousand for the Izmir Sandjak as an administrative unit. This figure included 279, 6 thousand Muslims, 133, 8 thousand Greeks, 17, 2 thousand Jews, 9, 2 thousand Armenians, 54, 6 thousand Jews and 54, 6 thousand foreign citizens.<sup>77</sup>

Basically, Izmir was composed of five neighbourhoods: Turkish, Jewish, Armenian, Greek and Frank neighbourhoods. The Turkish community established itself in

<sup>74</sup> Ring, Salkin and La, 350; İnal, 26.

<sup>75</sup> This is a phrase meaning the people on the Roman lands and used to differentiate the local Greeks of Izmir and Anatolia from the citizens of Greece.

<sup>76</sup> Kerimoğlu, 81-82.

<sup>77</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914 Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 122-123.



the higher part of Kadifekale. Another community of Izmir, the Rums were settled in the area behind the Frank Quarter. The Armenians as the smallest community of the city were settled in the Basmane area located between the Turkish, Greek, and Jewish districts. The other community of Izmir, Jews were established in Karatas region.<sup>78</sup> Probably due to the fact that the French were the first community to get into contact with the Ottoman Empire with regard to political and commercial issues, all European foreigners were called as Franks in the Empire. Frank neighbourhood was located in the Frank quarter by the seaside. The Westerns built the most comfortable and beautiful houses of the city in the Frank Street. Frank merchants generally dwelled upstairs of their warehouses which were aligned near the quayside.<sup>79</sup> The Frank neighbourhood was in the centre of economic and social life with the consulates, the European market, elegant houses, best-paved streets, art galleries, luxurious restaurants, theatres, clubs, coffeehouses, patisseries and pubs. Greek and Armenian neighbourhoods located at the rear of the Frank neighbourhood were characterised by Southern European style of houses. The social and cultural lives of the Greeks were particularly affected by the Franks. On the other hand, the Turkish and Jewish neighbourhoods which were less organised compared to the other neighbourhoods were identified with their narrow streets, red roof tiles and gardens.<sup>80</sup>

Notwithstanding the multicultural structure of Izmir, each ethnic and religious community preferred to live in its own quarter and formed its own neighbourhood in the city. Nevertheless, these different communities were not separated from each other by strict borders. The neighbourhoods which were characterised by mosques, churches or synagogues in consistence with the given community were close to each other. Hence, the enlargement of the quarters over time resulted in the formation of overlapping neighbourhoods. Thus, in spite of the differences between the communities they could still share the social, cultural, and economic life, and succeed to live together.<sup>81</sup>

Being attracted by the city's commercial growth, geographical location as well as ethnic, cultural and religious diversity, many travellers including Turkish and foreign ones particularly from England, France and Germany visited Izmir between the seventeenth and twentieth century. The writings of these travellers on their experiences and observations of Izmir clearly reflected the multicultural structure of the city.<sup>82</sup> A well-known Ottoman-Turkish traveller Evliya Celebi visited Izmir between the years of 1657 and 1658 and he included his observations and comments on the city in his famous Travel Book, called "Seyahatname". In addition to a thorough description of the historical, geographical, architectural and social elements of the city, Evliya Celebi also informed about the local people's lifestyles, beliefs, and their customs. According to his book, there were then ten Muslim, ten European and Jewish, two Armenian and one Gypsy neighbourhoods in Izmir. The population dwelled in 10,300 houses spreading from the foothills of Kadifekale to the plain up to the sea. Within this scope, different ethnic and religious communities who were dealing with their specialised economic activities co-existed peacefully. Evliya Celebi also mentioned about twelve mosques and forty churches and synagogues in the city.<sup>83</sup>

---

<sup>78</sup> İnal, 28-29.

<sup>79</sup> Evelyn Lyle Kalças, *Gateways to the Past Houses and Gardens of Old Bornova* (İzmir: Bilgehan Matbaası, 1978), 4, accessed July 11, 2015, <http://levantineheritage.com/pdf/Gateways-to-the-past-Houses-and-gardens-of-old-Bornova-Evelyn-Lyle-Kalcas.pdf>.

<sup>80</sup> Burcu Taşçı et al., "Rediscovering the 19th Century of a Port Town in Levant: Smyrna/İzmir," *Athens Journal of Mediterranean Studies* (January 2015): 66-70.

<sup>81</sup> İnal, 32-33.

<sup>82</sup> Taşçı et al., 62.

<sup>83</sup> Tatlıdil, 330.

The views of the travellers on Izmir frequently diversified. Whereas some portrayed the city as “an Eastern town” and “the capital of Levant”, some others viewed it as a Western city comparable to Marseille, Naples and Trieste. These differentiated views were mainly stemming from the dual structure of the city and the different life styles of the settled communities. The Turks, Jews and Armenians settled on the outskirts of the castle while the Greeks and the Westerns were located closer to the seaside. The Turkish and Jewish neighbourhoods shaped the Eastern style of the city while the Levantines, Greeks and the Armenians formed the Western style of the city with their social and cultural lives. Thus, the travellers who visited Western style parts described Izmir as a Western city, whereas the travellers who visited the other districts figured it as an Eastern city. The dual structure which was shaped by this multicultural society consisting of different communities was clearly reflected not only by the diversity in the urban and architectural styles but also by the differences in social and cultural activities. Therefore, the cultural activities also varied in the city. The Muslims often preferred to socialize by visits to their neighbours, gatherings in the front of or at the courtyards of their houses, and picnics. On the other hand, there were different socialisation tools for non-Muslims such as theatres, clubs, coffeehouses, patisseries and pubs which were mostly located on the coastal line.<sup>84</sup>

Thus, Izmir established itself as one of the largest multicultural and cosmopolitan cities of the Ottoman Empire. In 1988 there were 236,547 foreign citizens in the Ottoman state and 55,805 of this figure were settled in the Aydin province chiefly thanks to Izmir.<sup>85</sup> Izmir experienced a crucial progress essentially caused by the industrialisation in its urbanisation process from the second half of the nineteenth century. Izmir’s trade city identity improved owing to the advancement of the harbour and consequently urban population engaged in commercial activities progressively increased as a result of significant amount of immigration to the city. Hence, Izmir had gained a distinctive urban identity compared to the other Anatolian cities particularly due to the impact of the Levantines. As Izmir became an international harbour city in a multicultural environment the number of the cultural activity centres such as cinemas, theatres, dancing halls also increased. The new structuring and cultural diversity influenced the quality of life in the city.<sup>86</sup>

However, the rise of nationalism during the late Ottoman era had an undermining impact on multiculturalism in the Empire in general and in Izmir in particular. In this regard the multicultural structure of the city incrementally weakened in the twentieth century. Following the triumph of the Turkish forces in Izmir in 1922, a significant amount of the Greek population migrated to Greece. Furthermore, the huge population exchange between Turkey and Greece in 1923 was a very important development changing the ethnic diversity of the city. In addition to the flee of large amounts of Greeks, Armenians and other groups from the city, the arrival of Turkish Muslim population from Greece and islands considerably altered the population structure. Moreover, from 1950s onwards Izmir started to take interior migration as the third largest city of Turkey. The inadequacies in the master plans in terms of the settlement of the newcomers led to the formation of slum areas in the city which has faced difficulties to protect its historical heritage.<sup>87</sup>

---

<sup>84</sup> Taşçı et al., 64-65, 74-76.

<sup>85</sup> Karpat, 161.

<sup>86</sup> Tatlıdil, 331.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

Urban identity covers a large scope of issues related to cultural and social norms as well as natural and geographic factors. Although cities constitute many common features, they also have distinctive characteristics due to their natural, economic and social circumstances as well as historical evolution process. To say differently besides universal values, the cities may embody distinguishing values and characteristics at the same time.<sup>88</sup> In this respect, it is a fact that the current urban identity of Izmir has been deeply influenced by its historical heritage and multicultural past. Although the city has experienced vital changes in the course of time it still bears the borderland city flavour as a contribution of this heritage.

There is a widespread consensus both among the inhabitants of Izmir and people living in other parts of Turkey on the distinctiveness of this city. This distinctiveness which has both objective and constructed aspects can be associated with three main factors. Firstly, its physical features and location by the sea and Gulf and also the existence of harbour are crucial factors shaping the urban identity of Izmir which is often characterised as the “Pearl of the Aegean” and “Beautiful Izmir” in Turkey. The encirclement of the urban settlement by Izmir Gulf enhances the coherence of the city with the sea. Thus, the sea and the coast are always a vital part of the lives of people in Izmir. The second important factor regarding its urban identity is related to the perceptions of the inhabitants on Izmir as the actors of the city. The inhabitants of Izmir frequently view themselves “different” from the inhabitants of other parts of Turkey. They are generally pleased to be from Izmir and think that this is a privilege for them.<sup>89</sup> The issue of life style should be also mentioned as another crucial factor shaping the distinctiveness of Izmir as an input of urban culture and identity. The inhabitants’ social life is not limited to in-house activities, but rather the people often prefer to socialize outside spending time at coffeehouses, restaurants, and usually by the sea. The often mentioned tendency to free and modern life style in the city is also seen as an important aspect of the urban identity of Izmir. This tendency which can be associated with its multicultural heritage directly influences the perceptions on Izmir and its inhabitants. For instance, although the population of Izmir has lost its heterogeneous structure to a great extent due to the outflow of the majority of its non-Muslim population in the era of Turkish Republic, the pre-Republic description of the city as “Infidel Izmir” persisted in several circles in the other parts of the country.<sup>90</sup>

According to a study aimed at revealing the perceptions on Izmir and people from Izmir, the inhabitants of Izmir are pre-emptively identified as modern, relaxed, innovative, beautiful, democrat, extrovert, patriotic, good, sympathetic and friendly, entertaining, hybrid, intellectual, knowledgeable and healthy.<sup>91</sup> One can easily track the traces of

<sup>88</sup> Olca Sürgevil and Sabri Sürgevil, “Farklı Nesiller ve İzmirli Algısı” [Different generations and perception of being from Izmir], in *İzmirli Olmak Sempozyum Bildirileri 22-24 Ekim 2009* [Proceedings of Symposium on Being from Izmir 22-24 October 2009] (Ankara: BMS Matbaacılık, 2010), 182-183.

<sup>89</sup> İlhan Tekeli, “İzmir’in Farklılığı Üzerine Düşünmenin Değişik Yolları” [Different ways of thinking about the distinctiveness of Izmir], in *İzmirli Olmak Sempozyum Bildirileri 22-24 Ekim 2009* [Proceedings of Symposium on Being from Izmir 22-24 October 2009] (Ankara: BMS Matbaacılık, 2010), 29-33.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>91</sup> Nuri Bilgin and Pınar Uğurlar, “İzmir ve İzmirli İlişkin Algı ve Temsiller” [Perceptions and representations of Izmir and people from Izmir], in *İzmirli Olmak Sempozyum Bildirileri 22-24 Ekim 2009* [Proceedings of Symposium on Being from Izmir 22-24 October 2009] (Ankara: BMS Matbaacılık, 2010), 168.

Izmir's multicultural past in most of these characterisations. The results of another study are also striking in this regard. The mentioned study aimed at searching the opinions of people on Izmir who have positive or negative ideas and memories on the city regardless of their place of settlement or birth. In this study Izmir was portrayed by the participants as a place worth living, the most beautiful city of Turkey owing to its natural and historical beauties, and the modern and enlightened facade of Turkey. The main characterisations pointed out by the participants for Izmir include coastal, harbour, commercial, Western (European), cosmopolitan, most modern, secular, and tolerant city as well as respectful for freedoms and differences. On the other hand negative assessments regarding Izmir were mainly related to the physical aspects of living conditions such as transportation problems, insufficiencies of municipality services, and intensive immigration.<sup>92</sup>

### ***Conclusion***

Although cities constitute many common features, they also have distinctive characteristics due to their natural, economic and social circumstances as well as historical evolution process. In this regard, the current urban identity of Izmir has been deeply influenced by its historical heritage and multicultural past. As the door of Asia Minor opening to Mediterranean through the Aegean Sea, Izmir had long served as a point of interaction between the East and West and constituted a borderland between civilisations, between ethnicities, and between religions in its process of evolution from Smyrna to Izmir. The city was ruled or influenced by various civilisations in its history of 8,500 years. Thanks particularly to the worldwide economic developments and the increasing importance of its harbour in international trade, the city developed into an important and famous trade centre under the Ottoman rule particularly in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In this era, the multicultural fabric of the city was shaped by the formation of a cosmopolitan society composed of diverse communities such as the Muslim Turks, Jews, Armenians, Greeks and Levantines. Hence, the usually accepted distinctiveness of the city is substantially related to its historical and cultural heritage. This heritage has an impact not only on the everyday life and culture of the city but also on the perceptions of Izmir in general.

Undoubtedly, the standing of Izmir as an international port city plays a crucial role in shaping the social, cultural and spatial features of the city. Hence, the port has long been a vital aspect of the city's historical identity as a borderland city enabling the connection between the West and the East. As it was both a trade centre and living space with its climate, geographical location and natural beauty for the merchants in the Ottoman era, the foreign traders preferred to settle in Izmir. Although each ethnic and religious community established its own settlement and shaped its own neighbourhood in the city, there weren't strict borders between the neighbourhoods and they could live together. Especially in the last periods of the Ottoman Empire, the dual character of the city originating mainly from the multi-cultural nature of society dominated the economic, social and cultural life of the city. Principally by the influence of Levantines, Izmir gained a distinct identity from the other Anatolian cities and developed social and cultural connotations. In this regard, the numbers of the cinemas, theatres, night clubs and cafes in the city increased and these places became popular for the Levantines. The population structure of the city changed with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey and particularly with population exchange, and thus the multicultural nature of the city was

---

<sup>92</sup> Sürgevil and Sürgevil, 183-199.

partially lost. Nevertheless, both international port and the previous multicultural composition continue to affect social and cultural structure of the city. So, Izmir which had a different identity from the other Anatolian cities in its Ottoman past preserves the same feature today. In this sense, Izmir is considered to be different from the other parts of Turkey by both the ones who live in Izmir and who live in other provinces. In fact, this difference has a total content of both the city identity and town-dweller identity.

Today Izmir which is often characterised as the “Pearl of the Aegean” and “Beautiful Izmir” in Turkey is the third largest city and the second leading port of the country. The characteristic of Izmir as an international port city persists and the harbour gives vitality to the city economically and commercially. Besides, the active life of the city as a cultural and social inheritance from the past is still in progress. With rich social and cultural facilities, Izmir offers various cultural opportunities to the people of different social status. Until the 1950s, Izmir was spread to a limited area but has begun to grow rapidly after that date, and has expanded over the years in terms of both surface area and population. Migration from other provinces has had a significant impact on this expansion. The city’s uncontrolled growth in some places has brought significant challenges in the field of urbanisation and housing and infrastructure needs. Founded as a local government unit in 1984, Izmir Metropolitan Municipality has been working to solve these problems and from 2012 also offers services in both rural and urban areas. Despite the criticisms regarding Izmir’s insufficient performance to achieve its potential as well as to solve urban problems, Izmir continues to be a centre of attraction in economic, social and cultural terms. Izmir currently consists of 30 districts. The districts, namely Balçova, Bayraklı, Bornova, Buca, Cigli, Gazimir, Güzelbahçe, Karabağlar, Karsiyaka, Konak and Narlıdere are located in the centre of Izmir. On the other hand the other districts such as Cesme, Foca and Dikili stand out with their natural beauties and tourism potential whereas Selçuk, Bergama and Odemis come to the forefront with their historical and cultural heritage.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Agoston, Gabor, and Bruce Masters. *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*. New York: Facts On File Infobase Publishing, 2009.
- Ayönü, Yusuf. “İzmir’de Türk Hâkimiyetinin Başlaması [The beginning of Turkish domination in Izmir].” *Türk Dünyası İncelemeleri Dergisi* [Journal of Turkish World Studies] 9, 1 (2009): 1-8.
- Baran, Hitay, and Çınar Atay. “İzmir Alsancak Limanı’nın Etki Alanı ve İzmir Kentinin Ekonomik Yapısı ile Bağı” [The influence area of Izmir Alsancak Port and its connection with the economic structure of Izmir City]. *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Denizcilik Fakültesi Dergisi* [Dokuz Eylül University Journal of Maritime Faculty] 2, 2 (2010): 67-81.
- Bilgin, Nuri, and Pınar Uğurlar. “İzmir ve İzmirli’lere İlişkin Algı ve Temsiller [Perceptions and representations of Izmir and people from Izmir].” In *İzmirli Olmak Sempozyum Bildirileri 22-24 Ekim 2009* [Proceedings of Symposium on Being from Izmir 22-24 October 2009], 165-179. Ankara: BMS Matbaacılık, 2010.
- Bosworth, C. Edmund. *Historic Cities of Islamic World*. Leiden, IDC Publishers: 2007.
- Can, Isin. “Urban Design and the Planning System in Izmir.” *Journal of Landscape Studies* 3 (2010): 181-189.

- Çiçek, Ümit. "İzmir Limanı'nın Tarihsel Gelişimi [Historical development of the port of Izmir]." *İzmir Ticaret Odası Ar & Ge Bülteni* [Bulletin of Izmir Chamber of Commerce] (2006). Accessed June 28, 2015.  
[http://www.izto.org.tr/portals/0/iztogenel/dokumanlar/izmir\\_liminin\\_tarihsel\\_gelismisi\\_u\\_cicek\\_26.04.2012%2022-21-21.pdf](http://www.izto.org.tr/portals/0/iztogenel/dokumanlar/izmir_liminin_tarihsel_gelismisi_u_cicek_26.04.2012%2022-21-21.pdf).
- Derin, Zafer. "Yeşilova Höyüğü Kazıları ve İzmir'in Tarih Öncesi Dönemi [Yeşilova mound excavations and the prehistoric period of Izmir]." In *Körfez'de Zaman İzmir Araştırmaları Kongresi Bildiriler* [Proceedings of the Congress of Izmir Researches], edited by Eren Çiçek, Mustafa Mutluer, and Cüneyt Kanat. İzmir: Bormat Matbaacılık, 2010. Accessed June 25, 2015.  
<http://www.yesilova.ege.edu.tr/arsiv/korfez.pdf>.
- Dumludağ, Devrim, and Bülent Durgun. "An Economy in Transition: İzmir (1918-1938)." *Middle Eastern Studies* 47, 6 (November 2011): 923-945.
- Eldem, Edhem, Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Masters. *The Ottoman City Between East and West Aleppo, Izmir and Istanbul*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Frangakis-Syrett, Elena. "The Making of an Ottoman Port The Quay of Izmir in the Nineteenth Century." *The Journal of Transport History* 22, 1 (2001): 23-46.
- Goffman, Daniel. *İzmir ve Levanten Dünya 1550-1650* [Izmir and the Levantine World, 1550-1650]. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000.
- İnal, Onur. "Levantine Heritage in Izmir." MA thesis, Koç University, 2006.
- İnalçık, Halil. "Osmanlı'nın Avrupa ile Barışıklığı: Kapitülasyonlar ve Ticaret [Reconciliation of Ottoman with Europe: capitulations and trade]." *Doğu Batı Dergisi* [Journal of East West] 24 (August September October 2003): 55-81.
- İnalçık, Halil. "Osmanlı Deniz Egemenliği [Ottoman sea domination]." In *Türk Denizcilik Tarihi* [Turkish maritime history], edited by Bülent Arı, 49-65. Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Denizcilik Müsteşarlığı, 2002.
- Izmir Development Agency. "İzmir The Frontier City of Turkey." Accessed June 25, 2015. [http://izka.org.tr/files/oncubrosurur/Eng\\_web.pdf](http://izka.org.tr/files/oncubrosurur/Eng_web.pdf).
- Izmir Development Agency. "İzmir Current Situation Analysis." İzmir: Arkadaş Matbaası, 2009. Accessed June 25, 2015.  
[http://www.izka.org.tr/files/Mevcut\\_Durum\\_Analizi.pdf](http://www.izka.org.tr/files/Mevcut_Durum_Analizi.pdf).
- Izmir Development Agency. "Why Izmir: Economy?." Accessed June 25, 2015.  
<http://www.investinizmir.com/en/html/1089/Economy>.
- Izmir Development Agency. "Foreign Direct Investments." Accessed June 25, 2015.  
<http://www.investinizmir.com/en/html/1129/FDI+in+Izmir>.
- Izmir Development Agency. "Economic Facts and Figures-Izmir." 2014. Accessed June 25, 2015. <http://www.investinizmir.com/upload/Sayfa/1128/files/facts.pdf>.
- "İzmir Kent Rehberi [Izmir City Guide]." Accessed August 15, 2015.  
[http://www.izmirde.biz/FileUpload/ds31586/File/izmir\\_haritasi\\_5.png](http://www.izmirde.biz/FileUpload/ds31586/File/izmir_haritasi_5.png).
- Kalças, Evelyn Lyle. *Gateways to the Past Houses and Gardens of Old Bornova*. İzmir: Bilgehan Matbaası, 1978. Accessed July 11, 2015.  
<http://levantineheritage.com/pdf/Gateways-to-the-past-Houses-and-gardens-of-old-Bornova-Evelyn-Lyle-Kalcas.pdf>.
- Karpat, Kemal H. *Ottoman Population 1830-1914 Demographic and Social Characteristics*. Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.
- Kasaba, Resat. "Treaties and Friendships: British Imperialism, the Ottoman Empire, and China in the Nineteenth Century." *Journal of World History* 4, 2 (1993): 215-241.
- Kerimoğlu, H. Taner. "19. Yüzyılda Reformlar ve İzmir [Reforms and Izmir in the 19th Century]." In *İzmir Kent Ansiklopedisi Tarih Cildi I. Cilt* [Izmir city encyclopaedia

- history. Volume I], edited by Kemal Arı and Fevzi Çakmak, 81-89. İzmir: İmaj Basım, 2013.
- Ortaylı, İlber. *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* [The longest century of the Empire]. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2014.
- "Photos of İzmir." İzmir Metropolitan Municipality Website. Accessed July 11, 2015. <https://www.izmir.bel.tr/IzmirFotograflari/303/tr>.
- Republic of Turkey İzmir Governorship. "History of İzmir." Accessed June 25, 2015. <http://www.izmir.gov.tr/tarih-e>.
- Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism. "Smyrna in Ancient Times." Accessed June 25, 2015. <http://www.kultur.gov.tr/EN,34491/smyrna-in-ancient-times.html>.
- Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism. "İzmir Merkezde Görülmesi Gereken Yerler-Hükümet Konağı [The places to be seen at the centre of İzmir - Government Office]." Accessed June 25, 2015. <http://www.kultur.gov.tr/TR,72639/hukumet-konagi.html>.
- Ring, Trudy, Robert M. Salkin, and Sharon La. *International Dictionary of Historic Places*, Volume 3: *Southern Europe*. Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1996.
- Sözer, Ahmet Necdet. "İzmir: Ege'nin Metropolü [İzmir: The metropolis of Aegean]." *Ege Coğrafya Dergisi* [Aegean Geographical Journal] (1988): 1-18.
- Sürgevil, Olca, and Sabri Sürgevil. "Farklı Nesiller ve İzmirli Algısı [Different generations and perception of being from İzmir]." In *İzmirli Olmak Sempozyum Bildirileri 22-24 Ekim 2009* [Proceedings of Symposium on Being from İzmir 22-24 October 2009], 180-199. Ankara: BMS Matbaacılık, 2010.
- Taşçı, Burcu, Büke Özden, Fatma Davras, and Hümeysra Birol Akkurt. "Rediscovering the 19th Century of a Port Town in Levant: Smyrna/İzmir." *Athens Journal of Mediterranean Studies* (January 2015): 61-79.
- Tatlıdil, Ercan. "Kent ve Kentli Kimliği; İzmir Örneği [Identity of cities and citizens; the case of İzmir]." *Ege Akademik Bakış* [Ege Academic Review] 9, 1 (2009): 319-336.
- T.C. İzmir Valiliği Resmi Kent Rehberi [İzmir Governorship Official City Guide]. "Tarihçe/ İzmir/ Smyrna/ İzmir İsminin Anlamı [History/ İzmir/ Smyrna/ Meaning of the name of İzmir]." Accessed July 11, 2015. [http://izmirfx.mekan360.com/iys\\_tarihce,sehirID=35,icerik=135,sayfa=1-tarihce-smyrna-izmir-isminin-anlami.html?#detay](http://izmirfx.mekan360.com/iys_tarihce,sehirID=35,icerik=135,sayfa=1-tarihce-smyrna-izmir-isminin-anlami.html?#detay).
- T.C. İzmir Valiliği Resmi Kent Rehberi [İzmir Governorship Official City Guide]. "Tarihçe/ İzmir/ İzmir'in Yeniden Kurulması [History/ İzmir/ Reconstruction of İzmir]." Accessed July 11, 2015. [http://izmirfx.mekan360.com/iys\\_tarihce,sehirID=35,icerik=138,sayfa=1-tarihce-izmir-in-yeniden-kurulmasi.html?#detay](http://izmirfx.mekan360.com/iys_tarihce,sehirID=35,icerik=138,sayfa=1-tarihce-izmir-in-yeniden-kurulmasi.html?#detay).
- T.C. İzmir Valiliği [İzmir Governorship]. "İlimizin Tarihçesi [History of our city]." Accessed June 28, 2015. <http://www.izmir.gov.tr/tarih-e>.
- Tekeli, İlhan. "İzmir'in Farklılığı Üzerine Düşünmenin Değişik Yolları [Different ways of thinking about the distinctiveness of İzmir]." In *İzmirli Olmak Sempozyum Bildirileri 22-24 Ekim 2009* [Proceedings of Symposium on Being from İzmir 22-24 October 2009], 29-36. Ankara: BMS Matbaacılık, 2010.
- World eBook Library. "İzmir." Accessed July 11, 2015. <http://www.worldebooklibrary.org/article/WHEBN0000580279/%C4%B0zmir>.
- Yalçın, Turan. "İzmir Limanı [The port of İzmir]." T.C. Devlet Demiryolu İşletmesi Genel Müdürlüğü [General Directorate of Turkish State Railways]. Accessed June 28, 2015. [http://www.deu.edu.tr/UploadedFiles/Birimler/21148/TCDD\\_Turan%20YAL%C3%87IN.pdf](http://www.deu.edu.tr/UploadedFiles/Birimler/21148/TCDD_Turan%20YAL%C3%87IN.pdf).

Yetkin, Sabri, and Fikret Yılmaz. "İzmir'in Tarihi [The history of Izmir]." Accessed June 28, 2015. <https://www.izmir.bel.tr/Izmir%E2%80%99inTarihi/225/196/tr>.

Zürcher, Erik J. *Turkey: A Modern History*. New York: Tauris & Co Ltd, Revised Edition, 2004.



# Tiraspol – the Border City of Eastern Latinity

Vasile CUCERESCU<sup>1</sup>

Simion ROȘCA<sup>2</sup>

**Abstract:** *The paper focuses on the Moldovan border city – Tiraspol, belonging to the Eastern extremity of Latinity; de facto, being situated in the secessionist region of Transnistria. Tiraspol has developed next to the ruins of the ancient Greek city Tyras, founded about 600 B.C. by people from Miletus. Tiraspol is analysed as a border city of Eastern Latinity, following its legal status, name, geographical position, history, people, demographics, ethnic structure, international relations, cross-border relations, EUBAM mission. The city is presented through the prism of the Transnistrian conflict, an artificial and frozen conflict, which affects the natural socio-economic development of Moldova and afflicts the security of Europe in this region of the continent. From the geographical, historical and cultural points of view, the Europeaneity of Tiraspol can play a crucial role in developing an appropriate matrix at the border of Eastern Latinity.*

**Keywords:** *border city, Europe, international / cross-border relations, Latinity, status, Tiraspol*

## **Introduction**

Tiraspol as the border city is the focus of this research from various perspectives: legal, historical, etymological, geographical, demographic, economic, cultural, international and cross-border relations. The research employs a critical approach towards Tiraspol to reveal the generalities and the peculiarities as a border city in Eastern Europe.

In dealing with the design, it is worth analysing the concept of border city. The concept of border city implies proximity to the boundaries between two states or regions, i.e. the nearness to state borders. This means that the border city is at the same time like a protecting “wall” between two different countries, cultures or civilisations; and a place of unmeasured influences between and among cosmopolitan communities. The border city can also be a flashpoint for interstate, regional and international conflicts, being the case of our city, too. All these happen due to the fact that the border is a space of disparity and dependence. Maria Duenas Vinuesa emphasizes that it is possible, because “the border is an *interzone* between countries, languages, cultures and sensibilities, and the history of its people is one of oppression and struggle”<sup>3</sup>.

When treating the border as an open-close concept, including the borderlands and the border cities, scholars Mircea Brie and Ioan Horga state that “the cultural perspective gives birth to debates on the notion of European civilization unity and on the relationship

---

<sup>1</sup> Associate professor Vasile Cucerescu, Ph.D., ECSA-Moldova President, Jean Monnet academic coordinator.

<sup>2</sup> Associate professor Simion Roșca, Ph.D., Department of Political Science, Faculty of International Relations, International Relations Institute of Moldova.

<sup>3</sup> Maria Duenas Vinuesa, “Border Studies: An Annotated List of Cultural and Academic Web Sources,” *Revista Estudios Ingleses* [Journal of English Studies] 16 (2003): 9.

between geography and culture”<sup>4</sup>. The border city Tiraspol encompasses the cultural dilemma on European civilisation unity, because of the symbolic heritage for Latinity as the fissure appears between cultural and geopolitical layers.

Border cities display both advantages and disadvantages of their geographical position in performing legal or illegal cross-border economic activities, these being the sources of either welfare or risk. Challenging issues for Tiraspol as the centre of the secessionist territory in Moldova are export of secessionism in the region, terrorist threats and cross-border trafficking in illicit goods, arms, and drugs, chemical and biological weapons. The inability to transform disadvantages in advantages seems to be poignant for Tiraspol. Tiraspol has to face this problem, for social frontiers are characterised by “ideological”<sup>5</sup> concerns. The European Union is interested in communicating its policies to its neighbours in order to diminish socio-economic disparities in the bordering countries. Thus, scholars Ioan Horga and Ariane Landuyt argue that the “opinions and attitudes of people situated on the other side of the golden curtain of wealth have a great significance, because they influence the delivery of the EU’s economic and foreign policy objectives”<sup>6</sup>. The moves *to* and *from* are crucial for Tiraspol in relation to both Chişinău and Bruxelles.

Usually, border cities have major symbolic value for borderlands (borderlanders) and bordering countries (residents). Accounts of Tiraspol’s past and present evoke its significance for Transnistrian borderland, for Moldova and for Ukraine, too. That reality matters, because all those conceptual differentiations explain internal and external perceptions. Maria Duenas Vinuesa argues that “in their struggle for maintaining an identity in their own land but under an alien sovereignty, people along the border have merged influences, developing a particular cultural and social environment with distinctive styles, social organizations and local economies”<sup>7</sup>. Thus, the borderlands (borderlanders) constitute a specific culture as such.

The study of Tiraspol as the border city phenomenon, conditions of the people living in Transnistria, generated an intellectual quest under border studies, attracting the interest of various research perspectives. It is indicative that the study of Tiraspol as the border city is oriented towards the pertinent research and is open to follow-ups.

### *Some geopolitical data*

**Name.** The toponym Tiraspol is of Greek origin, consisting of two words: *Tyras* – the ancient name for Dniester River and *polis* – a city. Tiraspol has developed as an urban

<sup>4</sup> Mircea Brie and Ioan Horga, “The European Union External Border. An Epistemological Approach,” *Revista Română de Geografie Politică* [Romanian Journal of Political Geography] XI-1 (2009): 17.

<sup>5</sup> Mircea Brie and Dana Pantea, “The Social Frontiers of Europe,” *Eurolimes* 17, *The Social Frontiers of Europe*, ed. Mircea Brie et al. (Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2014), 5-7; Mircea Brie and Ioan Horga, “The European Union External Border. An Epistemological Approach,” *Revista Română de Geografie Politică* [Romanian Journal of Political Geography] XI-1 (2009): 15-31; Ioan Horga and Mircea Brie, “Europe: A Cultural Border or a Geo-cultural Archipelago,” *Eurolimes* 5, *Religious Frontiers of Europe*, ed. Sorin Şipoş et al. (Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2010), 155-169.

<sup>6</sup> Ioan Horga and Ariane Landuyt, “Communicating the EU Policies beyond the / Its Borders,” in *Communicating the EU Policies beyond the Borders*, ed. Ioan Horga et al. (Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2013), 7.

<sup>7</sup> Duenas Vinuesa, 8.

setting near the site of the ancient Greek city Tyras, which was founded about 600 B.C. by colonists from Miletus.

**Geographical position.** Tiraspol is situated on the left bank of the Dniester River. Latitude value is 46.84028 and longitude value is 29.64333. The distance between Tiraspol and the mouth of the Dniester River is about ten kilometres. Tiraspol has a mild weather, a humid continental climate with warm summers (with average temperatures around 21°C) and cold winters (with average temperatures around – 3°C). Average precipitation is nearly 500 mm per year.

**Legal status of Tiraspol.** Tiraspol is internationally recognised as a Moldovan city located in the Eastern part of the country, being the second largest city in Moldova. Article 110, Administrative-territorial organisation of Moldovan Constitution stipulates that “(2) Places on the left bank of the Dniester River may be assigned special forms and conditions of autonomy according to the special statutory provisions adopted by organic law”<sup>8</sup>. During a two decades period, the Moldovan Parliament has not legislated yet on the status of Tiraspol and Transnistria. The *status quo* of the region is uncertain from the legal point of view.

*De facto*, Tiraspol is the capital and administrative centre of the secessionist unrecognised region of Transnistria backed by Russian authorities. Tiraspol has its own red and green flag with diagonal blue and yellow waves of the river, which are separated by white colour.

Tiraspol has its own coat-of-arms that is a shield in red, yellow and green colours, depicting the river with the symbols of grapes and industry on the sides. The symbols refer to the city’s wine and light industries. The inscription of the year 1792 relates to Alexander Suvorov’s military campaign in the Balkans admittedly founding the city even it has a more ancient history.

**History and people.** Since ancient times Romanian Moldovans have inhabited the lands beyond the Dniester River. In 1455 the Moldovans govern the Lerici fortress situated near the mouth of the Dnieper River. The Moldovan flag with a buffalo head had waved above this garrison, announcing merchants who reached this part of the world that the fortress is Moldovan and customs taxes are paid to Moldovan rulers.

The region between the Dniester River and the Bug River would be called until after 1810 the Oceacov region, its administrative centre being the town of Oceacov, which the Moldovans would call Vozia and the foreigners considered it a part of Moldova. Travellers include Oceacov in Moldova, for example, Gian Lorenzo d’Anania, an Italian theologian and cosmographer, in his book *Universal System of the World of Cosmography* (Venice, 1596); Giovanni Botero in *Universal Relations* (Venice, 1596); Giovanni Antonio Magini in his *Two Wallachias* etc.<sup>9</sup>. Travellers who pass through Oceacov talk about it as a Moldovan town, noting its numerous Moldovan population.

In the sixteenth century the territory between the Dniester and the Dnieper was part of Lithuania; as well as Lithuanians were not enough to fill the huge space between the Baltic and Black Seas, they allow the displacement of the Moldovans over the Dniester. In those times Ukrainians had lived around the Don and the bends of Dnieper near its sills. One of the biggest sills of the Dnieper was called Voloshki that is Moldovan. In the following centuries, the lower part of Dubăsari below was called the Edisan Country, the

<sup>8</sup> “Constituția Republicii Moldova,” [Constitution of the Republic of Moldova] *Monitorul Oficial* [Official Journal] 1 (1994): Art. 110.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *Călători străini despre Țările Române* [Foreign travellers about Romanian countries], ed. Maria Holban (București: Editura Științifică, 1968).

pastures of the Nogai Tatars and the upper part was called Podolia and was a part of Poland.

Schollars consider that the Moldovan population is actually attested in the steppe between the Dniester and the Bug earlier than other peoples. The Moldovans are the oldest in these parts. The Moldovans are native inhabitants of this land. Until 1792 the towns beyond the Dniester bear Moldovan names: Balta, Nani (which became Ananiev), Ocna, Bârză (Birzula), Movilău (Mogilev-Podolsky), Moldovca, Dubăsari, Râmnița (Râbnița), Vozia (Oceacov) Moldovanca around which Odessa would rise, Sucleia (Tiraspol). All travellers who cross the space between the Dniester and the Bug till 1792 speak of Moldovan and Tartar localities and none mentions Russian or Ukrainian villages. What creeps from time to time in the old chronicles is that these villages were systematically burned by the Cossacks who arrived from the other bank of the Dnieper sills. Foreign travellers crossing the space between the Dniester and the Bug in the medieval period speak of it as a continuation of Moldova and none as a continuation of Russia. After 1791, when the Tatars are withdrawn in Crimea, the Moldovans remain for years the only inhabitants of these extensive plains.

In 1792 Catherine II reached with her army the Bug. The Tatar country, Edisan, with the later Tiraspol, was conquered by the Russians in 1792. The next year Russia will also occupy the upper Transnistria, called Podolia after the second division of Poland.

In 1792, Tiraspol was just a Moldovan village, Sucleia, located on lands of the Moldovan nobleman. Until 1792 Tiraspol had a hundred percent Moldovan population. Catherine II ordered Field Marshal Suvorov to think about a new strategic plan for the defence of the new border by potential invasions from the other side of the Dniester. Suvorov developed this plan, which was accepted and Petersburg. Fortress construction began on June 22 (July 6) in 1793 and completed at the end of 1795. The fortress was built according to all rules of fortifications. Initially, according to the project, the fortress had to look like a rectangular building and finally to take the shape of a building with eight corners / bastions. On the territory of the fortress it was built the church dedicated to Saint Andrew, three parks of artillery, gunpowder cellars, barracks, military hospital, a house for commander, stables for horses. The fortress was provided with the most modern weapons the Russian army was equipped to keep defence in the event of a potential threat by the Turks.

The fortress of Tiraspol, which had three gates, was built by Moldovan volunteers, who served in Suvorov's army, not on a waste place, but on the place of a Moldovan fishers' village, Sucleia Veche (Old Sucleia), an ancient settlement<sup>10</sup>. Why here? It's simple. On the opposite bank it was Tighina, the strong Moldovan fortress, occupied by the Turks and called by them Bender with the customs across the Dniester; on many occasions the Turks and Tatars crossed the river and devastated the Moldovan village.

The fortress was built with the help of Moldovans here, hoping to find refuge in eventual Turkish-Tatar attacks. The fortress is called Sucleia de Mijloc, i.e. the Middle Fortress; then, on January 27, 1795, after an imperial order, the burg of Sucleia is called Tiraspol, the city on Tyras, the old Greek name, and receives a town status. In 1795 the town's population was more than 2500 people<sup>11</sup>.

The Military Congress of October 21-28, 1917, which took place in Chișinău where the autonomy of Bessarabia was declared, the Transnistrian representatives asked not to be left: "Our brothers and our kins that we Moldovans are of the same blood, whom

<sup>10</sup> Nicolae Dabija, *Moldova de peste Nistru – vechi pământ strămoșesc* [Moldova beyond the Dniester – old ancestors' land] (Chișinău: Hyperion, 1990), 19.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

would you leave us, Moldovans who are torn from Bessarabia's bone and live on the other side of the Dniester? Brethren, let us not forget us not?"<sup>12</sup>. Transnistrian Moldovans decided to organise a congress of their own in Tiraspol. The first Congress of Moldovans of the other side of Dniester took place on December 17-18, 1917. At the Congress, the Country's Council delegate, G. Mare, handed Transnistrian Moldovans the three-coloured flag saying, "This is the flag of our Romanian nation and we all fight for victory in these times of great changes. Our nation that has so far pressed by foreigners must not to be henceforth anyone's slave. Long live our whole nation". On the second day of the Congress, everybody took pictures with the three-coloured flag. The delegates ask for unification of Transnistria with Bessarabia. "We want to be united with Bessarabia", said the speakers. They also want the language of instruction to be their mother tongue; court's trials to be held in the "language of the people"; to have medical assistants etc.<sup>13</sup> But in the four years of civil war and afterwards firstborn Congress delegates of Moldovans were mostly assassinated as traitors. On October 12, 1924, as a sign of Moldovan presence in Transnistria, the Stalinist regime decided to create in the western part of the territory between the Bug and the Dniester the Moldovan Autonomous Republic with the administrative centre in Balta, in the composition of the Ukrainian SSR. The newly created Republic had 11 districts with a population of 545 500 inhabitants. From 1929 the new capital of the republic became Tiraspol.

Moldovan Pedagogical Institute, Moldovan Institute for Teachers' Training, Moldovan Institute for Horticulture and Viticulture, theatres, Moldovan schools, artistic groups, creative unions (including the Writers' Union founded in 1934 and assassinations of its members in the coming years), Moldovan newspapers, publishing houses, libraries etc., all these were suggesting that Tiraspol was a Moldovan capital, that it contributed the way it could to the development of the Left Dniester Moldovan people's culture. In 1940, the capital was moved to Chişinău together with its administration and the majority of inhabitants.

Especially beginning with 1917, Transnistria was the object of a policy of denationalisation, Russification and colonisation. At the moment when the Romanian administration exerted its competences between the Dniester and the Bug the Moldovan population was about 250,000 out of the total of 1,200,000 (August 19th 1941)<sup>14</sup>. Most Moldovans lived in the villages around the Dniester. Nicolae Iorga describes Moldovan settlements according to a German map (Gotha) in 1917 as "a series of meanderings to North-East from Dubăsari and outspreading across Balta to Sofievca, a compact mass, which passes by Grigoriopol in the Southern part, (...) leading to the other colony from the time of Catherine II, Tiraspol, to lengthen afterwards until Maiac of the Dniester estuary, throwing a strand towards the Northeast. All these without large patches, which are spread the territory across the Bug, too"<sup>15</sup>.

Transnistrian Moldovan population was thinned by the Soviets through deportations and after the outbreak of World War II – by evacuations. In 1941 there were 89 Moldovan villages (24 in Râbnîţa district, 5 in Balta district, 12 in Ananiev district, 29 in Dubăsari, 3 in Golta district, 13 in Tiraspol district, 1 in Berezovca district and 2 in

---

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Olivian Verenca, *Administrația civilă română în Transnistria* [Romanian civil administration in Transnistria] (Chişinău: Editura Universitas, 1993), 33.

<sup>15</sup> Nicolae Iorga, *Românii de peste Nistru* [Romanians beyond the Dniester] (Bucureşti: Editura Excelsior, 1990), 28.

Ovideopol district). There were 50 mixed villages (with Russians, Ukrainians) and 36 villages with the population of other ethnic groups, but where there were living Moldovans as well, about 2,000 families<sup>16</sup>. Tiraspol was a county of exclusively Romanian population, excepting the town of Tiraspol that in 1905 had not a one hundred percent Romanian population. The ethnic structure of Tiraspol developed as follows: in 1897, Russians - 44.3%, Hebrews - 27.1%, Ukrainian - 11.7%, and Moldovans - 11.4%<sup>17</sup>; in 1926, Russians - 54.8%, Hebrews - 29.4%, Ukrainians - 11.9%, Moldovans - 1.4%<sup>18</sup>; in 1989, Russians - 41.3%, Ukrainians - 32.2%, Moldovans - 17.6%<sup>19</sup>.

On June 28, 1940, the USSR occupied and annexed Bessarabia (process ended on July 3, 1940). The occupation of Bessarabia by the USSR took place as a result of signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939. After drawing the new border lines on November 4, 1940, the strip of Transnistria became a whole with the newly created Moldovan Republic on August 2, 1940. The decision of border tracing was based on the ethnic criterion. Moldovan Republic, established by the occupation regime on the territory of Bessarabia, was deprived of Ismail, Akkerman, and Hotin counties under the pretext that the Ukrainian population would prevail numerically and received in exchange a strip of Moldovan territory of Transnistria where the Moldovan population was a majoritary one.

**Transnistrian “Conflict”.** Tiraspol has a special place in the Transnistrian war or the Dniester war, Chișinău officials preferring a more neutral terminology, the Dniester military conflict or warfare to defend the integrity and independence of Moldova (1991-1992). Tensions between Chișinău and Tiraspol, which marked the start of the secessionist conflict in Transnistria, began long before March 2, 1992, the official date of commencement of the Transnistrian war.

It is senseless to come back again to the chronology of events, which are very well described by historians. Moreover, it is not the design of this research. In fact, it is not a conflict, Transnistria is an occupied Moldovan territory by Russian troops that instituted and have supported the so-called Tiraspol administration in the geopolitical games of Russia so far.

### ***International and cross-border relations***

Tiraspol's international relations are relatively scarce. Tiraspol is the member in the “International Assembly of CIS Countries’ Capitals and Big Cities” (MAG), the “Black Sea Capitals’ Association” (BSCA). Tiraspol hosts several international organisations: Office to OSCE Mission in Moldova and other organisations.

There are also consulates of the following countries – Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus – and of the following unrecognised secessionist entities – Abkhazia / Georgia, South Ossetia / Georgia. Another dimension of international relations is town twinning. Tiraspol has twinned with the following cities: Bălți, Comrat (Moldova); Eilenburg (Germany); Trondheim (Norway); Odessa, Ternopol, Mykolaiv, Ismail, Belgorod, Kherson, Cherkassy (Ukraine); Volgograd, Kaluga, Kursk, Severodvinsk (Russia); Minsk (Belarus); Sukhumi (Abkhazia / Georgia); Tskhinvali (South Ossetia / Georgia).

---

<sup>16</sup> Verenca, 33.

<sup>17</sup> Constantin Ungureanu, “Populația R.A.S.S. Moldovenești (1924-1940)” [Population of MASSR (1924-1940)], *Caiete de istorie* [Notebooks of history] 12 (2004): 10.

<sup>18</sup> Constantin Ungureanu, “Populația Transnistriei (1926-1989)” [Population of Transnistria (1926-1989)], *Destin românesc* [Romanian destiny] 3-4 (2003): 115.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. 133; Victor Bârsan, *Masacrul inocenților* [Massacre of the innocents] (București: Editura Fundației Culturale Române, 1993), 20.

It is worth mentioning that the international relations of Tiraspol are primarily oriented towards other secessionist regions and Eastern Slavic countries, thus limiting deliberately the opportunities to develop open cooperation with other parts of the continent and of the world. Tiraspol imports top foreign relations from far Eastern Europe that are self-destructive for it and the whole region. Tiraspol is to focus on peace-building strategy to avoid geopolitical targeting that is totally harmful.

Despite the socio-economic function of border<sup>20</sup>, Tiraspol seems to be reluctant in developing cross-border relations with Ukrainian adjacent regions. The situation reflects that the conflict “is now sustained by political and economic factors”<sup>21</sup> of the distant supporter. The population of Tiraspol and Transnistria has sceptical attitude on cross-border cooperation. Cross-border cooperation is made impossible without the “green light” or at least tolerance of Tiraspol’s political class. Probably, peace-building and reconciliation activities are developed in which NGOs and people play an important role. Cross-border cooperation is limited to personal contacts in various areas. The discussion forums of young people are developed by older and newer NGOs in the region thus establishing bridges of communication.

Intergovernmental cooperation went down in 2006 without any light of favourable change in the future. The working groups have had multiple informal meetings with no immediate tangible results for further necessary negotiations. The year 2012 marked a stage in resetting confidence-building policy with a special focus on socio-economic issues. After a considerable break the freight train started to circulate from Moldova to Ukraine via Transnistria. A couple of bridges connecting the banks of the Dniester River still remain closed borderlanders and international travel. The situation of Romanian schools in Transnistria is uncertain yet. Upgraded telephone connectivity lacks openness. The secessionist Tiraspol administration promotes import taxes for Moldovan and Ukrainian goods, thus paving the path of an isolationist policy towards cross-border cooperation. The provisions are not applicable, for example, for Russian goods.

A visible cross-border cooperation project is the Dniester Euroregion, co-financed by the European Union. In fact the Dniester Euroregion is an association of local authorities of Moldova and Ukraine. The Dniester Euroregion is formed by Vinnitsa Region (Ukraine) and seven Moldovan districts: Ocnița, Dondușeni, Soroca, Rezina, Florești, Șoldănești, Dubăsari (two Transnistrian districts, Camenca and Rîbnița, being under negotiations). The Dniester Euroregion covers a territory of 34,218 km<sup>2</sup> and a population of 2,05 million people. The goal of the Dniester Euroregion is “the implementation of programs for harmonised and complex development of territories adjacent to the river Dniester”<sup>22</sup>. The Dniester Euroregion has the following objectives: “organization, coordination and developing relations in the sphere of economy, science, education, culture, tourism, sport; implementation of joint projects concerning environmental protection, ecological improvement of Dniester river basin; realization of common cross-border investment projects; implementation of regional projects (programs) for reducing unemployment among the population of border areas by increasing the

<sup>20</sup> Abel Polese, “The Socio-Economic Function of Borders, Evidence from EU Neighbourhood Countries,” *Eurolimes* 16, *Cross-border Governance and the Borders Evolutions*, ed. Alina Stoica et al. (Oradea: Oradea University Press, Autumn 2013), 40-49.

<sup>21</sup> Donnacha O. Beachain, “The Role of the EU and the OSCE in Promoting Security and Cooperation in the South Caucasus and Moldova,” in *Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus*, ed. Ayça Ergün and Hamlet Isaxanlı (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2013), 52.

<sup>22</sup> Dniester Euroregion, “About us,” accessed June 26, 2015, <http://www.dniester.eu/en/479>.

economic potential; organization of contacts with international organizations, funds, institutes, agencies and other organizations”<sup>23</sup>. Definitely, the Dniester Euroregion focuses on joint cross-border projects.

Among the partners can be mentioned the following institutions: Businessmen Club (Ukraine), Dondușeni Council (Moldova), Dubăsari Council (Moldova), EUBAM (EU), Florești Council (Moldova), Institute for Development and Expertise of Projects (Moldova), Institute for Stability and Development (Czech Republic), **International Centre for Democratic Transition (Hungary)**, Ocnița Council (Moldova), PACT (USA), Rezina Council (Moldova), Șoldănești Council (Moldova), Soroca Council (Moldova), Ukraine-Poland-Germany International Society (Ukraine), Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms (Ukraine), USAID (USA), Vinnitsa National Technical University (Ukraine), Vinnitsa Regional Association of Local Authorities (Ukraine), Vinnitsa Regional Council (Ukraine), Vinnitsa Regional State Administration (Ukraine).

The framework of the Dniester Euroregion reveals attractiveness both for Moldovan and Ukrainian borderlands, including the secessionist Transnistrian region with a favourable geographical position between the Moldovan districts and the Ukrainian region to be explored for the benefit of all borderlanders.

**Fig. 1.** *The Dniester Euroregion.*



**Source:** Dniester Euroregion, “About us,” accessed June 26, 2015, <http://www.dniester.eu/en/479>.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.



**EUBAM Mission.** Transnistria is included in the border monitoring by the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM). The EUBAM was established in 2005 with the mission “to make a sustainable contribution to the development of border-management procedures that meet European Union standards and serve the legitimate needs of Moldovan and Ukrainian citizens, travellers, and trade, which in turn enhances regional security and supports economic development”<sup>24</sup> *in response to illicit cross-border activities. The EUBAM is fully funded by the European Union within the framework of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, and with the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The EUBAM has advisory and technical competences to enhance border management capacities for 1,222 km state frontier, consisting of 955 km of “green” (land) border and 267 km of “blue” (river) border out of the same border 453 km not helped by the secessionist region of Transnistria under Tiraspol control. The EUBAM has six field offices, 3 on the Moldovan side and 3 on the Ukrainian side, including the adjacent Transnistria.*

The EUBAM aims to “contribute to enhancing the overall border and customs management capacities and the abilities of Moldova and Ukraine to fight against cross border and organised crime and to approximate the standards of the border and law enforcement authorities to those of the EU; assist Moldova and Ukraine in fulfilling their commitments under the European Neighbourhood Policy Action plans and partnership cooperation agreements; contribute to a peaceful resolution of the Transnistrian conflict”<sup>25</sup>.

The EUBAM mandate allows to “be present and observe customs clearance and border guard checks; (...) examine border control documents and records (including computerised data); provide assistance in preventing smuggling of persons and goods; request the re-examination and re-assessment of any consignment of goods already processed; make unannounced visits to any locations on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, including border units, customs posts, offices of transit, inland police stations, revenue accounting offices and along transit routes; move freely within the territories of Moldova and Ukraine; use all roads and bridges without payment of taxes and dues; cross the Moldovan-Ukrainian state border with only strictly necessary control and without any delay; have access to appropriate telecommunications equipment; import and export goods which are for official use of the Mission”<sup>26</sup>.

Moldovan and Ukrainian officials are responsible to “appoint senior members of their customs and border administrations to liaise with the Mission, and ensure that appropriately qualified staff are available to work alongside the Mission staff; authorize Mission staff to request the head of the relevant customs or border unit to order the re-examination of certain cargoes and passengers in case of doubt; authorize Mission staff to perform unannounced inspections at all relevant locations, including border crossing points, inland customs houses, transit points and locations along the ‘green’ and ‘blue’ border; make available basic office facilities for the local offices of the Mission; provide all possible assistance to solve unforeseen problems which the Mission may face”<sup>27</sup>.

The legal background for the EUBAM consists of the following acts: Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission, the Government of the Republic of Moldova and the Government of Ukraine on the European Commission

<sup>24</sup> EUBAM, “Background,” accessed March 26, 2015, <http://www.eubam.org/en/about/overview>.

<sup>25</sup> EUBAM, “Mandate,” accessed March 26, 2015, [http://www.eubam.org/en/about/what\\_we\\_do](http://www.eubam.org/en/about/what_we_do).

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

Border Assistance Mission to the Republic of Moldova and to Ukraine, 10/07/2005; European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans between the EU and Moldova and between the EU and Ukraine; Partnership and Cooperation Agreements between the EU and Moldova and between EU and Ukraine; Remarks by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, 12/02/2005; EUBAM – Declaration by the Presidency of the European Union, 11/30/2005; Council Joint Action 2005/776/CFSP of 7 November 2005 amending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for Moldova; The Commission's RRM financing decision on the establishment of EUBAM C(2005) 4231 of 28 October 2005; The information note on the establishment of EUBAM from the Commission to the Council, 10/27/2005; Council Regulation (EC) 381 of 26/2/2001 establishing the Rapid Reaction Mechanism<sup>28</sup>.

The cross-border cooperation between the EUBAM, Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities help enormously to prevent Tiraspol and the secessionist region of Transnistria in becoming an irrecoverable black hole of Europe. In this way, the EUBAM helps Tiraspol and the secessionist region of Transnistria to develop confidence-building measures in the borderland and among the borderlanders. Moreover, the EUBAM works together with competent regional actors for regional security and economic development in this area of Eastern Europe.

### ***Final remarks***

Tiraspol – as a border city – is characterised by very complex and complicated processes since its foundation. First, geographically and culturally it is the most Eastern city of Latinity. Such situation has given birth to life-death clash between civilisations that have lived or have migrated through this space. Secondly, the city belongs to a secessionist territory with dislocated foreign occupation troops, i.e. Russian soldiers neither have a mandate according to international law nor Moldovan national law. It jeopardizes the competitive development of the city and of the secessionist territory in general. At the same time, it raises security issues in the region that presume more actors, especially international actors. Thirdly, it is situated at the Eastern border space of the European Union that implies real opportunities of development and changes for better via cross-border cooperation.

Considering global competition for the European Union, professor Ioan Horga underlines the crucial importance of the relationships that are build outside at European borders, especially with Eastern partners: “the European Union should not allow a loss in interest for the Europeanisation process from the Eastern partners. However, this is a mutual relationship (...). Immediate and tangible results in different areas are necessary in order to create a new impetus in this relationship. Visa facilitation and trade privilege s can become motivations for the Eastern partners, because they can offer tangible solutions for citizens”<sup>29</sup>.

Immediate and tangible tools of EU programmes can contribute to sustainable development of Tiraspol as a border city, on the one hand. But, on the other hand, Tiraspol

---

<sup>28</sup> EUBAM, “Legal Basis,” accessed March 26, 2015, [http://www.eubam.org/en/knowledge/legal\\_basis](http://www.eubam.org/en/knowledge/legal_basis).

<sup>29</sup> Ioan Horga, “European Union between the Constraint of Borders and Global Competition,” in *European Union between the Constraint of the Borders and Global Competition*, ed. Ioan Horga and Adrian-Claudiu Popoviciu, supplement of *Eurolimes* (Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2011), 7.

has to share the same openness to international partners in order to build a space of security, peace and prosperity in the region.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bârsan, Victor. *Masacrul inocenților* [Massacre of the innocents]. București: Editura Fundației Culturale Române, 1993.
- Beachain, Donnacha O. "The Role of the EU and the OSCE in Promoting Security and Cooperation in the South Caucasus and Moldova." In *Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus*, edited by Ayca Ergun and Hamlet Isaxanli, 42-57. Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2013.
- Brie, Mircea, and Ioan Horga. "The European Union External Border. An Epistemological Approach." *Revista Română de Geografie Politică* [Romanian Journal of Political Geography] XI-1 (2009): 15-31.
- Brie, Mircea, and Dana Pantea. "The Social Frontiers of Europe." *Eurolimes* 17, *The Social Frontiers of Europe*, ed. Mircea Brie, Klára Czimre, and Bogumiła Mucha-Leszko, 5-7. Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2014.
- Călători străini despre Țările Române* [Foreign travellers about Romanian Countries], edited by Maria Holban. București: Editura Științifică, 1968.
- "Constituția Republicii Moldova" [Constitution of the Republic of Moldova]. *Monitorul Oficial* [Official Journal] 1 (1994).
- Dabija, Nicolae. *Moldova de peste Nistru – vechi pământ strămoșesc* [Moldova beyond the Dniester – old ancestors' land]. Chișinău: Hyperion, 1990.
- Dniester Euroregion. "About us." Accessed June 26, 2015. <http://www.dniester.eu/en/479>.
- Duenas Vinuesa, Maria. "Border Studies: An Annotated List of Cultural and Academic Web Sources." *Revista Estudios Ingleses* 16 [Journal of English Studies] (2003): 6-34.
- EUBAM. "Background." Accessed March 26, 2015. <http://www.eubam.org/en/about/overview>.
- EUBAM. "Mandate." Accessed March 26, 2015. [http://www.eubam.org/en/about/what\\_we\\_do](http://www.eubam.org/en/about/what_we_do).
- EUBAM. "Legal Basis." Accessed March 26, 2015. [http://www.eubam.org/en/knowledge/legal\\_basis](http://www.eubam.org/en/knowledge/legal_basis).
- Horga, Ioan, and Mircea Brie. "Europe: A Cultural Border or a Geo-cultural Archipelago." *Eurolimes* 5, *Religious Frontiers of Europe*, edited by Sorin Șipoș, Enrique Banus, and Károly Kocsis, 155-169. Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2010.
- Horga, Ioan. "European Union between the Constraint of Borders and Global Competition." In *European Union between the Constraint of the Borders and Global Competition*, edited by Ioan Horga and Adrian-Claudiu Popoviciu, supplement of *Eurolimes* (2011), 5-12.
- Horga, Ioan, and Ariane Landuyt. "Communicating the EU Policies beyond the / Its Borders." In *Communicating the EU Policies beyond the Borders*, edited by Ioan Horga, and Ariane Landuyt, 5-22. Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2013.
- Iorga, Nicolae. *Românii de peste Nistru* [Romanians beyond the Dniester]. București: Editura Excelsior, 1990.
- Polese, Abel. "The Socio-Economic Function of Borders, Evidence from EU Neighbourhood Countries." *Eurolimes* 16, *Cross-border Governance and the*

*Borders Evolutions*, edited by Alina Stoica, Carlos E. Pacheco-Amaral, István Süllý-Zakar, 40-49. Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2013.

Ungureanu, Constantin. "Populația R.A.S.S. Moldovenești (1924-1940)" [Population of MASSR (1924-1940)]. *Caiete de istorie* [Notebooks of history] 12 (2004): 6-12.

Ungureanu, Constantin. "Populația Transnistriei (1926-1989)" [Population of Transnistria (1926-1989)]. *Destin românesc* [Romanian destiny] 3-4 (2003): 114-142.

Verenca, Olivian. *Administrația civilă română în Transnistria* [Romanian civil administration in Transnistria]. Chișinău: Editura Universitas, 1993.

## **IV. Focus**

**Ioan HORGA** (Oradea) and **Ana-Maria COSTEA** (Bucharest)  
◄► *Border / Frontier Cities: Between Communication and  
Fragmentation*



# Border / Frontier Cities: Between Communication and Fragmentation

Ioan HORGA<sup>1</sup>  
Ana Maria COSTEA<sup>2</sup>

**Abstract.** *The globalisation phenomenon led to the relaxation of borders all over the world. But, at the same time it generated the appearance of invisible frontiers which may create deeper fragmentations inside the society. Apart from the national states, the cities are also markers of identity and places where the ethnic, religious, social, economic differences are more sensible. The present article tackles the issue of frontier / border cities in order to highlight the differences between them and to analyse how the border / frontier affect their development.*

**Key words:** *city, border, frontier, the EU, globalisation*

## Introduction

Although we live in a globalised world, thus an interconnected and even frontier less society, borders are now more important than ever. They stand as geographical, physical delimitations between two national states or two international identities (for example the frontier between Romania and the Republic of Moldova is also the frontier between the EU and Moldova). They are also identity markers, since within the borders we can speak about different identities that separate the ones from inside from the ones from outside. One example in this sense can be the Ukrainian crisis which once again emphasised the delimitation between the East and the West or between the EUropeans and non-EUropeans. Once it erupted, it put pressure on the securitisation of the EU's and NATO's external frontiers that were preoccupied for the national security of their member states. Another example in the case of the EU's external borders is the current migrants' crisis from the Middle East, especially Syria that search for asylum in the EU. Given the aforementioned examples, the EU was more than once accused of being a fortress that develops visible and invisible fences for the non-EU citizens. Nowadays, the regional dynamics reached a critical point and the migrants are putting the EU in face of a crucial option in which its member states have to decide their immediate and medium strategies regarding the thousands of migrants' families that try to enter its borders. This decision is even more difficult to take taking into consideration the EU's image as a normative power that fights for human rights protection. At the same time, the organisation comes with another challenge, the one of internal frontiers that created different identities even from within<sup>3</sup>. On one hand, we have the traditional national borders that delimit the national sovereignty of a member state, and on the other, there is the Euro zone's frontier that

---

<sup>1</sup> PhD, Professor at the University of Oradea, co-director of the Institute for the Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen. E-mail: ihorga@uoradea.ro.

<sup>2</sup> PhD, SNSPA Bucharest, E-mail: anamariaghimis@yahoo.com.

<sup>3</sup> Cristina-Maria Dogot and Ioan Horga, "Enlargement Process, Classic Geopolitics, and EU Internal Priorities," in *Eurolimes 14, Enlargements, Borders and the Changes of EU Political Priorities*, ed. Ariane Landuyt et al. (Oradea: Oradea University Press/Bruylant, Autumn 2012), 161-180.

separates the countries that use the Euro as their currency from the others that did not adopt the euro yet by choice or by objective, economical and procedural reasons. The EU also presents itself with the Schengen area, a region in which the national control borders are lifted. To all these over layered identities, the national states confront themselves with their internal frontiers / limits which are caused by multiple reasons like: economic disparities, social exclusion / inclusion, and ethnic characteristics. Last, but not least, we cannot exclude from this analysis the Article 4 of the Lisbon Treaty which clearly stipulates the competences of the Member states to which the EU is not interfering. Among them the national security, the local and the regional self-government remain in the sole exclusive responsibility of the Member states, adding a new layer to the aforementioned identities<sup>4</sup>.

To these national and organisational borders / frontiers, there can be added the transversal ones, which go beyond the national jurisdiction<sup>5</sup>. An example in this sense could be the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights which is administered by the World Trade Organization and it allows certain professionals to move beyond the national borders. But this liberty creates a new frontier which is even harder to be penetrated than the actual fences from certain national borders because for example poor migrants or the asylum seekers do not benefit from this opportunity, creating thus a separation line between the first group and the last<sup>6</sup>. This is also the case of the current migrant crisis that cannot enter the EU who are clearly separated from the professionals that are coming from the Middle East into Europe.

The present article will tackle the issue of borders / frontiers in the European continent, making references and analysing different meanings of the two concepts both internally and externally. The importance of the subject lays in the fact that the existence of borders / frontiers generates a different even an antagonistic position between us and them, fact that within a state and more importantly, within a city creates divisions that affects the social, economic and political development and stability of that particular city. The frontier cities present themselves with the characteristic of the states in which they are located, but also some of the ones that are present beyond the state's national borders.

### ***Borders and frontiers***

According to the common meaning, the border and the frontier are two concepts which are often confused in different languages around the globe. For example in English the terms are "frontier, boundary, borderland, limit; in French they are la frontière, la limite, fins and confins; in Italian la frontiera, il confine, termini; in Spanish la frontera, el limite, el confin; in German die Mark, die Grenze (and the derivatives Grenzgebiet, Grenzraum); in Slavic (e.g. Polish) granica ('border') and pogranicze ('borderland'), miedza ('baulk', absorbed into Hungarian as megye), rubież ('frontier'), kresy ('ends, distant extent'), formerly also kraina (East-Slavic ukraj, ukraina, 'land on the outskirts, on

<sup>4</sup> *The Lisbon Treaty of the European Union*, Article 4, accessed August 3, 2015, <http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-european-union-and-comments/title-1-common-provisions/5-article-4.html>.

<sup>5</sup> Ioan Horga, "Multilevel Governance (Mlg) and Subsidiary Principle in White Paper of Mlg of the Committee of the Region (CoR)," in *Regional and Cohesion Policy – Insights Into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design*, ed. Ioan Horga et al. (Debrecen University Press & Oradea University Press, 2011), 158-164.

<sup>6</sup> Saskia Sassen, "When the Center no Longer Holds: Cities as Frontier Zones," *Cities* (2012): 3, accessed August 3, 2015, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2012.05.007>.



the edge'”) and in Romanian graniță (border), frontier (frontier)<sup>7</sup>. All of them suggest the existence of a limit, of a demarcation point between *x* and *y*, but do not make the difference between border and frontier.

Although the concept of border makes more reference towards the geographical point of view and indicates the separation for security reasons and not only, since the Roman Empire it also implied the need for further cooperation or communication with the exterior: “Along history the borders didn't stop individuals and societies to communicate, communication didn't stop at the border, it was more a threshold where communication took place at a lower level. Inside and outside the borders there were different group identities which changed in size over time, changed their mentalities, their image about one another, while communicating<sup>8</sup>”. This need was accelerated over time given the complex interdependences that emerged between neighbouring states, especially since they developed what Barry Buzan called a regional security complex, a situation in which the security of one unit cannot be separated by the security of another<sup>9</sup>.

While the concept of border is generally used to highlight the geographical borders, the concept of frontier refers to other kinds of delimitation, such as the ethnic, political, religious, social ones. In order to highlight the difference between the two, during this study, we will analyse different cities from Europe, EU and non-EU ones.

The choice of analysing cities and not states is not by accident, since in our view they represent a new frontier zone, in which they have to deal with the internal conflicts, diversity and international vulnerabilities. Along history they had to tackle these issues and to become an integrated and functional city, so that they started to transform the actual military conflicts into opportunities of commerce and dialogue<sup>10</sup>. Examples in this sense can be the border cities, which must continue to be operational, although at inter-state level there are some diplomatic, political tensions (the Romania border city of Oradea and the Hungarian one of Debrecen<sup>11</sup>, that continue to have interactions despite the current diplomatic tension between Romania and Hungary<sup>12</sup>).

From an economic point of view, “these cities, whether in the global north or south have become a strategic frontier zone for global corporate capital. Much of the work of forcing deregulation, privatization, and new fiscal and monetary policies on the host governments had to do with creating the formal instruments to construct their equivalent of the old military “fort” of the historic frontier: the regulatory environment they need in

---

<sup>7</sup> Andrzej Janeczek, „Frontiers and Borderlands in Medieval Europe,” *Quaestiones Medii Aevi Novae* (2011): 8, accessed August 3, 2015, [http://vistulana.pl/uploads/files/Q16\\_wstep\\_introduction.pdf](http://vistulana.pl/uploads/files/Q16_wstep_introduction.pdf).

<sup>8</sup> Dana Pantea, “Cross Border Politics and Its Image in the European Union,” *Eurotimes* 4, *Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers*, ed. Gerard Delanty et al. (Oradea: Oradea University Press, Autumn 2007), 144-145.

<sup>9</sup> Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 2003), 44.

<sup>10</sup> Sassen, “When the Center,” 3.

<sup>11</sup> Ioan Horga and Constantin Vasile Țoca, “Sociological Research. Thinking the Future Together: The Debrecen+Oradea Cross-border Agglomeration,” in *Neighbours and Partners on the Two Sides of the Borders*, ed. István Süli-Zakar (Debrecen: University of Debrecen Press, 2008), 73-83.

<sup>12</sup> „Tensiunile diplomatice între România și Ungaria continuă. Ponta, mesaj dur pentru Budapesta” [The Diplomatic Tensions between Romania and Hungary continue. Ponta, tough message for Budapest], *Realitatea.net*, 11 August 2015, accessed august 20, 2015, [http://www.realitatea.net/tensiunile-diplomatice-intre-romania-si-ungaria-continua-ponta-mesaj-dur-pentru-budapesta\\_1766993.html](http://www.realitatea.net/tensiunile-diplomatice-intre-romania-si-ungaria-continua-ponta-mesaj-dur-pentru-budapesta_1766993.html).

city after city worldwide to ensure a global space of operations.”<sup>13</sup> Additionally these cities come with other frontiers from an economic point of view, like the custom control that checks the goods which are entering the respective city if they are not part of Schengen area or other likewise agreement.

From an identity point of view, large cities tend to create rather local identities, which may or may not diminish the ethnical tensions, especially in relation with other large cities. In general this is the case of capitals, since they encompass a large diversity of ethnic identities. At the same time, these cities, being at the median way between the national level and the local level, not so big as a country or as a region, but not so small as a medium and small city, represent an opportunity for the disadvantaged part of the population, since they “have also become a strategic frontier zone for those who lack power, those who are disadvantaged, outsiders, discriminated minorities”<sup>14</sup>.

At the other side, there will be analysed the border cities, the cities that are at the borderline between two states. Regarding these cities, there must be said, that unlike the frontier cities that create / present / develop invisible frontiers, nowadays the border cities tend to transform the geographical delimitation into an opportunity of cross-border cooperation. But this is a positive result if the regional setting is characterised by a high level of security and predictability. In this situation the neighbouring states does not necessarily cooperate with each other, but at the same time they do not form a regional security complex characterised by an enmity. An example in this sense could be the European Union member states and their border regions / cities. On the other side, we can witness a regional setting like the one between Afghanistan and Pakistan or the Middle East region especially Israel-Iran. Where in the first case we can discuss about the border city as a triggering factor for deeper cooperation and a space of diversity in the second one the border city represents vulnerability for the security of a state. At the same time given the low level of security, in the second case, the border cities are limited in their actions, since they do not attract investors (foreign or national) fact that has a negative effect over the local economy and thus under a spill over effect affects the social setting. Another important element of a border city is their relative large distance from the capital, fact that generally affects the financial distribution of resources and the concentration of investors and power too far away from them in order to have a positive effect. This distribution generated a relative isolation, but once the globalisation and the progressive opening of borders took place, new opportunities arose and new economic and social opportunities emerged<sup>15</sup>. In order to develop in a sustainable manner, border cities started to develop their own strategies by partnering with different local authorities from across the border so that they would transform themselves from “border cities” to “interface cities”<sup>16</sup>, so that the presence of border is no longer seen as a vulnerability in terms of security, but an asset that can take the form of different kinds of cooperation from infrastructure to socially, culturally based international projects.

<sup>13</sup> Saskia Sassen, “The City: Today’s Frontier Zone,” *Glocalism: Journal Of Culture, Politics and Innovation* (2014): 3.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Antoine Decoville et al., „Opportunities of Cross-border Cooperation between Small and Medium Cities in Europe,” *Report Written in the Frame of the Spatial Development Observatory, on Behalf of the Department of Spatial Planning and Development – Ministry of Sustainable Development and Infrastructure in Luxembourg*, LISER (2015): 6, accessed August 20, 2015, [http://www.dat.public.lu/eu-presidency/Events/Workshop-3/Opportunities-of-cross-border-cooperation-between-small-and-medium-cities-in-Europe-\\_LISER\\_.pdf](http://www.dat.public.lu/eu-presidency/Events/Workshop-3/Opportunities-of-cross-border-cooperation-between-small-and-medium-cities-in-Europe-_LISER_.pdf).

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

Next we will analyse the different types of border and frontier cities in order to emphasize the differences between them, the issues with which they confront themselves, the opportunities that arise, their effect over the national and regional security, etc. The distinction comes as a leitmotiv for the present study, since it offers the geographical / cultural / ethnical characteristics of a city. These elements affect in an automatically manner the development of that respective city. On one hand we will analyse the frontier cities, which often present internal frontiers that separate the city, and on the other we make reference to border cities, which have external frontiers that separates not only them from other cities, but two separate, independent, sovereign states. Hence, whereas the firsts have to look for internal solutions, but the latter must search for external ones in order to reach out their goals.

### ***Borders cities***

The European Union presented itself with new important opportunities regarding the border cities / regions. The four liberties (persons, capital, goods, and services) transformed the closed borders of its member states into an internal free market, which enhanced the bilateral and multilateral cooperation, not only between the states, but also between the cities.

The cross border cooperation was regularised through the Outline Convention of Madrid from 1980, which provided a legal basis for the agreements between the member states. According to Article 2 of the Convention, “transfrontier co-operation shall mean any concerted action designed to reinforce and foster neighbourly relations between territorial communities or authorities within the jurisdiction of two or more Contracting Parties and the conclusion of any agreement and arrangement necessary for this purpose”<sup>17</sup>. Another legal tool which enforced the importance of cross border cooperation is the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation from 2006, which represents the „first European cooperation structure with a legal personality defined by European Law”<sup>18</sup>. From its beginning it was designed to support and promote the cooperation between the EU member states at the level of: cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation, with the main objective of fostering the economic and social cohesion of the European territory<sup>19</sup>. At the level of implementation, from 2007 till 2014 there were implemented projects that amount approximately € 60 million<sup>20</sup>, fact that represents a relative negative dynamic of the initiative, given the large amount of domains in which the eligible actors can apply.

Within the next chapter we will analyse the following situations: cities divided by borders; cities which mark a border; cities which mark a border region and enclave cities.

### ***Cities divided by borders***

An example is this case could be the city of Nicosia. The capital of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia is divided between the North, that is the Turkish Cypriot and the

<sup>17</sup> “European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities,” Madrid, 21.V.1980, Article 2, accessed September 5, 2015, <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/106.htm>.

<sup>18</sup> “European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation,” accessed September 5, 2015, <https://portal.cor.europa.eu/egtc/about/Pages/What%20is%20the%20EGTC.aspx>.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Jürgen Pucher and Stefanie Zöchmann, „EGTC Monitoring Report 2014 Implementing the Strategy Europe 2020,” *Committee of Regions*, European Union (2015): 6, accessed September 5, 2015, [http://cor.europa.eu/en/documentation/studies/Documents/EGTC\\_MonitoringReport\\_2014.pdf](http://cor.europa.eu/en/documentation/studies/Documents/EGTC_MonitoringReport_2014.pdf).

South, which is inhabited by the Greek Cypriots. Whereas the latter is the capital of Cyprus and the place where the government is located, the north represents the capital of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, which declared its independency in 1983, but it was not recognized internationally. This division, which is enforced by the presence of the Turkish army in the north, led to major population dislocations: approximately 175.000 Greek Cypriots were displaced from the North, while 40.000 Turkish Cypriots from the south to the north. The tangible border of the city is represented by the Green Line, which was established in 1974 by the UN, and imposes physical crossing of the Greeks to the north and for the Turks to the south without special permission. This division tends to increase the already present antagonism between the majority (the Greeks) who feel threatened by the minority and the geographical neighbourhood with Turkey and the minority (the Turks) that feel threatened by the majority. In this way there will emerge a situation in which their ethnic identity is augmented by this dichotomy, no one agreeing to the *de facto* separation as an acceptable status quo, leaving no space for actual cooperation. The accent on the separation as a possible solution to the ethnic conflict is automatically affecting the development of the city, creating major discrepancies between the north and the south<sup>21</sup>.

#### *Cities which mark a border*

Giurgiu-Ruse, two cities that once were part of a single city belonging to the Bulgarian state, they are now two EU cities that are divided by the Danube. After Giurgiu became part of the Romanian state, the interactions between the two went to a much lower level. During the communist regime, the interactions increased to a moderated level, since there were people which crossed the border for shopping reasons. Neither the fact that in 2007 the two states became part of the EU changed the status quo<sup>22</sup>.

The main reasons may be:

- The lack of infrastructure, the bridge that connects the two cities being under construction for years, especially in the Romanian sector. In order to increase the interaction level both states wanted to construct a second bridge, but they did not agree on its position. On one side, Romania wanted to construct it near Constanta, so that people travelling it in their way towards Turkey or Greece should spend more time in Romania. On the other side, Bulgaria wanted to construct it near Sofia, for the same reasons<sup>23</sup>. In 2010 both states decided to build a bridge between Calafat and Vidin. Although the project met with several challenges, which put under question mark its development, it became operational and in 2014, especially, during the holiday's season, the bridge is crossed by approximately 7000 cars which travel towards Greece<sup>24</sup>.

- Immediately after their accession to the EU, we could identify numerous Bulgarian companies that tried to enter the Romanian market, the latter being four times

<sup>21</sup> Scott A. Bollens, “City and Soul. Sarajevo, Johannesburg, Jerusalem, Nicosia,” *CITY* 5, 2 (Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2001): 183-185.

<sup>22</sup> “Challenges of Cross Border Cooperation in Romania and Bulgaria,” 15 August 2011, accessed August 15, 2015, <https://criticalgeography.wordpress.com/2011/08/15/challenges-of-cross-border-cooperation-in-romania-and-bulgaria/>.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> „Trafic de trei ori mai intens pe podul Calafat-Vidin” [Three times more intense traffic on the Calafat-Vidin bridge], *Digi24*, 10 August 2014, accessed August 15, 2015, <http://www.digi24.ro/Stiri/Digi24/Actualitate/Stiri/Trafic+de+trei+ori+mai+intens+pe+podul+Calafat-Vidin>.

the size of Bulgaria's. But soon the economic crisis erupted and the Romanian economy depreciated enough so that they did not find enough opportunities to continue to invest<sup>25</sup>.

- The prices are relatively the same, so that cross-border shopping is not really profitable. Additionally, neither of the two states are part of the Schengen area<sup>26</sup>.

#### *Cities which mark a border region*

„Border regions are areas of contact between territorial systems with various political, cultural, economic and institutional heritages”<sup>27</sup>. As previously mentioned along history there were periods in which the borders were relatively impenetrable, fact that affected the development of these regions, since the flow of goods, persons, services, capital were relatively low. At the same time, being perceived as vulnerable points for the security of the state, these regions were not attracting enough investors. Moreover, as aforementioned, the capitals were attracting the highest degree of the GDP, the border regions lacking of a suitable degree of national investments. To all these economic and military security negative elements, the border regions were confronting with the different identities that existed along the border, thus “improving the feeling of the inhabitants to belong to a common territory is an important as well as complex task”<sup>28</sup>. These aspects started to change with the development of the European Union, moment in which its member states started to trust each other more, given the high level of economic integration and exchanges that were brought by the single market.

An example of border region could be the Bihor – Hajdú-Bihar Euroregion which has been created in 2002 by the County Council and the Self-governing Hajdú-Bihar<sup>29</sup>.

The main objectives of this Euroregion are: „to maintain and develop the relations of good neighbourhood; to identify the possible fields for cross-border cooperation; to organize and coordinate those activities that promote members’ socially, economically, culturally, educationally cooperation, to preserve their health, environment and tourism; to implement some precise programmes in the fields of common interest; to promote cooperation relations between the inhabitants and the specialists who work in different activity fields of common interest; to promote the cooperation of the Euroregion with other international organizations; to prepare together some projects in order to obtain financial funds from the European Union”<sup>30</sup>.

As it can be observed the objects start from the internal level of the region and end with the external one. Firstly, it emphasizes the necessity to create a suitable regional framework in which the parties find common interests and opportunities in several fields in which they can cooperate and only then, it promotes the cooperation between it and other regions, proposing a bottom-up approach that starts from the individual level.

---

<sup>25</sup> „Challenges of Cross Border Cooperation.”

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Decoville et al., 11.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> István Süli-Zakar, “The Role of the Euroregions and Eurometropolises in the Etherealization of the Borders in the Eastern Periphery of the European Union,” in *Eurotimes 7, Europe and the Neighbourhood*, ed. Dorin Ioan Dolghi et al. (Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2009), 139-148.

<sup>30</sup> Luminița Șoproni, „The Romanian-Hungarian Cross-border Cooperation in the Regional Press of Bihor County,” in *Eurotimes 3, Media, Intercultural Dialogue and the New Frontiers of Europe*, ed. Fabienne Maron et al. (Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2007), accessed August 10, 2015, [http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/33758/ssoar-eurotimes-2007-3-soproni-The\\_Romanian\\_-\\_Hungarian\\_crossborder.pdf?sequence=1](http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/33758/ssoar-eurotimes-2007-3-soproni-The_Romanian_-_Hungarian_crossborder.pdf?sequence=1).

At the level of implementation, the aforementioned objectives were implemented within Bihor – Hajdú-Bihar Euroregion. In this sense, we can recall the “Cross-border values in Bihor-Hajdú-Bihar Euroregion” seminar, event that took place in both Romania and Hungary at the same time. The aim of the seminar was to bring together experts from both sides of the border so that they would propose recommendations for a deeper cooperation and communication levels at regional level<sup>31</sup>.

Although the cooperation between the cities comprising this border region is relatively new and their intensity is thus limited, the potential still exists, especially since, for example Oradea and Debrecen<sup>32</sup>, are medium size cities (approximately 200 000 residents), hence encompass a large number of individuals and that they are relatively close to each other (70 km between them). In terms of commuting, the fore mentioned numbers translated at the level of 2012, in a number of 6889 persons who passed the border from Romania to Hungary in order work and 423 from Hungary to Romania. This large difference is explainable by Romania’s lower level of economic development and by the fact that a large part of the workers from Romania where belonging to the Hungarian minority, for the latter group being much easier to find work since they do not meet the language barrier, as in the case of the Hungarians in Romania<sup>33</sup>. This aspect could be dealt with if the Hungarians that were coming to Romania to work were going to Harghita or Covasna, two counties where the official language of the local administration is both Romanian and Hungarian. At the same time the aforementioned counties are ones of the poorest from Romania<sup>34</sup>.

Possible impediments for further cooperation are represented by the facts that: the border dividing the two cities is a non-Schengen border, so that the cross-border of goods, capital, persons and services are still under EU’s border control procedures; the region’s authorities did not develop a territorial development strategy so that they lack a clear medium and long term vision. These impediments can be overcome by the fact that within Romania, there is a large number of Hungarian Minority which could contribute to the future deeper ties between the cities, hence creating common grounds on which they can develop future projects. An already implemented cooperation project are the public transportation lines that link Oradea to Debrecen, responding to the needs of people that cross the border very often or promoting the intensification of such actions<sup>35</sup>.

### *Enclave cities*

An enclave city could be represented by Kaliningrad, a city which was considered a German territory for approximately 700 years, until 1945 when it became part of the Soviet Union. At the level of population, as a traditional strategy, the Soviet authorities decided to deport the German residents. Thus, Kaliningrad was to be inhabited by a mix composed of Ukrainians, Russians and Belarusians. Soon the German architecture was destroyed and replaced by the Soviet style one and the city witnessed a military

---

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Luminița Șoproni and Ioan Horga, „The Economic Frontiers of Europe,” *Eurolimes* 8, *Europe and Its Economic Frontiers*, ed. Luminița Șoproni et al. (Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2009), 5-6.

<sup>33</sup> Decoville et al., 36.

<sup>34</sup> „BUSINESS CLUB. Cele mai îndatorate județe din România” [Business Club. The most indebted counties from Romania], *Digi24*, 2 March 2015, accessed 15 August 2015, <http://www.digi24.ro/Stiri/Digi24/Economie/Stiri/BUSINESS+CLUB+Cele+mai+indatorate+jude+te+din+Romania>.

<sup>35</sup> Decoville et al., 36.

isolation<sup>36</sup>. Nowadays this city is surrounded by two EU member states, Poland and Lithuania, hence it is on one hand isolated from the Russian mainland while on the other its residents need visa in order to enter the Polish and Lithuanian territories, even if their final destination is Russia.

Being ruptured from the Russian mainland, Kaliningrad is liable to enter in an economic isolation, since it also lacks the possibility to develop administrative independent bodies that will establish the necessary and stable policies and institutions, elements that are quintessential for foreign investors' attraction. Legally, „the Russian constitution does not precisely define the rights of the 89 federal regions to pursue independent economic and political ties with other nations. Article 72, paragraph 2, of the Russian constitution notes that all subjects of the Russian Federation (respubliki, krai, oblasti, okrygi) have equal rights in the sphere of international ties (mezhdunarodnyie svyazi) and the formation of external economic ties (vneshne-ekonomicheskie svyazi)“<sup>37</sup>. But these elements do not precisely explain what international ties imply and to what degree the economic ties can develop. Do international ties imply diplomatic representation abroad? Are the economic ties restricted to trade agreements?<sup>38</sup>

All this indecisiveness at the legal level coupled with the conflict regarding the free trade zone reinstatement and the internal debate from the Russian Federation regarding the role of the centre and the role of the periphery augment the vulnerable position of the city affecting not only its development, but also its identity<sup>39</sup>.

### ***Frontier cities***

Where in the case of border-states, we could actually identify the demarcation line, in the case of frontier cities they are often invisible lines that still create the same or even a deeper separation between certain identities / groups / persons. Regarding this aspects we will analyse the following types of frontier cities: cities that present frontiers between communities, cities with integrated cultural frontiers and cities with social frontiers.

#### *Cities with frontiers between communities*

Earlier we have analysed the internal dynamics of a city which is divided by borders, Nicosia. In that example the city was split by visible, tangible lines that governed the passing of citizens from the north to the south. In the case of cities that present frontiers between various communities, the separating lines are not tangible or regularised. Rather than that, they are invisible, but possible having a deeper effect of separation than in the first case. An example in this sense could be the city of Sarajevo. Between 1992 and 1996, the tensions between the Bosnian Serbs and the Serbian Militias resulted in ten thousands of deaths and the destruction of almost 60% of the city's buildings. The political solution came with the Dayton accord which officially institutionalised the *de facto* partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Presently, Sarajevo “is [...] a different city, moving from a mixed ethnic population of 540,000 Bosnian Muslims (40%), Bosnian Serbs (30%) and Bosnian Croats

<sup>36</sup> Brian Vitunic, „Enclave to Exclave: Kaliningrad between Russia and the European Union,” 2, accessed August 10, 2015, <http://ece.columbia.edu/files/ece/images/enclave-1.pdf>; See also Gennady Fedorov, Yuri Rozhkov-Yuryevsky, „The Correlation between the Barrier and Contact Functions of the Kaliningrad Section of the Russian Border,” in *Eurolimes 15, A Security Dimension as Trigger and Result of Frontiers Modifications*, ed. Giuliana Laschi et al. (Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2013), 71-98.

<sup>37</sup> Vitunic, 10.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 10.

(20%) in 1991 to an approximately 80% Muslim city today of about 340,000 population”<sup>40</sup>, hence creating the unseen limits of the city in which NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) are present, trying to ensure the peace, security and stability in the absence of a marked border. Where in the case of Nicosia the actual border was seen as a potential solution to the conflict between the two antagonist parties, in the case of Sarajevo their absence are seen as a possible way of integrating all groups into a single city that will be able to develop a sustainable economic and social system. In this context the main responsibility lays in the hands of politicians who can construct on long term a unique, multicultural environment that will ensure the future development of the city.

### *Cities with integrated cultural frontiers*

Where regarding the aforementioned cases, Nicosia and Sarajevo, we identified divided cities by visible and invisible limits, in the case of integrated cultural frontiers, cities have succeeded in transforming a diverse cultural society into a multicultural one. One example in this case can be the Romanian city of Timișoara.

Almost 3.000 non-EU migrants were facing with a rigid and unapproachable administrative system. Being aware of the vulnerabilities that can arise from a culturally different environment, the local authorities implemented a project called Migrant in Intercultural Romania (MiIR). The project’s activities were implemented with the aim of reaching a trilateral sustained dialogue between: local authorities that had the solve the local issues by using local resources, national thematic meetings having the aim of adapting the legal system and coming with viable solutions and last, but not least, intercultural mediators that facilitated the communication and the cooperation between all parties. “The MiIR project recorded significant successes in terms of consultation and practical local interventions. Local representatives of the ministries and governments, like the prefecture, local immigration offices or country education inspectors, have managed to implement measures that were deemed necessary during local consultations”<sup>41</sup>. Although the city of Timișoara could have stood as an example for other cases in Romania, the changes that occurred at national level were relatively slow. The project proved to be successful due to the right identification of all relevant local and national actors that had the competences and the power to change the undesired status-quo. Additionally the political will for this change to happen was present in the case of Timișoara, factor which is quintessential for the positive end of the project and its sustainability. At the same time, this element was not met yet neither in the case of Nicosia, nor in the case of Sarajevo.

### *Cities with social frontiers*

At the same time the ethnicity or the religion are not the only differencing factors that can create intangible limits within cities. The existence of “the other” is more visible than ever given the current migrants from Syria with which the EU is confronting. On one hand, it represents an organisation that fights against human rights’ breach and in this sense it became an active player in the Middle East. On the other hand, it can still be perceived as a fortress, which raises its borders as part of a securitisation behavioural pattern, fact that contradicts with its normative power character. In a situation of crisis like

---

<sup>40</sup> Bollens, 171.

<sup>41</sup> Alexandru F. Ghita, “Timișoara Case Study: A New Approach to Integrating non-EU Migrants,” [Interim Report – Part B.1 Study on Promoting Multi-level Governance in Support of Europe 2020], (July 2014): 4, accessed September 15, 2015, [http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/sources/docgener/studies/pdf/mlg\\_cs7.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/pdf/mlg_cs7.pdf).



the current migrants one, some European cities will confront with large numbers of refugees that will have to have subsistence resources, shelter, etc. Also they have different identities, other cultural backgrounds aspect that would generate a feeling of separation between the current residents and them. If maintained, this differentiation can generate the city's fragmentation. Therefore, on medium and long term they will have to become an integrated part of the city in order to maintain a unitary or multicultural identity of the city and to not transform the city into a frontier one.

At the same time the economic development of certain groups is also a defining element that can create frontiers within a city, by the development of poor and rich districts. The economic disparities tend to be viewed as natural consequences. Once the industrialisation process has started and activities changed from agricultural based to industrialised ones, the population became more and more urban and inequalities tend to exist until the income rises to a level where all members of that specific society reach a common standard living. This logic could be applied also to large cities. As they grow larger and larger, they encompass a larger population and the economic disparities tend to be more visible, than in the case of small cities<sup>42</sup>.

Many EU and non-EU cities have been divided by the invisible economic development, where the south is poor and feels socially excluded and the north that is rich and it is perceived as the majority which influences the policy. This case can also apply to the current migrants' crisis. Many of the refugees are people with low income that are leaving their countries from security reasons. In this context, receiving large numbers of refugees will affect the economic development of the city and of the state.

### ***Conclusions***

Regardless of the current international development and the globalisation's effect, we still face physical and symbolic borders / frontiers. The development of economic free trade areas facilitated the lift of tangible border controls, but at simultaneously it led to the emergence of different kinds of frontiers.

Last, but not least, we must not forget that the EU's borders have been under constant change. Thus, the enlargement process could have been viewed as major opportunity for border cities that faced important chances regarding the market access. For example, when Romania became an EU member state, cities that are very close to the border, like Oradea had greater opportunities than for cities that are further away from the border like Craiova. Once the lines shift, border cities tend to increase their attractiveness for investors as analysed above. But at the same time, the border is still viewed as a burden<sup>43</sup> especially when that respective city is at the external border and the regional dynamics are affecting the security level in a negative way. Regarding this last aspect, Suceava felt the negative effects of the Ukrainian crisis, given their geographical neighbourhood with border cities like Cernăuți (aprox. 84 km). Another aspect is related to the effects of the border, which are relatively limited, around 70km. Moreover, the

---

<sup>42</sup> UN-HABITAT, „The Economic Divide: Urban Income Inequalities,” *State of the World's Cities* (2010/2011): 78, accessed September 1, 2015, [http://www.unhabitat.org/jo/en/inp/Upload/2233036\\_pages%20from%20Report-Englishrd-2.pdf](http://www.unhabitat.org/jo/en/inp/Upload/2233036_pages%20from%20Report-Englishrd-2.pdf).

<sup>43</sup> Steven Brakman et al., “The Border Effect of EU Integration: Evidence for European Cities and Regions,” 20, accessed August 20, 2015, [http://www.ihs.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/ihs/Marketing/Marketing\\_Projects/marrewijk\\_brakman\\_garretsen\\_borders\\_and\\_remoteness\\_dec\\_2010e.pdf](http://www.ihs.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/ihs/Marketing/Marketing_Projects/marrewijk_brakman_garretsen_borders_and_remoteness_dec_2010e.pdf).

studies show that the effect, where is present, does not last in long term, being about maximum 30 years<sup>44</sup>.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bollens, Scott A. "City and Soul. Sarajevo, Johannesburg, Jerusalem, Nicosia." *CITY* 5, 2 (Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2001): 169-187.
- Brakman, Steven, Harry Garretsen, Charles Van Marrewijk, and Abdella Oumer. "The Border Effect of EU Integration: Evidence for European Cities and Regions." Accessed August 20, 2015. [http://www.ihs.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/ihs/Marketing/Marketing\\_Projects/marrewijk\\_brakman\\_garretsen\\_borders\\_and\\_remoteness\\_dec\\_2010e.pdf](http://www.ihs.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/ihs/Marketing/Marketing_Projects/marrewijk_brakman_garretsen_borders_and_remoteness_dec_2010e.pdf).
- „BUSINESS CLUB. Cele mai îndatorate județe din România” [Business Club. The most indebted counties from Romania]. *Digi24*, 2 March 2015. Accessed August 15, 2015. <http://www.digi24.ro/Stiri/Digi24/Economie/Stiri/BUSINESS+CLUB+Cele+mai+indatorate+județe+din+Romania>.
- Buzan, Barry, and Ole Waever. *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 2003.
- "Challenges of Cross Border Cooperation in Romania and Bulgaria." 15 August 2011. Accessed August 15, 2015. <https://criticalgeography.wordpress.com/2011/08/15/challenges-of-cross-border-cooperation-in-romania-and-bulgaria/>.
- Decoville, Antoine, Frédéric Durand, and Valérie Feltgen. „Opportunities of Cross-border Cooperation between Small and Medium Cities in Europe.” *Report Written in the Frame of the Spatial Development Observatory, on Behalf of the Department of Spatial Planning and Development – Ministry of Sustainable Development and Infrastructure in Luxembourg*. LISER (2015): 1-55. Accessed August 20, 2015. [http://www.dat.public.lu/eu-presidency/Events/Workshop-3/Opportunities-of-cross-border-cooperation-between-small-and-medium-cities-in-Europe-\\_LISER\\_.pdf](http://www.dat.public.lu/eu-presidency/Events/Workshop-3/Opportunities-of-cross-border-cooperation-between-small-and-medium-cities-in-Europe-_LISER_.pdf).
- Dogot, Cristina-Maria, and Ioan Horga. "Enlargement Process, Classic Geopolitics, and EU Internal Priorities." In *Eurolimes 14, Enlargements, Borders and the Changes of EU Political Priorities*, edited by Ariane Landuyt, Dana Pantea, and István Polgár, 161-183. Oradea: Oradea University Press/Bruylant, Autumn 2012.
- "European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation." Accessed September 5, 2015. <https://portal.cor.europa.eu/egtc/about/Pages/What%20is%20the%20EGTC.aspx>.
- "European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities." Madrid, 21.V.1980. Accessed September 5, 2015. <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/106.htm>.
- Fedorov, Gennady, and Yuri Rozhkov-Yuryevsky. "The Correlation between the Barrier and Contact Functions of the Kaliningrad Section of the Russian Border." In *Eurolimes 15, A Security Dimension as Trigger and Result of Frontiers Modifications*, edited by Giuliana Laschi, Alexis Vahlas, and Dorin Dolghi, 77-90. Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2013.
- Ghita, Alexandru F. "Timișoara Case Study: A New Approach to Integrating non-EU Migrants." Interim Report – Part B.1 Study on Promoting Multi-level Governance

---

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 20-21.

- in Support of Europe 2020. (July 2014): 1-26. Accessed September 15, 2015. [http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/sources/docgener/studies/pdf/mlg\\_cs7.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/pdf/mlg_cs7.pdf).
- Horga, Ioan, and Constantin Vasile Țoca. „Sociological Research. Thinking the Future Together: The Debrecen+Oradea, Cross-border Agglomeration.” In *Neighbours and Partners on the Two Sides of the Borders*, edited by István Süli-Zakar, 73-83. Debrecen: University of Debrecen Press, 2008.
- Horga, Ioan. „Multilevel Governance (Mlg) and Subsidiary Principle in White Paper of Mlg of the Committee of the Region (CoR).” In *Regional and Cohesion Policy – Insights Into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design*, edited by Ioan Horga, Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, Adrian Ivan, Mykolia Palincsak, and István Süli-Zakar, 158-164. Debrecen, Oradea: Debrecen University Press & Oradea University Press, 2011.
- Janeczek, Andrzej. „Frontiers and Borderlands in Medieval Europe.” *Quaestiones Medii Aevi Novae* (2011): 5-14. Accessed August 3, 2015. [http://vistulana.pl/uploads/files/Q16\\_wstep\\_introduction.pdf](http://vistulana.pl/uploads/files/Q16_wstep_introduction.pdf).
- The Lisbon Treaty of the European Union*. Accessed August 3, 2015. <http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-european-union-and-comments/title-1-common-provisions/5-article-4.html>.
- Pantea, Dana. “Cross Border Politics and Its Image in the European Union.” *Eurolimes 4, Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers*, edited by Gerard Delanty, Dana Pantea, and Teperics Karoly, 142-147. Oradea: Oradea University Press, Autumn 2009.
- Pucher, Jürgen, and Stefanie Zöchmann. „EGTC Monitoring Report 2014 Implementing the Strategy Europe 2020.” Committee of Regions, European Union, 2015, 1-151. Accessed September 5, 2015. [http://cor.europa.eu/en/documentation/studies/Documents/EGTC\\_MonitoringReport\\_2014.pdf](http://cor.europa.eu/en/documentation/studies/Documents/EGTC_MonitoringReport_2014.pdf).
- Sassen, Saskia. “The City: Today’s Frontier Zone.” *Glocalism: Journal of Culture, Politics and Innovation* (2014): 1-4.
- Sassen, Saskia. “When the Center no Longer Holds: Cities as Frontier Zones.” *Cities* (2012): 1-4. Accessed August 3, 2015. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2012.05.007>.
- Șoproni, Luminița, and Ioan Horga. „The Economic Frontiers of Europe.” In *Eurolimes 8, Europe and Its Economic Frontiers*, edited by Luminița Șoproni, Angelo Santagostino, and Ernő Molnar, 5-6. Oradea: Oradea University Press, Autumn 2009.
- Șoproni, Luminița. „The Romanian-Hungarian Cross-border Cooperation in the Regional Press of Bihor County.” In *Eurolimes 3, Media, Intercultural Dialogue and the New Frontiers of Europe*, edited by Fabienne Maron, Renaud de La Brosse, and Luminița Șoproni. Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2007. Accessed August 10, 2015. [http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/33758/ssoar-eurolimes-2007-3-soproni-The\\_Romanian\\_-\\_Hungarian\\_crossborder.pdf?sequence=1](http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/33758/ssoar-eurolimes-2007-3-soproni-The_Romanian_-_Hungarian_crossborder.pdf?sequence=1).
- Süli-Zakar, István. “The Role of the Euroregions and Eurometropolises in the Etherealization of the Borders in the Eastern Periphery of the European Union.” In *Eurolimes 7, Europe and the Neighbourhood*, edited by Dorin Ioan Dolghi, Gilles Rouet, and Zsolt Radics, 139-148. Oradea: Oradea University Press, Autumn 2009.
- UN-HABITAT. „The Economic Divide: Urban Income Inequalities.” *State of the World’s Cities* (2010/2011): 60-81. Accessed September 1, 2015. [http://www.unhabitat.org/jo/en/inp/Upload/2233036\\_pages%20from%20Report-Englishrd-2.pdf](http://www.unhabitat.org/jo/en/inp/Upload/2233036_pages%20from%20Report-Englishrd-2.pdf).

- Vitunic, Brian. „Enclave to Exclave: Kaliningrad between Russia and the European Union.” Accessed August 10, 2015. <http://ece.columbia.edu/files/ece/images/enclave-1.pdf>.
- „Tensiunile diplomatice între România și Ungaria continuă. Ponta, mesaj dur pentru Budapesta” [The Diplomatic Tensions between Romania and Hungary continue. Ponta, tough message for Budapest]. *Realitatea.net*, 11 august 2015. Accessed august 20, 2015. [http://www.realitatea.net/tensiunile-diplomatice-intre-romania-si-ungaria-continua-ponta-mesaj-dur-pentru-budapesta\\_1766993.html](http://www.realitatea.net/tensiunile-diplomatice-intre-romania-si-ungaria-continua-ponta-mesaj-dur-pentru-budapesta_1766993.html).
- „Trafic de trei ori mai intens pe podul Calafat-Vidin” [Three times more intense traffic on the Calafat-Vidin bridge]. *Digi24*, 10 August 2014. Accessed August 15, 2015. <http://www.digi24.ro/Stiri/Digi24/Actualitate/Stiri/Trafic+de+trei+ori+mai+intens+pe+podul+Calafat-Vidin>.

## **Book reviews**



# The Challenges and Prospects for Development of the Carpathian Region

Julia TSYBULSKA<sup>1</sup>

Olga DEMEDYUK<sup>2</sup>

**Review of:** *Karpatskyi Rehion: Aktualni Problemy ta Perspektyvy Rozvytku* [The Carpathian Region: Problems and Prospects of Development], monograph in 8 volumes, edited by Vasil S. Kravtsiv. Lviv: NAS of Ukraine. Institute of Regional Research, 2013.

The monograph issue is devoted to 95-th anniversary of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. The monograph consists of 8 volumes. Each of them has profound target informational and analytical content by the separate structural research direction. At the same time they harmonically complement each other. Due to this fact the monograph is the outstanding example of interdisciplinary scientific research results interpretation combining in itself the large amount of aspects and phenomena elaborated by the team of authors consisting of leading scientists of the Institute of Regional Research of the NAS of Ukraine and the scientists from other scientific institutions<sup>3</sup>.

Monograph research opens up with the volume *Ecologic Security and Natural Resources Capacity*. The book reveals theoretical and practical aspects of sustainable nature management in the Carpathian region of Ukraine. The methodological basis of forming of current regional ecologic policy and the principles of sustainable natural resources management in the region is outlined. Major components of its natural resources capacity are characterised and the role of natural factors in forming of regional economic system and in the perspectives of its sustainable development is shown. The current condition and problems of environmental protection in the region in terms of transformation changes in its economy are analysed.

The second volume of the monograph, *Social-demographic Capacity*, reveals current theoretical and methodological basis of the research of up-to-date problems and perspectives of socio-demographic capacity development in the Carpathian region. It contains the retrospective evaluation of the regional socio-demographic potential and presents its development factors and possibilities of Carpathian population reproduction. It also analyses socio-demographic challenges of modern times over the development of social-demographic capacity of the region and discloses the role of migration in potential reproduction stabilisation. Methodological approaches to perspective development modelling are proposed. The rationalisation for regional social-demographic policy concept till 2030 and its institutional maintenance is provided and modern form and instruments of implementation are proposed.

---

<sup>1</sup> Junior scientific researcher, State Institution "Institute of Regional Research named after M. I. Dolishnij of National Academy of Sciences," Lviv, Ukraine. E-mail: julia\_5@ukr.net.

<sup>2</sup> Engineer, Institute of Regional Research named after M. I. Dolishnij of National Academy of Sciences, Lviv, Ukraine. E-mail: olya\_demediyuk@ukr.net.

<sup>3</sup> Yuriy Tunytsya, "Kompleksne doslidzhennya aktualnyh problem Karpatskoho rehionu Ukrainy" [Complex Research of Actual Problems of the Carpathian Region of Ukraine], *Rehionalna ekonomika* [Regional Economy] 3 (2014): 264-267.

The third volume of multi-author monograph, *Industrial capacity*, researches the theoretical and methodological basis of industry modernisation and provides evaluation of current condition and development trends of Carpathian region industry. It also reveals the peculiarities of structural and institutional transformation of the industry. Special attention is paid to the problem of investment and innovative maintenance of industry development and to the features of forming of internal industrial production market in the region. The directions and priorities of industry modernisation in the region are defined. The ways of production efficiency increase are justified.

Along the whole period of Ukrainian independence the development of agrarian sector of economy and rural territories has remained one of the major priorities of state economic policy. The forth volume, *Rural territories*, is devoted to the research of the problem of Carpathian region rural territories development and to the prognosis of the ways of their further evolution in terms of market economy. Special attention is paid to the examination of perspectives of multifunctional economy development at rural territories taking into account current Ukrainian reality and EU-countries' experience. The ways of overcoming the existing socio-economic, institutional, demographic and other problems of domestic village are outlined.

The fifth volume of multi-author monograph, *Small towns*, not only describes the problems of social and economic development of small towns in the Carpathian region. It also proposes the methodic of such problems diagnostics and defines the features of small towns of Carpathian region and their economic and social sphere transformation. The approaches to the adjustment of prognosis and planning documentation over the perspectives of small towns' development are outlined. The ways of their social and economic development are proposed. Anti-crisis measures directed at improvement of social and economic development of small towns in the structure of urban network in the region engaging the capacities of medium and large cities are listed.

The sixth volume of multi-author monograph *Financial capacity*, elaborates scientific basis for financial resources research in the Carpathian region and for determination of their structure, principles and functioning features at current development stage. Furthermore, it proposes the new view onto the solution of the problem of social and economic development growth in the region on the basis of the increase of financial resources and own financial capacity management mechanisms efficiency. The oblasts of Carpathian region are considered from the viewpoint of the peculiarities of their financial resources forming and use in terms of economy sectors. The major circle of problems of regional development financial maintenance is defined. Overcoming of the abovementioned contributes to the growth of region's economy, decrease of its subsidy level and launching the mechanisms of financial capacity growth in the region.

The sixth volume of multi-author monograph, *Investment activity*, is devoted to the complex research of investment activity in the Carpathian region. The monograph analyses capital investment in the region by sources and directions. Efficiency of investment process and its main tendencies are defined and directions of investment optimisation for maintenance of efficient transformations in the structure of region's economy are rationalised. The influence of attracted investment on social and economic development of Carpathian region in terms of oblasts is determined and perspective directions of investment activity activation in the region are emphasised.

The eight-volume issue closes up with *Cross-border cooperation*. It presents theoretical and methodological basis of cross-border cooperation development and cross-border markets functioning in the region. Special attention is paid to organisational and



legal maintenance of cooperation mechanisms and to the new forms of cooperation (cross-border industrial parks, technoparks, cross-border clusters and partnerships, etc.). Peculiarities of cross-border cooperation activation mechanisms in Carpathian region are examined. The principles of trade, economic and investment cooperation strengthening in cross-border regions in terms of European integration of Ukraine are found.

The monograph *Cross-border Cooperation*<sup>4</sup> is oriented at finding the principles and peculiarities of cross-border cooperation concept establishment and development in Cross-border region. It also proposes the ways of overcoming the existing problems, emerging from the barriers to activation of trade, economic, investment, institutional and other aspects cross-border cooperation.

The monograph constitutes some compilation of longstanding theoretical and methodological research of cross-border cooperation establishment and development conducted by scientific officers, PhD students and scientific degrees seekers of the Market Infrastructure and Cross-Border Cooperation Problems Department at the Institute of Regional Research of the NAS of Ukraine.

In the first monograph chapter attention is paid to theoretical and methodological basis of cross-border development in the Carpathian region. Primarily, theoretical basis of cross-border cooperation concept development, peculiarities of EU regional policy and of cross-border cooperation development in Carpathian region and the features of Carpathian region convergence with cross-border space are outlined.

The second monograph chapter is devoted to the influence of cross-border cooperation on the development of Carpathian region. Analysis of the regional cross-border convergence and of the bordering location influence on social and economic development of the territory is conducted. Peculiarities of foreign trade in goods and services in cross-border regions of Carpathians are studied. Financial mechanisms of cross-border cooperation activation in Carpathian region are generalised.

The third chapter examines classical forms of cross-border cooperation in Carpathian region, in particular the Euroregions as organisational and financial platform of cooperation as well as the specifics of bordering trade and development of cross-border labour, goods and services markets in Carpathian region.

The fourth chapter proposes measures over the development of new cross-border forms in Carpathian region. Infrastructural components of foreign economic relations in cross-border regions are defined. Creation of cross-border industrial zones and technological parks in order to activate foreign economic relations in cross-border regions and establishment of cross-border clusters for the regions' innovative development is proposed. Finally, the perspectives of cross-border cooperation development in Carpathian region re defined.

Cross-border cooperation development in Carpathian region has long-lasting traditions and features related to the fact that the borders of five countries meet on comparatively small part of the border: Ukraine, Poland, Slovak Republic, Hungary and Romania. The cooperation intensity considerably influences the living activity of the territories here. On the other hand, the Carpathian region oblasts are adjacent to the external border of Ukraine with the EU and this in terms of EU integration stipulates the fact that due to cross-border cooperation these territories not only improve the performance of foreign

---

<sup>4</sup> *Transkordonne spivrobitnytstvo* [Cross-border Cooperation], ed. by Nadiya A. Mikula, vol. 8 of *Karpatskyi Rehion: Aktualni Problemy ta Perspektyvy Rozvytku* [The Carpathian Region: Problems and Prospects of Development], ed. Vasil S. Kravtsiv (Lviv: NAS of Ukraine. Institute of Regional Research, 2013).

trade in goods and services but also increase the volumes of attracted foreign investment and international financial assistance and adapt European experience of conducting business, technology management, business ethics, social culture and civil society forming standards at the domestic ground.

It also emphasizes the fact that significant improvement of the preconditions of bordering territories development in Ukraine takes place due to the consistent influence of all abovementioned effects. This, in its turn, in reverse positively influences the further activation of cross-border cooperation. Primarily, it happens due to the stimulation of the development of all cross-border cooperation components: export and import of goods and services within the cross-border regions, bordering trade, cross-border entrepreneurship, Euroregions functioning, investment cooperation, new modern forms forming – cross-border clusters, partnerships, etc.

Special attention is paid to the mechanisms of foreign economic relations establishment in cross-border regions in terms of Ukraine's European integration. Among them major place should be granted to the functioning of Euroregions, creation of preferential regimens of cross-border entrepreneurship activation, labour migration within cross-border regions and cross-border marketing.

Each of the mechanisms influences the peculiarities of goods and services export and import in cross-border regions, the specifics of cross-border markets functioning within the regions, tendencies of investment cooperation and other aspects of foreign economic activity between the bordering administrative and territorial units of Ukraine and neighbouring countries – EU members in terms of cross-border regions functioning.

Thus, in Ukrainian-Polish cross-border region the mechanisms of labour migration and bordering trade are traditionally significantly important. They form the majority of tendencies peculiar to foreign economy component of cross-border cooperation between Ukraine and Poland. Instead, Euroregional and preferential mechanisms in this cross-border region are much less used. Moreover, attention should be emphasised at gradual growth of marketing mechanism weight in Ukrainian-Polish cross-border region, especially due to holding the Euro-2012 in Ukraine and Poland.

Relatively large share of foreign trade in goods and services of Lvivska and Volynska oblasts (almost 40% for goods and almost 30% for services) should be stressed among basic indicators of foreign economic activity peculiar to Ukrainian-Polish cross-border region. The cross-border region also significantly prevails in export and import of goods among all cross-border regions formed by Ukraine and EU and is characterised by stable negative balance of foreign trade in goods (import more than three times exceeds export) and by dominating in foreign direct investment attraction among all cross-border regions at the EU border 3 (more than 90%).

Ukrainian-Slovak, Ukrainian-Hungarian and Ukrainian-Romanian cross-border regions much more actively use the Euroregional mechanism of foreign economic relations activation as far as the Euroregion "Carpathians" efficiently enough exists here (and also "Upper Prut" in Ukrainian-Romanian cross-border region). Moreover, significant role here is played by the mechanisms of labour migration, bordering trade and preferential regimens (due to functioning of FEZ (free economic zones) and PDT (priority development territories) in Zakarpattia). However, the marketing mechanism is used less, especially in Ukrainian-Romanian cross-border region.

From the viewpoint of foreign economic activity features, Ukrainian-Slovak cross-border region is characterised by falling behind the calculated level of gravity capacity in goods and services export and import (especially in import of goods to Ukraine, where its share is almost ten times less than the calculated level of gravity

capacity of economies of Ukrainian and Slovak bordering regions). Furthermore, this cross-border region is the vivid outsider by the volumes of attracted foreign investment to Ukraine among all the cross-border regions of Ukraine under research.

The fact that creation of the balanced spatial structures oriented at adjustment and synchronisation of the development programs on both sides of the border bringing up the regional convergence in cross-border space is the most important issue in the context of finding the reserves of cross-border regions efficient functioning increase is proved. Therefore, the balanced development of cross-border regions becomes possible primarily due to the elaboration of joint development programs and creation of preconditions to implement «mirror» branch projects, i.e. cross-border convergence of competitive ability mechanisms.

The monograph proposes priority directions of foreign economic relations development in Ukrainian-Polish, Ukrainian-Slovak, Ukrainian-Hungarian and Ukrainian-Romanian cross-border regions, in particular: improvement of cross-border cooperation infrastructure, forming of cross-border industrial zones and industrial, technological and scientific parks, creation and expansion of cross-border clusters and other innovative forms of cross-border cooperation. The necessity and urgency of forming and implementation of own public policy of cross-border cooperation and Euroregional structures development is proved and strategic benchmarks and relevant public policy tasks over the increase of organisation-economic maintenance efficiency of Ukraine and EU Euroregional cooperation are defined as following: necessity of determining the place and strengthening the role of Euroregions in the system of public and regional administration; development of institutional maintenance of cross-border cooperation; maintenance of Euroregions' activity public support; implementation of the measures directed at increase of regional security in cross-border space and decrease of resources outflow.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Karpatskyi Rehion: Aktualni Problemy ta Perspektyvy Rozvytku* [The Carpathian Region: Problems and Prospects of Development], monograph in 8 volumes, edited by Vasil S. Kravtsiv. Lviv: NAS of Ukraine. Institute of Regional Research, 2013.
- Transkordonne spivrobitnytstvo* [Cross-border cooperation], edited by Nadiya A. Mikula, vol. 8 of *Karpatskyi Rehion: Aktualni Problemy ta Perspektyvy Rozvytku* [The Carpathian Region: Problems and Prospects of Development], edited by Vasil S. Kravtsiv. Lviv: NAS of Ukraine. Institute of Regional Research, 2013.
- Tunytsya, Yuriy. "Kompleksne doslidzhennya aktualnyh problem Karpatskoho rehionu Ukrainy" [Complex Research of Actual Problems of the Carpathian Region of Ukraine]. *Rehionalna ekonomika* [Regional Economy] 3 (2014): 264-267.



# The Road towards the New Europe. The Facets and the Developments of an On-going Process.

Alina-Carmen BRIHAN<sup>1</sup>

**Review of:** Bărbulescu, Iordan Gheorghe. *Noua Europă. Identitate și model european* [The New Europe. Identity and European Model]. Iași: Polirom, 2015. ISBN 978-973-46-5127-6.

The book named *Europă. Identitate și model european* [The New Europe. Identity and European Model] represents the first of the six volumes that will compose the new series called “The New Europe”, written by the Romanian academic Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, Dean of the Department of International Relations and European Integration, National School of Political Studies and (SNSPA), Bucharest. The Professor Bărbulescu, with a professional expertise in the domains of European studies, diplomacy, international relations and the evaluation of programs and public policies, has undertaken a prestigious and extensive work in the domain of the European affairs, through his thirteen books and monographs, and hundreds of articles, analyses, reports and studies, published at national and international levels.

Why “The New Europe”? As the author mentions in the first pages of his book, after the Treaty of Lisbon we are facing the moment of an important “leap” in the European development, as Europe has entered in its explicit phase of federalism and constitutionalism<sup>2</sup>. But the two models do not exist in pure form; they are adapted to the European realities: a federation of nation – states and a material constitution. Therefore, the major elements that characterize the New Europe are both the deepening and the enlargement of the European Union. According to Professor Bărbulescu, the unification of the EU is realised through its enlargement, while its federalisation – through integration<sup>3</sup>. If at internal level, the EU has a social - liberal model characterised by integration, federalisation, market economy, solidarity, common values, democracy, citizenship, constitutionalisation, unity, subsidiarity and diversity, at external level – we observe the extrapolation of the EU’s internal model through an active policy of peace, political and economic cooperation with all the states that have a political system compatible with the European values. As a consequence, the author states that the European Union has defined its own identity, both internally and externally, by developing, internally, a new political regime, a new legal order and a new social - economic model, and by projecting it, externally<sup>4</sup>. These evolutions define a new model of the EU, internally and externally, and the endeavour towards the creation of a European identity.

As regards the topic of the first volume of the series *Identity and European Model* the author considers that the EU builds and affirms, in a progressive manner, a true European identity, based on an economic and monetary union and expressed through a

---

<sup>1</sup> PhD in History, Assistant Lecturer within the Department of Political Science and Communication Sciences, University of Oradea. E-mail: alina\_brihan@yahoo.com.

<sup>2</sup> Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, *Noua Europă. Identitate și model european* [New Europe. Identity and European model] (Iași: Polirom, 2015), 21.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 25.

political union, a common foreign policy and a strategy aimed at ensuring a common security and defence, in the near future<sup>5</sup>.

The book is structured in three parts and twelve chapters, covering: the European Idea – the historical and theoretical bases (first part); from the European Idea to the European Union – integration and federalisation, enlargement and unification (second part); Europe – a new model of society (third part).

The first part of the book – the historical and theoretical bases of the European Idea – consists of two chapters: the history of the European Idea and theories and models of integration. The approach of the chapter dedicated to the history of the European Idea is organised around several coupled concepts that define the European Idea: unity and integration, integration and federalisation. Beginning with the idea of the European unity along the history of the European thought, following with the foreign threats seen as an unifying and federalising element (according to George Podiebrad, Piccolomini, Juan Luis Vives, and during the 1848 revolutions), the author moves forward so to analyse the first European projects of federalist union (in the work of Amos Comenius, the project of abbé de Saint – Pierre, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich W. Schelling, Victor Hugo, Giuseppe Mazzini, etc.), during which the author states that the work of Pierre – Joseph Proudhon contains some visionary ideas about the European federation understood as a multi-level organisation and as a result of the agreement of the parties<sup>6</sup>. The XX<sup>th</sup> century represents the century of the development of the federalist theories and of their functional application through the creation of the European institutions, so it is the century of the movement for theory to practice with regard to the functional – federalist ideas<sup>7</sup>. In this context, it is analysed the debate between the intergovernmentalists, confederalists and federalists, and Professor Bărbulescu concludes that federalism without supranational cannot exist, while supranational without federal can exist<sup>8</sup>.

In the process of transition from the European idea to the European Union, the author consecrates a subchapter to the Romanian contributions to the development of the European Idea. The transformation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in a federal state (the federalist plan of Aurel Popovici - 1906); the Danube Confederation Plan; the creation of the Economic Community of the Little Entente (1933); the Tardieu Plan of the Danube Confederation (1932) or the Balkan Pact (1934) – were all examples of the Romanian input, in the XX<sup>th</sup> century, to the European thought of creating Europe as a unique entity. The Romanian case in point also shows that the endeavour of thinking Europe as a unique entity has manifested, simultaneously, in the Eastern and Western Europe, and it has developed, in parallel, with that of building, at a continental level, of a federal-type structure, so that the ideas of federation and European unity have gone, mostly all the time, hand in hand<sup>9</sup>.

The second chapter scrutinizes the “Theories and Models of Integration”. The analysis of the new international order, from the perspective of International Relations and Political Science, has revealed that the European Studies domain (developed in the ‘60s) is situated on the border of the two above-mentioned domains, and it has an interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary character<sup>10</sup>. Professor Bărbulescu describes a two-fold typology of the

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 29.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 40.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 41.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 44. The issue of federal Europe was largely approached also by Cristina-Maria Dogot in *Le fédéralisme, fondement intellectuel de la construction européenne. Le fédéralisme personnaliste de Denis de Rougemont* (Saarbrücken: Editions universitaires européennes, 2011).

<sup>9</sup> Bărbulescu, 64.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 71.

new theories concerning the European integration: that of “double perspective” – International Relations (neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism and the liberal intergovernmentalism) vs. public and comparative policies (institutionalism, multi-level governance, supranational governance, the role of the institutions in the EU functioning) and of the EU study – regarded as a political system (Simon Hix)<sup>11</sup>. The author considers that each of the two new theories mentioned before relates to one of the two theories of European integration – federalism and intergovernmentalism; that each of them tries to clarify an aspect of the European Union – actors, political system, decision-making process, etc.; and that none of them aims at being universal and exhaustive, and this shows that the EU functioning cannot be explained by a single theory<sup>12</sup>. After discussing the theories derived from International Relations (intergovernmentalism and federalism) and the ones derived from Political Science (functionalism and neofunctionalism, the interdependence theory, the new theories of integration, etc.), Professor Bărbulescu affirms that there is not an academic consensus regarding the meaning of the “European integration” term, so that the European integration definition is realised through a theoretical mix of International Relations (ensure the general understanding of integration) and Political Science (explains the sectorial issues of integration) theories, none of them being sufficient for the explanation of the phenomenon, a compulsory interdisciplinarity being needed<sup>13</sup>.

The second part of the book is dedicated to the road Europe has followed between the European Idea to the European Union, a road characterised by integration and federalisation, enlargement and unification. In this part were approached six themes, corresponding to six chapters (from chapter three to chapter eight): the EU objectives and actors; the method, nature and progressivity of integration; the new European legal order; the formal and material competences and European public policies; the enlargement – political necessity and historical opportunity; the impact of enlargement and unification.

In the third chapter, the author discusses the initial and the subsequent objectives of the EU, from the ones that promoted the peace on the European continent and the economic unification, to those that regarded the political unification, democratisation and European social identity. If the evolution to the political dimension of the EU was achieved through the Maastricht Treaty, the political unification has been emphasised as the communities democratised. The author’s conviction is that the EU’s democratisation develops the political dimension and that the political unification is accomplished through the raising to the status of law of values as human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, state of law, etc.<sup>14</sup>. Meanwhile, the attainment of a European social identity has been done through the expansion from an exclusive economic community to one that had, in addition, political aims<sup>15</sup>. The author also focuses on the actors, from the role that the national actors play in the EU (as the member states continue to be the constitutive actors) to the role of the EU’s common institutions (Council of the European Union, European Parliament, European Commission, European Council, etc.)<sup>16</sup>.

The fourth chapter approaches three issues: the method, the nature and the progressivity of integration. As regards the method of integration, it comprises aspects as: unification, integration, cooperation, enlargement, consolidation and deepening. In this

---

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 77.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 78.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 112.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 123.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 135.

context, the New Europe is attained through two complementary processes: deepening (this process occurs as a result of the tensions between integration and cooperation) – seen as vertical development, and enlargement – considered as horizontal development, while protecting the consolidation of the achieved progresses<sup>17</sup>. The European Union is the result of progressive integration, in which the states were demanded not to give up to their sovereignty, but to the dogma of absolute sovereignty<sup>18</sup>. The transfer of sovereignty, administered by the nation states, to a supranational community, is in itself an expression of sovereignty, as it doesn't mean the loss of it, but the common exercise of sovereignty at the EU level. In this regard, Professor Bărbulescu considers that it isn't justified the fear that the European Union would proclaim itself a "state" over the will of the member states and of their peoples', as the EU has only the competences attributed to it by the states and any change made to these competences can be done only with the states' will and agreement<sup>19</sup>. At the same time, cooperation represents the states' availability to work together with the aim of accomplishing some common objectives, without giving up their sovereignty<sup>20</sup>. Moving further, the nature of integration is analysed through the political and legal dimensions of the European Communities / EU. From a legal point of view, it is argued that the European Communities and the EU are not subjects of the international law, to the detriment of the member states, but along with them, and that the European Communities and the EU are not vested with "the competence to establish competences"<sup>21</sup>. As regards the relation of the EU law with the international law, the European Communities and the EU have enriched the structure and functioning of the international law, contributing to the improving of the International Relations' techniques<sup>22</sup>. The European Communities and the EU's independence from the international law is more difficult to be established than their independence from the national law of the member states<sup>23</sup>. Referring to the third dimension of integration – the progressivity, both the use of the specific tools of integration and the attainment of its objectives have been done, from the very beginning, in accordance with the idea of progressivity<sup>24</sup>. But the author considers that the progressivity of the general plan shouldn't force the process of integration, nor to lose sight of the assurance, step by step, of the treaties' objectives fulfilment<sup>25</sup>. Professor Bărbulescu asks the question whether there is enough stability in a legal – constitutional system that is subject to change every four – five years (through the treaties)<sup>26</sup>. As a consequence, he affirms that the EU system should complete its evolution, should stop having a provisional character that would put an end, in consequence, to its legal and political deficiencies – that are the result of its continuous becoming. Subsequently, the progressivity – positive, up to a point, can't become permanent as it transforms in lability. Professor Bărbulescu suggests, therefore, that the EU should have the force and wisdom to achieve the great reform that would lead to a fundamental act, such as the evoked constitution<sup>27</sup>.

---

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 137.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 142.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 143.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 144.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 155.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 160.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 161.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 162.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 163.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 166.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.



The fifth chapter focuses on the new European legal order. The European Union is a normative system both in relation to the member states' and their regions' law, and in relation with the international law<sup>28</sup>. In this regard, are analysed: the sources of Community law – the primary law, the secondary law and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union; the application of the Community and EU law; and the Community and EU law versus the constitutions of the member states. The primacy of the Community law is progressive, as the communitarisation of the sectors of the national policies develop, and as its applicability is extended, namely the competences are transferred from the member states to the European Union<sup>29</sup>.

The sixth chapter addresses the formal and material competences and the European public policies. The author affirms that the integration and federalisation of the EU cannot be understood without the knowledge of the formal competences of the EU<sup>30</sup>. The origin of the common competences resides in the process of limiting the national competences and in the transfer of the states' attributions to the Communities and to the EU<sup>31</sup>, and they have extended as a result of the system's progressivity<sup>32</sup>. In the competences' classification, the control competence defines the fulfilment of the treaties' objectives, while the competence of action characterizes the competence of the Communities and of the EU to carry out the actions that aim at the fulfilment of the treaties' objectives and those of the Communities' and of the EU's, in general<sup>33</sup>. The Treaty of Lisbon has established the categories and the domains of the EU's competences: exclusive, shared and of supporting, coordinating or supplementing the actions of the Member States. At the same time, the elaboration of a "catalogue" of the EU's competences has brought clarity to the system, allowing the European citizen to know "who does what" in the EU, and it represents a federalist – type instrument, whose aim is the clarification, distribution and development of the common competences<sup>34</sup>. The more objectives are established and achieved, the more competences are for the Communities and the EU; therefore, as the Community evolves, are growing the number and the magnitude of competences (material competences) – from the sectorial to the general ones, from the economic to the political ones<sup>35</sup>. Regarding the common policies and actions, it is stated that to each objective is associated a competence and one or more European public policies. In this context, the author focuses on three large groups of policies: the common market, the economic and monetary union and the internal market<sup>36</sup>. The Treaty of Lisbon modifies the categories of competences and, consequently, the common policies, which are redefined, and enumerates the principles on which it is realised the delimitation (the principle of conferral) and the exercise of competences (the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality)<sup>37</sup>. In correlation with the principles of subsidiarity<sup>38</sup> and

---

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 168.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 221.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 223.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 224.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 229.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 227.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 230.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 249.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 252.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 254-255.

<sup>38</sup> Ioan Horga, "Multilevel Governance (Mlg) and Subsidiary Principle in White Paper of Mlg of the Committee of the Region (CoR)," in *Regional and Cohesion Policy – Insights into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design*, ed. Ioan Horga et al. (Debrecen & Oradea: Debrecen University Press & Oradea University Press, 2011), 158-164.

proportionality, it is analysed the role of the national parliaments and that of the regions and local communities. The national parliaments acquire the control function regarding the exercise of the European competences and the transfer of the new competences, to the EU. The inclusion of the national parliaments in the functioning of the EU represents an absolute novelty that is thought, *a priori*, as consolidating the democratic character of the EU and the development of the European federalism through the participation of the member states, not only at the governmental level, but also at the parliamentary one<sup>39</sup>, in the EU's decision-making process<sup>40</sup>. As regards the recognition and the guarantee of the regions' competences, this denotes one of the stakes found behind the principle of subsidiarity and the introduction of the political and legal control mechanism of its accomplishment<sup>41</sup>. The Treaty of Lisbon gives legal means to the regions, even if indirectly, to bring proceedings against the European legislative acts that violate the principle of subsidiarity. Consequently, the Treaty of Lisbon represents an important progress in providing, to the regions, the tools to protect their own competences against the undue interference of the national institutions<sup>42</sup>.

The seventh chapter is consecrated to the processes of enlargement and unification, and it analyses the accession process of the different waves, with a particular focus on the Central and Eastern European states' accession to the EU. Correlated to this chapter, the eighth chapter addresses the impact of the EU enlargement towards the ten Central and Eastern European states, as the enlargement towards this area represents a central element of the European unification and of the creation of the New Europe<sup>43</sup>. Following a comparative analysis of the European Union and the Central and Eastern European states, it is scrutinised the influence of the unification on the EU's common institutions (this enlargement accelerated the EU's institutional reforms and foreshadowed the great reforms brought by the Treaty of Lisbon<sup>44</sup>) and on the European public policies (EU financing, budgetary policy, common agricultural policy, internal market, environment, energy, etc.).

The third part of the book, *Europe, a new model of society*, comprises four chapters that regard: the federal – intergovernmental Europe (chapter 9); the European social market economy (chapter 10); the political Europe (chapter 11); and the EU – seen as a political – legal synthesis of a federation of nation-states, regulated by a material constitution (chapter 12).

The ninth chapter, devoted to the federal – intergovernmental Europe, is based on the author's assumption that, at this moment, it can be noticed a consolidation and an explanation of the European intergovernmental federalism<sup>45</sup>. In this context, the EU is defined as an union of states and peoples, based on a sovereignty exercised in common, according to whom the states and peoples decide the sectors in which they want to develop common policies (federal policies) and the ones in which they want to maintain their independence and to develop intergovernmental policies<sup>46</sup>. In the EU, the political process is a federal-type one, and the federal model has been constantly present in the European construction; this led to an institutional system that has been, continually, a mix of federalism and of an international organisations - like system. Starting with the European Single Act, all the reforms introduced by the following treaties are intertwined and all prepare the essential ones meant at completing

<sup>39</sup> Ioan Horga et al., *The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighborhood Policy* (Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2009).

<sup>40</sup> Bărbulescu, 257.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 258.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 284.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 299.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 326.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 327.

the EU's federal and constitutional model<sup>47</sup>. The author analyses the model's democratisation through the constitutionalisation of the EU's reform method (the Convention) and he states that the next EU treaty has to reflect the intergovernmental – supranational dimension resulted from the federalist – intergovernmental character of the European construction and of the Convention method<sup>48</sup>. As regards the Treaty of Lisbon (considered, formally, as a treaty, and materially, as a constitution), Professor Bărbulescu declares that the new characteristics that the EU has achieved are: the emphasize of federalism and the explanation of the federal model of the European construction; the attitude's change regarding the role of the European actors; progress achieved concerning the development of some "taboo" - considered issues (the EU acquires legal personality, the creation of a catalogue of competences, etc.); the explanation of the European model of society; the evolution to a political and social model defined as specific to the EU; the EU's role in the international arena, etc.<sup>49</sup>. After defining the European intergovernmental federalism as being asymmetric, multi-level and explicit, it is said that the deepening and the enlargement are the two processes through which the EU is redefined. With reference to the Europe – wide extrapolation of the model, in the last twenty-five years, the EU model has transformed, progressively, in a European one and, in the common consciousness, Europe has become more and more identified with the EU<sup>50</sup>. In this regard, the author says that the only unanswered questions, till now, are: the speed with which the model will become a European one, through progressive integration and enlargement; and the degree to which, based on this European model, it will reach a European federal union<sup>51</sup>. Professor Bărbulescu debates, also, the insufficiency of the intergovernmental reform method in a multidimensional Europe; he affirms that, as soon as the EU will acquire a political nature, it will have to move away from the format specific to the classical international organisations, and also from their reform method – the diplomatic method. The organisation of a Convention, before the Intergovernmental Conference, will definitely modify the reform model from a classical one, to a federal one, that will lead to the consolidation of the EU model in a political one<sup>52</sup>.

The tenth chapter undertakes an analysis of the European social market economy. After defining the EU's economic model of integration (the existence of the sectorial economic Communities; a method of transformation, from the national to the supranational level, through the progressive deepening and the integration of the economic sectors; an Economic Monetary Union, with a single currency; the perspective, in the future, of a deeper economic integration, etc.)<sup>53</sup>, the author proceeds to an historical approach of the economic unification and integration and, then, to the its conceptual approach (common market, single market, internal market)<sup>54</sup>. In this regard, it is analysed the evolution from the common market (the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community – 1951 and the Treaties of Rome - 1957) to the internal market (as it was first defined in the Single European Act – 1986, when it was explained by reference to the common market and to the single market), with a particular focus on the Treaty of Lisbon, where the internal market is

---

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 332.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 337. See also Cristina-Maria Dogot and Ioan Horga, "Enlargement Process, Classic Geopolitics, and EU Internal Priorities," in *Eurolimes 14, Enlargements, Borders and the Changes of EU Political Priorities*, ed. Ariane Landuyt et al. (Oradea: Oradea University Press/Bruylant, Autumn 2012), 161-180.

<sup>49</sup> Bărbulescu, 344.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 350.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 352-353.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 354.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 356-357.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 375.

defined as a space without internal borders, in which the free movement of goods, people, services and capital is ensured according to the Treaties' provisions. If the first part of the chapter is devoted to the economic dimension, the second part approaches the social dimension. The author considers that the social Europe is part of the European model of society and that it is referential to the social – liberal policies. As regards this latter issue, the argument for considering Europe as a model of social – liberal policies is that it implies the positioning of society in the centre of the market – state – society triangle<sup>55</sup>. Therefore, the European society takes a step forward and requests the attainment of a social and political format in which the citizen, the region, the state and the EU, as a whole; in the same time, this model has to respect the market rules without disadvantaging the citizens in front of the market<sup>56</sup>. Related to this, the Treaty of Lisbon postulates the institutionalised participation of the civil society in the EU decision-making – through the focus on the participative and representative democracy principles and the role of the regions in the EU's activity - as part of the EU's economic and social model<sup>57</sup>.

The eleventh chapter, *The Political Europe*, comprises four main directions of research: the political model of the EU; the representative and participative democracy; the European citizenship; and the EU – a new political reality. The political model of the EU is defined in the treaties (beginning with the Treaty of Maastricht) and it incorporates a set of values and principles; it establishes the power relations; it institutes the EU's own institutional system and a decision-making system; and it is defined by an own legal system and an own legal order<sup>58</sup>. In the development of the European political model and of his building method – the intergovernmental federalism, an important role is played by the further deepening of the European integration. Professor Bărbulescu affirms that, in the centre of any debate regarding the future of Europe, it is situated the understanding of the European model, to whom some additional topics are connected: the political and federal Europe versus intergovernmental Europe; technocratic government versus political government; single integration speed versus multiple integration speed; the neoliberal Europe versus the social – liberal Europe; the common values; the EU's role in the world. The nature of the European construction has completely and progressively changed through the transition from an economic European Community to a political European Union. Intrinsic part of this process of change were the actors and their roles – both of the governments' and of the new actors entered on the European arena – civil society, the social and political European forces, regions, etc.<sup>59</sup> A particular attention, as regards the political model of the EU, is given to the internal policy and to the foreign policy of the EU. Concerning the EU's internal policy, it is analysed the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, a sector that has experienced a late incorporation in the European construction for several reasons: its difficulty, amplitude, diversity and the importance of its policies (immigration, asylum, fight against organised crime, etc.); the member states' reluctance of transferring competences regarding sectors that have been previously considered as pillars of sovereignty; the institutional and decision-making' complexity of this domain; or the difficulty of harmonising the instruments used in the implementation of its policies, at national level<sup>60</sup>. The author discusses the evolution of the Area of Freedom, Security and

---

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 411.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 413.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 418-423.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 433.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 445.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 446.

Justice; the competences and application areas, the institutional structure, the decision-making process, the instruments used; as well as the provisions stipulated in the Treaty of Lisbon<sup>61</sup>. With regard to the EU's foreign policy, it is considered to encompass the international dimension of the European model and the EU's international personality – consisting of the external action, the common foreign and security policy and, lately, the common security and defence policy. Consequently, Professor Bărbulescu effectuates an analysis of: the evolution from the European Political Cooperation to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (through the Treaty of Maastricht); the foreign policy versus the defence policy; The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); the principles of the EU's external action; external action versus foreign policy (the author considers the notion of “external action” less rigorous and ambitious than the “foreign policy” construction; if the latter implies the existence of a philosophy, of some assumed political programs<sup>62</sup>, the “external action” concept reunites, in a single framework, the EU's instruments of external action; the author affirms that there can be noticed the early presence of a “political government”, as a result of the merger between the Commissioner for External Relations function with that of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy<sup>63</sup>); European common diplomacy versus intergovernmental external representation (the author asserts that the EU's legal personality demands the accomplishment of its external unity and visibility, and also of a European common diplomacy<sup>64</sup>); military power versus civil power (one of that differences between the characteristics of the EU's foreign policy and that of the member states' is that the first is based on common interests and values articulated around the notion of “civil power”<sup>65</sup>); the geographical limits versus the political limits; the European model of a globalised international society (the need for strengthening the visibility of the EU's external action can be noticed, also, through the “EU decisions” and the “EU objectives” collocations<sup>66</sup>). According to Professor Bărbulescu, despite the fact that the EU is an international organisation, it behaves like a state; its *sui generis* character and the deep integration of the institutions, decisions and policies, including the external one, make the EU a “special” subject of the international law, a status that brings a permanent tension between the supranational and state levels<sup>67</sup>.

In the approach of the representative and participative democracy - are scrutinised, in the beginning, the EU's values and principles, according to the Treaty of Lisbon, the democratic deficit issue and the problem of democratic legitimacy. The author stresses that inside the EU – state – citizen triangle stands the respect of the fundamental rights, that is compulsory not only for the member and candidate countries, but also for the states that want to establish relations with them<sup>68</sup>. The human rights and fundamental liberties issues are, therefore, dealt with by an overview of their evolution since the constitutive treaties to the Treaty of Lisbon; by their legal formalisation (the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon); and by the obligations that the member states and the third countries have concerning the respect the fundamental rights and liberties<sup>69</sup>. With regard to

---

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 447-470.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 486.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 488.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 489.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 490.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 496.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 499.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 517.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 530-531.

the relation between the UE and the member states, the Treaty of Lisbon also provides the respect for the national identity of the member states (the political and constitutional structures) and for their essential functions (in the protection of the territorial integrity, public order and national security)<sup>70</sup>. Three concepts are discussed, as well, with respect to the EU's democracy: loyal cooperation (among all the actors, at different levels; all actors' obligation to adopt the general and particular measures in order to transpose the EU's primary and secondary law; the actors' obligation to fulfil the EU's objectives and the integration process, and to participate to the activity of the common institutions<sup>71</sup>); solidarity (it is mentioned that the European solidarity shouldn't be seen in opposition with the member states' protection of their national interests, and that the common institutions should show solidarity with the member states and they shouldn't prejudice, through their actions, the member states' interests<sup>72</sup>); and transparency (it is important for the citizens' understanding of the EU decisions; at the same time, the author says that a more transparent Union is a more democratic one and more attractive for the European citizen<sup>73</sup>).

The European citizenship, whose origins are found in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), occupies, since then, a central place in the EU's treaties, and its creation generates several effects: the economic barrier is overcome; it is put the basis for a political union; and it is created a new legal institution that allows the exercise of the citizens' rights beyond the nation-state<sup>74</sup>. The legal status of the EU citizenship (that doesn't replace or eliminate the national citizenship) is addressed according to the Treaty of Lisbon: the rights of the citizens from a member state are extended to all the citizens from other member states, that live on the territory of the respective state; the rights stipulated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU are compulsory for all the member states (the freedom of movement and of residence, the right to participate to the political life in the country of residence, the right to diplomatic protection beyond the EU borders, etc.)<sup>75</sup>. Professor Bărbulescu considers that, by including the rights, obligations and the participation to the political life, the European citizenship aims at consolidating the EU's image and identity, but also the citizens' deeper involvement in the process of European integration<sup>76</sup>. In correlation with the concept of EU citizenship, are analysed the concepts of European identity and that of Europeanisation. If the European identity is defined by: a common political culture, common institutions, common values, common objectives, common policies, etc., the Europeanisation is given many meanings. With regard to Europeanisation, the author believes that, irrespective of the process's direction (from up to down, or bottom up), the concept refers to the building and to the formal and informal dissemination of norms, principles, beliefs or attitudes, regarding the impact of the EU political system<sup>77</sup>.

Concerning the EU – as a new political reality, the subject is treated in the light of the balance of power in the EU, between the big and small countries, North and South, East and West, etc., so that the votes assigned to the member states are important, as well as the voting procedures (double majority, qualified majority, mixed vote, etc.). The author considers that the EU decision-making process represents a continuous and multiple process of negotiations

---

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 519.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 522.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 523.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 533.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 534-540.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 540.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 547.

that regard not only the present, but especially the future<sup>78</sup>. Also, Professor Bărbulescu signals the necessity of being found a formula that shouldn't take the small states out of the game, which may become, in these conditions, uninterested of the decision-making process and of the EU, in general; his suggestion is for a mixed, fix and variable vote<sup>79</sup>. The last issue discussed in this chapter is the constitutionalisation of the EU. In this regard, the Treaty of Lisbon not only explains the EU's economic and social model, but it also marked an undeniable progress regarding the constitutionalisation of the European social model, through the formulation of its objectives, the inclusion of its necessary instruments (gender equality, protection of the environment, etc.), and the drafting of its "social clause"<sup>80</sup>.

In the twelfth chapter – entitled "The EU – as a political – legal synthesis of a federation of nation-states, regulated by a material constitution", are analysed three topics: national versus supranational and intergovernmental versus federal; confederation versus federation and international treaty versus European constitution; political compromise and legal symbiosis - federation of nation-states and material constitution. Following the examination of all these questions, Professor Bărbulescu asserts that the specificity of the European federalism resides in the symbiosis between the national interests and the European ones, and that this process hasn't weakened the member states and their identity as nation-states but, on the contrary, it strengthen them economically, politically and as presence in the world, so that the European integration was beneficial for the member states, internally and externally<sup>81</sup>. In his opinion, the practice of "the common sovereignty" and the dynamic of the "unity in diversity" principle represent the basis of the "new federalism", that may generate a functional - (common competences), institutional - (EU and national institutions) and holding - type federation<sup>82</sup>. Because of the distinctiveness of the European construction, the author defines the EU as a federation of nation-states<sup>83</sup>. But, as regards the final "leap" to a European federation, Professor Bărbulescu considers that it may be possible in 10 – 20 years as, for now, the supranational intergovernmental method – practiced in the EU – excludes the building of a European super-state. Still, the Treaty of Lisbon has some merits: of method and of model (the explication of the EU's political model); therefore, the Treaty marks a new beginning and gives a new direction to the EU, and proposes a big step ahead in the construction of the political Europe<sup>84</sup>. Last, but not least, the author concludes that, nowadays, we are witnessing a symbiosis that allows for the creation of a new model of federation - a federation of nation-states, based on a classical treaty, but also on a constitution – in terms of its content, so that we have a material constitution and a functional federation<sup>85</sup>.

In the book's conclusions, Professor Bărbulescu expresses two beliefs: that Europe is prepared to make a step ahead, as soon as it implements all the instruments and policies established by the Treaty of Lisbon; and that the Treaty will be interpreted in an ambitious manner, so to lead to a "more political and federal Europe" and to "more social Europe"<sup>86</sup>. At the same time, he rejects the Euroscepticism and he brings two counterarguments: the Europe 2020 and the Europe 2030 strategies. As a consequence, the author considers that: the building of the New Europe has been done progressively, from economic to political,

---

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 554.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 557.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 558.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 582.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., 583.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 585-588.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 588.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 591.

from national to federal; Europe has federalised through integration and has unified through enlargement, having as a model of development the model of social market economy; there is a European political model and a building method – the intergovernmental federalism; the New Europe is political, with a powerful social market economy<sup>87</sup>.

The book represents an exhaustive and clearly structured analysis of the evolution of the European construction, up to nowadays, but, in the same time, looking to the future. Focused on the facets and the developments of the on-going process of building the European model, the book considers, as the latest reference point, the European Union's last treaty – the Treaty of Lisbon (2007, 2009), the novelties it brings with regard to the EU's internal and external policies and the perspectives it opens for the New Europe, but also for the European identity. The first volume of Professor Bărbulescu's six volumes series – called "The New Europe" – represents a useful tool for students, practitioners and any European citizen interested in the place and role that himself / herself, his / her town, county, region and country can play in the XXIst century's Europe. A place and role that will be further deepened through the next five volumes dedicated to "The New Europe", which will approach: the European political construction, the EU institutions and decision-making process, European public policies and an explanatory dictionary of the EU, in Romanian.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bărbulescu, Iordan Gheorghe. *Noua Europă. Identitate și model european* [The New Europe. Identity and European model]. Iași: Polirom, 2015.
- Dogot, Cristina-Maria, and Ioan Horga. "Enlargement Process, Classic Geopolitics, and EU Internal Priorities." In *Eurolimes 14, Enlargements, Borders and the Changes of EU Political Priorities*, edited by Ariane Landuyt, Dana Pantea, and István Polgár, 161-183. Oradea: Oradea University Press / Bruylant, Autumn 2012.
- Dogot, Cristina-Maria. *Le fédéralisme, fondement intellectuel de la construction européenne. Le fédéralisme personnaliste de Denis de Rougemont*. Saarbrücken: Editions universitaires européennes, 2011.
- Horga, Ioan, "Multilevel Governance (MLG) and Subsidiary Principle in White Paper of MLG of the Committee of the Region (CoR)." In *Regional and Cohesion Policy – Insights into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design*, edited by Ioan Horga, Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, Adrian Ivan, Mykolia Palincsak, and István Süli-Zakar, 158-164. Debrecen & Oradea: Debrecen University Press & Oradea University Press, 2011.
- Horga, Ioan, Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, Adrian Ivan, Mykolia Palincsak, and István Süli-Zakar. *Regional and Cohesion Policy – Insights Into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design*, Debrecen & Oradea: Debrecen University Press & Oradea University Press, 2011.
- Horga, Ioan, Grigore Silași, István Süli-Zakar, and Stanislav Sagan. *The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighborhood Policy*, Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2009.

---

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., 593.



# European Integration: Achievements and Perspectives

Dan APĂTEANU<sup>1</sup>

**Review of:** *European Integration between History and New Challenges*, edited by Ariane Landuyt. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2014, 596p. ISBN 978-88-15-14715-8.

In order to face the perils that have appeared both internally and externally, key political actors have started a process of forming a common European body, by integrating the many parts of Europe; however, it has proven to be a long and winding one, with a continuous search for its identity and for its aims and challenges. For the analysis of this process, there is a major interest from researchers, coming from many domains, to find the best possible solutions.

The analysed book offers a comprehensive approach of the history of European integration, its evolving ideas from different national perspectives, actors such as trade unions, the industrial milieu, transnational parties, policies as for example regional development, gender equality, environment protection, external relations, as well as an insight into its development. It is a valuable study, obtained through the collaborations of researchers from several countries, by using both a thematic and an interdisciplinary approach.

The first part of the volume discusses the European Union history and its concepts, tackling the issues of its historiography, citizenship, the concept of regions and the geopolitical perspective of the EU enlargement. Historians tackled considerably the history of European integration, only after the 1980s, according to Daniela Preda in her paper „Between document and monument: the historiography of European integration amidst the challenges for change”. An obstacle that they had to surmount, has been that the analysis was done based on a national state framework. But, there was an impetus for its change, because of the similarity between the national and European Union interests, analysed on dynamic and pragmatic bases. The changing Europe started to be analysed in a diachronic view, with reference to institutions, diplomacy, and also other societal domains. European integration became an object for research when it was recognised as a novel historical process. Up to the 1990s, the historians had to carry a search process for the archival documents, as these were not organised systematically. However, the research process was supported by the collaboration of the historians who launched research organisations, focused on the “initiative factor”. The gradual opening of the archives and their systematic organisation have been very important. After the 1990s, the historians have studied the European integration process, also from the perspective of the “execution factor” and the perspective on the “founding fathers”. The author is describing the Italian case, picturing the European unification activities, that have been so far largely not presented, of many political and non-institutional actors.

George Contogeorgis in his analysis „Citizenship and Political Action. The Case of Political Europe” affirms that citizenship is interpreted in terms of nationality, not as subject citizen, reflected by the concept of European citizenship, as seen in the European

---

<sup>1</sup> University of Oradea, Faculty of History, International Relations, Communication and Political Sciences, Department of Communication and Political Sciences, danapateanu@yahoo.com, dapateanu@uoradea.ro.

community legal framework, as the European political system is representative of its state members, not their societies. There is an increasing deficit of democracy in the modern political system; a barrier to the direct connection between citizen and the state, in the opinion of Contogeorgios, is represented by the interest groups. The citizens are not satisfied by all these forms of representation, and they start to move in the direction of forming a cosmo-citizenship. The author reminds the concepts of governance / civil society, designed to mend the broken link between the social and political areas, but raises his doubts about it.

Paul Allies (“‘Denationalization’ of Europe: the evolving concept of the «Europe of Regions» in the European construction”) presents the evolving concept of European regions; at the end of 19th century, it was conceived as the ideology of resistance to industrialisation and to national assimilation. This has led to claims for political reforms, favouring decentralisation. In France, at the beginning of the 1900s, the institutional regionalism was in compliance with the organisation of the nation-state; however, this was dependent upon the transformations of the states, as they were part of an integrationist movement and regions got institutional rights; the structural funds gave them enhanced importance. The EU policies addresses considerably structural and cohesive policies, in line with the New Public Management; after 1980s, it has become more institutionally formalised, culminating with the formation of the Committee of Regions. This was the peak of the demands egalitarian evolution, of the peripheric / poor regions.

One of the goals of Amaral's paper entitled „Europe of the Regions – Europe with the Regions” is to clarify the meaning of regionalism and Europe of regions. One of these is a ideology that sets its goal on destructuring the state, replacing it with autonomous regions, in a European federation. Their proponents argue that states will power / war, while region aim for freedom / peace. Another view is one in which regionalism is only a temporary instrument used to achieve a federal union. A more recent trend is to view regions as partners of EU.

Herslund, in his paper „EEC / EU enlargements in a geopolitical perspective”, asserts that the enlargement of EU should be studied in the framework of the history and geography, hence in a geopolitical perspective. Enlargement was thought as necessary in order to achieve the main EU goals, peace, democracy and prosperity; these can be met only when the union is as inclusive as possible. Another reason was the threat represented by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, there were concerns regarding the enlargement. The author argues that the enlargements followed a logic regarding their direction related to the core: every enlargement has opened a geopolitical space that needed to be completed.

The next part presents the ideas of Europe, from different national perspectives, such as the Iberian, Scandinavian and Central-east European ones. Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, in „Ideas of Europe: Portugal and Spain” shows the different Portuguese ideas of building a new Europe. However, some of them distrusted a European federation, and rather supported a Europe of Christian nations and a collaboration oriented toward the Atlantic and African area. However, after the colonial war, Portugal shifted its orientation toward Europe. The supporters of European integration thought that this would be helpful for Portugal political and economic system, while its contenders said that it would obstruct the collaboration with Portuguese-speaking countries. In Spain, Europe became an important topic after the beginning of the XX<sup>th</sup> century, when some of the 98 Generation thinkers, as Jose Ortega y Gasset, promoted ideas of European integration. During the regime of Franco, Spain was isolated, at least at the beginning, from the European project. But, starting with the 1960s, Spain reconnected more and more with Europe. The Europeism movement became the dominant trend. The Spanish society required

increasingly a democratic regime, that was a prerequisite for joining EEC. After the death of Franco, Spain moved decisively toward democracy. All the societal segments agreed with the country application at the beginning of the process, but their support declined gradually after that.

Nordic countries have been rather sceptical regarding the creation of a European supranational governance system, according to Froland's study „Euro-scepticism. The Idea of Europe and Policies towards European Integration among the Nordic Countries”. Their policies favoured an economic cooperation, not a political one, at the beginning of the European integration process. Generally, they promoted their national interests, and only by pressure, have been willing to be open to the European integration process. Still, in addition of the economic reasons, Nordic countries followed geopolitical strategies that oriented them toward Europe. A strong antifederalist movement have existed in the Scandinavian countries. They based their refusal on the premise that, by giving away a part of their national sovereignty, this will lead to a democratic deficit. The Nordic countries preferred several alternative economic partnerships, especially with Great Britain.

Bielanski, in the paper „Ideas of Europe in Poland: federalist projects for East and Central Europe”, starts by pointing out the difficulty of defining the East-Central Europe term. In the 1930s, Poland tried to create a block of states that would resist to the influence of soviet and fascist regimes, but this was not an easy task as it did not have good relations with its neighbours. However, after the breakout of the WWII, their leaders realised that they had to cooperate to fight / resist the foreign invasion / influence. Great Britain was in favour of creating a federation of Central and Eastern European states. One of the influent figures that promoted the idea of European integration was Hieronim Rettinger, that was also one of the initiators of the Bilderberg group.

In Romania, after 1918, the intellectuality was a supporter of the national ideas, by re-evaluating the cultural standards, in the interest of serving the Romanian ideals, affirm Horga and Șipoș, in the paper „The perception of Europe and European values in Romanian culture between 1919 - 1945”. Two trends have emerged, one promoting the maintenance of our traditions, and the other one, wishing a profound restructuration. The authors presents the work of prominent thinkers, and some of the examples are: Eliade, who analysed the context in which evolved the Romanian culture in its history, showing what have been the obstacles in its development; Iorga examined the Romanian past, to identify the factors that lead to the Romanian vitality; Cioran, asserting that Romanians have to change, to realise their goals. Most of the intellectuals have been attached to the Romanian values, and to a less extent, to the European ones.

The third part exposes the history of European community actors and policies, namely trade unions, the industrial millieux, transnational parties, the regional, gender equality, environmental and technological policies.

Andrea Ciampani in the paper entitled „Trade Unions as Workers' Associations in the History of European Integration” considers that the trade unions have played an important role in the European integration process. The author presents the history of the social Europe and of the European Trade Union Confederation. There is a link between the national and international trade union movement in securing the workers rights. The trade unions have fought to be politically independent, for the freedom of trade union association, to obtain social and economic rights; inside these organisations, the European problems have been debated. The trade unions have been willing to participate in the process of European integration, to shape a social Europe, and in the same time, the European community decision factors were progressively ready to integrate these demands into their policies.

Two groups of scholars, the historians of international relations and the federalists, according to Petrini in „The historiography on industrial milieu and European Integration. Bringing the social conflict back in”, have considered important to analyse the influence of the economic interest groups in the construction of the EU integration and the problem of its common identity. It was suggested that the roots for this origin, were a defensive reaction to the foreign / non-European competition, the logic of the economic system and the continuation of the cartel system. Between the imposition of new economic regulations and their implementation by the private sector, there was a time gap between. The studies on the industrial milieu had, to a large extent, a national approach, and to a lesser extent, a transnational one, the latter one being presented in the study.

Piermattei believes that the study of the transnational federations of the European political parties needs an interdisciplinary approach, that of the history and of the political sciences (in „European Integration and Transnational Parties: A Look at the Historical Perspective and Current Studies”). The development of the federations has been influenced considerably by the process of European integration and it can be divided in several phases; the inception, followed by the formation of the European political parties after setting up of the direct elections for the European Parliament, continuing with the period that has the Maastricht Treaty as its turning point, and finally, with the contemporary phase. After the second phase, there has been a growth of studies on European elections, with two strands, one claiming that they are still mostly related to the national issues, while the other one, asserting they are centred on issues at the European level. The author thinks that the federations of the European parties have a transnational element, but, they have a limited political action at the European level.

The paper of Grazi „Regional and Cohesion Policy in the History of European Integration. Research Trends and Future Perspectives” aims to describe the history of the European regional policy. Its importance lies in the fact that it builds the European Social Model, that tries to harmonise the economic growth with attaining the social objectives, of improving the living conditions of the disadvantaged categories. The first regional studies appeared at the beginning of the European integration process, when even if there was no official regional policies, there were provisions that refer to the need to adjust the regional economic disparities. The formal regional policy regulations have been preceded by studies on the European regional problems. After the 1990s, the regional policy has been much more developed, illustrated by the creation of the European Regional Development Fund, in order to respond to the new societal changes, such as the economic hardships, the prospect of the European economic integration and the accession of new countries. Initially, the ERDF had several shortcomings, but it went through a series of reforms, the most significant one being in 1988, that emphasised the importance of the territorial criterion and of the multigovernance concept.

The European integration process had a positive influence on the situation of the women rights, as it is illustrated by Di Sarcina („Historical Studies on EEC / EU Gender Equality Policy: A Balance Sheet and some Perspectives”). Nowadays, the gender policy is one of the horizontal policies of EU, enforced by the Amsterdam Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. The new provisions refer to the concept of gender mainstreaming, that require the inclusion of gender equality in all policies. The fight for the women rights originated from the social policies, that included, among others, equal pay between men and women for the same job. After the mid 1990s, there has been an increase in the number of gender related studies, many of these, underlining the important work done by women who had key political positions.

According to Scichilone analysis „The EEC / EU Environmental Policy. The Historical Perspective between Environmental History and European Integration Process”, the protection of the environment is one of the most important issue, that society have to face nowadays, and also, difficult to solve, as it requires the international and national cooperation of the political actors. As EU is one of the important players in the international scene, its role is very important in dealing with the environmental issues. The European environmental policy has been tackled from different perspectives, such as economic, social or legal ones. The economic approach has offered interesting and original insights, such as the theory of environmental economics. The author underlines the importance of examining the relationship between man and nature, of the transformations that man have done to the natural environment, in order to improve its human environment. The intensification of the production mechanisms changed drastically the impact of man activities upon the environment.

When analysing the EU technological policy, it is important to distinguish between the intentions and the actual programs achieved; the latter, can be traced, from the public documents and from the specific studies. The historical studies related to the European technology, concern with technoscience, which is a mixed concept, formed from scientific knowledge and innovation. The cooperation in the techno-scientific area has two directions: the first is the institutional / integrationist one and the second being the intergovernmental one. Against the backdrop of foreign competition, it is necessary to strengthen the cooperation at the EU level among the research networks, as the study „Historiography on European Construction and Technology as Element of ‘Integration’” of Burigana concludes.

The final part is focused on the EEC / EU external relations and international studies on EU, related to the United States, the Soviet Union and Australia. Starting with the Treaty of Rome, EEC has built its external relations policy, dealing with states from all the continents, ascertains Laschi in the paper „The European Integration Process and the External Relations”. However, the historiography on this theme is still sparse and it had rather focused on the external relations of the states regarding the accession to the EU. The foreign policy of the EU has been formalised only in the Treaty of Maastricht, before that, was adopted by different community institutions and by the member states. It is important to observe the action at the national / intergovernmental level, at the European institutional level and the results from their mixture. The EU has developed an external relations policy, firstly, but not only, because of its existence as an international actor. The study of the EU external relations policy should make reference to periodisation, the enlargement process, the relations with the partner states and the external consequences of the internal policies.

Denis Rolland analyses the Schools of Political Sciences, established by the Council of Europe, in order to promote and consolidate the democratic values and the human rights in the former Communist countries, in „Promoting a democracy written on sand and a European identity in the transparency of the horizon: writing the history of the Council of Europe and schools of political studies”. Next, it is disentangled the confusion that often appears when people think about the Council of Europe identity, its role and activity. The organisation did not manage to promote a deeper political integration of its members. However, after 1990s, its activity has been revived, as it assumed the role of spreading the democratic values in the ECE / Balkans / Caucasus countries. Practically, it had become the anteroom for entry in EU, with the mission to prepare the candidate countries to fulfil the political admission criteria. One means of achieving this goal was by establishing a network of political schools, that are based on four pillars: European

integration, democracy, rule of law and human rights, followed by the presentation of the concepts. The schools do not have a single identity, but rather these have adapted to the local context.

The origin of the American identity has been created in opposition to the European one, more exactly, with distinct values. However, the two global wars from the XX<sup>th</sup> century, approached America to Europe, leading to the formation of the Atlantic alliance. This strong cooperation continued until the fall of the Communist regime. Nowadays, nevertheless, we observe, yet another change, as Europe distances from the interventionist policy of America. Bitumi Alessandra in the paper „The United States and Europe in the Mirror: Notes on the Origins and Evolution of the Transatlantic Relationship” presents the EU – US relation seen through the crises that have taken place. At the beginning of the Cold War years, US were a strong supporter of EU economic and political integration, as illustrated by the Marshall Plan. To a certain extent, Europe adopted the American way of life, and US imposed as a hegemonic power. But, in the following decades, as Europe have become stronger, asserted its own identity, so that the two partners have distanced one from the other.

Researchers have considered, usually, that the relation between EU and Soviet Union should be analysed in the context of the bipolar power structure, asserts Lara Picardo in her paper „Sources and Studies on Soviet Union and European Integration”. Nonetheless, the research process is still not well developed, as the archival resources have been scarce. After the nationalisation of the archives by the Russian Federation, it had ups and downs, with an opening up, by president Yeltsin and a partial closure by president Putin. Despite these difficult conditions, there have been researches that have analysed the relation between EU and the Soviet Union. The biased view in researches have started to change, under the Gorbachev leadership, gaining impetus after the fall of the Communist regime.

The study „In Search of European and EU Studies in Australia: Challenges and Opportunities” by Winand, Kalfadellis and Witzleb shows that Australia have become interested by the European situation, in the context of the European integration and EEC / EU policies, as these had the potential to affect Australia, especially through the Common Agricultural Policy and by the balance of the exports to EU. Hence, European Studies centres have been set up across Australia; these have disseminated the knowledge on the European culture and promoted the reciprocal cooperation. Undergraduate and graduate programs, European centres and Jean Monnet chairs have been established across Australia with the financial support of the European Commission, but also, of the Australian universities, based on the interest of the researchers community. However, even if many Australian universities teach European studies, only a few teach EU studies; also, there has been a rise in the interest for the Asian Law / Business Studies, in the context of the increase of economic exchanges with Asia.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Landuyt, Ariane (editor). *European Integration between History and New Challenges*. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2014, 596p.

# Historical Moments in the History of Europe

Anca OLTEAN<sup>1</sup>

**Review of:** Sorin Şipoş, Gabriel Moisa, Dan Octavian Cepraga, Mircea Brie, Teodor Mateoc, *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe* (Cluj-Napoca: Romanian Academy / Center for Transylvanian Studies, 2014). ISBN 978-973-7784-97-1).

The present volume was published as a result of a Jean Monnet Conference which took place in Oradea in 2013. The homonym conference *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe* was organised as a result of active involvement of the University of Oradea, University of Padova and State University of Chişinău in the framework of a Jean Monnet Project led by Professor Sorin Şipoş from the University of Oradea. In July 2015, the homonym volume was launched, being published under the aegis of Romanian Academy and of the Centre for Transylvanian Studies from Cluj-Napoca. The volume has as coordinators the following university professors: Sorin Şipoş, Gabriel Moisa, Dan Octavian Cepraga, Mircea Brie, and Teodor Mateoc.

In the framework of the present volume, authors from Romania and other European zones came with interesting issues belonging to past and contemporary European history with a strong emphasis on European ethnicities. Such authors are: Lorenzo Renzi, Ion Alexandru Mizgan, Florin Dobrei, Ioan-Aurel Pop, Ion Eremia, Delia-Maria Radu, Teodor Mateoc, Nicolae Edroiu, Şerban Turcuş, Florin Sfrengeu, Mihai Georgiţă, Sorin Şipoş, Mircea Brie, Mihai Drecin and Delia Cora, Anca Oltean, Gabriel Moisa, Sever Dumitraşcu, Ovidiu Mureşan, Radu Românaşu, Federico Donatiello, Stelian Nistor, Ioan Derşidan, Anarela Chiş (Meseşan) and Ion Zainea, Dana Sala, Viorel Bolduma, Antonio Faur.

The first section is entitled *Periphery Viewed from the Centre*. The volume opens with the article “From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe”<sup>2</sup>. The epoch of Enlightenment with its cosmopolitan discourse and curiosity for alterity and also non-European realities, with the appetite for travelling as it is described by Paul Hazard is emphasised by the authors Sorin Şipoş and Dan Octavian Cepraga. The authors are interested in Western travellers who went to Eastern Europe and their opinions about these regions were recorded in the turmoil of times. When dealing with such travellers, the authors are interested firstly in interrogations such as who are they? What intellectual formation they have? Their interests of traveling of what nature it was? Quoting Gianfranco Folena and Frederico Chabod, the authors raise the questions “What is Europe?”, “What is the Eastern border of Europe?”, heterogeneity of the European regions and borders, relation core-periphery. The authors try to determine the cleavages that took place in the European continent such as the split of European Christian Church

---

<sup>1</sup> Research assistant PhD at the Institute for Euroregional Studies, University of Oradea, olteananca@hotmail.com.

<sup>2</sup> Sorin Şipoş and Dan Octavian Cepraga, “From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe,” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Şipoş et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 5-12.

in the Orthodox division in Byzantium and Eastern part of the Roman Empire, respectively Catholicism in the Western part of Latinity. The unity of the Church seemed hard to regain still, the Europeans, Easterners and Westerners fought together defending Christianity and opposing to Ottoman expansion in South and East and to Islam. The boundaries between East and West sometimes created by the Turks or Tsarist Empire proved to be permeable since several western travellers reached the Romanian countries. The authors give the example of Count of Segur who passed from Prussia in Poland in 1784-1785 and found a completely different world, feeling as going back in history<sup>3</sup>. Marquis de Custine, another example quoted by the author, felt a few decades later, that it is very instructive for Westerners to travel in Russia, thus they will learn to appreciate better the rights and liberties they enjoy in their countries of origin.<sup>4</sup>

Among the travellers that criticised the state of facts existent in Ottoman Empire and the Principalities found under its domination, was captain Aubert that considered that the deficient management and administration of the Ottoman Empire was the cause of decline in Principalities, not the economic potential of these two countries that was really high.<sup>5</sup>

The authors give the example of another traveller at the North and South of Danube that was Antoine François Le Clerc, who considers too that the responsible for the decline of Principalities Moldova and Țara Românească is the Ottoman Empire. It seems that the Romanian countries aroused, again, the attention of Western European powers.

“Promontory of the Asian continent” or territory divided by the „iron curtain” Europe was always considered the bastion of Catholicism, civil society, democracy, rule of law. Now with the project of the European unification, Central and Eastern Europe has to “reinvent” themselves and to embrace the western pattern of civilisation. In the new “network” society boundaries become more flexible and easier to bypass than before, is the opinion of the two authors.

The next paper belongs to Professor Lorenzo Renzi, from the University of Padova, and has the title “Terra Romena”<sup>6</sup>. The authors try to establish the first mentioning of Romanian people in written documents but also the notion of knowing Romanian language. The author tries to establish when and in what context it appeared the term “Țara Românească”. Then he focused on the ethnical adjective *Romanian*, which names the people and the language<sup>7</sup>. There is a similarity between Romanian and Italian language concerning these issues. The common Latin origin of the two languages explains why we have so many similar terms in Romanian and Italian, is the conclusion of Lorenzo Renzi<sup>8</sup>.

Ion Alexandru Mizgan, priest and doctor in Historical Science, comes with the paper “The Crusades – Cause of Tension between Eastern and Western Europe”<sup>9</sup>. The author tries to establish the genesis of the crusades that took place between the years 1096-1270 in the Middle East, having as purpose the liberation of Holy Places. The

---

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>6</sup> Lorenzo Renzi, “‘Terra Romena’,” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Șipoș et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 15-20.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>9</sup> Ion Alexandru Mizgan, “The Crusades – Cause of Tension between Eastern and Western Europe,” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Șipoș et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 21-46.



European church sponsored them in order to colonize regions from Middle East as Palestine and Jerusalem found under Muslim domination.<sup>10</sup>

The author underlines that the importance of crusades cannot be denied, especially after the reform of papacy which took place during this time. The author points out the most important topics that referred to the crusades such as the work of Steven Runciman, who idealised the image of Western Christian knights. The author allocates a special place on the fourth crusade by quoting Steven Runciman that considered it a climax (cleavage) between East and West.<sup>11</sup> After underlining the importance of 1054 momentum with the Great Schism and cleavage between Catholics and Orthodox, the author focuses on the relationship between Byzantium and Western Crusaders. In time the religious ideals of the crusades makes space to political and economic interest that were on the basis of the fourth crusade.<sup>12</sup>

The following paper belongs to Florin Dobrei and has the title “Transylvanian “Schismatics”, “Heretics” and “Infidels” in the Vision of 13th – 16th century Catholic Europe”<sup>13</sup>. In the opinion of the author, “the great schism”, the separation between the two poles of Christianity led to the bridge between Eastern and Western Europe.<sup>14</sup> He makes reference to the project of Pope Innocent III who tried to bring back under the domination of Catholics the Eastern Orthodox Church. Rome found an ally in the Hungarian Apostolic State, which tried to bring Transylvania under hegemony of Catholic kings. Orthodox Romanians were persecuted as “schismatics”, “heretics” or “infidels”<sup>15</sup>. The following Popes took measures against intra-Carpathian Orthodoxy<sup>16</sup>. Together with other migrators, orthodox Romanians must have been submitted. The author follows the policy of different Hungarian kings in their relations with Orthodox “schismatics” from Transylvania. Failing in their attempts to submit the Orthodox, Romanian elites were targeted to become allies of the Hungarian Court.

The paper elaborated by the Academician Ioan-Aurel Pop, entitled “16th Century Venetian Bailiffs’ Reports on Realities in the Ottoman Empire”<sup>17</sup>, shows the interest of Venetians in the Ottoman Empire because it grew so fast that it threatened Christianity with its emergent power. The venetians ambassadors, called bailiffs, were concerned with this problem of growing influence of the Ottoman Empire. Ioan-Aurel Pop quotes Daniele de’ Ludovici, who wrote to the Dodge Andrea Gritti, describing the large extent of Sultan’s dominion. Wallachia and Moldavia, as Transylvania and Hungary too, are placed, according to this description, outside of the Ottoman law. Another ambassador (bailiff) was Bernardo Navagero, who describes the fact that Romania was becoming a part of Turkish Empire. Domenico Trevisan stipulates the tribute that Romanian countries had to pay to the Ottoman Gate: “Bogdania” and “Valachia” 20,000 ducats, and “Transylvania” 10,000. About the

---

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 22.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 46.

<sup>13</sup> Florin Dobrei, “Transylvanian “Schismatics,” “Heretics” and “Infidels” in the Vision of 13<sup>th</sup>–16<sup>th</sup> Century Catholic Europe,” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Şipoş et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 47- 60.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 47.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 48.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 49.

<sup>17</sup> Ioan-Aurel Pop, “16<sup>th</sup> Century Venetian Bailiffs’ Reports on Realities in the Ottoman Empire,” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Şipoş et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 61-75.

tribute that Romanian countries had to pay to the Ottoman Gate talked also the bailiff Antonio Barbarigo. Other bailiffs who brought forward the image of Ottoman Empire were Marino Cavalli, Andrea Dandolo, Antonio Barbaro, Costantino Garzoni, Bonifacio Antelini, Giacomo Soranzo, Giovanni Francesco Morosini, Lorenzo Bernardo.

In the article “A False Theory still Persists at the Eastern Border of Latinity”<sup>18</sup>, Ion Eremia presents some false theories that sustain that the origins of Dacians and other Moldavians are Slavic in order to legitimize Soviet expansionists claims that continue to expand today in the case of the Republic of Moldova that would have a different origin than Romanian people, according to these false assertions.

Delia-Maria Radu, in the study “From Centre to the Periphery and the Other Way Round”<sup>19</sup>, starts from assertion of historian Lucian Boia, who writes about the centre as the core states of Europe and a generator of normality, while Eastern Europe seemed to be in the 18<sup>th</sup> century an uncivilised, barbaric world. The North-South division, a clash between the elevated South and barbaric North was replaced by East-West division, asserts the author. Many western travellers analysed by the Delia Radu talk both in positive and negative terms about Romanian countries, noticing the cleavage between natural beauties and potential, and the arbitrary of habits and rule of governance and the lack of culture of local inhabitants. In the following centuries, points out the Delia Radu, these considerable differences will be bypassed, and Bucharest will be compared with Paris.

Teodor Mateoc, in the study “Identity and Race. The Problem of Otherness in Contemporary Cultural Studies”<sup>20</sup>, highlighted the importance of identity studies in cultural contexts and fields of study starting from ancient philosophers until contemporary thinkers such as Hannah Arendt and Levinas. The author makes the distinction between “self” and “identity”, between inner assumed being and unity in diversity that implies the relation with the others. Some approached topics are identity and temporality, the self and the other, cultural otherness, race, ethnicity and alterity. In the end the author concludes that “The difference between “race” and “identity” marks the evolution of human thinking about the difference of otherness from a biological and pseudo-scientific understanding to a cultural one,” pointing out, in this way, the importance of psychic factors coupled with symbolic elements<sup>21</sup>.

The second part of the volume has the title “Self-images at Europe’s Eastern Borders” and starts with the study of Nicolae Edroiu, “The Borders – Reality and Concept”<sup>22</sup>. The author launches his assertions by emphasising the important role played by the borders in the history of humanity. Natural border follow geomorphological units,

<sup>18</sup> Ion Eremia, „A False Theory still Persists at the Eastern Border of Latinity,” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Şipoş et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 76-87.

<sup>19</sup> Delia-Maria Radu, “From Centre to the Periphery and the Other Way Round,” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Şipoş et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 88-95.

<sup>20</sup> Teodor Mateoc, “Identity and Race. The Problem of Otherness in Contemporary Cultural Studies,” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Şipoş et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 96-104.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 104.

<sup>22</sup> Nicolae Edroiu, “The Borders – Reality and Concept,” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Şipoş et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 107-112.

and usually natural border became a societal one, separating different communities<sup>23</sup>. After the creation of nation-states, in modern and contemporary periods, natural borders became political and state borders. Nicolae Edroiu mentions also cultural borders that separate different civilisations<sup>24</sup>.

Șerban Turcuș, in the article “Ai confini della Cristianita. Il documento “fondazionale” della Citta di Oradea (1113). Interpretazioni ecclesiologiche ed onomastiche”<sup>25</sup>, considers that the historical critics asserted that this “diploma” (the “founding document”) is not a fake, after many controversies. The author concludes that this diploma proves the birth of the city of Oradea, at the oriental boundaries of Christianity, as a city of frontier with a cultural, linguistical and ethnical vocation.<sup>26</sup>

Florin Sfrengeu in the article “An Image of the Society in North – Western Romania during the 10-11<sup>th</sup> Centuries a.d.”<sup>27</sup> writes about a statistic of the number of settlements dated between 8<sup>th</sup>-11<sup>th</sup> centuries on the Northwestern territory of Romania.<sup>28</sup> Thus they were discovered 128 village type settlements and 5 caves. In the following centuries the number of settlements is smaller, only 61 rural settlements being identified and three caves. About the period in question, important are the information brought forward by Anonymus, who wrote about the state formations led by Menumorut, Glad and Gelu. The author furnishes to the reader a broader description of the information provided by Anonymous. Florin Sfrengeu describes the advance of Hungarian state and religion advance in the region of North-West Romania, quoting historians like L. Borcea and Al. Madgearu. In the part of conclusion, the author states the Romanian resistance in front of Hungarian attempts of conquest: “County organization could not abolish the old Romanian realities and institutions in north-western Romania. The natives continued their lives in small formations, principalities and voivodships, sometimes called “districts” by officials and within the Orthodox Church”.<sup>29</sup>

Mihai Georgiță, in the article “The Ennoblement of the Calvinist Romanian Priests at the Middle of the 17th Century in Transylvania”<sup>30</sup> writes about ennoblement of

<sup>23</sup> Dorin Ioan Dolghi et al., “Europe and the Neighbourhood – Introduction,” in *Eurotimes 7, Europe and the Neighbourhood*, ed. Dorin Dolghi et al. (Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2009), 6, underline the necessity to connect Europe with other spaces of civilisation: “The interpretation of Europe as a space of civilization must be also related to other spaces of civilization. From the neighbourhood perspective, the Europeans relates to the others in different terms. Firstly, there is a geographical delimitation between Europe, Middle East and Northern Africa. These regions are not always related in geographical terms but perceived in cultural terms. The main differentiations are related to religion, culture, beliefs and values”.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 111.

<sup>25</sup> Șerban Turcuș, “Ai confini della Cristianita. Il documento ‘fondazionale’ della citta di Oradea (1113). Interpretazione ecclesiologica ed onomastiche” [At the edge of Christianity. The ‘foundational’ document of the city of Oradea (1113). Ecclesiastic and onomastic interpretation], in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Șipoș et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 113-120.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 120.

<sup>27</sup> Florin Sfrengeu, “An Image of the Society in North-Western Romania during the 10<sup>th</sup> -11<sup>th</sup> Centuries a.d,” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Șipoș et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 121-132.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 121.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 132.

<sup>30</sup> Mihai Georgiță, “The Ennoblement of the Calvinist Romanian Priests at the Middle of the 17<sup>th</sup> Century in Transylvania,” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern*

such priests in the context of the leader Gheorghe Racotzi I, who intensified his proselyte campaign on Romanian priests. He mentions such priests and considers that during the reign of Rakotzi princes, there were several cases of ennoblement when proselytism was intensified.<sup>31</sup>

Sorin Şipoş, in his article “Foreign Travellers in the Romanian Space and Border Symbolism (1787- 1810)”<sup>32</sup>, writes on Enlightenment epoch with its appetite for travelling in Europe and outside Europe, the transition from small Europe to “large Europe”, with the ambition of Europeans to become also “citizens of the universe” and being interested in “exotic” realities. It was an epoch where the interest of Europe for the Romanian Principalities increased. In 18 century, the Romanian voivods from Moldova and Țara Românească were replaced with Levantine Greeks and the venality of functions was established. The author focuses on the cases of foreign travellers who came to Principalities and wrote about their experiences. Such travellers were Eduard Daniel Clarke, Christine Reinhard, Vince Batthyany, William Wittman, Adam Neale, Joseph Rohrer, the British lord Cavendish Bentinck, Louis Allier de Hauteroche, etc. Often they notice a difference in the organisation, exploitation and the political system of organisation that was stronger and more effective in Transylvania than in Țara Românească and Moldova. In the relation with the provinces placed under the rule of Orient, there are also mental borders who separate these travellers from the native population<sup>33</sup>, concludes the author.

Mircea Brie, in the article “Ethnicity and Politics in the Romanian Space, the Case of the North-Western Transylvania”<sup>34</sup>, emphasizes that the problem of ethnicity is strictly related with the problem of denomination in this region. Region is connected with ethnicity. The author focuses on the political context of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as determiners in the evolution of the ethnic structure. Before 1967, the region is part of Austrian state, then to Austro-Hungarian Empire during 1967-1918, is included in Hungary during 1940-1944 or is a part of Romanian state during 1918-1940, 1944-present days.<sup>35</sup> After focusing on the importance of these changes on ethnicity and population, Mircea Brie pays attention on evolution in the population ethnic structure during these epochs. During the interwar period, the region was subject of the Romanisation process, existing a Romanian speaking elite, while in the period of Hungarian dominance, Hungarisation process was a reality such as during the years 1940-1944<sup>36</sup>.

---

*Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Şipoş et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 133-140.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 140.

<sup>32</sup> Sorin Şipoş, “Foreign Travellers in the Romanian Space and Border Symbolism (1797-1810,” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Şipoş et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 141-157.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 157.

<sup>34</sup> Mircea Brie, “Ethnicity and Politics in the Romanian Space. The Case of North-Western Transylvania,” in *From periphery to Centre. The image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Şipoş et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 158- 170.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 160.

<sup>36</sup> István Polgár, in his book review “Ethnical and Confessional Diversity and Cohabitation in the Ethnic Borderlands of Romania and Hungary between 1867-1920,” in *Eurolimes 18, The Security Dimension of European Frontier vs the Legitimacy of Political Priorities of EU and EU Member States National Preferences*, ed. Dorin Dolghi and Octavian Țăcu (Oradea: Editura Universităţii din Oradea, Autumn 2014), 228, wrote about the reality of Romanian intellectuality fight against

Mihai Drecin and Delia Cora, in the paper “Sui romeni e sugli altri (1910- 1939). Immagini di Săcele, della Basarabia, dell’Europa Centrale nella memorialistica e nella corrispondenza del docente universitario Victor Jinga”<sup>37</sup>, emphasize that the historian Victor Jinga was the son of a shepherd from Săcele. He attended the Superior Institute of Economical Sciences in Venice (1920- 1925) where he obtained his PhD. In the last part of his career he was a researcher at the Institute for Economic Research of the Romanian Academy in Bucharest during 1963- 1973 and also a national leader of National Peasants Party in his youth years.

Anca Oltean, in her paper “Incursions in the History of Jews from Central and Eastern Europe (19th Century – 1945)”<sup>38</sup>, writes about the history of Jews in Central and Eastern Europe in 19th and 20th century<sup>39</sup>, in countries such as Russian Empire, in Hungary, in Poland, in Austria, in Czechoslovakia, in Romania, about the deportation of some Romanian Jews to Transnistria, about the Jews of Bulgaria, emphasising the anti-Jewish policies of these states in modern and contemporary epochs, in the time of Holocaust.

Gabriel Moisa in his work “Between Exclusion and Acceptance. The Perception of Historian Gheorghe I. Brătianu in Communist Romania”<sup>40</sup>, considers that Gh. Brătianu was one of the most prominent Romanian historians. A very representative work of him was *Maria Neagră. De la origini până la cucerirea otomană* [The Black Sea. From Origins to the Ottoman Conquest], being often compared with the works of Fernand Braudel. After his arrestment in 1950, Brătianu was in impossibility of writing. In 27

Hungarian domination during the years of dualism: “Fighting against dualism was first with the Romanian intellectuals in Transylvania. It is undisputed that this social strata understood well the sense of history and made commendable efforts to use all possible means within the limits allowed by an oppressive regime, sometimes even exceeding them to defend the rights of the Romanian population in Transylvania”.

<sup>37</sup> Mihai Drecin and Delia Cora, “Sui rumeni e sugli altri (1910- 1939). Immagini di Săcele, della Basarabia, dell’ Europa Centrale nella memorialistica e nella corrispondenza del docente universitario Victor Jinga” [The Romanians and other (1910-1939). Images of Săcele, of Bessarabia, Europe’s Central in the memoirs and correspondence of the university professor Victor Jinga] in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Şipoş et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 171-180.

<sup>38</sup> Anca Oltean, „Incursions in the History of Jews from Central and Eastern Europe (19<sup>th</sup> Century-1945),” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Şipoş et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 181-193.

<sup>39</sup> Anca Oltean in the article „The Jews of Romania and their Immigration to Israel. 1948-1953,” in *Eurolimes 11, Leaders of the Borders, Borders of the Leaders*, ed. Cristina-Maria Dogot et al. (Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2011), 42, quotes Victor Karady’s statistics concerning the evolution of Jewish population in the world (1780-1967) stating: „The table below shows the numerical evolution of the Jewish population in the world (1780- 1967). So we see that the Jews settled early in Hungary and in a high percentage, 0.9%, i.e., 81000 in 1780. In the same period they settled in Romania 2,4%, i.e. 80.000. In that time they were living in great number in Russia, Poland, Galicia and Moravia. Their number increased not only in Hungary, but also in Romania”.

<sup>40</sup> Gabriel Moisa, “Between Exclusion and Acceptance. The Perception of Historian Gheorghe I. Brătianu in Communist Romania,” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Şipoş et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 194-201.

April 1953, Gheorghe I. Brătianu died in the prison of Sighet. At the end of communist years, Brătianu and his work was rehabilitated<sup>41</sup>.

Part three of the present volume is entitled *European Identities*. This section opens with the paper of Sever Dumitrașcu with the title “European Carpathians vs. Marginal Carpathians”<sup>42</sup>. The author offers geographical details about Dacia, a territory blessed by God, and also of Dobruja, the Left Pont. Augustus conquered Dacia and Traian turned it into Province Dacia. Aurelian organised at the South of Danube, Dacia Aureliana. In the opinion of the author “Latin and Christian scholars, such as Nicetas of Remesiana, Dionysus Exiguus and John Cassian had an important contribution, which should not be disregarded, to the strengthening of the relationship (definitively Christian one) between Dacia and the Western Latin part of Europe”<sup>43</sup>.

Ovidiu Mureșan in the article “Projects and Attempts for the European Aggregation in the Middle Ages and at the Beginning of the Modern Period”<sup>44</sup>, writes about the confrontation between Papacy and Roman-German Empire in the detriment of Carolingian medieval unity. In the context of the medieval crusades it took place the implementation of several projects of the unification of Europe. The Grand Project of the duke of Sully included six hereditary kingdoms (France, Spain, Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden and Lombardy), six elective powers (the Pope state, Venice, the Roman-German Empire, Poland, Hungary and Bohemia) and three federative republics (Switzerland, Italy and Belgium).

Radu Romînașu wrote about “European Images and Policies Reflected in the Modernization Process of the Romanian Extra-Carpathian Space (18<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> century)”<sup>45</sup>, reflecting on the period contained between Cromwell’s revolution and *The Declaration of Man and of the Citizen*, and wandering what differentiates it amongst the other epochs<sup>46</sup>. The pre-modern values seemed to be not sufficient anymore and it started a crisis of European consciousness. The three Revolutions (English, American and French) created the newly about to be born world, followed by the expansion of European model. The author wanders how Romanian society can be integrated in this new world? Some forms of civilisation were borrowed in Romanian countries from the West, others did not fit in the realities of these provinces, is the opinion of the author.

Federico Donatiello in the work “L’opera italiana tra le selve dei Carpazi: La traduzione di Heliade Rădulescu della norma di Felice Romani”<sup>47</sup>, shows the fact that the

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 201.

<sup>42</sup> Sever Dumitrașcu, “European Carpathians vs. Marginal Carpathians,” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Șipoș et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 205-208.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 205.

<sup>44</sup> Ovidiu Mureșan, “Projects and Attempts for the European Aggregation in the Middle Ages and at the Beginning of the Modern Period,” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Șipoș et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 209-216.

<sup>45</sup> Radu Romînașu, “European Images and Policies Reflected in the Modernization Process of the Romanian Extra-Carpathian Space (18<sup>th</sup> – 19<sup>th</sup> century),” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Șipoș et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 217-232.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 217.

<sup>47</sup> Federico Donatiello, “L’opera italiana tra le selve dei Carpazi: La traduzione di Heliade Rădulescu della Norma di Felice Romani” [Italian opera among the forests of the Carpathians: The translation of Heliade Rădulescu the standard by Felice Romani], in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Șipoș et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 233-246.

Italian libretti were translated into Romanian by Ion Heliade Rădulescu and Gheorghe Asachi. The Romanian literature language became a concern of great European interest.

Stelian Nistor, in the article “Bihar County – Geographical Realities Reflected in Monographic Works from the End of 19<sup>th</sup> – Beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> Century”<sup>48</sup>, stressed that the county was the first administrative units in the time of Hungarian kings since 10<sup>th</sup> century. Then he focuses on the historical evolution of the county as administrative unit. According to the administrative reform, 64 counties were delineated. The first book of the monographic series was published in 1899, the series related to Bihor County was published in 1901. It is a work of synthesis containing the evolution of Bihor County starting with the Middle Age and ending with 1901. The book makes a comparative analysis in various domains such as history, geography, ethnography, linguistic and architecture.

Ioan Derșidan, in the work *An Algorithm in MittelEuropa*,<sup>49</sup> considers three writers, Ioan Slavici, Liviu Rebreanu and Schlattner Eginald, in whose operas he tries to identify the algorithm of Romanian man. The author concludes “The Gulag, the literature of apocalypse, Communism, totalitarianism, of the war (World War I and II) are just a few of the great / actual themes that stir the interest of many writers, researchers and analysts in the field of politics, literature, history and journalism, ethnic groups, etc. The literary researcher will always show an interest in analyzing the openness of literature toward history / reality and that of history toward literature”.<sup>50</sup>

Anarela Chiș (Meseșan) and Ion Zainea, in the article “The European Identity of the Romanian Exile”<sup>51</sup>, asserts the aspect that the Romanian exile rallied to the values of European identity and considered themselves as citizens of Free Europe. European mass media and Romanian elites from exile supported the implementation of Western European values in Romania. In the opinion of the authors, this freethinking exile coming from Romania in Western Europe contributed to the abolishment of the communist regime.

Dana Sala, in the article “Cartea Șoaptelor, by Varujan Vosganian: The Palimpsest of Collective Memory”<sup>52</sup>, focuses on the relationship between history and otherness. In this book the author identifies three paradoxes. Thus “The first paradox is about the relationship between the dead ones and their descendants, between death and life inside a community”<sup>53</sup>. The author points out that the second paradox is about suffering.<sup>54</sup> Last but not least, the authors points out: “A third paradox is to find meanings in suffering,

<sup>48</sup> Stelian Nistor, “Bihar County – Geographical Realities Reflected in Monographic Works from the End of 19<sup>th</sup> – Beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> Century,” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Șipoș et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 247-254.

<sup>49</sup> Ioan Derșidan, “An Algorithm in Mittel Europa,” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Șipoș et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 255-260.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 260.

<sup>51</sup> Anarela Chiș (Meseșan) and Ion Zainea, “The European Identity of the Romanian Exile,” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Șipoș et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 261-271.

<sup>52</sup> Dana Sala, “Cartea Șoaptelor, by Varujan Vosganian: The Palimpsest of Collective Memory” [The Book of Whispers, by Varujan Vosganian: The Palimpsest of Collective Memory], in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Șipoș et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 272-280.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 275.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 276.

to invalidate its destructive potential”.<sup>55</sup> This last paradox is considered the connection between uprootedness and dwelling inside words.<sup>56</sup>

Viorel Bolduma, in the article “The Relations of the Republic of Moldova with the European Union between 2009-2013: Achievements, Progress and Prospects”<sup>57</sup>, mentions that these bilateral relations started in 1994 with the signing of Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. In 2005, in Brussels, another step was done, the signing of the Action Plan Republic of Moldova – European Union. In May 2009, it was launched the idea of Eastern Partnership, a Polish – Swedish initiative to strengthen the relation between EU and six Eastern European neighbours (Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Armenia). In 2010, at Chişinău, it was signed EU – Moldova Association Agreement. Then it followed the implementation of a free trade area between Moldova and EU and also a visa agreement. These are only a few steps that have been made in the field of cooperation between EU and Republic of Moldova.

Antonio Faur in the article “Considerations on European Identity. An Investigation among Students in History at the University of Oradea (year 2013)”<sup>58</sup>, tries to analyze the impact of European integration among the university students from the year 1, 2, 3 from specialisation of history at the University of Oradea. The number of students who considered themselves only Romanian citizens varied from 41.66% (1st year) to 50% (2st year) and to 80% (3st year). The ones who consider themselves Romanian then European are 58.34% (1st year), 50% (2st year) or 20% (3st year). Last but not least they are not students considering that they are firstly European, then Romanian, in the three years of study.<sup>59</sup> It seems that the first year students feels more Europeans.<sup>60</sup>

The papers of the volume “From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe” remark by variety of content. The authors, coming from Eastern and Western Europe, express their belief in the political and cultural unity of the European continent.

---

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 277.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 278.

<sup>57</sup> Viorel Bolduma, „The Relations of the Republic of Moldova with the European Union between 2009-2013: Achievements, Progress and Prospects,” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Şipoş et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 281- 286.

<sup>58</sup> Antonio Faur, “Considerations on European Identity. An Investigation among Students in History at the University of Oradea (Year 2013),” in *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, ed. Sorin Şipoş et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014), 287- 292.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 290.

<sup>60</sup> Luminița Şoproni, in the book review “The European Studies – A Field with an Interdisciplinary Perspective,” in *Eurolimes 18, The Security Dimension of European Frontier vs. the Legitimacy of Political Priorities of EU and EU Member States National Preferences*, ed. Dorin Dolghi and Octavian Țicu (Oradea: Oradea University Press, Autumn 2014), 203, makes a connection between the idea of Europe and the necessity of the Union to become a centre of excellence and to establish its dominating values.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Brie, Mircea, and Ioan Horga. „Le frontiere europene – espressioni dell’identità” [European borders – expressions of identity]. *Transylvanian Review*, ISI Journal XXIII, supplement no. 1 (2014): 202-216.
- Dogot, Cristina-Maria, and Ioan Horga. “Enlargement Process, Classic Geopolitics, and EU Internal Priorities.” In *Eurotimes* 14, *Enlargements, Borders and the Changes of EU Political Priorities*, edited by Ariane Landuyt, Dana Pantea, and István Polgár, 161-183. Oradea: Oradea University Press / Bruylant, Autumn 2012.
- Dolghi, Dorin Ioan, Gilles Rouet, and Zsolt Radics. “Europe and the Neighbourhood – Introduction.” In *Eurotimes* 7, *Europe and the Neighbourhood*, edited by Dorin Dolghi, Gilles Rouet, and Zsolt Radics, 5-8. Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2009.
- Horga, Ioan, and George Anglițoiu. „National Memory and European Integration.” *Transylvanian Review*, ISI Journal, XX Supplement no. 3 (2011): 163-173.
- Horga, Ioan, and Ariane Landuyt. *Communicating EU Policies beyond the Borders*. Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2013.
- Horga, Ioan, and Constantin Vasile Țoca. „Sociological Research. Thinking the Future Together: The Debrecen+Oradea, Cross-border Agglomeration.” In *Neighbours and Partners on the Two Sides of the Borders*, edited by István Süli-Zakar, 73-83. Debrecen: University of Debrecen Press, 2008.
- Oltean, Anca. „The Jews of Romania and Their Immigration to Israel. 1948-1953.” In *Eurotimes* 11, *Leaders of the Borders, Borders of the Leaders*, edited by Cristina-Maria Dogot, Philippe Perchoc, and Tőkés Tibor, 41-54. Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2011.
- Polgár, István. “Ethnic and Confessional Diversity and Cohabitation in the Ethnic Borderlands of Romania and Hungary between 1867-1920.” Anders E. B. Blomqvist. *Economic Nationalizing in the Ethnic Borderlands of Hungary and Romania*. Stockholm: Edition of the University of Stockholm, 2014. In *Eurotimes* 18, *The Security Dimension of European Frontier vs the Legitimacy of Political Priorities of EU and EU Member States National Preferences*, edited by Dorin Dolghi and Octavian Țăcu, 225-229. Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, Autumn 2014.
- Șipoș, Sorin, Gabriel Moisa, Dan Octavian Căpraga, Mircea Brie, and Teodor Mateoc. *From Periphery to Centre. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*. Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2014.
- Șoproni, Luminița. “The European Studies – A Field with an Interdisciplinary Perspective.” Book review of *Eastern Journal of European Studies* (EJES), 4 (2013) and 5 (2014). Iași: Editura Universității “Alexandru Ioan Cuza”. In *Eurotimes* 18, *The Security Dimension of European Frontier vs. the Legitimacy of Political Priorities of EU and EU Member States National Preferences*, edited by Dorin Dolghi and Octavian Țăcu, 203-206. Oradea: Oradea University Press, Autumn 2014.



## **Our Partners**



# Center for Romanian Studies as Another Step towards the New Ukrainian-Romanian Relations

*Lyubov MELNICHUK<sup>1</sup>*

The cooperation between countries, educational institutions and people, in particular, plays a pivotal role in the European integration process. Ukraine is an independent European country which seeks to develop diverse relations of good neighbourhood with Romania both bilaterally and in the framework of international and regional structures.

The ceaseless historical, cultural and spiritual ties between these two countries strengthen the interest for the consistent support and upward development of the Ukrainian-Romanian dialogue. The similarity of their strategic guidelines serves as a basis for the development and strengthening of cooperation between Ukraine and Romania.

The Center for Romanian Studies (the CRS) at Yurii Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University is a scientific organisation that unites the scientists of different fields, namely, the experts in international relations, political scientists, historians, philosophers, lawyers, anthropologists, economists interested in Romanian issues, Romanian-Ukrainian and Romanian-Ukrainian relations with the purpose of research, information exchange and coordination of researchers in this field. The CRS is created by the decision of the Academic Council of Yurii Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University as its scientific structural unit.

To perform its objectives the Centre can interact with other centres and organisations with common goals and maintain international contacts and ties, initiate the signing of agreements, and participate in the activities that do not contradict the international obligations of Ukraine and current legislation and the Charter of Yurii Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University.

The main purpose of the Center for Romanian Studies is the research of the Romanian subject, including politics, history, culture, Ukrainian-Romanian and Romanian-Ukrainian historical and cultural relations, and features of the current foreign policy of Romania. In this context it provides the development of scientific contacts between Ukrainian and foreign scientists engaged with the outlined issues.

The main objectives of the Centre concerns the promoting and creation of necessary conditions to enforce the intellectual potential of Ukrainian and Romanian scientists in the field of scientific research and their intellectual growth.

Objectives of the Centre:

- creation of the scientific and research programs on Romanian subject on the basis of the previous works which include the research in the field of international relations, political science, history, sociology, economics, tourism and others;
- fostering and facilitation of teaching courses on Romanian issues;
- promoting and setting contacts with the relevant European and Romanian centres for the joint research programs;

---

<sup>1</sup> Director of the Center for Romanian Studies from Yurii Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University, Ukraine. E-mail: lyubov\_melnichuk\_85@mail.ua.

- organising and holding conferences on the issues of mutual interest;
- promotion of the student exchange programs between Chernivtsi National University and educational institutions of Romania;
- establishing contacts with various funds for educational, training and research grants in Romania;
- development of joint research projects involving Ukrainian and Romanian scientists.

*To fulfil its tasks the Center for Romanian Studies carries out such activities:*

- promotes the organisation of the Ukrainian and international conferences which embrace the Romania-connected issues, workshops and other scientific events where experts, young scientists and students take part;
- develops, prepares and submits scientifically based research projects of Romanian issues to be considered in the relevant institutions;
- initiates, organizes and conducts cultural events dedicated to Romanian and Romanian-Ukrainian subjects;
- settles contacts and cooperates with the similar organisations in Ukraine and abroad; takes part in the national and international research programs and activities of the international scientific societies, associations and unions; initiates the signing and conclusion of the respective agreements and documents;
- according to the current legislation of Ukraine it promotes the mobility of the scientists to participate in the international congresses, symposia, conferences, seminars connected with the Romanian subject;
- initiates and organizes the publication of the themed collections of the scientific papers and publications of other nature reflecting the activities of the CRS.

The Center for Romanian Studies consists of the scientists from Yurii Fedkovych Chernivtsi University and other higher educational institutes of Ukraine, public figures of Ukraine, as well as academics and public figures of Romania.

The Organization of the Center is carried out by its director Melnychuk Liubov.

## About Authors

**Anna BELOVA** is specialist of the Centre for monitoring of Regional markets, Institute of Environmental Management, Territorial Development and Urban Construction, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Kaliningrad, Russia. Last publications: “Significance of Small and Semi-medium Towns in Optimization of the Settlement System of the Kaliningrad Region Taking to Account Experience of Lithuania. Human resources – the main factor of regional development.” *Journal of Social Sciences* 2 (Klaipeda: Klaipeda University Press, 2010): 92-107; “Cross-border and Trans-border Cooperation of Semi-medium-sized Towns of the Kaliningrad Region in the Baltic Sea Region.” *Tiltai* 2 (Klaipeda, 2010); with Elena Kropinova “Kaliningrad Region as Prospective Centre for Development of Ecotourism in the South-East Baltic.” *Perspectives* 1 (2010): 48-49; “International Cooperation of Border Settlements in Strategies for Development of Small and Semi-Medium Cities: Case-Study of Kaliningrad Region (Russian Federation). Regional Formation and Development studies. Human Resources – the Main Factor of Regional Development). *Journal of Social Sciences* 1, 6 (Klaipeda, 2012). **E-mail:** polpyotkina@mail.ru.

**Vasile CUCERESCU** is associate professor at the Department of International Law, Faculty of Law, International Relations Institute of Moldova; director of the Centre for European Studies, International Relations Institute of Moldova. He is also the president of ECSA-Moldova and general editor of *European Studies Journal* (Moldova). His academic interests are: EU institutional law, EU education policy, EU projects management and EU external relations, especially the Eastern European partnership. Last publications: *Drept instituțional european* [European institutional law]. Chișinău: Editura Print-Caro, 2013, 177p; Vasile Cucerescu, Enrique Banús, Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, Ioan Horga. *Ghidul Uniunii Europene în școală între educația formală și neformală* [Guide of European Union in the school: between formal and non-formal learning]. Chișinău: Editura Print-Caro, 2014, 176p; *Managementul public și guvernanta în Uniunea Europeană* [Public management and governance in European Union], edited by Vasile Cucerescu and Valentin Beniuc. Chișinău: Editura Print-Caro, 2014, 175p. He participates in EU projects as coordinator and team member in unilateral and multilateral actions. **E-mail:** vasile.cucerescu@ymail.com.

**Ana-Maria COSTEA (GHIMIȘ)**, PhD, is Teaching Assistant at the National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Department of International Relations and European Integration. She holds the position of research management expert where she trains PhD students about the academic rules that have to be followed in order to deliver high quality academic papers. She also holds the position of communication expert within a European funded project where she conducts research on communication strategies that Romanian and European Universities have and their connection with the academic community, with the region and with the business sector. Additionally between September 2012 and

October 2014 was held the position of research within the Exploratory Research Project “The Romanian-Russian Bilateral Relationship seen from the point of view of Romania’s membership to the EU”. Ana Maria Costea is also the author of several BDI and ISI academic articles that are centred on the analysis of international relations, European affairs, energy security, NATO, the EU, Eastern Europe and foreign affairs strategies. **E-mail:** anamaria.ghimis@yahoo.com.

**Sedef EYLEMER** is an Assistant Professor in the International Relations Department and vice director of the European Union Research Centre at Izmir Katip Celebi University in Turkey. She has got her degrees of MA and PhD in European Studies from Dokuz Eylül University, Turkey. Additionally, she also got a MA degree in Mediterranean Studies from King’s College, University of London as a Jean Monnet Scholar. She has worked as teaching and key staff in various Jean Monnet projects of the European Union. Her main research interests include European political integration process, European integration theories, EU-Turkey relations, and EU as an international actor. **E-mail:** sedef.eylemer@ikc.edu.tr.

**Gennady FEDOROV**, Prof. Dr., is Director of the Institute of Environmental Management, Territorial Development and Urban Construction, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Kaliningrad, Russia. Last publications: “La région de Kaliningrad, future “couloirs de développement.” *La Resurgence de la Russie?* AGIR 45 (Fevrier 2011): 97-110; with Valentin Korneevets and Yury Zverev, *Kaliningrad oblast of Russia in the transborder region South-Eastern Baltic*. In *Coastal Regions* 19 (2011), 68p; with Yuri Rozhkov-Yuryevsky, “The Correlation between the Barrier and Contact Function of the Kaliningrad Section of the Russian Border.” In *Eurolimes* 15, *A Security Dimension as Trigger and Result of Frontiers Modifications*, edited by Giuliana Laschi, Alexis Vahlas, and Dorin Dolghi, 77-90. Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2013; “The Concept of demographic Situation and Geo-demographic Typology of the Subjects of the Russian Federation.” *Geo-Bulletin of Geography. Socio-economic Series* 25 (2014): 101-114, edited by Daniela Shimańska and Stefania Środa-Muravska, 101-114. Toruń: Nicolaus Copernicus University Press. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/BGSS.2014.032>; “Border Position as a Factor of Strategic and Territorial Planning in Russian Regions in the Baltic.” *Baltic Region* 3, 21 (2014): 58-67. **E-mail:** gennagy\_fedorov@mail.ru.

**Ioan HORGA** is the holder of the Jean Monnet Chair in Euro-regional Studies and co-director of the Institute for the Study Euro-regional Oradea-Debrecen. He was the Coordinator of Institutional LLP and Secretary General of the Association of Carpathian Region Universities (ACRUs). He received the “Pro cooperation” award from the Academy of Sciences of Hungary. Currently, he is involved in research on cross-border cooperation, regional development, on average. Also, he is the Coordinator of the *Eurolimes* magazine at the European Centre of Excellence Oradea-Debrecen. He is a member of the Advisory Committee of the Neighbourhood Collection, edited by Bruylard. He is the author of more than 12 books and more than 80 studies and articles. **E-mail:** ihorga@uoradea.ro.

**Tibor KECSKÉS** is a Geography, History and English teacher in a secondary school in Debrecen. In the last years he published numerous essays on Debrecen’s development. His field of research are the urbanisation, city planning, urban



regeneration / renewal and (among other things) their effect on the cultural economy. He takes a special interest in the renewal of Debrecen's city centre. His (PhD) consultant is Prof. István Süli-Zakar, with whom the author has published numerous essays. Last publications: Debrecen belvárosának rehabilitációja az 1990-es évektől napjainkig [The Rehabilitation of Debrecen Downtown since the 1990s]. In *Debreceni Szemle* – 2014 válogatás [Debrecen Review – 2014 selection], 47-57, Edited by János Barta ifj (editor in chief). Debrecen: A "Debreceni Szemle" Alapítvány ["Debrecen Review" Foundation], 2015. E-mail: kecskestibor@freemail.hu.

**Giorgos KENTAS** is Assistant Professor of International Politics and Governance at the Department of European Studies and Internal Relations. He also coordinates the Master Program in Public Administration. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium. His recent publications include: *Security in the Context of a Cyprus Settlement* (Athens: Livanis 2013, in Greek); "The Peculiar Concept of "Balance" between Turkey and Greece in Cyprus." In *Great Power Politics in Cyprus: Foreign Interventions and Domestic Perceptions* edited by Michalis Kontos, Sozos-Christos Theodoulou, Nikos Panayiotides, and Haralambos Alexandrou, 133-159. Cambridge: Cambridge Publishers, 2014; with Achilles C. Emilianides, "The Emergence and Regulation of Minority Religious Groups in Europe." In *How Groups Matter: Challenges of Tolerations in Pluralistic Societies*, edited by Gideon Calder, Magali Bessone, and Federico Zuolo, 182-198. (New York and London: Routledge, 2013). **E-mail:** kentas.g@unic.ac.cy.

**Ana-Teodora KURKINA** is Ph.D. student at the Graduate School for East and Southeast European studies, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich and the University of Regensburg. She is currently working on a thesis dealing with the development of East European social networks and their connection to federative projects produced by the Bulgarian revolutionary emigrants in the second half of the XIX century under the supervision of Professor Ulf Brunnbauer. She earned her first Master's and Bachelor's degree in history from the Lomonosov Moscow State University and her second Master's degree from the Central European University in Budapest. Her research focuses primarily on Bulgarian-Romanian relations in the XIX century, borderland disputes, social interconnections and the development of East and Central European social and intellectual networking with its impact on the 19th century Balkan state-building agendas. *Recent publications:* "The Language in the Romanian Political Thought of 1850-1890. The Grand Debates and Their Outcomes / Limba în gândirea politică românească între anii 1850-1890. Dezbaterile mari și rezultatele lor." *Hiperboreea*, Serie nouă, 1, 2 (2014): 125-145; Book review of: Miroslav Šedivý, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question*. University of West Bohemia, 2013. In *European review of history / Revue européenne d'histoire*, 21, 5 (2014): 767-768. **E-mail:** Ana-Teodora.Kurkina@extern.uni-regensburg.de.

**Dilek MEMISOĞLU** is Assistant Professor in the Political Science and Public Administration Department at Izmir Kâtip Çelebi University in Turkey. She has a Master degree and PhD in Public Administration from Suleyman Demirel University. Her main research topics include public administration and local

government reforms, new public management approach and public policy. **E-mail:** dmemisoglu@yahoo.com.

**Lidia OSMOLOVSKAYA** is assistant of Director, Institute of Environmental Management, Territorial Development and Urban Construction, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Kaliningrad, Russia. Publication: with Yelena V. Voloshenko, Anna A. Mikhailova, Gennady M. Fedorov, and Dmitry G. Fedorov, "Territorial Differences in the Innovative Development of Sweden, Finland and the North-western Federal District of the Russian Federation." *Baltic Region* 3 (2012): 66-78. **E-mail:** LOsmolovskaya@kantiana.ru.

**Petros PAPAPOLYVIOU** is Associate Professor of Contemporary Greek History at the Department of History and Archaeology, University of Cyprus. He holds a PhD from the Department of History and Archaeology of Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. His recent publications include: *The Cypriot Volunteers of World War II: The Registers, the Catalogues, and the Toll of Blood*. Leukōsia: Nicosia 2012 (in Greek); Editor of *History of the Republic of Cyprus, 1960-2010*, vols. 1-4. Nicosia: Liberal, 2010-2011 (in Greek). **E-mail:** ppplb@ucy.ac.cy; www.papapolyviou.com

**Bogdan Mihail POCOLA** finished his bachelor's degree in International Relations and European Studies in 2012 and his master's degree in European Studies in 2014. From 2010 to 2011 he was president of ARISE Oradea (Association of students from international relations and European studies). Currently he is a PhD. candidate at the Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca. The main research interests are in the field of: European policy on culture and digitalisation, conflict analysis and international negotiations. The results of research in these fields are 4 articles published: with Constantin-Vasile Țoca and Eliza Vas, "UN Security Council Reform. A Possible Solution to Uncertainty," *Analele Universității din Oradea, Relații Internaționale și Studii Europene* IV (University of Oradea Press, 2012): 159-173; with Constantin-Vasile Țoca, „Leadership Scenarios in Ukraine. The Impact of EU and Russian politics,” *Analele Universității din Oradea, Relații Internaționale și Studii Europene* VI (University of Oradea Press, 2014): 141-153; with Constantin-Vasile Țoca, „The Debate on the United Nations Security Council Reform. Learning International Politics Actively,” *Analele Universității din Oradea, Relații Internaționale și Studii Europene* V (University of Oradea Press, 2013): 83-97; with Constantin-Vasile Țoca, "Negotiations in the Context of the UN Security Council Reform," *Studia Europaea* 1 (2014): 203-228, [http://www.euro.ubbcluj.ro/studia/issues/steur2014\\_1.pdf](http://www.euro.ubbcluj.ro/studia/issues/steur2014_1.pdf). **E-mail:** poco.bogdan@gmail.com.

**Simion ROȘCA** is associate professor at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of International Relations and Political Science, International Relations Institute of Moldova. His academic interests are: political science, philosophy, national and world culture. He published 6 books and over 50 articles. Amongst them, it is possible to mention the following: "Paradigma de identitate europeană: aspecte conceptuale" [The paradigm of European identity: conceptual issues], *Relații Internaționale Plus* 1, 5 (2014): 110-122; "Câteva reflecții teoretice asupra multiculturalismului. Relațiile Internaționale – domeniu specific de activitate intelectuală. Contribuția instituțiilor de profil" [Some theoretical reflections on multiculturalism. International relations, a specific field of intellectual activity. The

contribution of specific institutions]. In *Materialele Conferinței științifico-practice internaționale, consacrate aniversării a X-a a Institutului de Relații Internaționale din Moldova, 2 aprilie 2013* [Works of international scientific-practical conference devoted to the tenth anniversary of the Institute of International Relations in Moldova, 02 April 2013], 260-269. Chișinău: IRIM, 2013; with L. Roșca, G. Socolov. *Istoria și filosofia culturii. Manual* [History and philosophy of culture]. Chișinău: F.E.P. „Tipografia centrală”, 1998. **E-mail:** simionrosca55@mail.ru.

**István SÜLI-ZAKAR**, (DSc), university professor, is the founder and between 1990 and 2010 Head of the Department of Social Geography and Regional Development Planning at the University of Debrecen, the doctor of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the honourable member of the Société de Géographie (Paris), and “Doctor Honoris Causa” at the State University of Oradea. He is the member of several national and international scientific organisations (Hungarian Geographic Society; HAS – Department 10 Geographic Scientific Committee; International Geographic Union (IGU) – Working Commission on Global Change and Human Mobility and IGU Working Commission on Rural Geography; Regional Studies Association – London, etc.), co-chairman of the Special Commission on Social Sciences of HAS Academic Committee of Debrecen, chairman of the Working Commission on Settlement Sciences and Regional Development, former member of the Senate of the University of Debrecen. Member of the professional committee of the LACE PHARE CBC Project, external expert of the European Commission Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), member of the Regional Council of the Carpathian Euroregion Interregional Association, chairman of the Working Commission on Regional Development, executive director of the “Living Tisza” Programme. Co-director of the Institute for Euroregional Studies (IERS) European Centre Excellence (Oradea-Debrecen) supported by the European Commission Jean Monnet Project. **E-mail:** suli.zakar.istvan@science.unideb.hu

**Miruna TRONCOTĂ** is a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of International Relations and European Integration at the National School for Political Studies and Administration (Bucharest, Romania), beneficiary of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/134650 with the title “Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships for young researchers in the fields of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences and Sociology”. In the period between 2010 and 2013 she was a PhD candidate at the same university with a study on the Europeanisation of Bosnia Herzegovina which was published in 2014 at Tritonic Publishing House in Bucharest. She was a research fellow at Hertie School of Governance (Berlin) at the University of Ljubljana and the University of Graz. In 2013 she was an intern at the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in 2014 she was an Intern Political Analyst at the Delegation of the European Union in Kosovo. Her research interests are: Europeanisation, EU Enlargement policy, Democratisation in the Western Balkans, Post-conflict societies, Constructivism, post Yugoslav space. **E-mail:** miruna.troncota@yahoo.com.

**Corina TURȘIE** is Lecturer at the Department of Politics – West University of Timișoara. She has a PhD in Political Sciences obtained in 2011 at the National School of Political and Administrative Sciences Bucharest. She is currently a Post-

Doctoral Researcher, with a project on European Capitals of Culture. Her research interests are: EU politics and institutions, EU governance, public policy analysis. Amongst last publications: *Politicile Uniunii Europene* [Policies of European Union] (Timișoara: West University of Timișoara Publishing, 2013); “De la standardele europene ale drepturilor omului la aplicarea acestora în legislațiile naționale” [From the European human rights standards to their implementation in the national legislations], *Jurnalul libertății de conștiință*, 210-223 (București: Editura universitară, 2013). **E-mail:** corina.tursie@e-uvt.ro.

**Constantin-Vasile ȚOCA** finished his bachelor’s degree in Sociology in 2001 and his master’s degree in Euroregional Studies in 2003. From 2007 to 2009 he was junior lecturer at the University of Oradea becoming assistant professor in 2009. In 2013 he finished his doctorate degree at the University of Debrecen, Hungary, with a study entitled: *Romanian-Hungarian Cross-border Cooperation at Various Territorial Levels, with a Particular Study of the Debrecen-Oradea Eurometropolis (European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation - EGTC)*. The main teaching and research interests are: international relations sociology, international organisations, cross-border communication and cooperation. Among the results of teaching and researching are 30 articles, 2 books as sole author and 4 books as coordinator, of which here are some examples just to name a few: with Bogdan Pocola and Eliza Vas, “UN Security Council Reform. A Possible Solution to Uncertainty,” *Analele Universității din Oradea, Relații Internaționale și Studii Europene* IV (2012): 159-172; with Bogdan Pocola and Eliza Vas, “Different Territorial Levels of Romanian-Hungarian Cross-Border Cooperation,” in *The Frontier Worker. New Perspectives on the Labor Market in the Border Regions* edited by Adrian-Claudiu Popoviciu and Dana Cigan, 71-80. București: Editura C.H Beck, 2013; *Relații Internaționale – Studii Europene. Caiet de activități practice* [International Relations – European Studies. Activity Notebook], designed to aid RISE students in monitoring their activity during the internship course; The projects portfolio includes 22 projects, participating in 16 of them as project member and four times as project manager; some examples include: *Să pregătim un viitor comun: Aglomerația Comunităților Debrecen – Oradea – 700.000 (2020)* [Thinking the future together the Debrecen – Oradea cross – border agglomeration – 700.000 (2020)] (project financed by euroregional funds), and *Dezvoltarea de competențe în domeniul administrației publice* [Developing competences in public administration] (through Lifelong Learning Policy Program). He is member of the Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen and of Romanian Association for International Relations and European Studies. **E-mail:** ctv\_i@yahoo.com.

## **Has published**

- Vol. 1/2006 *Europe and its Borders: Historical Perspective*
- Vol. 2/2006 *From Smaller to Greater Europe: Border Identitary Testimonies*
- Vol. 3/2007 *Media, Intercultural Dialogue and the New Frontiers of Europe*
- Vol. 4/2007 *Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers*
- Vol. 5/2008 *Religious frontiers of Europe*
- Vol. 6/2008 *The Intercultural Dialogue and the European Frontiers*
- Vol. 7/2009 *Europe and the Neighbourhood*
- Vol. 8/2009 *Europe and its Economic Frontiers*
- Vol. 9/2010 *The Cultural Frontiers of Europe*
- Vol. 10/2010 *The Geopolitics of European Frontiers*
- Vol. 11/2011 *Leaders of the Borders, Borders of the Leaders*
- Vol. 12/2011 *Communication and European Frontiers*
- Vol. 13/2012 *Permeability and the Impermeability of Socio-Economic Frontiers within European Union*
- Vol. 14/2012 *Enlargements, Borders and the Changes of EU Political Priorities*
- Vol. 15/2013 *A Security Dimension as Trigger and Result of Frontiers Modifications*
- Vol. 16/2013 *Cross-Border Governance and the Borders Evolutions*
- Vol. 17/2014 *The Social Frontiers of Europe*
- Vol. 18/2014 *The Security Dimension of European Frontier vs the Legitimacy of Political Priorities of EU and EU Members States National Preferences*
- Vol. 19/2015 *Border Cities in Europe*

## **Will publish**

- Vol. 20/2015 *Eurolimes: Theoretical Approaches and Borders' Assessment*
- Vol. 21/2016 *Minorities and European Frontiers*
- Vol. 22 / 2016 *Migration at the European Borders*
- Vol. 23/2017 *Seas and Rims of European Union: Challenges from the States Around*